


Matthias Loy, editor

**The Columbus Theological
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"The history of the Church confirms and illustrates the teachings of the Bible, that yielding little by little leads to yielding more and more, until all is in danger; and the tempter is never satisfied until all is lost.

– Matthias Loy, [*The Story of My Life*](#)

Matthias Loy was a zealous supporter of the Lutheran Confessions, and to that end founded and edited the *Columbus Theological Magazine*. Dr. Loy was Professor of Theology at Capital University (1865-1902), President of Capital University (1881-90), Editor of the *Lutheran Standard* (1864-91), and President of the Ohio Joint Synod (1860-78, 1880-94). Under his direction, the Ohio Joint Synod grew to have a national influence. In 1881 he withdrew the Joint Synod from the Synodical Conference in reaction to Walther's teaching about predestination.

"There is not an article in our creed that is not an offense to somebody; there is scarcely an article that is not a stumbling block to some who still profess to be Christians. It seems but a small concession that we are asked to make when an article of our confession is represented as a stumbling block to many Christians which ought therefore in charity to be removed, but surrendering that article would only lead to the surrender of another on the same ground, and that is the beginning of the end; the authority of the inspired Word of our Lord is gradually undermined.

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T H E

COLUMBUS THEOLOGICAL MAGAZINE

VOL. IV.

FEBRUARY, 1884.

No. 1.

INTRODUCTORY TO VOLUME IV.

The past year has given a new impulse not only to the work of the Church to whose interests our **MAGAZINE** is devoted, but also to the study of the great principles which guided Luther's life and gave distinctive character to Lutheran theology. The numerous addresses and publications elicited by the celebration of the fourth centenary of the Reformer's birth would have been a complete failure, if they had not served to lead at least some of the millions of readers and hearers to a better comprehension of fundamental truths and to a more ardent zeal in their preservation and propagation. We have reason to hope that in the year upon which we have entered, and in coming years, they will bear fruit to the glory of God and the salvation of man.

For to this the whole work of the Reformation was directed, and to this all labor in the spirit of that momentous movement must tend. That which so powerfully affected the hearts of Luther and his co-laborers was not personal honor or temporal profit. They saw that souls were perishing and that the name of the Lord was dishonored. By the grace of God they had been led to see the great light of the Gospel and to find comfort in its benign rays. To bring this light to others that sat in darkness, and to minister its comfort to their follow-men who were dying in misery, was their guiding purpose. There were controversies in those days, sharp and protracted controversies. It could not be otherwise when the truth which they proclaimed, and which alone could make souls free from sin and death, was bitterly resisted. Upon the

maintenance of that truth all depended. God's name could not be hallowed among men if that were lost; the souls of men for whom Christ died could not be saved if the Gospel, which is the power of God unto salvation, were taken away. Not for the laurels which men are constrained to bestow upon those who gain victories, but for the rescuing of sufferers from the grasp of tyrants who were murdering their souls, did Luther and Lutherans contend. Their contentions was a matter of salvation, not of vain-glory; it was in obedience to the words of St. Jude: "Beloved, when I gave all diligence to write unto you of the common salvation, it was needful for me to write unto you and exhort you that you should contend earnestly for the faith which was once delivered to the saints. For there are certain men crept in unawares, who where before of old ordained to this condemnation, ungodly men, turning the grace of God into lasciviousness, and denying the only Lord God, and our Lord Jesus Christ." The benefits which God conferred through the Reformation can be preserved among us only by holding fast the Word of God in all its purity and power. That must not only be our guide in all the work of the Church, but must also be the divine power upon which we depend for its accomplishment.

The age in which we live is not lacking in activity. These are busy times. But zeal is not all that is needed. It is an evil time that makes godliness a business co-ordinate with the other business of life and governed by the same principles. The apostle Paul bears record of Israel that "they have a zeal of God, but not according to knowledge," (Rom. 10, 2), and speaks of his own zeal before his conversion in persecuting the Church. Phil. 3, 6. Only when there is enlightened zeal that labors for this end and according to the rule laid down in Scripture is it pleasing to God and conducive to the salvation of man. Not only the end, but also the means must be according to the law and testimony. Eventually it will not result in blessing when men rush into the work without a divine call and without employing divine means, even though the object be to save souls. When individuals run wildly to and fro, jostling each and overturning God's institutions in their blind zeal to pluck brands from the burning; when associations are formed among men and women

for Christian work in total disregard of divine order, encumbering the Church and crippling her effort with their supposed help; when devices and contrivances are resorted to for accomplishing the end for which the Gospel was given and which it alone can secure, the appointments of God being treated with contempt by an unwise zeal which distrusts their power and substitutes the impotent ordinances of men, —the consequences, however well-meant the error may be, must be disastrous. The love that would outrun the infinite love of God in saving souls, and cannot, in its hurry and haste, take time to inquire what God would have us do to attain an end so much to be desired, is not a fruit of the Spirit, who teaches us first of all to reverence His Word and be concerned to do His will as that Word reveals it. Men who are too busy in the great work of delivering souls from hell, as some have professed to be, to give attention to purity of doctrine or take any interest in the war which the Church wages to preserve it, are but too likely to be blind leaders of the blind, and the danger is great, notwithstanding the impatient zeal which is manifested to escape it, that both will fall into the pit. That there are so many who approve such reckless zeal and regard those who contend for the faith which was once delivered to the saints as troublers of Israel, only increases the danger. Pious cant becomes a substitute for godly fear, and all chastened zeal that stands in awe of God's Word is regarded as cold formalism and brought into disrepute among God's people. Practically the supremacy of the divine Word, the recognition of which gave birth and power to the Reformation, is thus rejected, and setting up an independent business of saving souls, however zealously such business may be prosecuted, can never atone for the loss. "He that is of God heareth God's words; ye therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God." John 8, 47.

Our MAGAZINE could not be faithful to its purpose, and could contribute nothing to the preservation of the fruits of Luther's life and labors, if it did not earnestly contend for the supreme authority of that Word which is the source of all spiritual light and life and which is the only infallible rule of faith and practice. It is as indispensable to Christian theology as it is to Christian life and work. "To the law and

to the testimony; if they speak not according to this Word, it is because there is no life in them." Is. 8, 20. The glory of God and the salvation of souls are both involved in the maintenance of this principle both in theory and in practice.

Among Christians there is, in strictness of speech, no controversy on this subject so far as the theory is concerned. Properly speaking he is not a Christian who will not heed the voice of God when he recognizes it as such. A man cannot be a subject in Christ's kingdom and yet be a rebel against the King's authority. He that heareth not God's words is not of God. But there are many who profess to be Christians though they will not submit to the Word of God, and there are many who profess to submit, but practically renounce it.

Unhappily "many deceivers are entered into the world, who confess not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh." 2 John 7. They deceive many, because they still call themselves Christians and profess to accept the Scriptures as a revelation from heaven. In our day the number of those is large who, although they would still be classed with the disciples of Jesus, expressly declare that they accept the Bible with certain reservations. Claiming that they are devoted to truth and righteousness, they assert their right to test the contents of the Scriptures by this criterion and to reject what will not endure the test. That seems reasonable, and many are deceived by the semblance. But the claim assumes precisely what Christians deny and what as Christians they must deny. The question is whether there is a standard higher than the Word of God. Those who make such reservations assume that there is; Christians, led by the Spirit of God, maintain that there is not. If there is a higher principle by which questions pertaining to our salvation may be decided, it is proper that an appeal be taken from the Bible to that. It is not our intention at present to enter upon the proofs for the Christian belief that the Bible is supreme authority in the Church. For our purpose it is sufficient to urge the fact, that Christians as such believe the Bible to be the only infallible rule of faith and practice, and that persons who will not accept its authority as decisive, but appeal to some other standard by which its statements are to be judged,

depart from the fundamental principle of Protestantism in this regard. Whether they make tradition or the pope, reason or feeling, such standard, is unimportant for our present question. Papists, Rationalists and Fanatics are all the same in this respect. They all set up a criterion other than the Word of God, and are therefore equally at variance with the fundamental principle of the Reformation and of the Ev. Lutheran Church which confesses and advocates that principle, declaring: "We believe, teach, and confess, that the only rule and standard according to which at once all dogmas and teachers should be esteemed and judged are nothing else than the prophetic and apostolic Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, as it is written (Ps. 119, 105): 'Thy Word is a lamp unto my feet and a light unto my path.' And St. Paul (Gal. 1, 8): 'Though an angel from heaven preach any other Gospel unto you, let him be accursed.'" Form. Conc. Part I Int. § 1.

In practical agreement with those who explicitly make reservations and thus show their colors are those who substantially pursue the same course without making the same acknowledgment. Theoretically accepting the Protestant principle and declaring the Scriptures to be the only standard of appeal, and resenting as an insult any impeachment of their fidelity to this standard, they still practically, though often unconsciously, harmonize with the former class, and with them contend against us. They declare the Word of God to be supreme authority, but when the truth which that Word teaches is placed before them, they judge it by their own reason, feeling, or fancy, and accept it or reject it according as it coincides or conflicts with this subjective standard. Whilst they reject, in many instances even with horror reject the formulated principle that there is a court of appeal in spiritual matters higher than that of the Bible, they in practice make their appeal to such higher standard and thus recognize its authority. They are not on that account to be put in the same category with those who explicitly claim a higher criterion of saving truth. Their case is better. It is better for them and for others. It is better for them, because notwithstanding the inconsistency of their practice they may be sincere in their profession. Influenced by the errors pre-

vailing around them, they may accept the decisions of their own reason or the desires of their own hearts in the belief that these are what the words of Scripture were designed to express. Their errors therefore do not necessarily involve an abandonment of the Bible as the source and rule of faith, although that will probably be the outcome of a persistence in such inconsistency between theory and practice. Their position is better than that of many who consciously reject the infallible authority of the Scriptures, because their acceptance of these in theory at least as their standard and rule of faith furnishes them with a guide that will, if honestly accepted, eventually lead them out of the darkness into the full light of truth. And it is better also with regard to others, because the principle which they theoretically accept furnishes a corrective for the evil influence of their inconsistent practice. Their confession condemns their conduct. But their error is not on that account harmless. It is fraught with danger in two directions. On the one hand it may, by the application of a false standard, lead to the acceptance of fundamental error which drives saving truth from the soul. On the other hand it may lead to a conscious rejection of the right principle in order to justify the wrong practice. Our only safety lies in the unreserved reception, in theory and in practice, of the Holy Scriptures as the only standard and rule by which all teachers and teaching are to be judged.

For such absolute submission to the Word of God, as it was illustrated in the wars and victories of the great Reformer and as it is required by the great Church of the Reformation, there is ample reason. Christians were not freed from the bondage of popery in order to become the slaves of other human masters. A more radical misconception of the governing principle of the Reformation than that of so-called freethinkers, who regard Luther's work as a struggle for human emancipation from all authority, is scarcely possible. Such a conception makes of the glorious reformation an ungodly revolution. It was not for the dignity of man, but for the glory of God that Luther battled. That involved a struggle for human freedom, that God might be glorified in man's salvation. But such freedom is conditioned by submission to authority, not by revolt against it. "The truth

shall make you free." John 8, 32. "Sanctify them through Thy truth; Thy Word is truth." John 17, 17. Luther labored in the name of the Lord to deliver man from the yoke of human bondage under which the Antichrist at Rome had brought them, that they might be subject to their rightful Master in heaven, who alone can save them from death and lead them to glory. All human authority in things spiritual must be renounced, not that every man may believe and do what seems right in his own eyes, but that the authority of God, speaking by His Word, might be recognized in its absolute supremacy.

God is Sovereign. He is Lord of all. Men must have no other God to reign over them. To exalt any creature to such dominion is the cardinal sin of idolatry. His will is supreme. That will is expressed in His Word. To that Word all creatures must therefore be subject. It is rebellion against Him to appeal from that Word to some other standard of truth and right, or in any way to recognize another standard in its stead. There is no other. There can be no other. There is and can be no other because there is no other God and no other revelation of His will unto man's salvation. It is absurd as it is profane to think of calling the Almighty Maker and Monarch of the universe before the tribunal of His creatures and of testing the truth and righteousness of His words by the puny powers of the created human spirit. Christians cannot brook such a thought. Christians cannot but condemn such arrogance. But precisely of such shocking arrogance, such revolting idolatry the man is guilty who, when doctrines plainly contained in the Scriptures are presented, refuses to accept them, alleging as a reason their inconsistency with his reason or feeling, or with the reason or feeling of others whom he has learned to revere and to follow. Nor is the case of that man much better who, although he recognizes a doctrine as divinely revealed in the Word, refuses to contend for it, alleging as an excuse that it is intrinsically of no value, or that the peace that would be disturbed by such contention is of higher worth. The true disciple of Jesus, led by the Spirit of God, will gladly own his Lord as supreme authority, "casting down imaginations, and every high thought that exalteth itself against the knowledge of

God, and bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ." 2. Cor. 10, 5. If He is Lord of all, His Word must have absolute supremacy.

Moreover, the Word that is spoken by such a Monarch can not in any of its parts be useless. "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." 2. Tim. 3, 16. 17. God has not spoken vain words. He has not left it to us to select what seems to us good and valuable among the promises and precepts which He has given us. All is good; all is profitable; all is precious. "The words which I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life." John 6, 63. There is no exception made and none to be made. There is no room here for any human theories according to which some portions of the Word may be accepted as authoritative while others are rejected as lacking inherent credibility or practical value. There is no standard by which such discrimination could be directed. The right to reject any part implies the right to reject any other part or every part. All certainty is thus impossible, because all divine authority is undermined. "I testify unto every man that heareth the words of the prophecy of this book; if any man shall add unto these things, God shall add unto him the plagues that are written in this book; and if any man shall take away from the words of the book of this prophecy, God shall take away his part out of the book of life, and out of the holy city, and from the things which are written in this book." Rev. 22, 18. 19. This applies to all the Scriptures, because all are given by inspiration of God, whose gracious revelation was given for our profit and cannot be set aside with impunity. When the supreme authority of the Bible is once assailed or abandoned, virtually all is lost, as there is then nothing that would give divine assurance in regard to saving truth or lead back the erring soul from its wanderings in the mazes of human speculation and fancy. At every cost we must therefore hold fast the fundamental principle which was Luther's strength against the papacy and which the Church has ever maintained among her chief treasures, that the Word of God is sufficient and exclusive

authority in things pertaining to man's salvation. We may make distinctions in the contents of this Word between articles of faith and laws and facts that are not such; we may divide the articles of faith into such as are fundamental and such as are non-fundamental, and the former again into those which must be known in order to be saved and those without a knowledge of which salvation is possible. But when such distinctions are made with the presumption that some of the contents of Holy Scripture are useless, or that some may be rejected without harm, the whole process is full of danger. Such distinctions have their value, but not when they are brought into the service of error and used to undermine the whole organic foundation. Whatever is contained in the Scriptures, must be received as given by inspiration of God and having divine authority.

The firm adherence to this supremacy of Holy Scripture is the only way in which there can be freedom from those yokes of human bondage which are so galling and so degrading to men, and under whose burden Christians were groaning when God's set time was come to send deliverance by the hand of him whom He had chosen for the purpose. No one can be absolutely free from authority. Our moral nature recognizes a power above us, to which we feel our subjection. God did not cease to be King when He made man with a personal will that implies the power of choice. He made souls subject to His dominion. The fall of man did not eradicate the feeling of subjection. It turned the heart away from God, but it did not render man independent. He feels his dependence, and in such feeling is but too ready to be the slave of any creature that has the presumption to claim the authority which belongs only to the Creator. If we will not permit God to reign over us, we submit ourselves to some god that usurps His place. Even those who are most loud in asserting their independence of the King of kings are subjects of a power that reduces them to abject slavery. It is always so. Those who will not have Christ to reign over them become slaves of the pope; those who will not enjoy the Gospel liberty of the Church, suffer the legal bondage of the lodge. It is therefore not a question whether men will be in subjection; that is involved in the necessities of human

nature; but it is a question simply of subjection to the Lord of all, who rules in wisdom and in mercy, or to some rebellious power that rules in folly and in malice. If we will not be freemen of the Lord we must be bondmen of His creatures. If we will not be guided by the infinite wisdom and love of our Lord, we will be directed by the sin of Satan and our own hearts. Those who will not serve the Lord in liberty are doomed to serve the devil in slavery. The only way to be freed from every yoke of bondage is to recognize Jehovah as King and accept the supremacy of His Word. He is the rightful Lord, and through His Word all the longings of the soul for deliverance from sin and woe and for the possession of peace and blessedness are satisfied. As that is departed from, we recede from liberty to slavery. In Romanism we have an illustration of this. It has abandoned the supremacy of the Word and has in its stead the supremacy of the pope. The same is apparent in the history of every sect. As they abandon the Scriptures they become subject to human opinions and ordinances. Let the supreme authority of God's Word be maintained in theory and in practice, and we have a safeguard against the devices of Satan and of men to enslave consciences. To this our MAGAZINE proposes by the grace of God to adhere through evil and through good report.

What the Lord is pleased to speak His true disciples are pleased to hear. No argument can have any force in their minds against the absolutely decisive proof, "It is written." Here even hesitation is disloyalty. While a subject is under investigation as to what the Word reveals respecting it, suggestions and evidences for and against any given conclusion are in place. But they must not impugn the absolute authority of the Word whose decision is sought. When that decision is once obtained, no reason can have any weight against it. Not even for a moment must we give ear to any insinuations or argumentations implying an impeachment of its infallible authority. That would be listening to the old serpent with his suggestion of doubt in regard to the truth of God's declarations. Writers who endeavor to refute biblical proofs by arguments drawn from nature are pursuing a course that is not Christian and that is full of danger. By appealing to reason or common sense or prevailing opinions in the past or

the present against the plain statement of the Scriptures they overthrow, so far as in them lies, the very foundation of all Christian faith and assurance. All other voices must be silent when God speaks, and all inquiry as to what is the truth on any given point is at an end when the Lord has pronounced His decision. "The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether." Ps. 19, 9.

For the same reason the sincere Christian cannot otherwise than reject whatever is set up as an article of faith in conflict with God's Word. No authority can be admitted in opposition to that which is supreme. It is all a delusion that one man has as good a right to maintain his opinions in the Church as another has to maintain the faith once delivered to the saints. No man has a right to teach for doctrines of God the commandments of men. Human opinion is not equally authoritative with divine truth. It cannot save. Light and life and salvation come by the Gospel revealed from heaven. Men are saved not by human science and philosophy, by human wisdom and skill, but by divine grace, "being born again not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the Word of God, which liveth and abideth forever. For all flesh is as grass, and all the glory of man as the flower of grass. The grass withereth, and the flower thereof falleth away; but the Word of the Lord endureth forever. And this is the Word which by the Gospel is preached unto you." 1 Pet. 1, 23-25. What God's will and purpose are can be known only by His Word, and that Word alone is the power by which His will and purpose are accomplished. All human opinion substituted for that Word only tends to enslave and to destroy. Hence we are commanded to hold fast the truth of God and to shun human errors that would usurp its authority. "Beloved, when I gave all diligence to write unto you of the common salvation, it was needful for me to write unto you and exhort you, that ye should earnestly contend for the faith which was once delivered to the saints." Jude 3. Not for the sake of contention, but for the sake of the common salvation, do the followers of the Prince of peace contend for the faith. "If there come any unto you and bring not this doctrine, receive him not into your house, neither bid him God speed; for he that biddeth him God

speed is partaker of his evil deeds." 2 John 10. 11. Ministers are therefore commanded to guard the purity of doctrine as well as to promote purity of life, and to consent to nothing and to connive at nothing that impugns the supremacy of God's Word among God's people. St. Paul exhorts the teacher to "hold fast the faithful Word, as he hath been taught, that he may be able by sound doctrine both to exhort and to convince gainsayers. For there are many unruly and vain talkers and deceivers, specially they of the circumcision; whose mouths must be stopped, who subvert whole houses, teaching things which they ought not, for filthy lucre's sake." "Rebuke them sharply, that they may be sound in the faith, not giving heed to Jewish fables and commandments of men that turn from the faith." Tit. 1, 9-14. It is needful to contend earnestly against all false doctrine, not only that the truth immediately in question may be preserved, but also that the supremacy of God's Word, on which all assurance in matters pertaining to our salvation rests, may be maintained.

The objections which are raised against contending for the faith and rebuking error and errorists are themselves illustrations of the evil against which we are warned. The Word tells us to rebuke sharply those who depart from sound doctrine, and in the face of it men who profess to recognize the supremacy of that Word tell us that such rebuking is not wise; that the points of difference are not fundamental and should therefore not be made a matter of contention; that it is not generous and charitable to wound the feelings of fellow Christians by exposing their errors and warning against them; that it hinders the growth of the Church and cripples its energies to reprove departures from the faith, and that such a course is therefore manifestly inexpedient. But God is wiser than men and more merciful than men. He is Lord, and He knows best what tends to His glory and to man's salvation. Him we should hear and heed, even if in our blindness His ways should seem subversive of His ultimate purpose. The authority of the Scriptures is supreme, whether the doctrine immediately in controversy be fundamental or not. The principle involved, whether the Word of God is absolutely authoritative, is always fundamental. All

Scripture is profitable; how then could it be uncharitable to maintain any portion of it that may be assailed, even though the portion in question should be pronounced by men non-fundamental? Carnal feeling shrinks from giving a little pain to accomplish a great good, but carnal feeling is not Christian charity. This seeks the salvation of the soul, even though it should be necessary to give some pain in order to secure it. Human notions about the expediency of obedience to the Word of God in regard to rebuking error, the true child of God cannot respect, because he reverences the Word of the Lord. It is not for us to teach Him what is wise and expedient. Our wisdom must consist in hearing Him and recognizing His authority, that our faith may stand in the power of God and our obedience may glorify His great name.

L.

THE FIFTH ARTICLE OF THE AUGUSTANA.

BY REV. H. J. SCHUH, A. M., DETROIT, MICH.

III. The means of grace are bearers of the Gospel, which teaches that through the merits of Christ we have a merciful God.

In the preceding part of our essay we have seen that God is pleased to work faith in our hearts through certain means of His own appointment. But the fifth article of the confession goes farther. It not only tells us that God bestows faith through certain means, but it specifically defines what it is in these means that works faith. God has given "*the Gospel*" and the Sacraments; through them He works faith in those that hear "*the Gospel.*"

To understand the work of the Holy Ghost in the generation of faith, it will be necessary to distinguish between that which is wrought by the law and that which is brought about by the Gospel. Both Law and Gospel are instruments of the Holy Ghost, although these two doctrines are directly opposed to each other, both as to their teachings and results; and when the confession states that the Holy Spirit is given through "*the Gospel,*" it by no means wishes to say that the

Law is excluded from the Spirit's work. Properly speaking faith is the fruit of the Gospel alone; but when this statement is made the work of the Law is considered as preparatory to that of the Gospel. Law and Gospel cannot be too well distinguished and held apart in their teachings and in their effects. But too often the Law is considered less rigorous now than of old; and again, the Gospel is made a new law and Christ a second Moses. The law is defined in the Formula of Concord as: "A divine doctrine in which the righteous and immutable will of God is revealed, teaching what man ought to be in his nature, thoughts, words and deeds, in order to be pleasing and acceptable to God. And it announces that the wrath of God and temporal and eternal punishment will come upon transgressors." (New Market Ed. p. 652.) Law and Gospel are compared with and clearly distinguished from each other in the words of Luther: "All that describes our sins and the wrath of God, is properly the preaching of the law, no matter how or when it occurs. Again the Gospel is a preaching which exhibits and presents nothing else but grace and forgiveness in Christ, although it is true and correct that the Apostles and ministers of the Gospel, as even Christ Himself has done, confirm the preaching of the Law, and commence with it among those who do not acknowledge their sins, and are not alarmed in consequence of the wrath of God, as He Himself says: 'The Holy Ghost will reprove the world of sin—because they believe not on me.' Jno. 16, 8. 9. Yea, what is a more severe or terrible indication and preaching of the wrath of God against sin, than the very sufferings and death of Christ His Son? But as long as all this proclaims the wrath of God, and terrifies men, it is not properly the preaching of the Gospel, nor Christ's preaching, but that of Moses and the Law against the impenitent. For Christ and the Gospel were not ordained and given, either to alarm or to condemn, but to console and to strengthen those who are alarmed and depressed." (Page 651). It is the clear distinction between these two principles which forms one of the characteristic features of Luther's preaching.

The Law comes to man with demands and the Gospel with promises. The Law asks and the Gospel gives. The Law demands spiritual activity, but confers none. The Gospel does

not demand, but gives life. The Law requires love, but because its curse rests upon those who do not fulfill its requirements, it produces hatred. "The Law worketh wrath." Rom. 4, 15. It reveals the wrath of God against man's sin, and the natural man cannot love nor trust in a God who is angry with him and threatens temporal and eternal damnation. Therefore the natural effect of the Law, where it is left to work alone, is to drive away from God. The culprit is not inclined to love or confide in the judge who, he knows, will condemn him. This effect of the Law caused Adam and Eve to hide from the presence of Jehovah. The fear of God which the Law *demand*s is altogether different from that which it *produces*. It demands a child-like fear, but because of sin in us and the justice and righteousness of God which it reveals, it produces a slavish fear.

The cause of this effect of the Law is not in it, but in the sad condition of human nature since the fall. Paul says: "The Law is good and holy." Rom. 7, 12. In the state of integrity the Law brought life, but now it brings death. It is "the letter which killeth," 2 Cor. 3, 6. because it reveals the spiritual death into which sin has brought us.

And yet the Law is necessary to the attainment of faith. As said above, through it the Holy Ghost performs a preparatory work. "By the Law is the knowledge of sin," Rom. 3, 20., and this knowledge (or acknowledgment, *ἐπίγνωσις*) of sin is an indispensable prerequisite of faith. Before we can be made spiritually alive we must be brought to know and acknowledge that we are by nature spiritually dead. The patient must be convinced that he is sick, sick unto death, ere he will call in the aid of a physician. Such conviction is wrought by the Law. The putrid sore must be laid open to the core, ere the healing process can begin. The soil must be broken and pulverized before it is in a proper condition to receive the seed. It is the office of the Law to make sin appear what it really is, to make it "exceeding sinful," as Paul says Rom. 7, 13. The light of the Law only reveals the hideousness of the night into which sin has plunged us. Yet all this may take place without faith. Judas was certainly convinced of the exceeding sinfulness of his sin, and yet this conviction only deepened the night of despair in his soul.

The *Gospel* is the "Spirit which giveth life." This Gospel is briefly defined as the doctrine "which teaches that through the merits of Christ, and not through our own merits, we have a merciful God, if we believe these things," or as the Latin copy has it: "That God, not on account of our merits, but on account of Christ, justifies those who believe themselves to be received into favor for Christs' sake." * The Gospel reveals the true nature of God when it sets forth His love and mercy. "God is love." Jno. 4, 16. His being is love itself. When God reproves and curses sin He does a "strange or foreign work," as the Formula of Concord says: "Therefore the Spirit of Christ necessarily not only consoles, but also, through the office of the Law, reproves the world of sin, Jno. 16, 8 and thus proceeds in the New Testament, as the Prophet says: *Opus alienum, ut faciat opus proprium*, Isa. 28, 21.; that is, He must do a strange or foreign work (ein fremd Amt verrichten) which is to reprove, until He advances to His own work, which is to console, and to preach concerning grace." (P. 651.) On the passage, "God is love," Luther says the following: "God is love itself and His being is nothing but pure love. So that if one would properly paint Him, he must produce a picture that is mere love: as though the divine essence were nothing else than a furnace and glow of such love as fills heaven and earth. And again, if it were possible to portray love one must paint a picture that is not of works or human, but one that is God Himself." (Erl. Ed. 18, 313.)

It is true that holiness and righteousness are also essential attributes of divinity, as in God nothing is accidental, and yet the Scriptures do not say that God is holiness or God is righteousness. Love is, so to speak, the fundamental attribute in God. It is love which prompts Him even to the exercise of His righteousness, as Luther says: "But nevertheless God remains pure love, as His nature is only love, so that even when He must thunder and strike with lightning and punish, it is done out of love and a good heart. For He only does it to hinder the evil, and it is thus He must intimidate the stubborn and hard heads, who rob, steal, covet

* Scilicet quod Deus non propter nostra merita, sed propter Christum justificet eos, qui credunt se propter Christum in gratiam recipi.

and live in all manner of blasphemous works. This He does for the sake of His own children, who are oppressed and agrieved and must suffer all manner of malice from the world and the devil, to strengthen and comfort them that they may see, that they have a God who is faithful and of a good will toward them and can deliver them from everybody's wrath and raving, so that toward us, who believe on Him, even all the works of His anger must be called nothing but love." (Erl. Ed. 18, 316.)

But God loves men only in Christ and for Christ's sake. The natural man can do nothing to make himself acceptable to God. All our good works are only damnable sins, as soon as they are in any sense made the reason of our acceptance with God. Our merits and the merit of Christ are like fire and water when brought to bear on our relation to God. The one destroys the other. Christ by His active and passive obedience has satisfied the demands of divine justice, and for His sake alone there is mercy in store for sinners. God poured out the full measure of His wrath on the substitute of the human race, in order that He might "*be just and a Justifier of him that believeth in Jesus.*" Rom. 3, 26. His love prompted Him to do what His justice demanded. In the merit of Christ God's love and His justice are reconciled. Christ as the second Adam restored mankind to that favor of God which it had lost in the first. The reconciliation between God and man has been accomplished, as far as God is concerned, and it now only remains for man to accept this peace which is offered him in the Gospel. As St. Paul says 2. Cor. 5, 18-22.: "And all things are of God, who hath reconciled us to Himself by Jesus Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation; to wit, that God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them, and hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation. Now then we are ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech you by us: we pray you in Christ's stead be ye reconciled unto God."

It is the declaration of this message of peace which works faith in man's heart. This is that "still small voice" which Elijah heard after the storm and the fire and the earthquake had passed by revealing the majesty of Jehovah.

This is "the Spirit that giveth life" to those whom the letter (the Law) had killed. Through this Gospel God imparts the Holy Spirit, who works faith in those that hear. As Paul says: "So then faith cometh by hearing," and that he means here specifically the hearing of the Gospel is evident from Gal. 3, 2: "This only would I learn of you, received ye the Spirit by the works of the Law or by the hearing of faith?" The whole context shows that "the hearing of faith" is the hearing of the Gospel.

The very word *ευαγγέλιον*, which is used to express this preaching, indicates its nature, being composed of the particle *εὖ*, (well or good as opposed to *κακῶς*, bad, ill) and *αγγελία* (message or news). Our English word gives the sense accurately, being of exactly the same composition. It is formed of two Anglo-Saxon words, "god" (good) and "spell" (story or tidings). What better news, what sweeter story could there be for poor terrified consciences, than "the old, old story of Jesus and His love?" This message comes not to terrify, but to comfort, not to kill, but to make alive. It comes as a message of pardon and peace to rebels and traitors; and as a Word of the Great God it is able to accomplish that whereunto it is sent. As long as we know nothing of God, but that He is just and holy, we cannot trust nor love Him; but when we are told that He loves us, yea that He *so* loves us and all the world "that He gave His only begotten Son that whosoever believeth on Him might not perish, but have everlasting life," then we see in Him a God whom we can love and trust. In Him we can have confidence. So the Gospel melts the ice of fear and dread and fills the heart with the warmth of love and trust. So it in short gives faith.

We now come to consider our fourth proposition.

IV. *These means are to be publicly administered in the Church.*

The Church of God has from the beginning been blessed with the treasures of divine revelation. To her were committed the oracles of God. What Paul says of Israel, Rom 3, 1. 2, may, in a certain sense, be said of the Church of all ages: "What advantage then hath the Jew, or what profit is there of circumcision? Much every way: chiefly, because

that unto them were committed the oracles of God." The Word and the Sacraments, the divinely appointed means through which faith is wrought, are entrusted by the heavenly King to His earthly spouse, the Church. This we confess in the Catechism when we say: "The office of the keys is the peculiar Church power which Christ has given to His Church on earth," etc.

But the Church is not at liberty to use these means as it pleases. Christ has with them given the instructions for their proper use. According to His own institution they are to be publicly administered in the Church. For this purpose He has instituted the office of the ministry, which in the Latin copy of the Confession is described as the ministry of teaching the Gospel and giving the Sacraments (*ministerium docendi evangelii et porrigendi sacramenta*). The Gospel is to be taught, and for this purpose there must be teachers; the Sacraments must be administered, and therefore there must be administrators. So Paul says of himself and all Gospel ministers: "Let a man so account of us, as of the ministers of Christ, and stewards of the mysteries of God." We are stewards, the house wherein we have our stewardship is the Church, and the goods which are entrusted to us are the means of grace. "And the Lord said, who then is that faithful and wise steward, whom his lord shall make ruler over his household, to give them their portion of meat in due season? Blessed is that servant, whom his lord when he cometh shall find so doing." Luc. 12, 42. 43.

We stated in the introduction to this essay that the office of the ministry is only incidentally treated in this fifth article of the Augustana. The doctrine of the ministry is *ex professo* contained in the fourteenth article. It would be wrong therefore to lay such stress on its incidental mention here, as virtually to make the person ministering the faith-working instrument. The Lutheran Church teaches that the validity and efficacy of the means of grace depends neither on the character nor office of the administrator. To make them depend on the former is the Donatistic error, which is expressly rejected in the eighth article of the Confession: "The Sacraments, nevertheless, are effectual even if the preachers by whom they are administered be not pious; as Christ Himself

says, Matt. 23, 2: 'The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses seat,' etc. On this account the Donatists are condemned and all such as teach contrary to this article." The Apology in the article treating of the Church says: "Nor are the Sacraments, Baptism, etc. without efficacy, because administered by unworthy and ungodly men, for they stand before us by virtue of the call of the Church, not in their own authority, but as representatives of Christ, who says Luke 10, 16: 'He that heareth you heareth me.' Thus Judas was also sent to preach. Now although ungodly men preach and administer the Sacraments, they officiate in Christ's stead. And this declaration of Christ teaches us, that in such cases the unworthiness of the servant should not offend us." (P. 222.) What Luther himself thought of the means of grace when administered by ungodly men, he has expressed with his characteristic force thus: "And if the devil himself should come (if he could or would be pious enough to do so) and, I suppose the case, that I should afterward become aware of the fact that the devil had thus sneaked himself into the office, or, in the form of a man, had had himself called to the office and had publicly preached the Gospel in the Church, baptized, read mass and absolved, and had exercised such office according to the command and institution of Christ, we must still confess that the Sacrament would be right, and we had received true Baptism, had heard the true Gospel, had received the true Sacrament of Christ's body and blood For our faith and Sacrament must not depend on the person, be he pious or godless, ordained (*geweiht*) or not ordained, called or not called (*eingeföhlichen*), the devil or his mother; but on Christ, His word, His office, His command and institution." (Erl. Ed. 31, 362.)

But it may be asked, has not at least the office of the minister something to do with the efficacy of his acts? And it might seem that what is said in the twelfth article of the Formula of Concord against the Schwenkfeldians would go to prove this. As an erroneous doctrine of this sect, the teaching is there rejected: "That the ministry of the church . . . is not an instrument through which God the Holy Spirit teaches men, and produces in them a knowledge of Christ, conversion, repentance, faith, and new obedience." (P. 731.)

But to avoid any such misunderstanding "the ministry of the Church" is there described as "*the preached and heard Word.*" The ministry is spoken of not with reference to the person, but with reference to that which is ministered—the Word. In the appendix to the Smalkald Articles it is expressly taught: "Now truly this office of the ministry is not confined to any particular place or person, as the Levitical office under the Law was; but it is dispersed throughout the world, and it is wherever God has bestowed His gifts and sent His apostles, prophets, pastors, and teachers, etc. *Nor does the authority of any person add anything to this word and office, ordained by Christ, preach and teach it who will, where there are hearts who believe it and adhere to it. To these it comes as they hear and believe it.*" (P. 397.) Ordination does not confer special powers which are not implied in the universal priesthood, but is simply an apostolic rite, by which the call to the ministry is to be publicly confirmed. "In former times the people elected clergymen and bishops, then the bishop living in or near the same place, came and confirmed those elected by laying on of hands; and at that time *ordination was nothing else than this approbation.*" (Smalkald Art. p. 401.) That the special office of the ministry in no way adds anything to the power and efficacy of the Word and Sacraments, was taught very clearly by the Reformer. In his tract on Private Mass and Ordination to the Priesthood (*Von der Binkelmesse und Pfaffenreicht*) 1533 he says: "The sanctuary or Church teaches, that neither priest nor Christian make a single Sacrament. Our office is called and is, not to make or transubstantiate (*wandeln*), but to offer and give. As for instance a pastor or preacher does not make the Gospel, and by his office and preaching his word is not made Gospel; else it must needs all be Gospel that he teaches, but he simply by his preaching offers and gives the Gospel; for the Gospel is and must be there previously: Christ Himself made and left this, and impressed this on the hearts of the apostles, and ever afterwards through the followers of the apostles, impressed it on the hearts of Christians and had it portrayed outwardly in letters and pictures. So that nothing remains for the office of the ministry but this one work; namely, to give and preach the Gospel commanded by Christ."

“So the administration of baptism does not make baptism, but Christ has already (juvor) made it; the one who baptizes only offers and gives For it is not called a baptism because I baptize or perform the work, even if I were holier than St. John or an angel, but my baptizing is called a baptism because Christ has so ordained that water and His Word shall constitute baptism,” etc. (Erl. Ed. 31, 359.)

It is clearly Luther's doctrine that the Gospel ministry only publicly exercises those powers which are the common possession of all Christians by virtue of their being made kings and *priests* unto God in holy Baptism, according to Rev. 1, 6; 5, 10; 20, 6. In the above named tract he beautifully and forcibly sets this forth in the following words: “God be praised, in our churches we are able to show Christians a true Christian Mass after the institution of Christ and the true intent of Christ and His Church. Here our bishop or minister, properly and publicly called, but previously ordained, anointed and born a priest of Christ in Baptism, without the secret anointing of the Papists (Winfeldrefem) steps before the altar. He sings publicly and plainly the words of the institution in the Sacrament, takes the bread and wine, gives thanks, distributes and gives them, by virtue of the words of Christ, ‘This is my body, this is my blood: this do,’ etc., to us and to others who are present and wish to receive, and we severally who wish to commune, kneel down beside, behind, and around him, male, female, young, old, master, servant, mistress, maid, parents, children, just as God brings us together, every one of us true priests with Him (Mitpriester), sanctified by the blood of Christ, anointed by the Holy Ghost and ordained (geweiht) in Baptism.

“In this our inborn, hereditary, priestly honor and adornment we are present, (as is portrayed Apocalypse in the fourth chapter). We have on our golden crowns, harps in our hands and golden censers, and do not let our pastor for himself or for his own person speak the words of the institution of Christ; but he is the spokesman (Mund) for us all, and we all speak them with him in our hearts and with uplifted faith to the Lamb of God, given for us and present with us to feed us, according to His institution, with His body and

blood. This is our mass, and a true mass that cannot fail us." Erl. Ed. 31, 370.

Let this suffice to show that the Lutheran Church with the great Reformer teaches, that the efficacy and power of the means of grace depend neither on the character nor on the office of the administrator. The Word taught by a father to his household and the Sacrament of Baptism administered by a layman in case of necessity, are just as efficacious as though performed by an ordained minister.

And yet the ministry dare not be set aside as though it were a useless institution. It is Christ's own arrangement that the Word should be publicly preached and the Sacraments administered by men who are to be called and set apart for this work. And he who preaches, teaches, or administers the Sacraments without a regular call, sins against divine order. It must be remembered, however, that the head of a family, for instance, is just as divinely called to teach in his own household as the minister is to teach publicly in the congregation.

THE HISTORICAL PROOF FOR INFANT BAPTISM.

That it is right and acceptable to God to baptize children in their infancy, must, of course, first of all be proved from the Holy Scriptures, or, the first and principal proof for infant baptism must be a dogmatical one. And such a dogmatical proof we can advance.

We can show from the Word of God, in the first place, that also children in their infancy stand in need of the benefits of baptism, because they are by nature sinners and as such under the wrath of a holy and just God. "For the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth," Gen. 8, 21. "Behold, I was shapen in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me," Psalm 51, 5. "We were by nature the children of wrath, even as others," Eph. 2, 3. "Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born of water, and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is

born of the Spirit is spirit," John 3, 5. 6. In those and other passages of Holy Writ it is stated as plainly as possible that every human being conceived and born in the natural way, the offspring of a human father and mother, is by this its very origin a sinner and a child of wrath, is such from the very first moment of its existence. Therefore children are already in their infancy in need of that grace which holy baptism is instituted to confer, namely, of forgiveness of sins and all its blessed results.

In the second place, we can show from our Bible that the whole redeeming and saving work of Christ is also intended for them. "The Son of Man is come to save that which is lost," Matt. 18, 11. Children by nature are lost. Consequently Christ has come to save also them. Therefore He also says, "Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not: for of such is the kingdom of God," Mark 10, 14.

Thirdly, according to the Word of God they are capable of receiving the benefits of holy baptism. In the passage cited last our Savior says expressly, "Of such is the kingdom of God." It cannot be theirs for this reason that they were no sinners. For they *are* sinners, as shown above. So it must be theirs because they are the very persons capable of being brought into it by the grace and efficacy of the Holy Spirit. So much is this the case every adult person that wishes to enter the kingdom of God must become as one of these children. "For of such is the kingdom of God." "Verily, I say unto you, Except ye be converted and *become as little children*, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven," Matt. 18, 3. To be sure, because they are sinners and flesh, they are also enemies of God. "Because the carnal mind is enmity against God," Rom. 8, 7. They, therefore, also have and exercise that *natural* resistance against the work of the Holy Ghost that is common to *all* men, whether infants or adults. But this natural resistance is no hindrance to the Holy Ghost, does not prevent conversion or regeneration; else no man could ever be converted or regenerated. And that wilful and contumacious resistance which is the cause that so many who are called by the Gospel are not converted and saved, because they by this resistance "foreclose the ordi-

nary way to the Holy Ghost so that He *cannot* effect His work in them" (Formula of Concord, I, XI, 10), this is not to be found in infants because it necessarily presupposes the *use*, not only the possession, of reason. And thus infants have that remnant of the original image of God, the passive capacity of being converted and regenerated, in a higher degree than any grown person. But there is no conversion or regeneration without faith. Are, then, infants also capable of faith? Who is able to decide that question but our blessed Lord, being the all-seeing and all-knowing God? And He says, "*These little ones which believe in me,*" speaking of *παιδία*, i. e., *babes* or *infants*. And whosoever is capable of believing in Christ is also capable of receiving all the benefits of baptism and of being baptized.

But whilst infants are capable of faith and regeneration, God, as much as we know, is not willing to work these in them by anything else but by His appointed means of grace, the Word and the Sacraments. Of these two the second only, viz. baptism, is applicable to infants. The Word by itself, not combined with the Sacrament and included in it, cannot be the efficient cause of faith, because it presupposes and requires hearing and understanding. For "faith cometh by *hearing*, and hearing by the Word of God," Rom. 10, 17; and "how shall they believe in Him of whom they have not *heard*?" V. 14. The sacrament of the altar presupposes and requires in those who are to partake of it the faculty of examining themselves. "Let a man *examine* himself, and so let him eat of that bread and drink of that cup," 1 Cor. 11, 28. That infants are incapable of such self-examination needs not be proved. Consequently the sacrament of the altar as a means of grace is not applicable to them. Only baptism remains as such a means of regeneration to salvation. And if our reasoning up to this point is sound and valid, we must say, Children are the very ones to whom baptism is necessary and for whom it must be intended. Grown persons would still have a twofold means of grace, the Word of God and the Eucharist, even if they did not have baptism. And the whole saving grace of God is in every single means of grace, so that no one need be without this grace if he, for example, only had the Word to read.

But infants have *no* means of grace if they have not baptism. Humanly speaking we might say, an adult might very well get along without baptism, but infants cannot by any means. Baptism must, therefore, have been instituted and ordained by God *especially for infants*. And this is, no doubt, the principal reason that baptism is called the "washing of regeneration," Tit. 3, 5. A "washing of regeneration" is, in its *first* and *primary* meaning, a "washing" that *brings about* or *works* a regeneration that has not as yet been in existence. Only in a *secondary* way it can denote a "washing" that *strengthens, confirms* and *seals* a regeneration that *already exists*, having been produced by some other means. Now, adults must already be regenerated by faith in Christ produced by the audible Word of God before they are baptized. This is, at least, the will of God, and the usage and practice of the Church is in conformity with it, inasmuch as she baptizes no grown person of whom she must not in charity believe that he already has faith in Christ. If, now, infant baptism were not according to the will of God, only such persons could rightly be baptized that by faith produced by the Word of God *are already regenerated*. And so baptism would, according to the primary intention and ordination of God, not at all be a means of *producing* and *working* regeneration, but *only* one of confirming and sealing a regeneration that already exists. Consequently, if always administered in the proper manner, i. e., to persons who already are regenerate, it would never be a "washing of regeneration" in the *original* and *primary* sense of this term, that is, in such a sense that it is a means of *producing* regeneration, but only in the *secondary* sense, i. e., in the sense of a means that confirms and seals a regeneration that already exists. But we cannot be persuaded that a name should by God Himself be given to baptism, which, if baptism be properly administered, would *not* apply to it in its *original* and *primary*, but *only* in its *secondary* signification. And therefore we are convinced that this very appellation of baptism, viz. "washing of regeneration," proves irrefutably that baptism is by God especially intended for infants, that is, for such persons as cannot be regenerated by the audible Word of God, and could not at all be regenerated if it were not for baptism.

Lastly, we see from the Word of God that in the words in which Christ instituted holy baptism infant baptism is not excluded, but included. "Go ye, and teach *all nations*, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost," says our Savior. And who can say that children do not belong to the "nations?" Do they not, indeed, form a considerable, if not the greater part of them? And if so, they, according to these words of Christ, are to be baptized. Else He could not speak in such a general way, but would have clearly pointed out that part of the nations to which alone He referred, viz. the grown persons.

This is the dogmatical proof for infant baptism in its principal outlines. It is, as already said, the main and primary proof. But it is not the only one. We can also furnish a historical proof; that is, we can prove from history that infant baptism has been the usage of the Christian Church from the beginning.

In the Acts of the Apostles we find it recorded in two distinct passages that *whole families* were baptized: Lydia of Thyatira "and her household" (ὁ οἶκος αὐτῆς, *her house*, i. e., all persons that belonged to her house or family, 16, 14, 15); the keeper of the prison at Philippi "and ALL his" (οἱ αὐτοῦ πάντες, 16, 33). "Crispus, the chief ruler of the synagogue, believed on the Lord with ALL his house" (σὺν ὅλῳ τῷ οἴκῳ αὐτοῦ); and "many of the Corinthians, hearing, believed, and were baptized," 18, 8, cannot well be understood otherwise either. In the same way the Apostle Paul says 1. Cor. 1, 16: "And I baptized also the household of Stephanas" (τὸν Σ. οἶκον). Now it is, indeed, not expressly said that also *children* were baptized in these cases. But just as little is it expressly stated that *adults* were baptized. *Households* or *houses* were baptized. And we all know what constitutes a household or family, viz., that as a rule children are included. Is it not highly improbable that in four different families that were baptized, not a single infant should have been found? The very expression "all his," "all his house," must confirm the idea that children were also there. And if they were there, they were most certainly baptized together with the adults. There is no denying that. As far as historical facts are concerned all the probabilities tend towards infant baptism. The proba-

bilities are so great that they verge on certainty. And as the dogmatical proof for infant baptism, as shown above, is so overwhelmingly in favor of infant baptism, only a direct denial on the part of the New Testament authors could be sufficient to make an unbiassed Christian believe that the Apostles did not baptize infants. The dogmatical proof together with the historical proof, even as it is found in the New Testament, cannot but render us certain that infant baptism was in use already at the time of the Apostles.

In the writings of the "Apostolic Fathers," so called because they were universally believed to have enjoyed the conversation and the instruction of the Apostles themselves, we also find, on the one hand, the direct acknowledgment that baptismal grace is necessary for every natural descendant of Adam, and, on the other hand, the assertion that infants are in grace and favor with God, and do believe. So *Clemens Romanus*, supposed to have suffered a martyr's death before the close of the first century of our Christian era, and thus to have died even before the Apostle St. John, expressly says in his first epistle to the Corinthians, ch. 17: "No man is free from uncleanness, even if he should only be *one day old*." In the letter attributed to *Barnabas*, composed, according to the best critics, about A. D. 100, it is said: "We descend into the water (of baptism), full of sins and uncleanness, and we ascend, bearing fruit in our hearts, having the fear and the faith in Jesus in our souls." And the writing called *Pastor Hermae*, that in the second and third centuries was looked upon as inspired and cited as such even by Irenaeus, Clement and Origen, composed, perhaps, in the first half of the second century, speaks of men, "who have *believed like guileless infants*," and says directly: "All infants are honored by God and are considered the first." All this agrees with the statements of the New Testament that infants stand in need of regeneration and baptism, and are capable of believing and therefore also of being baptized. To be sure, neither in the writings of these Apostolic Fathers we find the explicit statement that infants were actually baptized. But would it not be the height of folly to occupy the dogmatical standpoint just mentioned and not actually to baptize infants? How could they have had a good conscience and

hoped to be able to stand before the judgment-seat of their Master, if they *wilfully*, although they knew better, had neglected to apply to infants the only means of grace that was applicable to them and could really save them? That our sectarians do not care to baptize infants, is, humanly speaking, not so very strange, since they do not believe that an infant is by nature a miserable sinner and a child of wrath, nor that it is capable of believing and being rightly baptized. But all this the Apostolic Fathers believed, as we have seen. And therefore it would be passing strange if they had not been careful and anxious to have their infants baptized.

Justinus Martyr, the oldest and most renowned of earlier Christians Apologists, beheaded because of his unflinching faith in Christ about A. D. 166, says in his *Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo*: "Also we who have come near to God have not received this *circumcision* according to the flesh, but the *spiritual* one . . . We have received the same through the grace of God *by baptism, since we have been born as sinners*; and every one is permitted to receive it likewise. Certainly, his language in general does not exclude, but rather includes infants. And his parallelizing the circumcision of the Old Testament and the baptism of the New, and calling the latter a spiritual circumcision, proves conclusively that he includes infants. For how could he parallelize circumcision in this way, if, whilst the former, as a rule, had to be applied to infants eight days old, the latter could not be applied to them, but only to grown persons? Is it, moreover, at all probable that baptism would have been put on a level with circumcision, and even been called spiritual circumcision, in a community where infant baptism was not in use? We think the late *Dr. Hoefling*, in his most excellent work "*Das Sacrament der Taufe*," 2 vols., is entirely right when he answers this question negatively (I, p. 144). The same Justin, in an apologetical work written about 150, speaks of old fellow Christians "who had become disciples of Christ *from their childhood*." But by what other means could they have become such disciples at so early a time except by holy baptism? So infant baptism must have been practiced before the close of the first century.

Irenaeus († 202 as martyr in the persecution of Septimius

Severus) has a passage that excludes all doubt as to infant baptism having been a usage in his times. In his celebrated work "*Adversus Haereses*" he writes as follows (II, 22): "Being, therefore, a teacher, He (Christ) had also the age of a teacher, not rejecting nor passing by any man, nor setting aside in Himself His law regarding mankind, but sanctifying every age by passing through an age similar to it. For He came to save all through Himself; *all, I say, who through Him are being regenerated unto God, INFANTS AND CHILDREN, and boys, and youths, and old men.* Therefore He went through all the different ages, and became an infant for the infants, sanctifying the infants; a child among children, sanctifying those who are of this age, at the same time also made unto them an example of piety, and righteousness, and subjection; a youth among youths, becoming an example unto youths and sanctifying them unto the Lord." There Irenaeus says, in the first place, that Christ became a man and went through all the principal ages of man, in order to save all, to set a good example to all. But he adds, in the second place, that of course only those are really saved by Him who through Him are regenerated unto God. And this, he goes on to say, in the third place, is possible for every man, in whatever stage of life he may be: whether he be an INFANT, or a *child*, or a boy, or a young man, or an old man. Thus according to Irenaeus, also infants and children are *capable of being regenerated* through Christ unto God. That no man can be regenerated without the means instituted by God for that purpose, is self-evident also to Irenaeus, as to all the Church Fathers. And that baptism is the washing of regeneration is also his faith and teaching. Justin in his greater Apology says: "Then they are led by us to a place where water is found, and they are regenerated in the same mode of regeneration in which also we have been regenerated." And in the same way Irenaeus speaks of baptism. In his great work cited above he expressly calls baptism "the regeneration unto God" (I. 18), and again says that Matt. 28, 19 Christ gave His disciples "the power of regeneration unto God." He, therefore, considers baptism preeminently the means of regeneration. And where he, now, without any distinction, speaks of the regeneration of infants and children as well as of boys, young men

and old men as the way of being actually saved by Christ, we cannot but hold that in his times and with his entire approbation also infants and children were baptized in order to be regenerated unto God.

A younger contemporary of Irenaeus was the renowned Carthaginian *Tertullian* († 220). He is the very first who *expressly* mentions infant baptism, and this too in a disapproving manner. But the whole tenor of the passage in question shows irrefutably that in his times infant baptism was a general observance, and that he looked upon it as an ancient usage, not as one that had just sprung up. His words, contained in his work "De Baptismo," ch. 18, read as follows: "According to the condition and disposition, and also age of every person, it is better to wait with baptism, but especially with regard to *small children*. For why is it necessary to bring also their sponsors in danger, who, on the one hand, because of their mortality may be prevented from fulfilling their promises, and, on the other, may be deceived by the subsequent bad character (of the children)? The Lord, indeed, says: Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not. May they, then, come as they grow up; may they come as they learn, as they are being taught whither they come; let them become Christians when they have become able to know Christ. Why does this innocent age hasten to the remission of sins? Men will act more cautiously in secular affairs; so that divine things are entrusted to him who would not be trusted with earthly things. May they first learn to know how to ask for salvation, so that it may be seen that you give it to one who asks for it. For no less a reason also the unmarried should be made to wait, in whom a temptation is prepared as well for virgins because of their maturity as for widows because of their roaming about, until they either marry or are confirmed in continence. If there are some who understand the importance of baptism, they will more fear to obtain than to defer it. True faith is sure of salvation."—Certainly a strange passage in some respects, yet clear enough as to the state and condition of infant baptism at that time. *Hoefling*, in his work mentioned above, to which among others we are indebted for these citations, says very pertinently: "Surely no one who

judges prudently and circumspectly will get the impression from these sentences as if Tertullian here were declaiming against a new usage that had been originated only in his times. If he had been able to take an argument against it from its having been introduced recently, he in his manifest aversion to infant baptism would certainly not voluntarily and silently have foregone using it. That he does not attack infant baptism with external, historical reasons, not as something that had not been in use in the first times and only later had been practiced improperly, is manifestly merely to be ascribed to this that he could not at all plead these reasons, if he did not want to be given the lie by the historical consciousness of his contemporaries. It is apparent that he does not speak as one conscious of justifying and defending something that hitherto had been customary in the Church, but rather of reforming the same, and that he knows the practice of the Church not to be for, but against him. By the very manner in which he objects to infant baptism he not only utters the most reliable testimony for the prevalence and sway of the same in the domain of ecclesiastical usage, but he also gives us the first account of an institution especially important for it, namely that of sponsors. He does not object to infant baptism as if it were an unapostolical institution having against itself the practice of the earlier time of the Church, but because in his opinion it is accompanied by certain inconveniences and contradictions to his principles. How little he in this regard can be looked upon as the organ of the consciousness of the Church at his time is apparent from the total isolation and ineffectiveness of his attack. In the same way as the practice of the Church up to that time was not in favor of what he maintained, and as he did not in his opinion follow it, in the very same manner it did not follow him either. And it was right in doing so. For if it had followed his principles, it would have had not only to desist from blessing infants, but could also not have admitted any unmarried adults to this sacrament, until they either should have been married, or become gray with age, or proved themselves capable of living up to a vow of constant continence." Most assuredly the way in which Tertullian attacks infant baptism is an unanswerable argument for the

assertion that in his time infant baptism was generally in vogue and could not be looked upon as an innovation or a "new departure" that ought to be resisted with might and main. To be sure, if he had believed himself that it had been practiced by the apostles themselves, he would scarcely have dared to impugn it so openly and decidedly. But, on the other hand, he dared not say either that it had *not* been practiced by the apostles. For if he could have done so without having to fear that his assertion would be refuted he, beyond any doubt, would have made use of this argument. For it would have been the strongest he could have used. And thus, in the good providence of God, the first assailant of infant baptism inside the Christian Church has become our principal witness for its having been an institution already of the first Church.

What Tertullian says, indirectly indeed, but unmistakably and manifestly, *Origen*, the most learned and noted of the earlier Alexandrian Church Fathers, born about 185 (†254 as a martyr), proclaims in the most direct terms as the doctrine and usage of the Christian Church since the time of the apostles. In his VIII. Homily on Leviticus he writes as follows: "Hear what David says, 'Behold, I was shapen in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me,' showing thereby that every soul that is born in the flesh is polluted by the uncleanness of iniquity and sin, and that for this reason has been said what we have already often mentioned, that no one is clean, if his life should be only that of one day. Thereto may be added this, that it may be asked, what the reason is that, as the baptism of the Church is administered unto the remission of sins, *according to the observance of the Church baptism is also applied to small children*, as, indeed, if there were nothing in these infants that ought to pertain to forgiveness and indulgence, the grace of baptism would seem superfluous." Again, in his XIV. Homily on the Gospel of St. Luke: "*Infants are baptized unto the forgiveness of sins*. Of what sins? Or at what time did they sin? Or, how can there be any necessity for baptismal washing in infants, if not according to that sense of which we have spoken just before: 'Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? Not one.' (Job 14, 4. 5). *And because by baptism the uncleanness of our*

birth is taken away, therefore also infants are baptized. For except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." And again on Rom. 5, 6: "*The Church has received the tradition from the APOSTLES to administer baptism also to infants.* For those men to whom the secrets of the divine mysteries were entrusted knew that the innate uncleanness of sin is in all men, and that it has to be washed off by water and the Spirit." Indeed, nothing is wanting in this direct testimony of Origen. Direct we call it, though in one sense it is indirect, but only the stronger for being this. As the reader will have observed, it is not the intention of Origen to prove the necessity of infant baptism from original sin, but, on the contrary, to prove original sin from the usage of the Christian Church down from the times of the apostles to baptize infants. *This latter he takes for granted by all*, and uses it as the foundation for proving the corrupt state of every natural man. There can be no stronger proof that a man is convinced of the truth of any doctrine or institution than his using it as a foundation for proving some other point.

Tertullian's countryman and disciple *Cyprian* († 258 as martyr) in his LIX. Epistle to Fidus shows us that at his time there was indeed a controversy about infant baptism; but not about the question whether infants ought at all to be baptized. That this was to be done according to Apostolic tradition and churchly usage was conceded by all. But the question was whether baptism should be administered to them before or on the eighth day of their life. There were some who contended that the latter only was in order, because in accordance with Old Testament circumcision. Cyprian was in favor of having infants baptized as soon as possible and could point to the decrees of a council held at Carthage in the year 256 as decidedly taken his view. Not the smallest vestige of an opposition to infant baptism in general can be found in his letter bearing on this controversy; so universally was its correctness considered as beyond any attack. Of course Cyprian's arguments in this case have equal, if not greater weight over against the opponents of infant baptism *in toto*, though he had no such in view. So he says, for example: "Besides, if anything could hinder man from obtain-

ing grace, graver sins would rather hinder adult and older persons. But if even to the greatest criminals and to those who have sinned against God grievously before, if they afterwards have come to faith, the remission of sins is given, and none of them is excluded from baptism and grace, *how much more ought an infant not to be excluded that, being recently born in a carnal way after Adam, it has contracted the contagion of an old death by its first nativity* . . . And for this reason, my dearest brother, this was the conclusion in our council *that no one ought to be excluded by us from baptism and the grace of God, who is merciful and benign and kind to all.*"

And in the same way we find in the Apostolical Constitutions, whose oldest and principal portion (the first 6 books) is supposed to have originated in the latter part of the third century, the general instruction and admonition (VI, 15) : "*Baptize also your infants, and bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord. For He says, Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not.*"

And thus we have seen that the historical proof for infant baptism is not wanting at all, but in its nature as plain and strong as the dogmatical. He who weighs both without any prejudice or bias can surely not help coming to the conclusion that infant baptism is well founded in the Word of God and in the history of His Church. He who objects to it does so only because he follows his reason in a sphere where he ought to lead it captive unto the obedience of faith.

But if, finally, some one should ask, How do you account for the want of *explicit* proof for infant baptism in the two first centuries of our Christian era? — we would answer in the words of *Hoefling* (I, pp. 105 sq.) : "The circumstances of those times were such that infant baptism, even if it were administered, could not possibly be regarded with that attention and interest which attached to the baptism of adults. According to its nature infant baptism could then as now be applied only to infant children of Christians, or to such infants as lived in the midst of a Christian family, and whose Christian education was thereby guaranteed. By means of it the Church was not so much spread as it was rather preserved and propagated in those circles that it had already conquered. But the more at that time the Church was and had to be pre-

eminently interested in founding new Christian families, in forming new Christian congregations, in extending the Church over new territory, in converting Jews and Gentiles to Christianity, in the gradual Christianization of the surrounding heathen nations, and the greater the number of Jews and Gentiles who asked to be received into the communion of life with the Redeemer and His redeemed was, in consequence of the missionary zeal of the Church at that time, and of the irresistible power by which the divine light shining forth in her life drew to itself all the souls that were in any way susceptible and desirous of being saved: the more infant baptism had necessarily to stand back before the baptism of proselytes, if not, indeed, for a long time in regard to number, yet as to public interest and attention that was given it." St.

THE PASTOR AND HIS BIBLE.

Translated from Guth's "Pastoralspiegel," by G. H. S.

1.—BIBLE READING.

He who wants to serve Christ must, like Mary, seat himself at Christ's feet and give heed to His words. Alexander the Great always took a copy of Homer along with him on his military expeditions, and during the night kept it under his pillow; Chrysostom was accustomed to keep a copy of Aristophanes lying under his pillow. Much more indispensable should the Word of God be for us. In the first centuries the Christians were thoroughly at home in the Sacred Scriptures, although as a rule they could learn them only through the public reading in the churches. Eusebius relates that common believers frequently knew the New Testament Scriptures by heart, so that when the anagnostes, or public reader, made a mistake in a word, they could correct him. The same Eusebius makes mention of an aged Christian whose eyes had both been burned out in the Diocletian persecution, but says that in the public assembly of the congregation he could repeat the Word of God as fluently as though he was reading it. Augustine also reports an example of thorough acquaintance

of the people with the Word of God, and their deep reverence for it. He says that a certain African bishop had cited a passage from the prophet Jonah somewhat differently from the usual translation, and that the congregation was so offended at this innovation that, had he not immediately promised to justify his course, they would have driven him from the pulpit. The Waldensian congregations knew whole epistles and chapters of the New Testament by heart. The Prince Eberhart in Bart is lauded, because he had read the Old and New Testament so diligently, that he could have been considered able to lecture on the Bible, and he frequently tired out the one who read for him. In the times of the terrible persecutions under Louis XIV. it happened not unfrequently that common farmers and citizens could repeat from memory whole chapters of the New Testament. Aquila was so well read in the Scriptures, that Luther said: If the Bible should be lost, I would find it again in Aquila. The jurist Benedict Carpzov had read his Bible through fifty-three times; Count Frederick of Baden-Durlach, who in the thirty years' war had been expelled from his country, had read it through fifty-eight times; Beata Sturm, the Tabea of Wuerttemberg, more than thirty times; the pious chancellor Forstner of Mompelgard had set certain hours of each day aside for Scripture reading; the Mexican hermit, Gregori Lopez, devoted several hours each day to reading the Bible, although he knew nearly the whole book by heart. Charles XII. of Sweden did not intermit his daily Bible reading even when in camp. It is related of a learned theologian of this century, Dr. G. Menken, that he used his Bible so faithfully, that he needed a new Bible more frequently than new clothes.

How many preachers of the Word could be found at the present time who feel to such a degree the need of constant reading of the Scriptures? Is not often more time devoted to the reading of newspapers than to the reading of God's Word? Does it not often happen that a plain member of a congregation is more at home in the Bible than his pastor? The old preachers like Valerius Herberger, John Hermann, Luetkemann, Heinrich Mueller, Scriver, Lassenius, Spener, and others, were so deeply rooted in the Scriptures that they could quote from memory, by chapter and verse, the many passages

of Scripture cited by them in their sermons. Quoting Scripture is, for many modern preachers, an embarrassing task. This would not be the case if preachers would heed the admonition in Jos. 1, 18: "This book of the law shall not depart out of thy mouth, but thou shalt meditate therein day and night;" and 1 Tim. 4, 13: "Give attendance to reading." The reading of God's Word should be their continued occupation.

2.—MEDITATION.

But diligently reading the Scriptures does not alone suffice. Rousseau relates of himself that he read the Bible through five or six times. But he never read it in the spirit of reverence and worship. What a great difference between the Bible reading of Rousseau and of Augustine! The difference is as great as between the *Confessions* of Rousseau and the *Confessions* of Augustine. Bacon's dictum: "*Duo si faciunt idem, non est idem,*" is applicable to the reading of Scripture also. It is not sufficient that through diligent perusal of the words of the Bible we impress them on our memory: they should be felt in their power in our hearts, according to the injunction of Deut. 6, 6: "And these words which I command thee this day, shall be in thine heart." In the granary of the memory the seed of God's Word cannot take root and grow, but only in the heart.

We must read the Bible first as Christians, and then only as theologians; first for ourselves, and then only for the congregation; first for the salvation of our own souls, for our own edification, and then only for the purpose of enriching our minds for our pastoral calling.

We hear August Herman Francke, even after he had, as public teacher, already commenced his *collegia philobiblica*, complaining that his theology was in his head, and not in his heart, and must we not join in this complaint? Do we always, when reading God's Word, seek for the kernel, or do we gnaw more at the hull? Are we satisfied to learn the Bible by heart, or do we endeavor to make it our inward possession? And if the Scriptures are *Christus scriptus*, do we endeavor in reading to *have* them and not to *know* them merely, as A. Monod says?

Concerning the proper manner of reading Scripture, Lu-

ther remarks: "They are eternal words, and must be reviewed and understood with a contemplative spirit, as the psalmist says, I will listen to what God speaks in me. And no one will understand the Scriptures except such a quiet and contemplative spirit." And H. Mueller says: "If we would draw a light from God's Word with which to enlighten others, we must in spirit contemplate it, press and chew every word well, that the juice may first flow into our own hearts, and then into the hearts of the hearers. There is, in truth, more power and wisdom in one single word of Holy Scripture than our whole soul can embrace; therefore we should cling to every word, as a bee clings to the flower, and not leave it until we are fully satiated and satisfied, so that we can also impart to others of our abundance." Quiet contemplation of Holy Scripture, pious studying of its treasures, the reception of its divine truth into our hearts,—this is the proper way of reading the Bible.

Such pious contemplation of the Law was enjoined upon the Jews in Jos. 1, 8 and Ps. 1, 2. The Therapeutics and the Essenes stood in high regard because they practiced this study. Church history shows us in every century men whose favorite occupation and recreation was such study of the truths of God's Word. Of Ambrosius it is related that he was once standing at his desk, with a copy of the Psalms open before him, and his finger resting on a certain verse. Then one by one a number of Christians entered his room in order to ask his counsel in spiritual matters; but he was so preoccupied in the study of the depths of God's Word, that he neither saw nor heard them. Nor were they willing to disturb him in his contemplation, and it required considerable time before he could withdraw from the holy Word of God and return to his work.

A similar contemplation and immersion into the Scriptures we find in Luther. Among other things we hear him say: "I have for a number of years been reading the Bible through twice every year, and if the Bible were a mighty tree, and all its words limbs and branches, yet have I shaken at each one of them in order to learn what was on it and what it was worth, and everytime I have shaken down additional good fruit."

Pascal, as a result of his diligence in reading the Bible, could almost repeat it by heart, but he never read it except in the spirit of reverence, worship and pious contemplation, in accordance with his principle, that only that Word of God which had been received into the heart could confer blessings.

Tholuck, in his Work on the "Living Witnesses of the Lutheran Church during the Thirty Years' War," mentions a considerable number of men—not only theologians, but also physicians and lawyers—who wrote, and chiefly for their own edification, *meditationes sacrae*. But at the present time a pastor who would daily engage in such meditation for his own sake would be an *avis rara*. Læhe goes so far as to say, that such exercise and expression of inner life are lost entirely in our day—to wit, meditation or contemplation of divine words and truths in the presence of God. Whenever no time is taken or no desire is present to fill the wells of our souls with such waters of eternal life, the heart must remain dry and cold. Without holy meditation there is no inner, living knowledge of God and of divine truths. John H. Ursinus, born at Spire and later Superintendent in Regensburg, compared the merely outward knowledge of God and of the divine truths with the waves of the sea, which overflow the banks, but do not make the fields fruitful.

Just as John (Rev. 10) had to take the little book from the hand of the angel and eat it, so must we take and assimilate the Word of God as the true food of our souls. The Word of God should be our permanent means of nourishment. This is what Paul teaches when in 1 Tim. 4, 6. he describes the good minister of Jesus Christ as being "nourished up in the words of faith and of good doctrine." This passage probably was in Ambrosius' mind when he said in a sermon exhorting to the daily study of the Word of God: "The Word of God is the principle of life for our souls, through which they are nourished and governed. In proportion as the Word of God, after it has been received into the soul and has been understood, increases, the soul's life also increases; and in proportion as the Word of God departs from our souls, life too departs therefrom. Therefore we must under all circumstances strive—something that is higher than all other things—to gather into ourselves the words o

God, and receive them into our soul and mind, into our thoughts and actions."

Our chief interest in the investigation of God's Word should not be of an intellectual character. Two things must be united, namely, learning the Word of God and doing the Word of God. The author of the precious Letter to Diognet speaks to the point when he says: "The true Christian is a paradise, where the tree of knowledge and the tree of life grow near to each other. These are planted so near together, because neither life is certain without knowledge, nor knowledge certain without life." "Action is a preparatory to knowledge," was the maxim of Gregory of Nazianz. And Ullmann, the biographer of this theologian, remarks on this: "Only in proportion as we have received into us what we have learned, and so permit the truths of salvation to become in reality active agencies for our sanctification, can a firm, living, well-rooted knowledge of these truths, one which is continually developed to a higher state of perfection, be acquired. Therefore, in the science of divine things, in theology, those have ever been great masters and have effected the greatest and most blessed results, whose pure knowledge was based on a powerful inner life. Every growth in the knowledge of truth should be accompanied by a growth in the obedience to truth."

Whenever only a literary interest is taken in God's Word there results a hypertrophy of the intellect and an atrophy of the heart, and the health of the inner man thereby is entirely lost. Religious and moral decay will sooner or later show itself wherever the truth does not sink into the heart, but is made only an object of speculation, where learned science is not combined with a practical conscience. Carl von Raumer correctly observes: "It sometimes seems as if through a too strong tension of the intellectual powers the moral suffer, that on account of too much work for the intellect there is no time left for thoughts of sanctification and of struggles, and even at last there is not even the strength and ability for these left, because such work of the intellect takes up the entire man."

The Word of God is given "for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness." The fundamental

interest which we should have in the Word of God is of an ethical character. But we should assimilate with all the powers of our inner man the whole Word of God, not only as to its loving and consoling, but also as to its earnest and reproving side. "As the sponge-like moss on the wooded hill-tops," says Loeber, "receives the dews of heaven and lets them descend drop by drop into the wells beneath, so too must the faculties of the human mind receive the divine revelation. The fundamental faculties are willing and knowing. To know an object we must first let it make an impression upon us. All profound knowing is passive, but a real appropriation takes place only when we grasp, govern and pervade the object of knowledge with all the organs of our life, when all the faculties of knowledge, the feelings, the imagination, judgment, thought, and all-embracing memory through the will are put into independent activity. The revelation of God is worthy that we should pursue the thoughts of God that appear in the distance, as a hunter pursues his game, through all its windings, hems it in on all sides, until he strikes and slays it." Hamann, the Magus of the North, called the Bible his element and his nourishment. How much more should it be the element and the nourishment for the preacher! Paul Gerhard sings:

"Dein Wort ist meine Speise,
Bis ich gen Himmel reise."

Every pastor should join in this song. But it should not be a song merely; it should be reality.

3.—SELF-STUDY IN THE MIRROR OF THE WORD.

Hand in hand with the study of the Word must go the study of self. The *consideratio sui* is a part of the *meditatio*. Pelagius in a letter to Demetrias well says: "You will be making good use of the divine Word, if you employ it as a mirror, so that in it the soul may see itself as an image, and may better its faults and ornament still more its virtues." The Word of God is the mirror, but we must look not only at the mirror, but at ourselves also; our inner and our outward form, our private and our public life we should examine in this mirror. For we would be looking at the mirror only if we would consider the Word of God in a learned, objective

manner, and would neglect to make the transition from the objective to the subjective. In reading the Scriptures, we must always say to ourselves, *I am the one to whom these words are spoken; I am the one of whom this is said.*"

If Pythagoras, Plato, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius could daily take time to study and examine themselves, how much more should the Christian, the pastor, practice self-observation. Not only did Thales admonish to "know thyself," but the Scriptures do the same. In the *vitae patrum* we read how the Fathers used the Bible for self-examination, how they read it with self-criticism. On one occasion Origen, while studying the words of Ps. 50, 16: "But unto the wicked God saith, What hast thou to do to declare my statutes, or that thou shouldst take my covenant in thy mouth?" was so moved to tears that for some time he was unable to speak a word. The deeply humble Ambrosius, while examining himself in the light of the words of Luke 7, 47. laments: "When will I be able to say of myself, 'He loved much, for many sins were forgiven him?' I confess that my sins were greater than those of the woman mentioned in this gospel and that more has been forgiven me, because I have been called from the busy world to the service of Christ's Church." The jurist John Brunnemann, who died in 1672, in speaking of Matt. 20. 1-16, confesses as follows: "How many of my works have I undertaken for the sake of men! How often have I in my undertakings looked only to human applause! How often have I searched for the metal of human interest instead of the gold of eternal life! How many works have I undertaken for perishable objects! How earnestly have I striven, how diligently have I labored, how anxiously have I concerned myself in the sweat of my brow for human honor and praise, money and earthly prosperity! O, if I had undertaken but half this work to the honor of God! I have subjected myself to innumerable anxieties, but have been negligent in that which is serviceable to salvation, with miserable cares have I burdened myself, but the works which truth and honor demanded I have not prosecuted with that care which I should have exhibited, and not with the proper aim before my eyes. I have endured much in the course of my life, nothing, or but little, however, for the honor of Christ, or because of obedience to His commands. Be on thy guard, O

my soul, that thou mayest not be found among those who while on earth strive only for earthly possessions, but in the life beyond the grave will be condemned to eternal torment because of their ambition."

Lœhe says: "In the heart of every Christian, even if he has not the Word of God lying open before him, there should nevertheless be so much light and power of the Word, that by looking into his heart and at his walk, he can see his defection and departure from the Word and will of God. Wherever he goes the punishing power of God's Spirit should go with him; he should know and feel himself to be in the power and punishment of the Spirit. But he should carry within himself and so to say suffer not only this necessary result of a life devoted to the Word, but he should meet the humiliating effects of the Word and the Spirit by diligence and fidelity in seeking out his sin. When he feels the punishment of sin within him, he prays with Ps. 139, 23, 34: 'Search me, O God, and know my heart; try me, and know my thoughts. And see if there be any wicked way in me, and lead me in the way of everlasting.' Especially is it befitting a pastor to live in continual self-examination, sorrow and contrition on account of his sins committed in the discharge of his calling. If he lives in self-examination then the whole complex of his duties will ever and again rise vividly before his soul, and he will not always or so often overlook things which everybody beside himself disapproves in him, but which he in human weakness and forgetfulness easily passes by."

It has often been said of our times that men reflect and *speculate* on the truths of Christianity, while the early Christians *lived* in them. A French historian, Rosseuw St. Hilaire, says: "The weak side of the religion of our day is intellectualism; Christianity with us is rather thought than feeling and life." This is an ailment of pastors also. It would be much better if, hand in hand with the study of the Word, there would be a constant self-examination, and if this latter were accompanied with that same honesty and earnest repentance out of which the *Confessiones* of Augustine were born.

If the study of the inner and the outward life in the mirror of God's Word is of the right kind, then this must necessarily result in *pia suspiria*.

4.—THE PRAYERFUL ASSIMILATION OF THE WORD.

Origen exhorted his former pupil, the later renowned Bishop Gregorius Thaumaturgus in New Caesarea, to read the Scriptures diligently, but added: "Be not satisfied with merely seeking and knocking; the most important thing, in order to understand divine things, is prayer. The Lord, in urging us to do this, does not say merely: Knock, and it shall be opened unto you; seek, and ye shall find; but also: Ask, and it shall be given unto you!" Pelagius writes in a letter to Demetrias: "Let prayer frequently interrupt your reading." Bernhard of Clairvaux says: "Reading searches for the sweetness of a blessed life, meditation finds it, prayer asks for it." In the Bible God speaks to us. But what He says to us should furnish us the occasion to speak to Him: all of God's commands and all His promises we should convert into prayer. We should read the Word prayerfully, and pray while reading. Oetinger, the Magus of the South, was accustomed to fold his hands while reading the Bible. The Lutheran theologian Calvœr could say of himself: "What I have learned through study and examination, that I embody in my prayer."—"What is easier than this study, examination, prayer, and what makes us wiser, stronger and more blessed in doing good? How do we thereby feel the powers of the future world, which lie concealed in the Word! How does the Word become sweeter than honey and the honey comb!" "In this way we should always make use of the Holy Scriptures, and through them experience the most joyful hours of our inner life, and foretaste of eternal life." Prayerful reading of the Bible is at the same time a *studium pietatis*. Without this all search in the Scriptures is nothing but a *philosophia de rebus sacris*, as A. H. Franke was accustomed to call it.

He who with a prayerful heart seeks for the saving truths revealed in the Word of God, will surely find them. And he who has found them and has felt their divine power cannot be confused by dark and mysterious passages in the Scriptures; he applies to the Scriptures what a wise Greek said of the writings of Heraklites the Dark. "What I understand of them is excellent, and from this I draw my conclusion of the worth of that which I do not understand." Goethe re-

marks: "Really we learn only from those books concerning which we are not able to pass judgment. The author of a book concerning which we can pass a judgment, must learn from us. Therefore the Bible is a book of eternal power, because since the beginning of the world, nobody has been able to stand up and say: 'I comprehend it all, and understand each single point!'"

If the Bible reader stands before a passage that is locked, this should furnish him an occasion to ask the doorkeeper to open. The real doorkeeper of God's Word is the Holy Spirit (John 14, 26). "He who has not the Holy Spirit, does not understand an iota of Scriptures," says Luther. In harmony with this even Goethe says: "Woe unto the Christian who would understand the Scriptures from commentaries." In order to understand Scripture more is necessary than mere human erudition, more than theological learning. K. v. Raumer correctly remarks: "Palæstrina and Hændel understood the 53. chapter of Isaiah better than Gesenius." The similar is comprehended only by that which is similar. This is a truth observed even in lower spheres. A man can be eminently talented for philosophy and the natural sciences, but if he has no taste for music he is not capable of passing a judgment on a Sonate of Beethoven. Frederick the Great, the philosopher on the throne, declared the dramas of Shakspeare to be barbarous, and Kant, notwithstanding his philosophy, could not appreciate the poet Sophocles; he lacked the inner relationship. The canon that he who would understand a poet must go into the poet's country, can be applied to the Holy Scriptures also. The Scriptures being inspired by the Holy Ghost can be understood only by congenial spirits, but not by people that have a heterogenous spirit. He who goes to school to the Holy Spirit will feel within himself a powerful inner sympathy with the Scriptures, and passages that formerly were dark to him, will become as transparent as jewels, which are dark only at dusk, but when held in the light of the sun reveal unthought of brilliancy.

The reading of the Word of God must be prosecuted with the Pentecostal prayer:

Veni Sancte Spiritus
Et emitte coelitus
Lucis tuae radium!

THE FORMULA OF DISTRIBUTION IN THE LORD'S SUPPER.

In accordance with the plain words of our Lord in the institution of the Holy Supper the Lutheran Church believes, that this blessed sacrament "is the true body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, under the bread and wine, for us Christians to eat and to drink." This faith she has set forth in her public confessions, and this she declares when she celebrates the sacrament. So her ministers teach, because so her people believe, and so they confess when the administration takes place. When this faith is in the heart it would seem not only proper and right, but even necessary, that she should distribute the elements with the confession that this is the true body and the true blood of our Lord Jesus Christ.

But to this objections have been made in the past and are repeated in our own times. That those who deny the real presence of our Lord's body and blood in the sacrament should object to such a confession, is perfectly natural. So far as they would still accept the Scriptures as the Word of God and therefore not reject our Lord's words, "This is my body," "This is my blood," as formally false, though insisting on giving them an interpretation which materially changes their sense, they could not have the same objection to using the words, "Take eat, this is the body, this is the blood, of our Lord Jesus Christ," as they have against employing the words "This is the true body, this is the true blood of our Lord." In the former case they would have no more difficulty with the words of distribution than they have with the words of institution. The manipulation of the words by which the result is reached that the body and blood meant are not the body and blood of our Lord at all, but only a something to which by a rhetorical flourish these names are attached, will answer the purpose in one case as well as in the other. It is as easy to explain away the disciples' confession, "This is the Lord's body," as it is to explain away the Master's declaration, "This is my body." If conscience does not protest in the latter instance, it certainly will not in the former. For such persons our article is not designed. It would be useless to attempt a refutation of their objections

to a Lutheran formula of distribution so long as they are not convinced of their error in rejecting the Lutheran doctrine out of which that formula springs. Indeed, it would be uncandid to deny that when men believe our Lord's words, "This is my body," to mean that it is not His body at all in any proper sense, it would be inconsistent on their part to say that it is His *true* body. Our controversy with such persons lies in a different field from that contemplated by our present inquiry.

But there are some who object to our formula on other grounds. They do not deny the truth of the confession, "This is the true body of our Lord." On the contrary, they subscribe to our confessions, not excepting those portions in which the words true and truly are used with reference to our Lord's body and its presence in the Holy Supper. Their objection is to the propriety of employing these terms in the administration of the sacrament. It is claimed, in the first place, that it is an irreverent and utterly unjustifiable proceeding to insert a word into the solemn declaration of the Lord Himself. Although this is not directly expressed, yet the meaning of the objection is that those who insert the word "true" in the formula of distribution are guilty of interpolating the Scriptures and subject themselves to the curse pronounced upon men who make additions to the words of God's Book. In the second place, it is urged that in the sacramental feast of fellowship and love it is wantonly introducing a discordant element when a word that forms the shibboleth of a denomination is employed in the very moment of communion with Christ and with each other. Christian charity, it is thought, must forbid the insertion at least at such a time, even if it be admitted that there may be times when such explicit statement of doctrine is admissible or even necessary.

The latter objection carries with it but little weight and will require no lengthy refutation. It seems to us to imply more than those who make desire to say. It would be of some force if it were admitted that the doctrine of the Lord's Supper revealed in the Scriptures and confessed by the Lutheran Church is not of such import or value as to require, or even to justify, our making any practical account of it in our wor-

ship and especially in the celebration of the sacrament itself. If the Lord really taught us that what He bestows in this holy communion is His true body and blood, and that in the reception of this body and blood heavenly blessings are designed to be imparted to our souls, why should not the very time of its administration be appropriate to remind us of the unspeakable gift and to confess the goodness of God in bestowing it? How could true charity stand in the way of telling to others what a precious treasure God conveys to us in the sacrament? It is true, there are some who deny the presence of this gift and the reality of the treasure, and it is true also that such may take offence at any confession which affirms such presence and reality. But in this regard there are two points to be considered. First, it is not the Christian spirit that suggests silence in regard to heavenly truths when men are unwilling to hear them because they prefer human errors. Our Lord requires us to confess Him before men, not to deny Him when confession imposes a cross. Secondly, those who take offense at the humble confession of the truth which our Lord taught us are not the people whose feelings are to be mainly taken into account when we celebrate the sacrament. There are those who love that truth and are delighted and edified by the confession. These are our brethren who have prior claims upon our charity, and what charity to these requires will not fail to be charity also to those who unhappily are not pleased when the truth is declared. Moreover, those who are offended when believers confess their humble faith will not be disturbed in their communion, as they cannot, just because they take offense at our Lord's teaching, be admitted to the Lord's table. The objection therefore refutes itself. Whoever finds himself disturbed or offended by the confession of what the Master of the feast teaches concerning it is out of place at the feast, and those who partake of it need not suppress the consoling truth on their account. The true disciples of the Lord are not ashamed of Him or of His words.

The second objection is more plausible. Nothing could justify any addition to the words of the Holy Spirit, as nothing could justify any subtraction from them. But the objection rests on a misapprehension of the purpose and meaning

of the words of distribution. Their design is not to repeat the words of institution as a necessary constituent of the holy sacrament, but to express the faith of the Church which accepts and believes those words. The former is done in the consecration, not in the distribution.

“The form of this sacrament,” writes Gerhard, “consists in an action, and that the same which Christ and His apostles observed in its administration, and which they not only by example, but also by precept commanded to be observed. From the description of the evangelists we gather that three sacramental acts belong to the form and integrity of this sacrament, to wit: 1. Christ took the bread and blessed it; 2. He gave and distributed the broken bread to His disciples, saying, ‘Take, eat, this is my body which is given for you’; 3. The disciples received and ate the consecrated bread.” After stating that the same course was taken in regard to the cup he continues: “There are thus three sacramental acts: 1. The consecration or blessing of the bread and cup; 2. The distribution of the bread and cup consecrated; 3. The sacramental eating and drinking of the bread and cup distributed.” *Loci* 22, § 142. Further on the same great dogmatician writes: “As Christ in the institution of the Holy Supper expressly directs that we should do that which He did, it follows that the ministers of the church in celebrating the Supper should repeat the words of the institution and in this manner consecrate the bread and wine and distribute them to the communicants.” *Ib.* § 149.

What Gerhard and the other great theologians of our Church say in regard to the necessity of consecrating the elements by repeating the words of the institution is in exact accord with the Confession, which says: “In the administration of the Holy Supper the words of institution should be publicly spoken or sung, distinctly and clearly, and should in no way be omitted, in order that obedience may be rendered to the command of Christ, ‘This do,’ and that the faith of the hearers concerning the nature and fruit of this sacrament (concerning the presence of the body and blood of Christ, concerning the forgiveness of sins and all benefits which have been purchased by the death and shedding of blood of Christ, and are bestowed upon us in Christ’s testa-

ment) may be excited, strengthened and confirmed by Christ's word, and, besides that the elements of bread and wine may be consecrated or blessed for this holy use, in order that the body and blood of Christ may therewith be administered to be eaten and to be drunk, as Paul declares (1. Cor. 10, 16), 'The cup of blessing which we bless,' which indeed occurs in no other way than through the repetition and recitation of the words of institution. Nevertheless, this blessing, or the narration of the words of institution of Christ, does not alone make a sacrament, if the entire action of the Supper, as it was instituted by Christ, be not observed, as when the consecrated bread is not distributed, received, and partaken of, but is enclosed, sacrificed, or carried about. But the command of Christ. 'This do,' which embraces the entire action or transaction in this sacrament, viz. that in an assembly of Christians bread and wine are taken, consecrated, distributed, received, i. e. eaten and drunk, and the Lord's death is thereby shown forth, should be observed unseparated and inviolate, as also St. Paul presents before our eyes the entire action of the breaking of bread or of distribution and reception." Form. Conc. II. Art. 7, § 78-84.

These citations show that our Confessions as well as our dogmaticians understand our Lord's words, commanding "This do" in the sacrament of the altar, to mean that the elements shall be consecrated, distributed, and received, and that the consecration which is thus commanded is to take place by the repetition of our Lord's words of institution. In the first of those actions constituting the sacrament these words must be employed, that the elements may thus be set apart for holy use. There is no command, and for the constitution of the sacrament there is no need, that they be employed in the other two actions belonging to the integrity of the holy sacrament. The Lord's Supper would be valid if any other suitable words besides those of the institution were spoken during the distribution, or even if no words at all were spoken. The Lord prescribed no formula of distribution, and none can therefore be obligatory upon the Church for conscience' sake, much less be made essential to the validity of the sacrament. The word of God is added to the element in the consecration, and in that the words of institu-

tion are therefore necessary. For the distribution and reception of the elements thus consecrated and set apart for sacramental use no words are prescribed, and nothing more is requisite to constitute the sacrament, after the consecration, than that the consecrated elements be given to the communicants and received.

In the year 1619 the subject here under consideration was brought to the notice of the Theological Faculty at Wittenberg. The question was proposed whether in the administration of the Lord's Supper it is necessary to use these or similar words: "The body and blood of Christ preserve your body and soul unto eternal life." The point to be decided was whether the Lord's command, "Do this in remembrance of me," implies the command to use such a formula of distribution. Those learned Lutheran theologians replied as follows:

"This certainly rests on the institution of the holy sacrament by our Lord, especially on the words referred to, 'This do,' as this looks to the final cause of the administration. In view of this it is, in the first place, indubitably certain that for the proper and salutary administration of the Holy Supper it is necessary thankfully to remember the Lord Jesus Christ and show forth His death. But it is equally certain that such commemoration and showing forth of the Lord's death can take place without this or a similar formula repeated to every communicant: e. g. by previous admonition; by the recitation of the words of institution; by Christian hymns sung during the distribution; also by every Christian's true and suitable devotion. Therefore the words mentioned in the question cannot be regarded as belonging to the essence of the sacrament, nor as an integral portion of it, without which it would be imperfect, nor as necessary to the salutary use of the Supper. This is apparent when it is considered 1. That they are not contained in the first institution nor there commanded; 2. That they are not mentioned by St. Paul as necessary to the holy sacrament; 3. That we nowhere read that Christ or the apostles or the first apostolic Church, by whom everything necessary to the substance and use of the holy sacrament was employed, used this or a similar formula. In the mean time it is not to be denied that it contributes to

the welfare and edification of the Church if the distribution of the sacrament is not an *actio muta* (silent transaction), but every communicant is reminded of the benefits of Christ and especially of the use and efficacy of this sacrament, the ignorant are informed and instructed, and many a person is awakened who is led by the recitation of such a formula to a deeper view of the transaction. Finally, in this way there will also be the better compliance with the words of Christ, 'Do this in remembrance of me,' and of St. Paul, 'As often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup ye do show the Lord's death.' For these and other reasons no congregation should omit to use some formula in distributing the Lord's Supper." *Thesaurus Dedekenni*, Vol. I. Part 2, 267.

It is therefore unquestionable that the Lutheran Church has been unanimous in the conviction, that the words of institution are to be used in the consecration, where of course they should be given without any change, but that in the distribution no special formula is prescribed or necessary, it being left to the liberty of the Church to choose any words that would be deemed most suitable. That the ancient Church entertained the same conviction is evident from the variety of formulæ of distribution employed in the early centuries, and from their uniform character as confessions of faith, not citations of Scripture. In his *Archæology* Guericke writes: "The bishop or presbyter, sometimes too (as in cases of necessity) a deacon, administers the bread with the words, not historically narrating, but confessionally testifying, 'The body of Christ,' upon which the recipient, also adding his confession of the true presence of Jesus Christ, responds 'Amen.' The deacon presents the cup with the words, 'The blood of Christ, the cup of life,' and the recipient answers 'Amen.' In the Liturgy of St. Mark the words of distribution are these: 'The holy body, the sacred blood of the Lord, our God and Savior.' In the time of Gregory the Great this formula was also used: 'The body of our Lord Jesus Christ preserve thy soul.' According to the statement of the Conc. Turonicum I. a. 460 this form was employed: 'The body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ help thee unto the forgiveness of sins and eternal life.' Thus the words of distribution in the different old Liturgies were indeed not quite the same;

but all of them bear testimony to the real presence of the body and blood of Christ, and nowhere and never in the ancient Church were the words of institution, historically narrated, themselves used in the distribution. It was clearly understood that the citation of the Lord's words, here as in the analogous case of Baptism, belongs to the consecration, whilst in the distribution an open, free, unambiguous confession is in place." *Chr. Arch.*, p. 309.

As in the ancient, so in the Lutheran Church there were different words used in the distribution of the Lord's Supper, but all of them confessing the Church's faith that the true body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ are given to the communicant. The diversity of form only shows the unanimity with which the words used in distributing were regarded as a confession of faith, not as an application of the Lord's words necessary to constitute the sacrament, as is the case in the consecration. In the distribution the Christian Church declares what that is which is administered and received, and does this in the form that she finds most suitable and adequate to express what she has learned from her Lord's words and heartily believed.

It only remains then to inquire whether the formula, "This is the true body, the true blood of our Lord Jesus Christ," is such an adequate expression of the faith which the Lutheran Church has held and holds. Of this there can be no question. From her earliest to her latest confession her testimony in this regard is always the same. The sacrament of the altar is "the true body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ," she says and teaches her children to say in her Catechism. "Of the Supper of the Lord they teach that the true body and blood of Christ are truly present," says the Augsburg Confession. And in her later confessions this is earnestly maintained and defended against all gainsayers. Without all controversy, the formula in question expresses what the Lutheran Church believes in regard to the holy sacrament. "This is the true body of our Lord" is the sincere confession of her believing heart.

It is true, there have been other forms in use, and the early Lutheran Church was content to use them, although the word "true" was not annexed to "body" and "blood," as the

Christians in ancient times, though they believed that it is the true body which is presented, spoke merely of the Lord's body. When no question is raised about the reality of the object designated by the word, there is no need for any terms to set aside falsifications and misunderstandings. Who, when a body is mentioned, ever thinks of anything but a true body, unless some reason be furnished for suspecting that the object is not really what the word declares it to be? The Lord says that it is His body which is given, and the Lutheran Church would confess that it is His body, and rest the matter there. That it is not a true body would scarcely enter a truly believing heart. But when men arise who teach that it is not a true body, that it is not the Lord's body at all that is given in the sacrament, that it is a mere emblem of a body, that it is only metaphorically called the Lord's body, but is in fact nothing but the bread which the senses discern, — who can doubt the propriety of so formulating her confession that she will not be misunderstood, and of declaring accordingly that it is the Lord's *true* body? Therefore for three hundred years this formula has been in use among Lutherans, and those who desire a clear and unequivocal confession of their faith in the holy sacrament will not fail to find it preferable.

We append an extract from Rudelbach's excellent work on the Words of the Sacraments. Referring to the charge that the words, "Take and eat," as well as the form, "This is the *true* body, the *true* blood," is only a bitter fruit of the excitement against Crypto-Calvinists, he says: "Verily, without in the least desiring to defend the mode and manner of that controversy, we must remark that this allegation is equally in conflict with truth and justice. To our fathers it was a sacred matter of the highest importance that the words of the sacrament should be preserved pure, and that every believing communicant have in the administration the faith of his heart clearly and distinctly expressed. And if they now found it necessary to give a more precise and exact expression to their faith, without in the least changing the substance of the matter, who should forbid them? Was the sense different when they said: 'This is the *true* body' from what it was when they simply said, 'This is the body?' On the contrary, those who could not bear to hear the word '*true*'

subjected themselves to the just suspicion that there is something dubious about their faith in the *true* presence of the Lord's body and blood in the Holy Supper, notwithstanding their frequent declarations. And the Church should not be permitted to express such a shibboleth? When was ever the Greek Church censured for inserting in the symbol the word *ἕνα* before *μυστογενῆ*, in order to cut off the roots of Gnosticism, according to which there were two Christs, one suffering and the other not? And, finally, how did it come that in Denmark, a Lutheran country in which Crypto-Calvinism had scarcely any adherents and where the Formula of Concord was never accepted, that addition '*true*' was delighted in, while the other part of the formula, 'Take, eat' was never introduced." *Sacraments-Worte*, p. 78.

We do not maintain that those who use some other formula of distribution than that under consideration are not Lutherans, or that their preference in any way subjects them to reproach. There were other formulas employed in the Church's best days, and there may be others employed without offense now. But it cannot be denied that the words, "This is the true body, the true blood of our Lord Jesus Christ," adequately express the Lutheran faith as no other formula does, and that the false doctrines in vogue concerning the Lord's Supper, and the frequent attempt to explain away our Lord's words by representing the body of which He speaks as not being His body at all, make it not only eminently proper, but highly desirable that it should be used, in order that the Church may bear her constant and un mistakeable testimony to the truth which she holds. And this must be added, in all charity and kindness, that when men make objection to this formula, they suggest the suspicion that they are averse to the faith which it expresses; and as against such persons it is needful to hold fast the good confession and to give place, no, not for an hour.

L.

HOMILETICAL DEPARTMENT.

Contributions to this department are respectfully solicited.

C. H. L. S.

FOURTH SUNDAY AFTER EPIPHANY. MATT. 8, 23-27.

Int. Matt. 8, 19-23. Luke 22, 28-29. Acts 14, 22. From passages such as these you see that the Lord Jesus does not seek to win us for Himself and His kingdom by promises of earthly riches, ease, comfort, pleasures, and the like. No, He tells us beforehand that we must suffer all manner of tribulations if we would be His disciples. God will not only permit the devil, our most bitter enemy, to tempt, persecute and afflict us; but, for wise reasons, He Himself will at times lead us in ways which are exceedingly distressing to the body and trying to the soul. As *disciples* we need *discipline*—and sometimes the discipline of the rod.

But shall these considerations deter any one from becoming a follower of Christ? Shall they move us who are with Him, to forsake our Lord and Savior? God forbid! We know that greater than all our needs is His help; that His consolations exceed all our sorrows; and “that the sufferings of this present time,” etc. Rom. 8, 18.

Doctrines, instructive and comforting, such as these, we are taught by the lesson narrated in the text.

THE LORD JESUS AND HIS DISCIPLES OUT ON THE SEA.

I. *The great tempest.*

1. The seas, the winds, all nature and the forces of nature, are God's creatures and subject to His command. It is He who “divideth the sea with his power—who maketh the deep to boil like a pot.” Job 12, 41. Ps. 135, 5-7.
2. By the will and command of God “there arose a great tempest”—comp. Isa. 43, 2.—to prove the disciples—to strengthen their faith—to prepare them for the work of life.

II. *The cry of distress.*

1. “We perish!”—Perish, and the Lord so near? (The conflict of faith with sense and reason.)
2. “Lord, save us!” Little faith and hope—yet true faith and hope.

III. *The Master's rebuke.*

1. Of the tempest in the hearts of the disciples.
2. Of the winds and the waves.

IV. *The Query: "What manner of Man," etc.*

1. Importance of.
 2. The answer: Man (sleepeth); God (command).
- C. H. L. S.

SEPTUAGESIMÆ. MATT. 20, 1-16.

Int. In the figure of a vineyard the kingdom of heaven is presented to us in both the Old and the New Testaments. Comp. e. g. Jer. 2, 21 and 5, 2. Also John 15, 1, etc. Thus in our text.

2. Here special prominence is given to the fact that we are called into the kingdom as *laborers*. A fact, how slowly learned, how little understood, how flagrantly disregarded!

OUR FATHER'S KINGDOM IN THE PARABLE OF A VINEYARD.

I. V. 1-7. *or the call to the kingdom.*

1. "*The householder went out*"—i. e. God comes to us that we may come to Him—O boundless grace! We in "the market place," i. e. a busy but sinful world—"standing idle," i. e. all labor outside of the kingdom is vain.
2. "*Early*"—the 3., 6., 9. and 11. hour; i. e. from the beginning of the world to its end God wearies not in His call to man—from the cradle to the grave He pleads with the individual—with you and me.
3. First He says, "*for a penny a day*;" then "*whatsoever is right*;" but really, the Gospel promises "every grace and every blessing." Comp. Matt. 19, 27-30.

II. V. 8-9. *or the day of account in the kingdom.*

1. "*When even was come*"—the evening in our Father's vineyard is the day of judgment. Then shall the laborers rest from their labors, but Heb. 9, 27; 1 Peter 4, 17-19, etc.
2. "*Saith unto His steward*," i. e. Christ; comp. John 5, 27-9.
3. "*And give them their hire . . .*" Then every laborer received "whatsoever is right;" that is, they who had entered the vineyard and engaged to labor in it according to the terms of the law and in its spirit, received "whatsoever is right" according to the Law; but those who had entered upon Gospel terms and labored in the Gospel spirit received "whatsoever is right" according to the Gospel. (By the Law man is entitled to nothing good, but is deserving

only of damnation; by the Gospel man is entitled, for Christ's sake, to eternal life).

III. V. 10-12. *or dissatisfaction in the kingdom.*

1. "*They supposed.*" By the Law they judge the kingdom of God to be based on strict justice and not on grace; and hence they misjudge the kingdom and the laws whereby it is truly governed.
2. "*Received more . . .*" A legal spirit is always a mercenary and venal spirit. Then judging their own worth by the time and amount of labor and not by the spirit in which labor was done, shows that they even understand not the meaning of the Law.
3. "*These last have wrought.*" Envy, its foolishness and hurtfulness.

IV. V. 13-15. *or the justice of the kingdom.*

1. "*I do thee no wrong—take that thine is . . .*" Strict divine justice to all who (discarding God's grace) appeal to it. And accordingly what do they receive? God saying to thee: "Take that thine is and go thy way." What wilt thou have? and whither wilt thou go?!
2. "*To do what I will.*" Though many of the called would make the kingdom of God one of justice, a kingdom of grace it is and shall remain. Happy they who will as such accept it.

Conclusion: V. 16. Having entered the kingdom let us avoid the mistakes and sins of the murmuring laborers lest we be found among the called indeed, but not chosen.

C. H. L. S.

SEXAGESIMÆ. LUKE 8, 4-15.

A.

THE HUSBANDRY OF HEAVEN.

I. *The Sower; V. 5a and 11.*

1. Though the word is *spoken* by Moses and the prophets, by Evangelists and Apostles, by preachers and Christians generally, yet they do it for God and in His name.
2. God is the real sower, the giver of the Word and of its increase. For this reason it is quick and powerful, able to create and destroy, to save and to condemn.

II. *The Seed; V. 5 and 11.*

1. Is the Word. Appropriateness of the figure.

2. Its good and pure qualities—contrast with words of men.

III. *The Ground*, 12–15.

1. The hearing people. 1 Cor. 3, 9.

2. Of a fourfold condition.

a) 5 & 12; b) 6 & 13; c) 7 & 14; and d) 8a & 15a.

IV. *The Harvest*, 8b and 15b.

1. Its ripening (“patience;” subject to heat and cold, sunshine and rain, etc.)

2. Its measure and kind. Comp. Mark 4, 20.

Conclusion: V. 8b and 10 as a word of invitation and of warning. C. H. L. S.

B.

HOW ARE WE TO RECEIVE THE WORD OF GOD?

I. *How?*

1. *Not with closed*, V. 5. 10. 12. *but open hearts;*

2. *Not with divided*, V. 7 & 14, *but with whole hearts;*

3. *Not with wavering*, V. 6 & 13, *but with faithful hearts.*

II. *Why?*

1. *We must render a strict account of the use of the Word;* 10.

2. *We are much tempted while hearing it;* 12.

3. *We depend on it for our salvation.* 12.

ADAPTED FROM THE GERMAN OF JASPIS.

QUINQUAGESIMAE. LUKE 18, 31–43.

Int. Thoughts. The nearness of the season of Lent. Its observance highly salutary. To it our text is intended to introduce us; as then Jesus “took unto Him the twelve,” so would He now take us and, in spirit, direct us to the scene of His sufferings.

“BEHOLD, WE GO UP TO JERUSALEM!”

I. *Behold the great and wonderful things which are there accomplished.* 31–33.

II. *Behold them. How can we unless the Lord have mercy on us that we may see?* 34–43. C. H. L. S.

FIRST SUNDAY IN LENT. MATT. 4, 1–11.

A.

THE TEMPTATION OF CHRIST AND OUR OWN TEMPTATION.

I. *He was tempted like as we are; but where we fell, there He conquered.*

- II. *We are tempted like as He was; but where He conquered, therein now can and shall we conquer likewise.*

FROM THE GERMAN OF UHLHORN.

B.

THREE LIES OF THE DEVIL.

- I. *That necessity ever justifies unrighteousness;*
 II. *That the Word of God can be quoted in support of his own wicked self;*
 III. *That there is any benefit or salvation in sin.*

FROM THE GERMAN OF F. ARNDT.

SECOND SUNDAY IN LENT. MATT. 15, 21-28.

Int. Reminiscere is the name of the present Sunday, and that means: *Remember*. There is so much for us to remember . . . The woman of Cānaan remembered what she had heard concerning the Son of David, that He had helped and delivered many, etc.

OF WHAT DOES THIS WOMAN OF CANAAN REMIND US?

- I. *That the Lord is the true physician of body and soul—and that we seek Him.*
 II. *That His hour does not always come when we would have it—and that we be patient.*
 III. *That we implore His help—and that we continue in prayer.*
 IV. *That He doeth all things well—and that we humble ourselves (and glorify Him).*

FROM THE GERMAN OF FUCHS.

THIRD SUNDAY IN LENT. LUKE 11, 14-28.

WHAT IS YOUR RELATION TO CHRIST THE LORD?

- I. *Are you His avowed enemy? 14-22.*
 II. *Do you attempt neutrality? 23.*
 III. *Are you an apostate from the faith? 24-26.*
 IV. *Do you have great zeal, but little knowledge? 27.*
 V. *Are you among those that are pronounced blessed? 28.*

C. H. L. S.

FOURTH SUNDAY IN LENT. JOHN 6, 1-15.

THE EARTHLY GIFTS OF LOVE DIVINE.

This divine Love gives:

- I. *To all, whatsoever they need;*
- II. *Always in due season;*
- III. *More than we ask for;*
- IV. *Things earthly with an eye to things heavenly.*

FROM THE GERMAN OF FUCHS.

FIFTH SUNDAY IN LENT. JOHN 8, 46-59.

A.

Int. Thoughts. The nearness of Good Friday.—Inquiry about Him who gave Himself for us, in the light of Heb. 7, 26 and 1 Pet. 1, 19.

THE SINLESSNESS OF CHRIST JESUS.

- I. *He is the Holy One of God—worship Him; 46 a. 52-59.*
- II. *He speaketh the truth of God—receive it; 46 b 47, 61.*
- III. *He doeth the work of God—confide in Him; 48-50.*

C. H. L. S.

B.

THE HATRED DIRECTED AGAINST CHRIST AND HIS WORD.

I. *Whence it is:*

1. *Not from the Lord*
 - a) Neither from His holy person.
 - b) Nor from the truthful word.
2. *It is of man and from within him.*
 - a) Be it from a want of knowledge,
 - b) Or from a lack of right will.

II. *Whither it leads:*

1. *To man's own destruction.*
 - a) He could have life;
 - b) He chooses death.
2. *Never to the injury of Christ.*
 - a) His enemies cannot hurt Him.
 - b) His God does not forsake Him.

FROM THE GERMAN OF GEROK.

PALM SUNDAY. MATT. 21, 1-11.

A.

BLESSED IS HE THAT COMETH IN THE NAME OF THE LORD?

I. *Who is He that cometh and what is the purpose of this coming?*

1. "Who is this?"

a) Think what God had done for thousands of years to teach to Jews the answer of this question, and yet they learned not—

b) Think what God does and has done for us these many years, to teach us Christ; but how little is He known among us.

2. "This is Jesus the Prophet."

a) Zechariah 9, 9; John 1, 14; Phil. 2, 6-11.

b) These very names state the purpose of His coming.

II. *What heart here present will withhold its benediction from Him who so cometh?*

1. *What heart, I ask; for with your lips you have blest His coming these many years, and this day—*

2. *If with the heart you bid welcome to your Savior, thus will you give utterance to your faith and hope and joy and love in word and work.*

C. H. L. S.

B.

THE RECEPTION OF OUR CHILDREN INTO FULL COMMUNION WITH THE CHRISTIAN CONGREGATION.

I. *For this the Lord Himself has prepared them through the ministry of His disciples. 1-5.*

II. *They come with the assurance that they trust the promise and will obey the commands of their Savior. 5-7 and 11.*

III. *By the people of God they are received with heartfelt supplications and glad hosannas. V. 9.*

ADAPTED FROM THE GERMAN.

GOOD FRIDAY. MATT. 27 OR LUKE 23.

A.

"BEHOLD THE LAMB OF GOD WHICH TAKETH AWAY THE SIN OF THE WORLD."

I. *Behold—and repent!*

II. *Behold—and be of good cheer!*

III. *Behold—and follow after holiness.*

C. H. L. S.

B.

“MY GOD, MY GOD, WHY HAST THOU FORSAKEN ME.”

I. *Because we have sinned Christ was forsaken of God.*

II. *Because Christ was forsaken of God we are accepted.*

C. H. L. S.

EASTER. MARK 16, 1-8.

A.

The angel-message :

JESUS OF NAZARETH, WHICH WAS CRUCIFIED, HE IS RISEN.

I. *Words which proclaim great things.*

II. *Words which require believing hearts.*

C. H. L. S.

B.

Int. Matt. 27, 62-66—“so the last error shall be worse than the first.” But, thanks to God, “the last error” has become the first truth.

COME, SEE THE PLACE WHERE THE LORD LAY! OH,
BLESSED SIGHT.

I. *Now we know that He is the Holy one of God. (V. 9. worshipped Him.)*

II. *Now we know that He has saved His people from their sins. (1 Cor. 15, 17).*

III. *Now we know that His words are spirit and are life.*

IV. *Now we know that hell is captive led and opened is the gate of heaven.*

V. *Now we know that we need fear no evil and that in our flesh we shall see God.*

Conclusion: Thanks be to God who giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.

C. H. L. S.

THE COLUMBUS THEOLOGICAL MAGAZINE.

This Magazine is designed to supply the want, long since felt, of a Lutheran periodical devoted to theological discussion. Its aim will be the exposition and defence of the doctrines of the Church as confessed in the Book of Concord. Theology in all its departments is embraced within its scope, though for the present special attention will be given to the controverted subject of predestination.

1. The Magazine is published bi-monthly, each number containing 64 pages.

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3. All remittances should be addressed to J. L. Trauger, Agent, Columbus, O. All Communications pertaining to the Editorial Department to Prof. M. Loy, Columbus, O.

The friends of the Magazine are requested to give such aid in its circulation as their circumstances permit.

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C O L U M B U S

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THEOLOGICAL MAGAZINE.

A BI-MONTHLY JOURNAL DEVOTED TO THE INTERESTS OF
THE EV. LUTHERAN CHURCH.

EDITED BY THE FACULTY OF CAPITAL UNIVERSITY.

VOL. IV.—No. II.

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THE
COLUMBUS THEOLOGICAL MAGAZINE

VOL. IV.

APRIL, 1884.

No. 2.

WHAT IS THE CHURCH?

When the Evangelical Lutheran Church is represented as the true visible Church of Christ on earth, and altar and pulpit fellowship with those who hold contrary doctrines is declined and disallowed, we are met with arguments and reproaches that are so irrelevant and so unjust that, if the source of the error were not known, we would have reason not only to be surprised, but even to doubt the Christian integrity of opponents. We are told, for example, that such a claim on our part is a denial that other Christian organizations are churches at all, and that such a practice involves the assumption that there are no true Christians in any other but the visible Lutheran Church. Manifestly such objections to our doctrine and practice are based on the theory that the one holy Christian Church is in its essence an external body with material marks by which the senses may discern it; that all denominations of Christians are parts of this extended whole, and therefore the denial of equal rights to any of the parts would be equivalent to unchurching them; and that the unity of the Church consists in the union of these historically separated Christian denominations, so that all opposition to such unionism is by its very nature sectarian or schismatic. That there is, as against Lutherans, no relevancy in any such objections, and that the inferences drawn from the false imputations involved are without all foundation, will be apparent to all fair-minded men who keep in view what the Scriptures teach and the Lutheran Church confesses concerning the nature of the

Church. The gross wrong is done us of arguing from substantially Romish views of the Church against an Evangelical Church that discards those views and regards them as part of a corrupt system from which, by the grace of God, she was delivered in the glorious Reformation of the sixteenth century. Believing that the claims of the Lutheran Church and the practice arising from them can be understood and appreciated only when the underlying doctrine of the Church in its essence is understood, we propose to set forth that doctrine as taught in Holy Scripture and our Confession.

To the question, What is the Church? the Augsburg Confession gives the brief and lucid answer: "The Church is properly the congregation of saints and true believers." Art. 8. The error that it is, in the strict or proper sense, an external polity, as Rome teaches, is thus renounced, and the truth that it is a spiritual body with faith as its essential mark, as the Bible teaches, is thus declared. That the papal figment and the Lutheran truth are thus in open antagonism is obvious. "We wonder why they find fault with our description," says the Apology, "which speaks of living members. Neither have we said anything new. Paul has defined the Church in precisely the same way (Eph. 5, 25 sq.), that it should be cleansed in order to be holy. And he adds the outward marks, the Word and Sacraments. For he thus says: 'Christ also loved the Church, and gave Himself for it, that He might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of water by the Word, that He might present it to Himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing, but that it should be holy and without blemish.' In the Confession we have presented this sentence almost in the very words. Thus also the Church is defined by the article in the Creed, which teaches us to believe that there is 'a Holy Catholic Church.' The wicked indeed are not a holy Church. And that which follows, viz. 'the communion of saints,' seems to be added in order to explain what the Church signifies, viz. the congregation of saints, who have with each other the fellowship of the same Gospel or doctrine and of the same Holy Ghost, who renews, sanctifies, and governs their hearts. And this article has been pre-

sented for a necessary reason. We see the infinite dangers which threaten the destruction of the Church. In the Church itself infinite is the multitude of the wicked who oppress it. Therefore, in order that we may not despair, but may know that the Church will nevertheless remain, likewise that we may know that however great the multitude of the wicked is, yet the Church exists, and that Christ affords those gifts which He has promised to the Church, to forgive sins, to hear prayer, to give the Holy Ghost: this article in the Creed presents us these consolations. And it says 'Catholic Church,' in order that we may not understand the Church to be an outward government of certain nations [that the Church is like any other external polity, bound to this or that land, kingdom or nation, as the pope of Rome will say], but rather men scattered throughout the whole world, who agree concerning the Gospel, and have the same Christ, the same Holy Ghost, and the same sacraments, whether they have the same or dissimilar human traditions. And the gloss upon the decrees says that 'the Church in its wide sense embraces good and evil;' likewise that the wicked are in the Church only in name, not in fact; but that the good are in the Church both in fact and in name. And to this effect there are many passages in the Fathers. For Jerome says, 'The sinner, therefore, who has been stained by any impurity, cannot be called a member of the Church of Christ, neither can he be said to be subject to Christ.'" Apol. 4, § 6-11.

What the Church is cannot be ascertained simply from the name, which imports an association or assembly, without connoting its character. The word is in itself colorless. The nature of the body to which it is applied in the Scriptures and which historically bears the name so applied, must be learned from the account which the Scriptures give of the Christian assembly to which the divine gifts are imparted and the divine promises are made. Appealing to this source, we find that our confessors were unquestionably right in their definition of the Church, and that their opponents were just as unquestionably wrong, as are all those who in these last times adopt the Roman definition and from it argue against us.

The Church, *properly speaking*, is the congregation of be-

lievers. This implies that there is a sense in which the word embraces something more. The word is applied to the external congregation of people professing to be followers of Christ. In such application it includes persons who are not believers. That is undeniable. When believers gather around the Word and Sacraments, as the Lord has commanded and as the Spirit impels them, some join them who are not believers. There are other motives than that of faith which lead to outward confession of the truth and to association with those who believe the truth. The believers who assemble to hear the Word and receive the Sacraments do not lose their rights and privileges on account of such intrusions by unbelievers. They are the Church, and are none the less so because some have joined them who have not that which is essential to constitute them parts of the Church. The word which designates the assembly of believers is applied to the visible assembly, notwithstanding that some are in it who are not believers. The assembly is a congregation of believers still, notwithstanding that those who are in it are not all believers. Unbelievers are included in the application of the word, but not in the conception of the thing. When we apply the name wheat to a field, notwithstanding that there are tares growing there also, we do not mean to deny that there are tares, nor do we mean to affirm that the tares are wheat; we merely apply a term that designates what was sown and what was intended to be grown there. For the sake of convenience the term which properly designates the principal part is applied to the whole. There is wheat there, and therefore that name can be correctly used to designate it, even though there be tares there also, to which that word does not properly apply. The word Church is thus used synecdochically of believers as they appear in the administration of the means of grace and in the confession of the truth revealed from heaven. In this their outward appearance there are always some mixed with them who are not believers, and who are on that account not properly parts of the congregation of believers, i. e. of the Church, though the name is applied to the whole, in this case not merely for convenience, but from necessity, since we cannot know which really are the believers and which do not belong to them. In its proper sense the word applies only to the former.

“The Church is properly the congregation of saints and true believers.”

When St. Peter confessed the truth which flesh and blood had not revealed to him, our Lord said, “Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.” Matt. 16, 18. The members of the Church are accordingly built upon the word of truth which is revealed from heaven, and upon Christ, who is the substance of that revelation. That is the Rock upon which it stands, and upon which the waves of hellish malice dash in vain. But only those are built upon that Rock who believe in the Christ, the Son of the living God. The Church that is founded upon this Rock is the congregation of believers. St. John writes concerning the words of Caiphas: “Being high priest that year, he prophesied that Jesus should die for that nation; and not for that nation only, but that also He should gather together in one the children of God that were scattered abroad.” John 11, 51. 52. The word Church is not here used, but the design of God is distinctly mentioned to gather His people together into one body, which assembly is repeatedly called by that name. It is the children of God that are to be united into the assembly, and “as many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on His name, which were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God.” John 1, 12. 13. St. Paul writes to the Corinthians: “Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you? If any man defile the temple of God, him shall God destroy; for the temple of God is holy, which temple ye are.” 1 Cor. 3, 16. 17. The Spirit of God dwells in the hearts of His people by faith, and thus they are the temple of God. “If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His.” Rom. 8, 9. No one can belong to the Church of Christ without being among those who are His and in whom He dwells by faith. These form His body, which is the Church, as St. Paul writes to the Ephesians: God “hath put all things under His feet, and gave Him to be head over all things to the Church, which is His body, the fulness of Him which filleth all in all.” Eph. 1, 20. 21. Those of whom

Christ is the head and who are members of His body can not be persons who are none of His, but must be those who live because He liveth in them. This is expressed also in a subsequent chapter, where the apostle says that "the Church is subject unto Christ" and that He "loved the Church and gave Himself for it, that He might sanctify and cleanse it." Eph. 5, 23-27. The Church is thus represented to be His believing disciples who live under Him in His kingdom and whom He designs to present "a glorious Church, not having spot, or wrinkle, or any such thing." Therefore it is spoken of as "the general assembly and Church of the first born which are written in heaven." Heb. 12, 23. This Church may be spoken of, in the Scriptures and elsewhere, as it appears on earth and as it thus has material mixed with it that is not of it, but in itself, in its essence and nature, it is always and only "the congregation of saints and true believers."

So our Confessions uniformly speak of it, and that not only incidentally or by implication, but expressly and repeatedly. "Although hypocrites and wicked men," says the Apology, "are associated with the true Church in outward rites, yet when the Church is defined, [when we use the word in the proper sense], it is necessary to define that which is the living body of Christ, and likewise is in name and in fact the Church [which is called the body of Christ, and has fellowship not only in outward signs, but has gifts in the heart, viz. the Holy Ghost and faith]. And for this there are many reasons. For it is necessary to understand what it is that principally makes us members and living members of the Church. If we should define the Church only as an outward polity of the good and the wicked, men would not understand that the kingdom of God is righteousness of heart and the gift of the Holy Ghost [that the kingdom of God is spiritual, as nevertheless it is; that therein Christ inwardly rules, strengthens and comforts hearts, and imparts the Holy Ghost and various spiritual gifts], but they will judge that it is only the outward observance of certain forms of worship and rites. Likewise what difference will there be between the people of the Law and the Church, if the Church be an outward polity? But Paul distinguishes the Church from

the people of the Law thus, that the Church is a spiritual people, i. e. that it had been distinguished from the heathen not by civil rites [not only in the polity and civil affairs], but that it is the true people of God, regenerated by the Holy Ghost. Among the people of the Law, the carnal seed [all those who by nature were born Jews and Abraham's seed] had, in addition to the promise concerning Christ, promises also of corporeal things, of government, etc. And for these reasons even the wicked among them were said to be the people of God, because God had separated this carnal seed from other nations by outward ordinances and promises; and yet these wicked persons did not please God. But the Gospel [which is preached in the Church] brings not merely the shadow of eternal things, but the eternal things themselves, the Holy Ghost and righteousness, by which we are righteous before God. But every Christian is even here upon earth partaker of eternal blessings, even of eternal comfort, of eternal life, and of the Holy Ghost, and of righteousness which is from God, until he shall be completely saved in the world to come. Therefore only those are the people, according to the Gospel, who receive this promise of the Spirit" *Apol.* IV. § 12-15. The people of God are the Church of God, and people of God we do not become otherwise than by the Holy Spirit and by faith in Christ. Hence it is clear, as our confessors argue, that only believers constitute the Church. So they say also in the Smalcald Articles: "Thank God, to-day a child seven years old knows what the Church is, viz. saints, believers and lambs who hear the voice of their Shepherd. For the children repeat, 'I believe in one holy Christian Church'. This holiness consists not in an alb, a tonsure, a long gown, and other of their ceremonies devised by them beyond Holy Scripture, but consists in the Word of God and true faith." Part III. Art. 12.

The Church, according to the Scriptures and our Confessions, is therefore not an external organization whose formal essence consists in something that is discernible by the senses. As it consists of men who have duties to perform and privileges to exercise, it becomes manifest in outward organization in and for the discharge of its proper functions in the world. Christians are required by the Word and moved by the Spirit

that dwelleth in them to preach the Word and administer the Sacraments, to confess the Lord Jesus, to abound in good works to the glory of God. But it is not the dissemination of the Gospel and the confession of Christ and the holiness of life that makes them Christians. Men are to be Christians first, then to go into all the world and preach the Gospel; they are to believe in the Lord Jesus first, then to confess Him before all people; they are to be in Christ Jesus first, then to walk worthy of Him. A person is not a Christian because he preaches or confesses Christ; he ought to be a Christian before he does these things, but not every body is what he ought to be, or does what he ought to do. A Christian is one who realizes his lost condition by nature and believes in the Savior of the world unto the forgiveness of his sins by grace; he does not become so by some action of his performed after he has believed. As a believer he is one of those who form the congregation of saints and true believers. This congregation is the aggregate of such believers, assembled spiritually before the eyes of God, though widely scattered in the world and separated in space and time. As the individual Christian exists before he exercises the rights and performs the duties belonging to him as such, so this assembly of Christians exists in the eyes of God before it exercises the rights and performs the duties belonging to it as the Church of Christ. The functions of the outward organization are necessary by divine command, but the body which has the command and promises exists before it performs or can perform its proper functions. These outward things do not belong to the *essence* of the Church, which exists before it does its legitimate work. That is what the Scriptures mean when they call the Church "the body of Christ," which is composed of those who are living members of that body by living faith, and are so prior to their formation of a visible congregation or to their participation in the work of a congregation already existing. That is what our Confession means when it says that "the Church is *properly* the congregation of saints and true believers." In a figurative sense we may call that the Church which outwardly assembles for worship in a building that is also, by another figure, called a church. We may do so because the "congregation of true believers" is truly and really there, although there are some mingled with it that are not true believers.

But *properly*, that is, in the strict and native sense of the word, the Church is the body of Christ, the aggregate of those who by faith are members of His body, "the congregation of saints and true believers," the word being always taken in a figurative sense when any others are included in the extent of its meaning, just as the word wheat is used in a wider sense when it is applied to a measure of grain that is meant to be wheat, but that contains some rye and barley and wheat.

This doctrine of the Scriptures and of our Confessions has been set forth and defended by our standard theologians against Romanists and Romanizers from the days of the Reformation until the present. In testimony of this we shall furnish a few extracts. Luther writes: "Therefore let him who would not err hold fast to this, that Christendom is a spiritual assembly of souls in one faith, and that no one can be regarded as a Christian on account of his body, that he may know that natural, proper, true, essential Christendom depends on the spirit, and on nothing external, whatever this may be. For everything else one who is not a Christian may have and is never made a Christian by it, except the true faith, which alone makes Christians. Therefore we are called Christian believers and at Whitsuntide we sing, 'Now we pray the Holy Ghost most of all for true faith.' In this way the Holy Scriptures speak of the Holy Church and Christendom, and they have no other way of setting them forth." *Erl.* 27, 101.

The great dogmatician Gerhard writes: "We define the Church to be the congregation of saints, that no one may suppose the Church to be merely some external polity of good and evil persons, when properly and accurately speaking it is a holy society of those who are joined together by the bond of the Spirit in true faith and love. But we by no means use the appellation 'saints' in the Anabaptist or Pelagian sense; nor do we imagine that the true members of the Church in the infirmity of this life are wholly and entirely sinless; neither do we transform the Church into a Platonic idea or an empty phantasm of the brain; but we distinguish between sins of infirmity, with which true faith, penitence, and zealous piety may consist, and sins against the conscience, by which the regenerate cease to be true and living members of the Church." *Loci* XI. § 51, 5.

Hence it is expressly denied, as of necessity it must be, that unbelievers and hypocrites are members of the Church in the proper sense; for this would be equivalent to the contradictory declaration that an unbeliever may be one of the true believers who form the Church. If any man have not the Spirit of Christ he is none of His, and cannot be a member of His body. Our Lord does not suffer His living body to be clogged and burdened by dead members. "I am the vine," He says, "ye are the branches: he that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit: for without me ye can do nothing. If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch and is withered." John 15, 5. 6. Hence it is said of those who were in the external congregation without being members of the Church in the proper sense, and who finally ceased to play the hypocrite: "They went out from us, but they were not of us; for if they had been of us, they would no doubt have continued with us; but they went out, that they might be made manifest that they were not all of us." 1 John 2, 19. Those who are not true believers may be externally united with the Church in its external appearance in the worship and work and may thus be counted with the Church as it appears to our eyes, and be included in the name by a figure of speech, but really and truly they are not of the Church, which is the congregation of true believers, not of unbelievers and hypocrites, or of believers and unbelievers both.

Our Confessions with great distinctness set out this negative side of its definition of the Church. Thus we read in the Apology: "The Church is the kingdom of Christ, distinguished from the kingdom of the devil. It is certain, however, that the wicked are in the power of the devil, and members of the kingdom of the devil, as Paul teaches, Eph. 2, 2, when he says that the devil 'now worketh in the children of disobedience.' And Christ says to the Pharisees, who certainly had outward fellowship with the Church, i. e. with the saints among the people of the Law; for they held office, sacrificed and taught: 'Ye are of your father, the devil.' John 8, 44. Therefore the Church, which is truly the kingdom of Christ, is properly the congregation of saints. For the wicked are ruled by the devil, and are captives of the devil, they are

not ruled by the Spirit of Christ. But what need is there of words in so manifest a matter? If the Church, which is truly the kingdom of Christ, is distinguished from the kingdom of the devil, it is necessary that the wicked, since they are in the kingdom of the devil, are not the Church; although in this life, because the kingdom of Christ has not yet been revealed, they are mingled with the Church and hold office in the Church. Neither are the wicked the kingdom of Christ for the reason that the revelation has not yet been made. That which He quickens by His Spirit is always the kingdom of Christ, whether it be revealed or covered by the cross. Just as he who has now been glorified is the same Christ who was before afflicted. And with this the parables of Christ clearly agree, who says, Matt. 12, 38, that 'the good seed are the children of the kingdom, but the tares are the children of the wicked one.' 'The field,' He says, 'is the world,' not the Church. Thus John speaks concerning the whole race of the Jews, and says that it will come to pass that the true Church will be separated from that people. Therefore this passage is more against the adversaries than in favor of them, because it shows that the true and spiritual people is to be separated from the carnal people. Christ also speaks of the outward appearance of the Church, when He says, Matt. 13, 47: 'The kingdom of heaven is like unto a net,' like 'to ten virgins,' and He teaches that the Church has been covered by a multitude of evils, in order that this stumbling-block may not offend the pious; likewise, in order that we may know that the Word and Sacraments are efficacious even when administered by the wicked. And meanwhile He teaches that these godless men, although they have the fellowship of outward signs, are nevertheless not the true kingdom of Christ, and members of Christ. They are members of the kingdom of the devil. Neither are we dreaming of a Platonic state, as some wickedly charge, but we say that this Church exists, viz. the truly believing and righteous men scattered throughout the whole world.

"We are speaking not of an imaginary Church, which is to be found nowhere; but we say and know certainly that His Church, wherein saints live, is and abides truly upon earth; namely, that some of God's children are here and there

in all the world, in various kingdoms, islands, lands, and cities, from the rising of the sun to its setting, who have truly learned to know Christ and His Gospel." IV, § 16-20.

In the same way do the theologians of our Church speak of the subject, not only representing the Church as the congregation of believers scattered throughout the world, who are all joined together by one Spirit in the one faith of the Gospel, and who form one body in the sight of God, notwithstanding that they are separated in space and time, but also expressly denying that any unbeliever or hypocrite is a member of this body, although he may be a member of the outward organization which, because the members of the Church in the proper sense are found and perform their proper offices in it, is called the Church in that place. Thus Luther writes: "The pope says that he is the Christian Church; to this we say no, although there are some under the papacy who belong to the Christian Church, as there are many in Turkey, France and England who belong to the Christian Church. They are baptized, preserve the Gospel, make right use of the sacrament, and are true Christians. But that they condemn us and say that our doctrine is not true, and thus seek their own honor and endeavor to justify themselves with their laws, devices, brotherhoods and good works, saying that whoever keeps them is a true Christian and the true Christian Church—to this we say no. We admit that they are in the Christian Church, but they are not true members of the Church. They have the pulpit, baptism, the ministry, the sacrament, and are within the Church, but not rightly, just as there are many among us who are baptized, receive the sacrament, and pretend to be Christians, but are nevertheless arrant knaves; they are not upright. Therefore we say that they are among the number of Christians; they have the name, appearance and practices of the Church and of Christians, but that does not make them such. Thus you must distinguish the true Christian Church, which is the Church in truth, from the Church which pretends to be such, but is not. The false Church has only the appearance, but still has the Christian offices. For a knave can baptize, read the Gospel, receive the sacrament, and repeat the ten commandments. All this is and remains right. But he re-

mains a knave, and does not become a Christian and is not called the Christian Church, but we say he is in the Christian Church as mice dirt is in the pepper or cockle is among the corn and helps to fill the measure." *Erl.* 48, 221. As certainly as cockle is not corn the hypocrites and unbelievers are not members of the Church; and in the same sense in which the cockle is called corn, when it is mixed with the latter, the hypocrites and unbelievers are called Church when they are mixed with the congregation of believers.

It is on this account that the Church is spoken of by all our standard theologians as essentially invisible. Frequently as this term has been misunderstood, it must be maintained as the appropriate expression for an important biblical truth. The misconceptions that are current on the subject render it necessary to make some statements which would otherwise seem superfluous. Our theologians never had a thought of denying that the believers who constitute the Church are visible, or of maintaining that their assemblies for worship and their administration of the means of grace are invisible. A Christian man is visible certainly as well as a heathen man, and the actions of a believer are visible certainly as well as the actions of an unbeliever. But that is not relevant to the point before us. What is meant when the Church is declared to be essentially invisible is simply that it is the congregation of believers, to which no unbeliever or hypocrite belongs. But this congregation of believers cannot be known by sight. We can see the Christian people who come together in a local congregation, and we can see the administration of the means of grace which enables us by faith to know of the existence of the Church in that place; but we cannot see that which makes men Christians and which distinguishes them from other men who are not Christians. Though by the visible signs of the Word and Sacraments we may know, not by seeing them administered in itself, but by believing the promises connected with their administration, that there are Christians in the assembly which we see, this assembly which we see is not properly the Church, nor can we by sight ascertain which among them are properly the Church. The visible assembly is called the Church, as the wheat and the cheat together are called wheat, but only the

believers are the Church, and these as believers are not discerned by the eye. What we see is called the Church, because the Church is really in the assembly which we see, but the assembly of believers which is the Church in this mixed assembly we do not see. Nor is there any visible mark by which we could distinguish the believers who properly form the Church from the unbelievers who are not the Church and who do not in the proper sense belong to it. Where believers outwardly organize and congregate to exercise their privileges and perform their duties in the world, knaves and hypocrites will be sure to mingle with them, and the true believers, who alone constitute the Church, will therefore be hidden in the congregation which is called the Church, and rightly called so because the Church is really in it, but which contains the unbelievers also who are not the Church. The Church in the proper sense is invisible; we can see only the Church in the synecdochical sense, i. e. the Church as it is mixed with elements that are not Church and that do not belong to it any more than the mice droppings belong to the pepper. Not only are the believers and the unbelievers mixed as they appear before the eye, but there is no possible criterion by which the eye could make the distinction between that which is Church and that which is not; for that which makes the difference is no external mark which the eye could see, but the faith which is hidden in the heart and which only the eye of God can see. The Church in its proper sense as such, because of its nature, must always remain to human eyes invisible on earth.

Our Lord gave to those who asked Him when the kingdom of God should come the answer: "The kingdom of God cometh not with observation; neither shall they say, Lo here! or lo there! For behold, the kingdom of God is within you." Luke 17, 20-21. He thus plainly teaches us that His kingdom, which is His holy Church, is not a secular institution that could be locally pointed out and distinguished by external pomp and ceremony which the eyes could observe, but that it is a spiritual kingdom established in the hearts of men, who by the grace of God are made believers and willing subjects of the King in Zion. This St. Peter expresses in other words when he says: "Ye also as lively

stones are built up a spiritual house, a holy priesthood, to offer up spiritual sacrifices, acceptable to God by Jesus Christ. Wherefore also it is contained in the Scripture, Behold, I lay in Zion a chief corner stone, elect, precious: and he that believeth on Him shall not be confounded." 1 Pet. 2, 5. 6. The Church of Christ is thus represented as a spiritual building, the lively stones of which are the believers in Him who is the chief corner stone. These believers, whom God sees as one assembly of saints, though they are scattered over the earth, are not discernible by our senses, because that which constitutes them believers and thus a congregation of saints is not a thing subject to sense. "The foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal, The Lord knoweth them that are His." 2 Tim. 3, 19.

Therefore in the earliest of the Church's symbols the confession is made, "I believe in the Holy Ghost, the holy Christian Church, the communion of saints." The Church is an object of faith, not of sight. That there is a congregation of saints or true believers we cannot know upon the evidence of our eyes, but can know only by the evidence of faith. "Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." Heb. 11, 1. An unbeliever cannot know that the Christian Church exists. He can see the assembly that is called the Church, but that there are really believers in the Lord Jesus among them, and that accordingly the Church really exists in the congregation that is called Church, he cannot see. Just as the people who saw our Lord Jesus in the days when He walked visibly on earth could not by sight know and be assured that He is the Christ and the Savior of the world, but could have such assurance only through the Word and its reception by faith, so the people of to-day can not know by sight that the congregation which meets to worship Him is His body, but can have such knowledge only through the word of promise and its reception by faith. Christians should abide by their ancient creed and not adopt the Romish speech which translates "*I believe*" into "*I see the Holy Christian Church.*" In this sense the Apology of the Augsburg Confession, from which we have already furnished extracts, speaks throughout.

"If Christendom were a bodily assembly," writes Luther,

“we could see by each one’s body whether he is a Christian, Turk, or Jew, just as we can see by each one’s body whether a person is man, woman or child, whether he is white or black, etc. Again, in an external assembly I can see whether a person is assembled with others in Leipzig, Wittenberg, or here or there, but not whether he believes or not.” Erl. 27, 100. Again he says: “When I call the Christian Church a spiritual assembly you mock at me, as if I would build a Church, as Plato would a city, which is nowhere; and you are so well pleased with your fancy that you flatter yourself, you have struck the target exactly. You say: Would not that be a grand city that had spiritual walls, spiritual towers, spiritual guns, spiritual horses, and everything spiritual? Ultimately your opinion is that the Christian Church cannot exist without a material city, locality and goods. I answer, My dear Murnar, shall I on account of your reason deny the Scriptures and exalt you above God? Why do you not answer my Scripture texts? E. g. There is no respect of persons with God. Eph. 6, 9. The kingdom of God is within you. The kingdom of God cometh not with observation. They shall not say, Lo here, or, Lo there! Luke 17, 20. 21. And our Lord says, That which is born of the Spirit is spirit. John 3, 6.” “Therefore I conclude that the Christian Church is not bound to any place, person, or time; and although the ignorant crowd, the pope with his cardinals, bishops, priests, and monks will not understand this nor accept it as truth, yet the people, the children on the streets, with the whole multitude of Christians throughout the earth nearly all are with me and join me against the fancied church of the pope and his Papists. Do you ask, How so? I answer briefly: All Christians in the world confess, I believe in the Holy Ghost, the holy Christian Church, the communion of saints. If this article is true, it follows that no one can see or feel the holy Christian Church, neither can any one say that it is here or there. For what we believe we do not see or feel, as St. Paul teaches in Heb. 11, 1. Again, what we see or feel we do not believe.” Erl. 27, 301. 303.

Chemnitz, having stated the twofold manner of describing the Church, as embracing all who profess to be believers, and as including only those who really believe and as thus in-

visible, says: "Eck indeed ridicules this acceptance of the word and calls this a mathematical church and a Platonic idea. But he may laugh as much as he will, that which is to us an idea and cannot be seen, must not on that account be hidden to God also. Col. 3, 3. Our life is hid with Christ in God, but our life is not on that account a Platonic idea, i. e. a visionary fancy. But we know that when Christ, who is our life, shall appear, then shall we also appear with Him in glory. Meantime Luther never approved the ravings of the Anabaptists, who, on this pretext that the Church is invisible, desire to hide in corners, creep into houses, and establish little churches in them. Against these Luther in 1532 wrote an earnest warning, entitled 'Wider die Winkelprediger.' But the true and holy Church of the elect remains invisible nevertheless, especially when it is described as an assembly not of any particular people, such as was the Jewish or Israelitic in the Old Testament, but as the Catholic congregation, in whatever place, people, language, or time it is gathered, which in firm faith has accepted the Gospel, employs the sacraments, and serves Christ under the cross unto eternal life." *Loci P. III. p. 127.*

Gerhard enters into a lengthy proof that the Church is invisible, and refutes the objections which Romanists adduce against it. In the course of his argument he says; "The hour cometh, and now is, when the true worshipers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth. John 4, 23. Therefore the Church of the New Testament does not consist in any outward sign, nor is it bound to any corporeal places and ceremonies Our argument is this: The true Church, properly so called, consists of true worshipers. But who these true worshipers are cannot be seen with human eyes, because the true worshipers worship in spirit and in truth, and who does this the eye cannot discern, since the hypocrites, so far as the outward appearance is concerned, do the same. Therefore the true and properly so called Church cannot be seen . . . The Church has indeed an external cultus and external ceremonies, but that is not its chief cultus, and therefore from the external cultus and external ceremonies which the eye perceives we cannot judge who is properly a citizen of the Catholic Church and a true member of it, but the judgment must

be formed from the internal and spiritual cultus. But this is not obvious to the eyes of men. Therefore these are not able to see who offers the spiritual and internal worship." On Heb. 12, 22: "Ye are come unto mount Zion and unto the city of the living God," he remarks: "We therefore conclude thus, Whatever is spiritual is invisible; the Church is a spiritual Zion and a spiritual city; therefore it is invisible." *Loci* XXIII § 73, 74. Again he says: "We have shown that the Church properly is the congregation of saints, whence we gather: To the Church properly and strictly so called belong none but saints and true believers. But who are truly believers and saints is not perceptible to human eyes. Hence the true Church, the Church properly so called, is not perceptible to human eyes." *Ib.* § 77. The same great theologian makes the following explanation, which will assist the reader to understand the doctrine maintained: "The Church of the elect is said to be invisible, not because the pious scattered through the world do not come under the sight of man with respect to their person, but because faith and the divine election, with respect to which they belong to the Church as true members, do not appear in them; they are seen as men having bodies, and not as elect men. Neither is the Church of the elect said to be invisible because the pious and elect have no intercourse whatever with the visible ministry of the Word and Sacraments, and with the outward practice of divine worship, but because the inner gifts of the Holy Spirit, by which they are distinguished in the sight of God from corrupt and dead members, are in no way manifest to the sight of men." *Ib.* § 70.

Quenstedt proves his thesis that the Church is invisible by various arguments drawn from the Holy Scriptures and from the nature of the subject, and to the objection of Bellarmine, that the Bible nowhere expressly calls the Church invisible, he replies: "Wherever the term Church is employed in the literal and specific sense and used to designate the Catholic Church, it denotes the invisible congregation of saints and true believers, because none are members of the Catholic Church unless they are true believers and saints." *Theol. P. IV. cap. 15, § 2.*

That the word Church is sometimes used in a wider sense,

so that it is made to include all those who outwardly join the believers in the confession of Christ and the use of the means of grace, is not denied; but when the question is, What is the Church in itself, or what does that term properly designate? the answer of the Scriptures, of our Confessions, and of all our standard theologians is with one accord: "The Church is properly the congregation of saints and true believers." L.

THE FIFTH ARTICLE OF THE AUGTSTANA.

BY REV. H. J. SCHUH, A. M., DETROIT, MICH.

It now remains for us to consider our last proposition to wit:

V. *These means are always efficacious, but never irresistible.*

The efficacy of the Word is implied in its very origin as a Word of God. God's Word is not like man's word, often mere sound. It is "quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart." Heb. 4, 12. What Christ says of the Word which He spoke can be said also of the Word which was written by His command and is to-day proclaimed by His order—it is spirit and life. In 1 Pet. 1, 23 the Word is called an "incorruptible seed, which liveth and abideth forever." The same figure is used James 1, 18. Of the efficacy of the means of grace in general, we spoke under our second proposition; here we wish to set forth the fact, that the efficacy of these means is not limited to certain times, places and persons.

It is true the operations of God's grace are not the same in all times, places and persons. The ways of God's providence are unsearchable, as well in the history of the individual, as in the history of whole nations. In this sense the Formula of Concord says: "God knows, without doubt, and has appointed the season and time of each one's call and conversion; but since He has not revealed these things unto us, we understand that it is enjoined upon us to occupy our-

selves continually with the Word of God, but to commit the season and time to God. Acts. 1. 7.

“In the same manner, when we see that God gives His Word to one region, but not to another; that He withdraws it from one people, but allows it to remain with another; or that one man is hardened, blinded, and given over to a reprobate mind, but that another, though equally guilty, is converted by God, it is our duty in such cases to remember that Paul Rom. 11, 22. 23, has assigned certain limits to us, beyond which we are not allowed to enquire, etc.” (P. 720.)

This same truth, of the unsearchableness of the ways of God's providence in the conversion of men, is expressed in our fifth article of the Augustana in these words: “For the purpose of obtaining faith, God has instituted the ministry, and given the Gospel and the Sacraments, through which, as means, He imparts the Holy Spirit, *who in His own time and place, works faith in those that hear the Gospel,*” etc. It would certainly be a misconstruction of these words to conclude from them that our church teaches that the means of grace are not in themselves always efficacious, but only in such places, at such times, and to such persons, as God's special grace may designate. This is essentially the Calvinistic position, that the means only then are efficacious or effectual, when they come to those whom, as the elect, they are by God's special eternal decree to bring to faith and to preserve in the same. This is why the Calvinists so often speak of the Word as a dead letter and of the Sacraments as mere outward signs and ceremonies. Thus the Westminster Confession makes a difference between *effectual calling* and that which is not such. In chap. III, § 6 we read: As God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so hath He, by the eternal and most free purpose of His will, foreordained all the means thereto. Wherefore *they who are elected*, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by Christ, *are effectually called* unto faith in Christ, by His Spirit working in due season; are justified, adopted, sanctified, and kept by His power through faith unto salvation. Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, *effectually called*, justified, adopted, sanctified and saved, *but the elect only*. In chap. X, § 1 effectual calling is thus defined: “All those whom God hath predestinated unto life, and those only, He is pleased in His

appointed time *effectually to call* by His Word and Spirit," etc., and in the same chapter, § 6, *effectual* calling is said to be of God's *special* grace alone. In the large Catechism of the Presbyterian Church, in answer to question 67: "What is effectual calling?" we read: "Effectual calling is the work of God's almighty power and grace, whereby out of His free and especial love to the elect and from nothing in them moving Him thereto, He doth in His accepted time invite and draw them to Jesus Christ by His Word and Spirit," etc. The answer to the next question expressly states: "All the elect and they only are effectually called." The same idea is set forth in the shorter Catechism.

This difference between effectual and ineffectual calling is taught, though in a somewhat milder form, in Dr. Ursinus' Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism. On page 112 of the English translation the question is raised: "What are the causes of faith?" and the answer given is: "The first and chief efficient cause of historical and temporary faith, as well as the faith of miracles, is the Holy Spirit, who produces these different kinds of faith by His general influence and operation. It is different however as it respects justifying faith, which the Holy Ghost produces *by His special working.*" On page 300 among the effects of predestination is classed thirdly "the effectual calling and conversion of the elect to Christ by the Word and Spirit of God." Concerning the efficacy of Baptism he says, page 373: "All those who are baptized with water, whether adults or infants, are not made partakers of the grace of Christ, for the eternal election of God and His calling to the kingdom of Christ is free."

From these quotations it will be evident that the Calvinistic system makes the efficacy of the call dependent on a special decree as the expression of a special grace, which extends over a select few to the exclusion of all others. This is a consequence of the singling out of a chosen few, from the whole mass; (which singling out is based on a secret counsel) and a decree that "these, and these only, shall and must be saved."

The Missourians expressly repudiate the accusation that they teach a limitation of effectual calling to the elect only. The means of grace are, they say, in themselves always

effectual, and yet they claim to believe that the elect come to faith and are preserved in the same by virtue of a special decree, which extends over them alone to the exclusion of all others. They make saving faith a direct result of special election. That faith which finally makes men partakers of eternal glory is not the result of the grace of God in as far as this embraces all and looks to the salvation of all, but in as far as it specially embraces only the elect, whom as God has foreordained that they "shall and must be saved," He has also predestinated to persevering faith. It is claimed that the plan of salvation in as far as it is meant for all men can be frustrated by the arts of Satan, but in as far as it is specially meant for the elect it is above all possibility of failure to accomplish its purpose. The difference then must be this, that when the means of grace come to one who is not of the chosen few, they come, indeed, with power to save, but only with such power as can be resisted and frustrated, whilst, when they come to the elect, they come with such power as by virtue of a special divine decree cannot thus be frustrated.

And still they claim a heaven-wide difference between their doctrine of the efficacy of the means of grace and that of the Calvinists. We admit there is a difference. But that difference, according to our understanding, is not essential, but only accidental. We are well aware of the fact that, whilst the Calvinists deny that the non-elect ever come to true faith and that the elect ever entirely fall from grace, the Missourians have hitherto strenuously upheld that the non-elect may for a while believe and the elect may for a time fall away. Yet the question here is not concerning this temporary faith or loss of faith, but concerning that faith which in the end makes us partakers of eternal glory — concerning persevering faith. On this vital point we are unable to see any difference between the doctrine of Calvinism and that of Missouri. In one respect the latter seems to us even worse than the former. For a thorough Calvinist says: I know that I am elect, because I know myself to have true faith; but according to the Missouri theory, even a true believer might be tempted to say: Although I know myself to have true faith, yet I can not be sure from this that I am one of the elect, for many of the non-elect also have true faith.

It has been claimed that the difference between the Calvinistic position and that of Missouri lies in this, that according to the former the elect are *compelled* to believe. But if by this claim it is intended to impute to the followers of Calvin a doctrine by which force or coercion are used to bring the elect to faith, it is an unjust and an unfounded accusation. The Westminster Confession, than which we can scarcely image anything more Calvinistic, just as strenuously repudiates this idea as ever Missouri did. In chap. III, of God's eternal decree, it states: "God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin: *nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.*" In the above cited chap. X, the definition of effectual calling winds up with these words: "Yet so as they (the elect) *come most freely, being made willing by His grace.*" And the larger Catechism of the Presbyterians states that "God renews and powerfully determines the wills of the elect so as they (although in themselves dead in sin) are hereby *made willing and able freely to answer His call* and to accept and embrace the grace offered and conveyed therein."

But does not the Formula of Concord say: "The eternal election of God not only foresees and foreknows the salvation of the elect, but through His gracious will and good pleasure in Christ Jesus is also the cause which procures, works, facilitates and promotes our salvation *and whatever pertains thereto,*" etc.? Must we not conclude from this that saving faith is the result of special election, because being the cause of all *that pertains to our salvation*, this "all" must embrace faith also? The Missouri interpretation of this passage would have us believe that such is the case. But they evidently prove too much, and therefore prove nothing. This "all that pertains thereto" in the above passage embraces a great deal more than faith. It also embraces the sending of Christ as the Mediator. This certainly also "pertains to our salvation;" yes, it is the very foundation of it. Now, will it be admitted that special election is the cause of the sending of Christ as the Redeemer? Do not even the Missourians teach that the

cause of Christ's mission is the universal good will of God for the salvation of all men? To teach anything else would be the worst kind of supralapsarian Calvinism. Therefore the above interpretation can not hold good.

The Formula itself tells plainly enough how it wants the term "eternal election of God" understood. After it has summarily set forth the redemption of the human race, the call, the efficacy of the same, justification, sanctification, preservation and final salvation it says: "*All this* is comprehended in the doctrine concerning the eternal election of God," etc. That God elected or chose to redeem the human race through Christ, to call men by the Gospel, to enlighten them by His gifts, to justify those that believe, to sanctify them by His good Spirit, to preserve them unto the end, and finally save them "if they adhere to the Word of God, are diligent in prayer, persevere in the grace of God, and faithfully use the gifts received"—all this is not to be excluded from the conception "eternal election of God" in the sense of the Formula. Of course *this* eternal election of God is the cause of our salvation and *everything* that pertains thereto; not only of faith, but of redemption and everything which in any way pertains thereto. To say in this sense that election is the cause of faith does not limit the efficacy of the Word to a chosen few. This "generic action of God's election or choice," this "generic chain of election," to speak in the words of the sainted Dr. Krauth, is evidently that of which the Formula speaks in the above quoted passage.

But our opponents say we must accept both doctrines, that God earnestly desires all men to come to persevering faith, and that those who come to this faith do so by special grace. They admit that there is, at least, a seeming contradiction here. But, they say, are there not many seeming contradictions in our Christian system of doctrine? We admit, in the first place, that not only some, but all the mysteries of our faith are in real conflict with our perverted reason since the fall. We further admit that there are, to our limited understanding, seeming contradictions between the articles of faith. But at the same time we insist there should be a difference made between seeming and real contradictions. It is a seeming contradiction to say that there is but one

divine essence and yet there are three distinct persons in God. It would, however, be not a seeming, but a real contradiction to say that there is but one divine essence and yet there are three divine essences in God. So it is a seeming contradiction to say of the person Jesus Christ that He is true God, and yet to say of the same person that He is true man. It would be a real contradiction, however, to say of this person that He is true God and again to say that He is not true God, or to say that He is true man and again to say that He is not true man. Such statements are of a character that one nullifies the other. Of two such contradictory propositions only one can be true. So also of the grace of God, which works persevering faith; if it is universal it can not be limited to a few, and if it be so limited it can not be universal. These two are diametrically opposed to each other. If one be true the other must be false, and vice versa. The "universal" and the "special," or limited, are contradictory conceptions. Now "the grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared to *all* men." If God is in Himself equally concerned for the salvation of all men, He can not be specially concerned about the salvation of a few; if he is not equally concerned about the salvation of all, then the cause of the particularity of salvation lies in Him and His grace, and this is so evidently against the whole Gospel that every child ought to see it.

But our opponents point us to such passages as Rom. 8, 28, and say: are not some persons there spoken of as those who are "called according to the purpose" (*πρόθεσις*)? Is not the difference here made between the called in general and the "called according to the purpose?" To interpret the passage with such a difference would frustrate the whole object which the apostle has in view. Paul wants to comfort the Christians at Rome in their afflictions (v. 18) by telling them that "all things must work together for good to them who love God," and then he adds, "who are the called according to the purpose." To think of a special purpose according to which a select few and not all are called, would rob them of all comfort. For then the question whether *to them* "all things must work together for good" would depend upon "whether they were among the chosen few who are "called

according to the purpose." This would be to say: All things must work together for good to you believers in Christ, if you are among those who are "the called according to the purpose." But how were they to know that they were among the number of those *thus* called? We are told they might know this from the fact that they knew themselves to love God (to be true believers). But we ask: Are all true believers among those who are "the called according to the purpose," i. e. among the elect? The answer is No; for it is admitted that there are some true believers who, falling away before they die, are not among the elect, and consequently not among those who are called according to this special purpose. Then their faith could be no certain evidence to the Romans that they were such as are designated "the called according to the (special) purpose," and if they were not certain of this they could not be sure that all things must work together for their good. Or could they have any other evidence of their being among those called according to the (special) purpose, besides the fact that they know themselves to be true believers? None. And so all the comfort which the apostle endeavors to give them falls to the ground. Yes, they would be worse off than they were before. This method of comforting would be like trying to heal a wounded heart by driving poisoned arrows into it.

No! The "purpose" of which Paul speaks in this passage can be no other than that of which he speaks 2 Tim. 1, 8-10: "Be not thou therefore ashamed of the testimony of our Lord, nor of me His prisoner: but be thou partaker of the afflictions of the Gospel according to the power of God; who hath saved us, and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to His own purpose (*πρόθεσις*) and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began; but is now made manifest by the appearing of our Savior Jesus Christ, who hath abolished death and brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel." It will be noticed that here also Paul mentions the being "called according to His purpose" as a source of comfort in affliction. And here he expressly says of this "purpose" that it is "now made manifest by the appearing of our Savior Jesus Christ, who hath abolished death and brought

life and immortality to light through the Gospel." This *πρόθεσις* is therefore not a hidden, secret purpose, but one that is made manifest by Christ through the Gospel. And, we ask, is that "purpose and grace" of God which is made manifest by the appearing of Christ and His abolishing death and bringing life and immortality to light through the Gospel, one that is limited to a chosen few, or one that embraces all men? Let the passage John 3, 16 be a sufficient answer.

That our Church does not in any sense whatever, either directly or indirectly, limit the efficacy of the Word, may be seen from expressions like the following: "If, therefore, we would profitably consider our eternal election to salvation, we must firmly and constantly observe this point, that, as the preaching of repentance is universal, so is also the promise of the Gospel, that is, it extends to all persons, Luke 24, 47. Therefore Christ commanded, 'that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in His name among all nations.' 'For God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son' unto it, John 3, 16. 'Christ taketh away the sin of the world,' John 1, 29. Christ gave His flesh 'for the life of the world', John 6, 51. His blood 'is the propitiation for the sins of the whole world,' 1 John 2, 2. Christ says 'come unto me all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest.' Matt. 11, 28. 'God hath concluded them all in unbelief, that He might have mercy upon all.' Rom. 11, 32. 'The Lord is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance,' 2 Pet. 3, 9. 'The same Lord over all is rich unto all that call upon Him.' Rom. 10, 12. 'The righteousness of God, which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all, and upon all them that believe, is manifest.' Rom. 3, 22. 'This is the will of Him that sent me, that every one that seeth the Son, and believeth on Him, may have everlasting life.' John 6, 40. Thus it is commanded of Christ, Luke 24, 47; Mark 16, 15, that in general unto all, unto whom repentance is preached, this promise of the Gospel should also be presented.

"And this call of God, which is given through the preaching of the Word, we should not regard as pretended and unreal (*sollen wir vor kein Spiegelfechten halten*), but we ought to know that through it God reveals His will; namely, that in

those whom He thus calls, He will operate through the Word; so that they may be enlightened, converted and saved. For the Word through which we are called is a ministration of the Spirit, which imparts the Spirit, or through which the Spirit is conferred, 2. Cor. 3, 8; and is the power of God unto salvation, Rom. 1, 16. And since the Holy Spirit will be efficacious through the Word, strengthen us and administer power and ability, it is the will of God that we should receive and believe the Word, and be obedient to it." (Book of Concord p. 715.)

Luther, speaking of the power of the Word says: "God's Word is the same Word and just as truly God's Word when it is preached and presented to the wicked, hypocrites and godless, as when it comes to the truly pious Christians and to the godly. Even as the true Christian Church is among sinners, where the evil and the good are mixed up. And this very Word, whether it bring fruit or not, yet it is God's power unto salvation to all who believe on it; and again it will judge and condemn the wicked, John chap. 5. else they would have a good excuse before God why they could and should not be condemned; namely, that they had had no Word of God which they could have accepted. But we say, teach, and confess, that the Word, absolution and the Sacrament of the ministers is not the work, voice, cleansing, loosening and effect of men, but of God. We are only instruments, co-laborers or helpers of God, through whom God performs and accomplishes His work." (Erl. Ed. 57, 38).

But it is time we were coming to the second part of our proposition, which states that although the means of grace are always efficacious, yet *they are never irresistible*.

This part of our last proposition is based on the character of God's operations in the kingdom of grace. In the kingdom of power God is irresistible. This was the nature of the Word by which the world was created. When God said "let there be light"—"there was light." It was impossible that this Word should not accomplish its purpose. This too is the character of God's providence in nature, no matter whether He is pleased to work in what men call "the laws of nature," or whether His working partakes of the extraordinary character of miracles. When Christ said to the young man at

Nain: "I say unto thee arise," body and soul were again united and the young man lived. A failure of this word to accomplish its purpose is not in the range of possibility. Such a thing could not be conceived of at all, without a denial of Christ's divinity or of the very attributes of Divinity itself. If God's Word would fail to accomplish its purpose in the kingdom of power, He would cease to be omnipotent. When Christ said to the man sick of the palsy: "Arise, take up thy bed and go unto thine house," a failure of this Word to accomplish its purpose would have shattered the universe to atoms.

But in the kingdom of grace God, in His incomprehensible wisdom, has seen fit to adopt a mode of operation in which it is possible for man in his weakness and wickedness to thwart the counsels of divine love. For we daily see that God's grace, though it has done and still does all that can be done to save all men, yet does not accomplish its purpose in all. Of a stiff-necked Israel God says: "What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done in it? wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?" Isa. 5, 4. The tears of Jesus over impenitent Jerusalem are evidence enough that the wickedness of man may make it impossible for divine love to accomplish its object. True, God has said: "My Word shall not return unto me void," nor indeed does it; for if it does not in all persons accomplish its object, still wherever it is preached there must, by virtue of this promise, always be some who yield to its influence, as Luther says, speaking of this passage: "Therefore there must needs be among us at least some true, pious, holy children of God and real Christians, no matter how few they be, else God's Word would be among us in vain, which is impossible." (Erl. Ed. 26, 248.) God's Word would only then "return unto Him void," if there were none at all who yielded to its influence.

As soon, however, as we make the faith of the elect dependent on a special grace, by virtue of which they "shall and must believe and be saved," we have essentially an irresistible grace. Even the gross Calvinists do not teach anything else. We have already shown above that they do not mean by the term "irresistible grace" that God uses force or compulsion to convert men. We will add still another cita-

tion to show that this is not their meaning: "When God converts a sinner and translates him into the state of grace, He frees him from his natural bondage under sin, and by His grace alone, enables him freely to will and to do that which is spiritually good," etc. Confession of Faith (Presbyterian), chap. 9, § 4. And yet in spite of such declarations they teach an irresistible grace. Our Missouri opponents reject this term, as far as we can see, not from any aversion to the thing which it designates, but because they are ashamed of the associations it brings. The term is very offensive to Lutheran ears, and it will be a long time before it dare be used even in those circles where the thing it designates has long since been adopted as orthodox teaching. A true Lutheran, however, is not only ashamed of the term, but of the thing itself. For much as we are concerned, in the defense of man's total natural depravity, to set forth his perfect slavery to sin in the direction of the spiritually good, we are, at least, equally concerned, in the interest of God's universal grace, to claim and defend His perfect liberty in the direction of the spiritually bad. Man has the liberty (if we may use so noble a word to designate so mean a power) to reject God's grace from first to last. And when the elect persevere, it is not because God made it impossible for them to fall away, whilst for all the rest he left it possible; else the difference between the elect and the non-elect must lie at the door of Him who, for unsearchable reasons, foreclosed the possibility of final apostasy in the one case and left it open in the other.

But, we are told, does not Christ Himself say Matt. 24, 24: "For there shall arise false Christs, and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders, insomuch that *if it were possible* they shall deceive the very elect." Is it not here made impossible for the elect to fall from grace? To understand these words properly they should be taken in the connection in which they occur. Verse 22 reads: "And except those days be shortened, there should no flesh be saved, but for the elect's sake those days shall be shortened." The days just previous to Christ's second coming shall be such terrible days of persecution and unbelief that, if they were not shortened, the whole Church would perish from the earth. But

this can not be, as Christ has promised that the gates of hell shall not prevail against His Church. For the sake of those, who, as true believers, hold fast the promises of the Gospel to the end, God shortens these days of dire tribulation. They who thus persevere are the elect of God; and because by the grace of God they thus persevere in faith, it is impossible that they should be deceived. For it is impossible that a Christian should be led astray as long as he holds to God's Word. That we have not mistaken the sense of this passage is also evident from verse 13. After describing the persecution and apostacy of the last times Christ adds: "But he that shall endure unto the end shall be saved."

In the same way other passages, as for instance Rom. 8, 35-39, must be explained. Nothing is able to separate us from the love of God, for God's grace is sufficient to overcome all that opposeth itself against our salvation; and this grace is offered not only to a chosen few, but to all. And yet it is possible for us at any moment to fall away from Christ, if we throw away the grace of God. Who the elect of God spoken of in this passage are, is evident from verse 29: "For *whom He did foreknow* He also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the first-born among many brethren." In this sense we are able to say, it is impossible for the elect finally to fall from grace, and yet at the same time to say God's grace is not irresistible. Keeping in mind the fact that God predestinated those whom He did *foreknow*, their falling finally from grace would imply a mistake in God's foreknowledge, which is impossible. So with the Lutheran Church we hold fast, as a doctrine of great comfort, the truth that the means of grace are always efficacious; and, as a doctrine of serious warning, the truth that these means are at no time irresistible.

ARE THERE ANY REMNANTS OF THE IMAGE OF GOD IN NATURAL MAN?

In order to be able to answer this not unimportant question satisfactorily we must, of course, first of all know *in what the image of God consisted*.

Gen. 1, 26 sq. we read: "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. So God created man in His own image; in the image of God created He him." This is the first passage of Holy Writ that speaks of the image of God. But it does not tell us wherein this image essentially and primarily consisted. No doubt the *dominion* over all the earth and its inhabitants besides man has something to do with that image. But whether it is the sum and substance, or at least an essential part, or only an attribute, a result, an emanation of that image, that passage does not tell us. Some have thought that the two words "image" and "likeness" were intended to give us a hint in that direction. But the lexicographers and commentators of our day seem to be agreed that there is as little real difference between the two as there is between the two prepositions used in our English translation, "in" and "after." Also our older Lutheran exegesets (compare Calov in his *Biblia Illustrata*, and Luther in his translation, "*ein Bild das uns gleich sei*," and his commentary to Genesis) are of this opinion.

Gen. 2, 17 we read of another thing that was found in man together with the image of God. God there warns man, "In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die;" and in accordance with this He pronounces on man who *had* nevertheless eaten, the sentence Gen. 3, 19, "Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." Will we be wrong in drawing the conclusion that *immortality* was a part or an attribute of the image of God? In the same way we conclude from Gen. 3, 25: "And they were both naked, the man and his wife, and were not ashamed," compared with 3, 7: "And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked," that the *entire absence of evil lusts and concupiscence* was in some manner connected with the image of God. And Eccles. 7, 29 teaches us: "*God hath made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions.*" So *uprightness* or a *normal condition, in every respect, especially as to morality*, was an attribute of man when he had the image of God.

And if we now turn to the New Testament we find two

distinct and clear passages that tell us in what the image of God principally consisted. The first is Eph. 4, 24 where St. Paul exhorts his fellow Christians: "Put on the new man *which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness*," the second Col. 3, 10 where the same apostle says: "Ye have put on the new man *which is renewed in knowledge, after the image of Him that created him.*" In both passages the spiritual condition to which a Christian is renewed is called the image of God, in the first "righteousness and holiness," in the second "knowledge." From this we see that the image of God consisted essentially and primarily in the normal condition of the principal powers and faculties of the soul, viz. the will and the intellect, or in perfectly knowing the will of God as to man's conduct, and in being and living according to this will of God.

From this we also see that the image of God may be taken in a twofold sense, a wider and a stricter one. In the former, all what has been mentioned in the passages cited belongs to it or forms a part of it; in the latter, only that which the four last passages speak of, whilst the rest is to be looked upon as a result or an attribute of it.

Let us now turn to our Confessions and see what they teach concerning this subject.

In the Apology of the Augsburg Confession, Art. II, Original Sin, (Mueller, p. 80 sq., Jacobs' Translation, p. 78 sq.) we read as follows: "In the Scriptures righteousness comprises not only the second table of the Decalogue, but the first also, which teaches concerning the fear of God, concerning faith, concerning the love of God. Therefore original righteousness should have not only an equable temperament of the bodily qualities (perfect health and, in all respects, pure blood, unimpaired powers of the body), but also these gifts, viz. a more certain knowledge of God, fear of God, confidence in God, or certainly rectitude and the power to yield these affections. And Scripture testifies to this, when it says (Gen. 1, 27) that man was fashioned *in the image and likeness of God*. What else is this than that, *in man, there were embodied such wisdom and righteousness as apprehended God, and in which God was reflected*, i. e. to man there were given the gifts of the *knowledge of God, the fear of God, confidence in God, and*

the like? And Paul shows in his Epistles to the Ephesians (5, 9) and Colossians (3, 10) *that the image of God is 'the knowledge of God, righteousness and truth.'*"—Again, Formula of Concord, Part II, Art. I, Original Sin (M. 576; J. 541): "There is an entire want or lack of the concreated *original righteousness, or of God's image, according to which man was originally created in truth, holiness and righteousness.*" And again, Part I, Art. VI, The Third Use of the Law (M. 536; J. 509): "Even our first parents before the fall did not live without Law, *which Law of God was also written in their hearts, BECAUSE they were created in the image of God* (Gen. 1, 26 sq.; 2, 16 sqq.; 3, 3)."

What, then, do our Confessions understand by the image of God? Primarily and essentially "such wisdom and righteousness as apprehends God, and in which God is reflected," although they do not entirely exclude from it the results from this blessed spiritual condition with regard to the body. These latter, however, are something secondary in their estimation when compared with the former. Here, then, we can also trace the distinction between the image of God taken in a wider and that taken in a stricter sense.

Of our Dogmaticians we will only cite two. Quenstedt (II, p. 9, *§§*: XXIV.) says: "The definition of the image of God is this: The image of God is natural perfection, consisting in an entire conformity with the wisdom, justice, immortality, and majesty of God, divinely created in, and together with, the first man, so that he might perfectly recognize, love, and glorify God, his Creator." The same says (p. 24, *§§*:): "The image and likeness of God *primarily* and *principally* consisted, as to the *mind* or *intellect*, in an excellent cognition of God and divine things, as well as in an exact knowledge of the created world and things natural; as to the *rational appetite* or the *will*, in a perfect inclination and propensity to the highest good that has been recognized, and in a spontaneous obedience unto God, and, therefore, in a righteousness and holiness that is perfectly conformable to the law of God, and excludes all sin; as to the *sensitive appetite* and the *affections*, in an amicable agreement with the higher faculties of the mind." And again (p. 31, *§§*:): "*Less primarily* and *secondarily* the image of God consisted in the im-

passibility and immortality of the body, and, in a certain sense, also the external dominion over the animals belonged to it."—Baier in his *Compendium Theol. pos.* (Part I, chap. IV, § 6 sqq.) says: "But that divine image that man obtained is taken in a twofold sense: 1. In a *general* sense and without any restriction, in so far as it contains *all* that in which there is a certain conformity between man and his archetype, God; 2. In a *special* sense, or with a restriction and primarily (*κατ' ἐξουσίαν*), in so far as it imports an especial similarity between man and God, by virtue of which man, *absolutely* speaking, can be called the express image of God. Taken in a *general* sense, the image of God; besides the righteousness and wisdom created together with, and in, the first man, comprises also the spiritual essence (*esse spirituale*) of the soul of man and its faculties, the intellect and the will, as well as the immortality of the soul and the dominion over other creatures. . . . Taken in a *special* sense, the image of God imports certain accidental perfections that were created together with, and in, the intellect and the will of the first man, conformable to the perfections that are in God, and conferred upon men in order that they might regulate and perform their actions rightly, so as to attain the ultimate end."

So we see that the Bible, our Confessions, and our Dogmaticians are in the fullest harmony in their doctrine concerning the image of God, not only in general, but also touching the twofold sense in which that expression may be taken.

Such, then, was the image of God conferred upon man in his first creation. But *what has become of it?* That is the second question we will have to answer, if we want to do justice to our subject.

We first again turn to the Bible and ask it to give us the correct answer. And what is this answer?

The third chapter of Genesis tells us how man was disobedient to his Creator and Benefactor and transgressed the commandment given, and how, in consequence thereof, he became aware of being naked, i. e., felt lust and concupiscence in his soul, lost the former dominion over the earth, and became mortal. Gen. 5, 1-3 we read that "Adam begat a son *in*

HIS OWN *likeness, after HIS image,*" whilst "in the day that God created man, *in the likeness of God* made He him." Gen. 8, 21. God says: "The imagination of man's heart is EVIL *from his youth,*" whilst 1, 31 we are told: "God saw *everything* that He had made"—man, of course, included—, "and behold, *it was VERY GOOD.*" The passages cited above, viz. Eccles. 7, 30; Eph. 4, 24; Col. 3, 10, teach us likewise that the original uprightness, righteousness and knowledge of man is now, after the fall, no more to be found in him in his natural condition; he must put it on anew or be renewed to it, if he is to have it at all. The same we are taught in a great number of other Scripture passages. We only cite a few more. John 3, 3 our Savior says: "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." Rom. 3, 23 St. Paul writes: "All have sinned, and come short of the glory of God." Psalm 143, 2 David prays: "Enter not into judgement with thy servant: for in thy sight shall no man living be justified." And Isaiah confesses, 64, 6: "We are all as an unclean thing, and all our righteousnesses are as filthy rags."

Thus, according to Scripture, by the fall of Adam the image of God has been lost to man in all its essential parts.

That our Confessions are in full accord with these teachings of Holy Writ can be seen already from the second passage cited above. We will add a few more. In the Apology we read, Art. II, § 15 (M. p. 80; J. p. 78): "Neither have we said anything new. The ancient definition understood aright expresses precisely the same thing when it says: 'Original Sin is the absence of original righteousness' (a lack of the first purity and righteousness in Paradise)." Again, Formula of Concord, P. II, Art. I (M. 576; J. 541 sq.): "Original Sin (in human nature) is not only such an entire absence of all good in spiritual, divine things, but it is at the same time also. *instead of the lost image of God in man, a deep, wicked, horrible, fathomless, inscrutable and unspeakable corruption of the entire nature and all its powers, especially of the highest, principal powers of the soul in understanding, heart and will; that now, since the fall, man receives by inheritance an inborn wicked disposition, an inward impurity of heart, wicked lusts and propensities,*" etc.

That our Dogmaticians agree with this a few citations

will suffice to show. Chemnitz (*loci theol.* 1, 227) says: "For also this is the misery of original sin that not only *the image of God itself is lost*, but the knowledge of the same is almost extinguished." Him Kœnig joins (*theol. pos.* 80): "The effect of the first sin is, with regard to our first parents, *the loss of the divine image, and that a total one, only a few fragments or vestiges remaining.*"

The last passage cited leads us to our last question in this matter, viz. *Are there still any remnants of the image of God in natural man, and if so, what are they?*

In the first place, we, as good Lutherans, ask, Does the Word of God warrant us in answering the above question affirmatively? Let us see?

Gen. 9, 6 God says to Noah: "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: *for in the image of God made He man.*" James 3, 9 we read: "Therewith" (the tongue) "bless we God, even the Father; and therewith curse we *men which are made after the similitude of God.* With regard to the first passage it might be said that the latter part refers only to the making of Adam, though evidently the expression is general and must therefore be applicable to all men, even since the fall. But the second passage says as plainly as possible that all men are made after the image of God. That cannot *only* mean that all men have in Adam been created after the likeness and image of God. For who would say, You shall not curse the devil because he was created an angel of light? Consequently there must be yet another relation between fallen man in his natural state and the image of God. Hollaz no doubt is entirely right when he, in accordance with our other theologians, explains these passages in the following manner (p. 486 sq.): "Man after the fall is said to have been made in the image of God, a.) *because of the first creation of man*, who was made in the image of God; all men have, therefore, received the image of God in Adam as the head and source of mankind; b.) *because of the remaining fragments* of the divine image which are a light of what is true and a seed of what is good, or the principles of reasons born with us, as well the theoretical as the practical; c.) *because man after the fall is capable of the divine image, to whom also, by virtue of the divine intention, it is due (debita)*, although in fact

he has it not ; d.) because, by virtue of the universal merit of Christ, *the image of God is to be restored* in all men, partly in this life, partly in that to come, so that man has a right to recover the image of God." Compare Gerhard (Loc. VIII, 136) who gives substantially the same explanation.

Gen. 9, 2 God says to Noah and his family: "The fear of you, and the dread of you, shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all that moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hands are they delivered," etc. If we compare this blessing after the fall with the one pronounced upon man before the fall, Gen. 1, 26, we will surely find a great difference, but also in part a conformity. Hence with regard to the dominion over the earth a vestige of the image of God is found also in fallen man in his natural condition. But more than this. Let us look at Rom. 1, 19-21: "Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them" (men in general, as they are in their natural condition after the fall); "for God hath showed it unto them. For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse: because that, *when they knew God*, they glorified Him not as God," etc. Compare this with Col. 3, 10, and you will find that also with regard to the knowledge of God and divine things a remnant, however small it may be in comparison with the original treasure, of the divine image has been left to fallen man by the grace of God. And if we compare Rom. 2, 14 ("When the *Gentiles*, which have not the law, *do by nature the things contained in the law*, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves") with Gen. 1, 31 and Eph. 4, 24 we will not hesitate to say that "philosophic or civil righteousness, which we also confess to be subject to reason, and in a measure within our power" (Apology II, 12: M. p. 80; J. p. 78) is also a remnant of the image of God. This same is taught clearly in the Formula of Concord, Part II, Art. II, § 9 (M. p. 589; J. p. 553): "Man's reason or natural understanding has still indeed a dim spark of the knowledge that there is a God, as also (Rom. 1, 19 sqq.) of the doctrine of the Law" (in the Latin it reads: *et partikulam aliquam legis TENET*). That the "spiritual essence" of the soul and its faculties have remained need not be proven.

But how is it with regard to the *passive capacity of being converted by the grace of God* that the Scripture, indirectly indeed, but plainly and clearly attribute to every fallen man, and without which he could not be converted at all except by the absolute omnipotence of God? Can we properly call this a remnant of the image of God? We think, we can. And in this our Confession agrees with us. For so we read, Formula of Concord, P. II, A. II, 21 sq. (M. p. 593; J. 556): "All teaching and preaching are lost upon him" (man in his natural state), "until he is enlightened, converted, and regenerated by the Holy Ghost. *For this renewal of the Holy Ghost no stone or block, but man alone was CREATED.* And although God, according to His just sentence, eternally casts away the fallen evil spirits, He has nevertheless, out of pure mercy, willed that poor fallen human nature might again become and be capable and participant of conversion, the grace of God, and eternal life; not from its own natural (active or) effective skill, aptness or capacity (for the nature of man is perverse enmity against God), but from pure grace, through the gracious efficacious working of the Holy Ghost. And this Dr. Luther calls *capacity* (not active, but *passive*), which he thus explains: When the Fathers defend the free will, they say of it that *it is capable of freedom in so far that, through God's grace, it can be turned to good, become truly free, FOR WHICH IT WAS CREATED IN THE BEGINNING.*"—We don't think that anybody can or will deny that here our Confession together with Luther regard the passive capacity of being converted by the grace of God after the fall as something that formed a part of the image of God, and that solely by the grace of God has been preserved to fallen man, whilst it has been denied to the fallen angels by the justice of God. For if this were not the case, how could it be said that *man alone HAS BEEN CREATED for the renewal of the Holy Ghost?* But, surely, the possibility and passive capacity of being again by the grace of God brought into the state of righteousness or of having the image of God restored is only a poor remnant and fragment of that primeval righteousness and image, i. e. when we compare it with this righteousness and image itself, though in itself it is an inestimable boon. And whilst that image itself was man's righteousness before God, this passive capacity of having it restored by the grace of God is, of course, no such thing.

That this passive capacity may be rightly called a remnant of the divine image is also the opinion of the acute and discerning dogmatician Quenstedt. It will be conceded by all, that free will is a principal part of the divine image. Gerhard says (V. 98): "Since by sin the image of God has been lost, at the same time also that power of choosing what is good has been lost, as this was a part of the divine image." What is a part of free will or can be called free will, viz. in its orthodox theological sense, must, therefore, also be a part of the image of God. Now Quenstedt says (II, 174: De libero arb. cap. III, § 81: XVI): "And thus free will (*liberum arbitrium*) is taken 1.) for the will itself, which is an essential faculty of a rational soul; 2.) for the *passive capacity and faculty* that is a mere logical non-repugnance (*mera non-repugnantia logica*). For there is a certain capacity (*ικανότης*) by virtue of which (*qua*) an unregenerate man can, not indeed convert himself, but be converted by God, which capacity is not found in irrational creatures and in devils," &c. And again (185: quaest. II, § 281: Observ. VII): "If by free will the passive capacity is understood that the mind and will of man can be converted by the ordinary grace of God, we concede that in this respect free will has not been lost. For there is in man a certain capacity, by virtue of which he cannot, indeed, convert himself, but can be converted by God, if he only uses the means that are divinely ordained." This shows plainly that also Quenstedt looks upon this passive capacity as a remnant of the divine image. Compare Musaeus, who, in his book inscribed "*Der Jenischen Theologen Ausfuehrliche Erklaerung*," shows conclusively that Luther, Chemnitz, Hutter, Gerhard, Lobeck, Mylius and Aeg. Hunnius held and taught that the passive capacity of being converted by the grace of God is something that man has by nature in consequence of his being created in the image of God, and consequently—though that expression is not used—as a remnant of the image of God that has not been lost by the fall. We will append here the passage cited from Hutter in his *Loci Communes Theologici* p. 282. It reads as follows: "The first question is, *Whether after the fall all powers in man are so broken, yea, extinguished in spiritual things that no aptitude or capacity has remained*. Concerning this question a rather bitter strife has arisen between some theologians: some banishing the

words *aptitude* and *capacity* from this article; others, contrariwise, admitting the same; neither, perhaps, explaining the matter as properly as it ought to be done. For this controversy is ended easily if only this is duly considered that those words can be taken in a twofold sense, viz. in an *active* and in a *passive* one. In an *active sense*, then when by aptitude and capacity you understand such an operating (*ἐνεργητικὴν*) faculty by means of which man can of himself apprehend the grace of conversion offered in the word that is preached. In a *passive sense* when man is said to be a receptive (*παθητικὸν*) subject that is fit (*habile*) to receive conversion or suited (*aptum*) to conversion. Such a passive capacity or aptitude is not found in a trunk or stone, neither of which is fit or able to have such a capacity (*ἰκανός* sive *δεκτικός* *capacitatis*.) And in this latter sense our sainted Luther has rightly ascribed to man a capacity, i. e. a receptive faculty (*δύναμιν παθητικῶς se habentem*) . . . Concerning both these capacities Bernhard in the beginning of his dissertation speaks in a manner no less forcible and orthodox than elegant, saying: ‘What does free will do? I answer briefly, It is saved. Take away free will, and there will be nothing that can be saved; take away grace, and there will be nothing by which it can be saved. This work cannot be effected without these two: the one by which it is done, the other to or in which it is done. God is the author of salvation, free will is only capable (*capax*); nor can any one give it (viz. salvation) except God, or receive (*capere*) it except free will by agreeing, i. e. by being saved. For to agree (*consentire*) is to be saved. How then? Is this, now, the whole work of free will? Is this its only merit that it agrees? It is precisely this; but not in such a sense as if even the consent wherein the whole merit consists were of itself, as we are not even sufficient of ourselves to think anything (which is less than to agree) as of ourselves; but God precedes us by sending into our hearts good thoughts and by changing our evil will.” Hutter, according to this passage, regards the passive capacity of being converted by the grace of God as something that “after the fall has remained” with regard to man’s relation to “spiritual things,” or as a remnant of what has been lost in spiritual things, i. e. of the image of God.

We sum up with the words of Gerhard (Locus VIII, Cap.

IX, 129): "1. If the divine image is taken for the essence of the mind itself, for the intellect, will, and other faculties, it cannot be said that it has been lost by the fall, since, as to the essence, the soul of Adam after the fall remained the same that it was before the fall. 2. If the image of God is taken for a certain general congruence and analogy, by which the soul of man expresses some of the divine things (*quaedam rã ʒsĩta*), e. g. that it shows a shadow of the holy trinity, that it is incorporeal, spiritual, intelligent, and of free will in things subject to its power, it can, again, not be said that it has been lost by the fall, since all this is noticed in the soul of man after the fall. 3. If the image of God is taken for the dominion over the other creatures, especially the living, wherein in a secondary sense the image of God consists, we can, again, not say that in this sense and respect the image of God has been entirely lost; for although that majesty of authority has been diminished and weakened in many ways, yet some vestiges of the same are still remaining. 4. If the divine image is taken for the principles born with us that are some trifling relics of the divine image in the mind and will of man and, so to say, fragments of a most beautiful edifice, we confess again that with regard to these very poor particles the image of God has not been entirely lost, as the work of the law is still written in the hearts also of the unregenerate. 5. But if, according to the explication and determination of Scripture, the image of God is taken for that true righteousness and holiness unto which man was created, for that concreate integrity and rectitude of all faculties that was in man before the fall, we must surely say that the divine image has been lost by the fall." And as in general the image of God is taken in this last, strictest sense, it is, of course, perfectly right to say, nay more, it must be said in *this* sense that the image of God has been *entirely* lost by the fall of Adam. For *not a particle of the original righteousness and holiness is in any natural man.* If we say that there are any remnants of the image of God in natural man we must take it in a sense wider than the last one.

St.

HOW TO READ THE BIBLE.

Everything rests on principles. A man's judgment decides a given case upon principles and rules that he has already accepted as true. Where physical phenomena are involved, experience is often made the rule. The king of a southern island had never seen ice; and when told that in northern climates water becomes so cold as to assume a solid form, he denied it as an impossibility.

This is the very way in which some people read the Bible. Indeed, it is perhaps the way in which all people read it, both they who believe and they who do not believe; and the different decisions are reached from different standpoints. The principles and rules by which men decide are different, and so it happens, that one man takes a statement as true while another tries to evade and explain until the obvious meaning is explained away.

With one man it is a fundamental principle, that God is King, and that the Bible is His Word, His message from heaven to earth, a letter of revelation written by divine intervention and sent out of the world of the invisible and spiritual into the world in which things are visible and material. But another man has never yet accepted any such clear and well-defined principle. When the former reads, God decides for him; but in the mind of the latter many Scriptural statements are yet open questions; he hardly knows whether they are true; at all events explanations are needed.

It is strange that the statements usually selected for criticism and perhaps rejection are the somewhat unpalatable statements. What a man does not like, he declares is not good, as though his own likes or dislikes decided everything. Such persons forget, that a man may dislike some things that are after all intrinsically good. An apple is an apple after all, even though some people may have no taste for it. On the other hand, tobacco is bitter anyway, even though some people do like it exceedingly. Taste has nothing to do with merit. It does not change anything. Truth is truth, whether a man likes it or not.

To make the application, here is the Scriptural state-

ment that God loved the world. Most people like that, and because they like it they accept it. But the statement in direct connection with this, though equally Scriptural, is not so acceptable. God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that all who believe on Him might not perish, but have everlasting life. Here lurks an unpleasant inference. *All who believe on Him.* What of those who do not believe? The thought is not as palatable as it is suggestive. What, then, shall be done with it? An easy way of disposal is, to say it is not true. But does that end the matter? What if it were true after all?

The same may be said of all Scriptural statements that refer to the saved and the lost. *Saved*, that is a word of pleasant sound. But *lost, lost*, what of that? The natural man does not like it. It is startling, alarming, repulsive. Therefore that word in the Scriptures must have a meaning different from its meaning in other writings. It cannot mean that in the judgment day some will be cast out; at least not forever.

There is that word *forever*. If God were King in all hearts, and the Bible His Word accepted as such by all, then *forever* would always be accepted as having one and the same meaning. But when a man's likes and dislikes are permitted to decide the case, then the *forever* of the Bible means to such a man one thing in one connection, but has quite a different meaning in another connection.

It is quite agreeable to think of shining "as the stars forever and ever." Dan. 12, 3. The poetic fancy is gratefully stimulated by the statement. The kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our Lord and His Christ; and He shall reign forever and ever. Rev. 11, 15. Probably a glow of satisfaction is felt by some hearts when they read, "But I am like a green olive tree in the house of God: I trust in the mercy of God forever and ever." Ps. 52, 6. It adds to the grace and perhaps tenderness of an obituary notice to write over it, "For this God is our God forever and ever." Ps. 48, 14. Many recognize the beauty of the promise about abiding "before God forever." Ps. 61, 7.

The Bible has a large number of additional statements in which the word forever appears in the same agreeable con-

nection. In all such connections men do not seem much inclined to abridge the meaning of the word. They are willing to let it remain as it is; let it mean what it says, *forever!*

But the Bible also has another class of statements in which the word appears. "And the devil that deceived them was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet are, and shall be tormented day and night forever and ever." Rev. 20, 10. Few would trouble themselves much about the "devil," upon whom the everlasting torment has come; but some would like to have the "false prophet" out of it, and are therefore in favor of an explanation that would shorten that *forever and ever*. "God shall likewise destroy thee *forever*." Ps. 52, 5. What an unpleasant point at which to say *forever!*

The Romish religion would suit some people much better than it does, if the hell of the thing were taken out of it, and the purgatory only were left in. Purgatory does not mean *forever*; but hell does.

What is true of *forever* is likewise true of some other words that have an equivalent meaning. "And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt." Dan. 12, 2. "And every one that hath forsaken houses, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my name's sake, shall receive a hundred fold, and shall inherit everlasting life." Matt. 19, 29. "Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness; that, when ye fail, they may receive you into everlasting habitations." Luke 16, 9. "Wherefore, if thy hand or thy foot offend thee, cut them off and cast them from thee: it is better for thee to enter into life halt or maimed, rather than having two hands or two feet, to be cast into everlasting fire." Matt. 18, 8. "As the whirlwind passeth, so is the wicked no more; but the righteous is an everlasting foundation." Prov. 10, 25. "Then shall He say also unto them on His left hand, depart from me ye cursed into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." Matt. 25, 41. "And these shall go away into everlasting punishment: but the righteous into life eternal." Matt. 25, 46. But a larger number of instances is not needed. The word is found often in the Scriptures.

And how pleasant it is to read, *everlasting* life, *everlasting* habitations, *everlasting* foundation, and the like. Yes, everlasting means *everlasting*. It refers to an endless state, to a never-ending condition. It describes a condition that shall endure as long as eternity. But, on the other hand, how unpleasant it is to read, *everlasting* contempt, *everlasting* fire, *everlasting* punishment, and the like. What now? Shall God speak? Or shall a man's likes or dislikes speak? Men have an easy way of deciding. Everlasting does not mean everlasting. It does not mean forever. It does not refer to a state or condition that is endless. It only means *a long time*, but a time that will at last end. Why does it mean this? Because a man wants it so. It is not pleasant to think of the almost countless souls that will suffer forever. And then one's own sin comes into the account. The question is suggested, Must I suffer everlasting punishment? It is so much more agreeable to ask, Will I enjoy everlasting life? And so in the latter case the man lets everlasting mean what it says, everlasting,—an endless state or condition; but in the former case it cannot mean everlasting, but only a very long time. And thereupon the man goes on about his business as though he had solved the problem, fixed up the whole matter and arranged the whole future to suit himself. What if the whole arrangement should fail? Perhaps after all everlasting does mean everlasting, whether it refers to punishment or reward, to life or death. Why should it mean one thing in one case and something else in the other case? If a man makes his own wish the rule, he will decide for himself; but if he proceeds on the principle that God is King, he will decide with the Word of God: *Everlasting* means *everlasting*: everlasting life; everlasting death.

The same principles of interpretation are involved in the case of other words. Singular as it may seem, one of the very simplest and plainest words in any language has in this way become the subject of controversy. Does "is" mean "is," or does it mean something else? No one would ever have thought of such a question if the Marburg Conference of 1529 had not been held. The word never had any other meaning previous to that date. "Is" was "*is*"; "est," "est;" "eimi," "eimi." The meaning of the words "This is my

body" had indeed become a subject of controversy in the ancient church, long before the days of Zwingli; but the discussions of those days had no reference to the meaning of "is." That was settled. But "this *is* my body" did not suit Ulrich Zwingli. He did not want it so. He gave his reasons why he did not want it so. It can not be so. It is impossible. It is unreasonable. It is against the reason of man. Therefore "is" can not mean "*is*." It must have some other meaning. No other case can be found in which it ever has had any other meaning. But the ingenuity of desire is equal to the emergency. If God does not speak otherwise, man will. "Is" means "represents" or "signifies," and, lo, there it is, "This *represents* or *signifies* my body."

It is perhaps not entirely easy to recognize, that here "is" and "everlasting" are arranged in one and the same line. And yet here they stand, side by side. Men say, the doctrine of an endless punishment is against God's mercy. Zwingli and his admirers say, the doctrine, this *is* my body, is against God's reason. This is perhaps not precisely the way in which the followers of Zwingli would say it. But it is the legitimate way of saying it. It is the conclusion at which any proper chain of reasoning must end. Zwingli meant to say, This *is* my body, is against the reason of man. It is against human reason. But here God's reason and human reason are made to stand side by side, because the word in question is God's word. Therefore to say, God does not teach things contrary to human reason is after all the same as saying, God does not teach things that are contrary to God's reason; or, in other words, This *is* my body, can not be a true statement of doctrine, because God's reason would be against it. So, then, in the one case we have God's mercy arrayed against a word in its ordinary meaning, and the other case we have God's reason arrayed against a word in its ordinary meaning. Everlasting can not mean everlasting, because God's mercy would be against it, and *is* can not mean *is* because God's reason would be against it. And in both cases the likes and dislikes of men lie at the bottom of all. If God were King in men's hearts, the trouble would vanish; but when men's desire is king, the trouble continues.

It is not usually observed, that the reasoning employed

by human desire really compromises God's mercy, instead of rescuing it, as is supposed. If the mercy of God requires an interpretation of "everlasting" to the effect that it shall not mean endless when referring to punishment, would not this same mercy of God be most sadly compromised by a similar interpretation of "everlasting" when referring to life? It would indeed be a strange sort of mercy that would say to a soul in the day of judgment, your portion is "everlasting" life, when the meaning is nothing more than that the life shall be quite a long life, but after a while it shall come to an end. Therefore, to rescue the mercy of God, human desire needs two forms of interpretation, according to one of which it must be said, everlasting means everlasting, eternal, unending, endless; while according to the other everlasting means not eternal, final, but a long time merely, and the like. And the rule would be, when God speaks, you take it all as you like it. If one interpretation suits you better than another, then take one that suits you best; but be very sure always to make your own interpretation.

They who are in the habit of reading the Scriptures after this method may perhaps regard these charges against them as too severe. And yet, if they will carefully analyze their own motives, they will find them in all respects true. A man reads and wishes that it might be otherwise. The next step is, to find some explanation or interpretation by which it is made to seem otherwise. After that the man has nothing more to do than to claim that it is otherwise, and to defend the position taken. So error is born, and after it is born men adhere to it. They cling to the error because the truth is not palatable.

The modern predestination error of Missouri possibly does not belong to this class by a direct lineage; but indirectly it has descended from the same parent stock. Not that men naturally like a doctrine that makes the salvation of some and the eternal damnation of others depend merely upon an arbitrary divine decree. That is hardly possible. But in the heat of discussion a statement is made that is somewhat extravagant; and after it has once been uttered it must be defended. At this point human desire enters the field. The brave warrior who has so often returned from the

slaughter of his foes covered with glory, desires the honor of adding another trophy to his vast collection. If victory is within the reach of his valor, strength or skill, he will not be defeated,—no, he absolutely will not. He may be on the wrong side, but he would rather defend the wrong than suffer defeat. Indeed, an admission on his part that he is on the wrong side would be the most disastrous of all defeats. It would tarnish all his former glory and cast a shadow over all former honors. No, no, it must not be. Therefore what has been said must be defended, and out of the loins of human desire the error has come forth.

This is no doubt the inside history of the Missouri new departure on predestination. For the purpose of provoking discussion statements were made in a form to give them the appearance of error. Then these statements were defended with skill and courage. But in the course of debate other statements were again made that needed proof. These must also be defended, until at last the new doctrine began to appear. Its first appearance was in a sort of embryo state; it was “without form and void;” but soon it assumed a definite and permanent shape and stood out boldly and defiantly, claiming to be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

A thetical statement must be so constructed as to have the appearance of heresy, and yet be true. This was Dr. Walther's idea of a model thesis. If a thesis is so constructed as to state the truth with entire clearness, it provokes no discussion and accordingly fails to accomplish its object. Whether this idea of a model thesis is correct, it is not at present the aim to determine. But the mistake was, that on the subject of predestination statements were so made, as to have not only the form, but also the substance of heresy. And yet a defense must be made, because the hero of many controversies values his own fame and cannot bear to have a shadow cast upon it. He has gone too far to make an honorable retreat, and so he draws the sword out of its scabbard and stands ready for the conflict.

And after the new doctrine is once fairly out of its shell, it soon finds other defenders. The valiant hero of many battles, who has commanded the field so long and with such

masterly skill, must not be forsaken now. Accordingly his army falls into line as soon as the call to arms is heard. "War you will have, and war you shall have," is signal enough, and in a moment every trusty warrior stands under the banner of his captain, ready for strife and blood, all because human desire is not willing to acknowledge an error, but clamors loudly for the delights of victory.

So it is entirely evident, that the new predestination theory stands side by side with the doctrine of a merely temporal future punishment, and side by side with the Zwinglian doctrine, "This signifies my body." Men read the Bible, thinking that they find these doctrines in it, because they want to find them in it. The companionship in which the new doctrine here appears may not be entirely agreeable to its advocates and defenders. The terms Calvinism, Zwinglianism and Universalism do not have a pleasant sound to their ears. But it is rather difficult to get the new doctrine away from its congenial associates, for it is evidently "of a feather" with them.

Accordingly a lover of Zwingli reads, "This is my body;" but he looks through Zwinglian spectacles, and always sees it, "This signifies my body." A Universalist reads, "And these shall go away into everlasting punishment;" but through his Universalist spectacles he always sees it, "And these shall go into a finite period of punishment." And a predestinarian reads, "God so loved the world, that He gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life." But through his predestinarian spectacles he sees it, "God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that the few chosen ones who by God's eternal decree must believe in Him, and can not do otherwise, shall not perish, but have everlasting life."

So each one wears his favorite glasses, and through them sees his favorite doctrine in the Bible because he wants to see it there. And then these people wonder why everybody else can not also see their favorite doctrine in the Bible, and sometimes grow indignant at those who do not see as they see. If they would lay aside their spectacles, they would cease to wonder, and their indignation would disappear.

In the dissecting room of a medical college embryo doc-

tors examine the dead to obtain a knowledge of the living. The plan is, in an important measure, successful, because dead flesh and living tissue, though the difference between them is very great, have after all many points of similarity. But when embryonic theologians and scientists examine their own dead hearts and carnal desires to obtain a knowledge of the living God, they misapply the rule. They might as well examine a garden rake to get a knowledge of astronomy. The difference between the two things is too immensely great. God can not be measured and weighed by human standards. His thoughts are too high and His ways too exalted for that.

When a man reads the Bible, therefore, he must not think of putting anything into it. If he stands on the high platform of Biblical truth, he must not get down because he finds things there that his reason can not reconcile. But this is the very thing that men do. They reject God because they can not measure Him. One man does not see how infinite mercy and impartial justice can be united in one divine being, and he therefore gets on the side of Universalism. Another can not reconcile the universal love of God with His unfailing foreknowledge, and accordingly gets down on the side of Calvinism. Now it is hardly worth while for the two to accuse one another of being down. They are both down. Whether the one has descended on the north side and the other on the south side matters very little. Why should such persons have controversies among themselves?

But the man who stands on the platform of Biblical truth has a position entirely different. He reads the same Bible that the others also read, but he can not get down among them, can not be one of them, can not identify himself with them, can have no religious fellowship with them. Why? Simply because he is standing upon the rock, while they are down. They can have fellowship with one another and lose nothing because they are all down any way. But if he wants to have fellowship with them he must get down, and that he can not afford to do; he can not afford to lose so much. He may have as much trouble about reconciling things as the others. He may not see any more than others do, how mercy and justice can stand side by side, how

the will and desire of God to save all men can agree with His foreknowledge, or how God, knowing that the fall of man would come, can be His Creator and yet free from the responsibility of having introduced sin into the world. But he reads and believes. To reconcile apparently contradictory things is not his business. To God all is clear. In God mercy and justice and judgment all stand in perfect harmony. God's will and desire to save all men and His foreknowledge do not conflict in His mind. He sees all and understands all. He knows how it is that He created a being that has sinned and yet has in His own person remained free from sin. Jesus touches the leper without becoming leprous, and it is all done in spite of man's philosophy. The believing reader of Holy Scripture does not comprehend these things any better than the unbelieving reader does. But he knows that God does understand them, and that is enough.

But must a man's reason remain entirely unemployed? By no means. The Bible is in this respect like other books and writings. Reason and judgment on the part of man must be exercised when the reading is being done. Without this it is impossible to read intelligently. But when reason presumes to ask, Are these things true?, then reason has entered a province in which it has no business. When a man brings in his wisdom as a measure of the wisdom of God, he ascribes too much to himself. The question whether a Biblical statement is true or false can never enter the mind of the believing reader. No matter how strange or unreasonable it may seem, it is always supremely and incontrovertibly true.

The true reader of the Scriptures therefore always approaches the Bible with the full conviction that it is the fountain of truth, the mine in which spiritual treasure is stored. He never opens the Book with the thought of enriching it with his wisdom, but always with the hope of being enriched with the wisdom of God. He does not expect to put his gold into the mine, but to get the gold of God out of the mine. He has no "signifies" to put in where God says, "This is;" no "they cannot believe because they are not predestinated," to put in where God says, "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved;" no secret will of God

to put in where it is said of God that He is "not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance;" no "long period of time" to substitute for "everlasting." But he does have his sins to bring to Jesus, and he comes to get for them the righteousness of God. He does have his poor empty heart to bring, that it may be filled with both the wisdom and knowledge of God. He does have his own sin-polluted robes to bring, that they may be washed and made white in the blood of the Lamb. All he has to bring is worthless; all he expects to get is of priceless worth.

And all Bible reading of this sort is beneficial. The souls that engage in it find rest and peace. "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart: and ye shall find rest unto your souls. For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light."

H. A. BECKER.

PASTORAL CONFERENCES.

That those who are engaged in the work of the ministry should feel the need of fraternal intercourse with each other is natural. The pastor has much about which he would like to confer with his brethren who are engaged in the same work. For this purpose pastoral conferences are organized. They are not divinely commanded, but are organizations formed in the exercise of Christian liberty to meet a want which many feel and some feel deeply.

But because there is no divine command that requires a pastor to support them, they are sometimes not well attended. Unhappily there are some ministers who do not experience the want. They have become accustomed to their routine work, which presents to their minds but little to perplex them, and have found enjoyment in occupations which enable them to dispense with the society and counsels of their brethren in the ministry. Lack of interest in the Conference may be regarded as a sign that zeal for the work, and a consequent desire to secure all the help possible in order to do it

well, has declined or decayed, and that interest has been awakened in some avocations that are not in harmony with the divine command to the minister: "Give attendance to reading, to exhortation, to doctrine. Neglect not the gift that is in thee, which was given thee by prophecy, with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery. Meditate upon these things; give thyself wholly to them, that thy profiting may appear to all." 1 Tim. 4, 13-15. When a minister gives himself wholly to the work of his holy office, it is not probable that he will feel no need of conferring with brethren who give themselves to the same work, whose experience will furnish him with many an important suggestion, and whose counsels will render him the assistance needed for his profiting and progress. The Conference meets a want which ministers ought to feel.

The pastor that is wise will therefore regard the very fact that he finds in his soul a lack of interest in the meeting of Conference a warning to arouse himself from his drowsiness. That he has no desire to go should furnish him an additional reason for determining to attend. The things that excite the desire to stay at home are very probably such as will not tend to make manifest his profiting in that which pertains to his office, and the things which are brought to his attention at Conference are such as will promote his progress in the knowledge of truth and in sound judgment respecting matters of practice. Conferring with his brethren on subjects of importance to the ministry will awaken a new interest in such matters, and will be a benefit that is not easily overestimated. The danger of falling into total indifference in regard to the ministerial work and of becoming immersed in employments and amusements that do not belong to his calling, if they are not in direct conflict with it, will be obviated. The interest displayed by others and the light that is emitted by the discussions will arouse the conscience and banish the indifference and drowsiness.

It is not only those, however, who are falling into a dangerous lethargy that need the Conference and should be diligent in attending them. These meetings have other uses and are needed on other grounds. The apostle exhorts all Christians that they should endeavor to keep the unity of the

Spirit in the bonds of peace. All must use diligence to preserve the purity of doctrine and promote consistency of practice. But especially must the ministers, who have the oversight and guidance of the flock, be concerned to teach and practice in harmony with each other, that no dissensions may arise among them and no offence be given the people by disagreements, real or apparent. The apostle exhorts: "I beseech you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that ye all speak the same thing, and that there be no divisions among you; but that ye be perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment." 1. Cor. 1, 10. That pastors who assemble in Conference have the same Confession, is necessarily presupposed. They would otherwise have no common basis upon which they would meet and discuss topics of importance to the Church. But upon this basis they should grow in knowledge as well as in grace, and see that they advance in harmony with each other, both in understanding of the truth and its application in the ministerial work. Such harmony is greatly promoted by meeting in Conference and exchanging convictions and sentiments for mutual instruction and edification.

Nor is the increase in knowledge which may be derived from the meetings of Conference to be lightly esteemed. The pastor must increase his stock of information and penetrate ever deeper into the mine of truth as he grows in years. He could not be faithful to his God and his charge if he stood still. It is idle talk to say that as, when he was examined and ordained, he was pronounced qualified for the ministry, it can not be necessary for him to increase his mental stores in order to be a faithful minister. A man is judged according to his opportunities. The man who has a small charge has not as many souls to account for, as the man to whom a large congregation is committed. The man who has had a year to study is not expected to attain the same degree of proficiency as the man who has had twenty years to gather and digest knowledge. What is satisfactory in a beginner is not on that account satisfactory in a workman of long experience. The pastor who has made no progress in knowledge in the course of years has not been faithful. If he obeys the divine command and gives attendance to reading, if he follows the

example of the men of God of old and makes the law his meditation day and night, he must grow in knowledge. And such growth is required of him. The Lord wants no laborers to idle away their time in His vineyard. Pastors can become better qualified every year for their important work, and what can be, the Lord demands, as the Spirit urges to its attainment. For such growth in knowledge Conferences are important aids. The studies of different pastors have been in different fields, and the bent of their minds has directed their reflections in different channels. In the interchange of thought and mutual communication of knowledge each gets the benefit of the learning and judgment of all, and a few hours often clears up a subject that an individual alone in his study might have required weeks and even months to investigate and understand. If pastors therefore are desirous of growing in knowledge, as the Word of God requires of them, they must avail themselves of the excellent opportunities afforded to this end by Conferences. Especially must this be the case with young ministers, who have but made a beginning in learning those things which are needed for an efficient ministry, and whose perplexities and doubts can be so readily removed by the learning and experience of older pastors. But these older pastors also have their difficulties to be solved, and certainly when they get too old to learn they have become too old to preach.

Occasionally an excuse for neglecting Conferences is suggested that savors more of self-conceit than of knowledge and grace. It is intimated, if not directly expressed by a pastor here and there, that little can be learned of the members of Conference and that the time would therefore be spent more profitably in study at home. The implied claim put forth by such pastors is that they have learned all that their brethren are able to teach, and have therefore nothing to gain by meeting with them. It is a proud claim which no pastor of the right spirit will be likely to put forth. But even supposing that one entertained such thoughts, even though he should be ashamed to express them, the excuse would not be valid. If he has learned so much he certainly owes it to his brethren to give them the benefit of his superior knowledge. All must be willing to impart as well as to receive. "There are

diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit. And there are differences of administrations, but the same Lord. And there are diversities of operations, but it is the same God which worketh all in all. But the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal." 1 Cor. 12, 4-7. Pastors should therefore be willing to use their gifts for the advantage of others, as they should be ready to avail themselves of the benefits to be derived from others' gifts, and all should be glad to meet in Conference that the gifts of all may be utilized for the good of all. L.

HOMILETICAL DEPARTMENT.

Contributions to this department are respectfully solicited.

C. H. L. S.

QUASIMODOGENITI SUNDAY. 1 JOHN 5, 4-10.

A.

Int. Thoughts. 1. Jesus of Nazareth which was crucified and is risen hath obtained the victory over sin, death, and the devil. 1 Cor. 15, 55-57; John 16, 33; Gal. 1, 4; Rom. 14, 8-9.

2. Jesus is the captain of our salvation—His victory is to be made our victory—we are called to reign with Him. But how? By faith.

THE FAITH WHICH OVERCOMETH THE WORLD.

I. *The Faith.*

1. *In Jesus the Son of God.* 5, 6a and 7. Compare 1 John 2, 23.
2. *Begotten of God.* 4 and 6b; Eph. 2, 8.
3. *By the threefold witness of God.* 8-10.

II. *The Victory.*

1. *Over the unbelieving and unrighteous world.*
2. *Over the lustful and alluring world.*
3. *Over the miserable and condemned world.*

C. H. L. S.

B.

OUR MOST HOLY FAITH.

- I. *Its Import* (or the object apprehended). V. 5.
 II. *Its Power* (or what it accomplishes). V. 4.
 1. *The believer is born of God.*
 2. *The believer overcometh the world.*
 III. *Its Foundation* (or whence its certainty). V. 6-10.
 1. *Three witnesses in heaven.*
 2. *Three witnesses in earth.*

FROM THE GERMAN OF WESTERMEIER.

MISERIC. DOM. SUNDAY. 1 PET. 2, 21-25.

A.

Int. Thoughts. Jesus Christ my Lord "has redeemed me, a lost and condemned sinner, purchased and won me from all sins, from death and from the power of the devil . . . that I may be His own, and live under Him in His kingdom, and serve Him in everlasting righteousness, innocence, and blessedness. This is most certainly true." Gal. 2, 16-21; Rom. 6, 4, etc.

WE THAT ARE JUSTIFIED ARE CALLED TO LIVE UNTO
 RIGHTEOUSNESS.

- I. *To this end hath Christ left us an example.* 21-23.
 1. *In His holy person* (22) and
 2. *In His holy living* (21 & 23) that we be like Him and follow His steps.

But how is this possible, we being sinners? Answer:

- II. *To this end hath Christ redeemed us.* 24.
 1. *Who His own self bore the guilt of our sins.*
 2. *Who His own self delivered us from the dominion of sin.*
 3. *Who His own self perfects our imperfect endeavors to serve God in righteousness.*
 III. *To this end is Christ the Shepherd and Bishop of our souls.* 25.
 1. *He Himself directs and leads us in the way.*
 2. *He Himself secures us against the foe and provides for us in our necessities.*

Conclusion: 1 Cor. 15, 57-58.

C. H. L. S.

B.

THE SUFFERING JESUS.

I. *How hath He suffered?*

1. *As the innocent Lamb of God.* 22.
2. *In patience and willing submission.* 23.
3. *In the consciousness that He is thereto called.* 21 (deduce from).

II. *Why hath He suffered?*

1. *In our stead—"for us."* 21.
2. *For our reconciliation.* 24.

III. *To what end hath He suffered?*

That we live unto righteousness. 25.

FROM THE GERMAN OF COUARD.

JUBILATE. 1 PET. 2, 11-20.

A.

Int. Thoughts. 1. Jubilate, i. e. Rejoice! Why? For many reasons; but this day because we are of the household of God. Eph. 2, 11-13 and 19.

2. Heaven is our home. John 14, 1-3 and Heb. 11, 13-16. We are on the way thither. Hence

RULES OF CONDUCT FOR THOSE WHO JOURNEY
HEAVENWARD.

- I. *Abstain from fleshly lusts which war against the soul.* V. 11.
- II. *Walk honestly among the people of the world.* V. 12.
- III. *Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake.* V. 13-15 and 18.
- IV. *Enjoy your Christian liberty in the fear and love of God.* V. 16-17.
- V. *Incur the displeasure of no man by any fault of your own.* V. 19-20.

C. H. L. S.

B

TRUE CHRISTIANS ARE AT THE SAME TIME GOOD
CITIZENS AND SUBJECTS.

- I. *True Christians live not according to the lusts of the flesh but to the honor of God.*
- II. *True Christians subject themselves as the servants of God to every ordinance of man.*

FROM THE GERMAN OF STIER.

CANTATE SUNDAY. JAMES 1, 16-21.

A.

Int. Thoughts. This Sunday is called Cantate and invites us to sing. We have much for which songs of thanksgiving and praise are due unto God—To-day we would sing the praises of the Father of lights who hath begotten us—We would fain have our whole life turned into a song of thanksgiving for God's gift of a new birth.

THE LIVING SONG OF OUR NEW-BORN HEARTS.

- I. *We adore the gracious will of God of which He has begotten us.* 18 a.
1. *There was nothing in us to make us worthy of a new birth, but much to make us wholly unworthy of it.*
 2. *Of His own merciful will, as revealed to us in Christ Jesus, begat He us.*
- II. *We prize the Word of Truth by which He hath begotten us.* 18 b. and 19 a. and 21 b.
1. *The visible (sacraments) and the audible word as the means of grace.*
 2. *We deem them holy, willingly hear and learn them.*
- III. *We love the life of holiness whereto He hath begotten us.* 19 b—21 a.
1. *In the holiness is formed within us the image of our God.*
 2. *In this our new spiritual nature and its exercise we take great pleasure.*
- IV. *We rejoice in the many gifts of the Father who hath begotten us.* 17.
1. *Good gifts and perfect gifts.*
 2. *Bestowed unceasingly.*

C. H. L. S.

B.

WHEN ARE WE FOUND IN THE SAVING WAYS OF GOD?

- I. *When our eyes are directed heavenward.*
- II. *When our ears are turned to the Word of truth.*
- III. *When our feet walk the way of holiness.*

ARRANGED FROM THE GERMAN OF CASPARI.

ROGATE SUNDAY. JAMES 1, 22-27.

A.

Int. Thoughts. The lesson of last Sunday closes with the declaration that God's Word *can* save our souls. When *does* it save our souls? To this St. James gives answer when he says:—

BE YE DOERS OF THE WORD, AND NOT HEARERS ONLY!

I. *Be ye Hearers of the Word.*

1. *Of the Law*—which discovers to you your sinful, damnable and helpless condition. Like a mirror it reflects your true spiritual condition. V. 23.
2. *Of the Gospel*—which reveals to you the saving mercy of God in Christ Jesus. God in all His tender compassion for the sinner and the salvation offered are likewise reflected by the word. V. 25.
3. *Of the Law and the Gospel*—the one telling you what is the true service of God; the other enabling you to render it.

II. *Be ye Doers of the Word.*

1. *By repentance.* V. 23-24.
2. *By faith.* V. 25.
3. *By love.* V. 26-27.

Hearing only you deceive yourselves; but doing you are blessed in your deed. 22 b and 27 b. C. H. L. S.

B.

PURE RELIGION, OR THE ACCEPTABLE SERVICE OF GOD consists in

- I. *An attentive hearing of*—22-24.
- II. *A true believing in*—22-25.
- III. *A willing obedience to*—26 and 27.
- IV. *A faithful continuance in His Word.* 25.

C. H. L. S.

ASCENSION-DAY. Acts 1, 1-11.

A.

OUR REDEEMER EXALTED.

- I. *Exalted, but not until He has lovingly and faithfully ordered the affairs of His kingdom on earth.* V. 1-8.

- II. *Exalted to the infinite power and majesty of God therein to live and reign to all eternity for our good.* V. 9.
- III. *Exalted, but once more to return to judge the quick and the dead, and to take us with Him.* *Halleluja!* V. 10-11.

C. H. L. S.

B.

THE SANCTIFYING POWER OF THE WORDS: JESUS IS TAKEN UP INTO HEAVEN.

- I. *It establishes our hearts in the faith; (that Jesus is the Son of God our Savior.)*
- II. *It comforts us in our afflictions; (Jesus is ever present with us).*
- III. *It cheers us in the hour of death; (Jesus will take us to Himself).*
- IV. *It makes us zealous in our sanctification; (that we may be prepared for Him).*

ADAPTED FROM THE GERMAN OF BÆCKH.

EXAUDI SUNDAY. 1 PETER 4, 7-11.

A.

Int. Thoughts. "This same Jesus which is taken up from you into heaven, shall so come in like manner as ye have seen Him go into heaven." Acts 1, 11.—Meanwhile, what shall we do? Answer:

GLORIFY GOD IN ALL THINGS THROUGH JESUS CHRIST.

- I. *Of God we receive every good gift.*
1. *Through Christ* V. 10.
 2. *In answer to prayer.* V. 7.
- II. *To God we minister in all things.*
1. *According to His will; V. 8-9 and 11.*
 2. *As of the ability which God giveth.* V. 11.

C. H. L. S.

B.

THE GOOD STEWARD OF THE MANIFOLD GRACE OF GOD.

- I. *He receives in prayer.*
- II. *He expends in love.*
- III. *He renders account to God.*

FROM THE GERMAN OF BECK.

PENTECOST SUNDAY. Acts 2, 1-13.

Int. 1. It is maintained by the chief teachers of the Jews that on the day of Pentecost—the 50th following Easter—God gave the Law to Moses. Accordingly they celebrate the day. But primarily and properly such is not the meaning of the day. God appointed it to be observed as “the day of the first fruits” of the field. Num. 28, 26. A harvest-home to be observed with thanksgiving and praise. The festive character of the day among the Jews.

2. To us the day of Pentecost signifies neither the one nor the other of the events named; but an event greater by far than either. Besides this earth with its sunshine and rain, its seed-time and harvest—besides the Old Testament covenant with its laws and ceremonies, with its sacrifices and symbols—God has established another and a higher order of things, an economy of grace,—a heavenly vineyard whereof the Father is the husbandman, Christ is the vine, and we are the branches. In this too there is sunshine and rain, seed-time and harvest—in this too there is a day of Pentecost, a day of first-fruits, a day of commemoration of the first great fruits of Jesus' labors: “for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you; but if I depart, I will send Him unto you.” Joh. 16, 7. This coming of the Comforter is to-day celebrated by Christian people every where.

THE GRACIOUS OUTPOURING OF THE HOLY GHOST.

I. *The preparations preceding it.* V. 1.

1. *On the part of God:* “was fully come.”

a) Promises Isa. 44, 3. Zech. 12, 10. Joel 2, 28.
Acts 2, 16-18.

b) Life, sufferings and death of Christ.

2. *On the part of men.*

a) Harden not your hearts, resist not, grieve not the Spirit, Prayer, etc. Ps. 51, 14.

b) As to the time—“when the day of P. was come”—defer not repentance; and as to the place—“were in one place”—the Christian home and Church.

II. *The manner of its fulfillment.* V. 2-11a.

1. *Then:*—

a) Signs.

b) All filled with the Holy Ghost.

c) Tongues.

2. *Now*.—By the means of grace. This too is a wonderful work of God.

III. *The things which follow it.* V. 11b-13.

1. *In and by those who receive the Spirit.*
 a) Contrast the disciples before and after the day of Pentecost.
 b) The difference in our own lives before and after our Pentecost.
2. *In and by those who reject the Spirit.*
 a) Their mockery, etc., and
 b) Their fearful end.

C. H. L. S.

TRINITY SUNDAY. ROM. 11, 33-36.

A.

TO THE LORD OUR GOD BE GLORY FOREVER.

I. *He is unsearchable and past finding out.*

1. *In the works and ways of providence.*
 2. *In the works and ways of redemption.*
 3. *In the works and ways of sanctification.*

II. *Oh, come and worship at His feet.*

1. *All His works and ways are truth and righteousness.*
 2. *All His works and ways are love and mercy.*

C. H. L. S.

B.

THE HOLY DEPTHS OF THE GODHEAD.

I. *As they stand before us.*

1. *In God's works.*
 2. *In God's ways, and*
 3. *In God's essence.*

II. *As we stand before them.*

1. *In humility.*
 2. *In faith.*
 3. *In hope.*

FROM THE GERMAN OF GEROCK.

THE COLUMBUS THEOLOGICAL MAGAZINE.

This Magazine is designed to supply the want, long since felt, of a Lutheran periodical devoted to theological discussion. Its aim will be the exposition and defence of the doctrines of the Church as confessed in the Book of Concord. Theology in all its departments is embraced within its scope, though for the present special attention will be given to the controverted subject of predestination.

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C O L U M B U S

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T H E

COLUMBUS THEOLOGICAL MAGAZINE

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No. 3.

WHO IS THE SUBJECT OF CHURCH POWER?

There seems to be no difficulty in such a question. It might even be pronounced tautological, and thus unworthy of serious consideration. By the very terms the subject of the Church's Power is the Church. But that does not place the matter beyond further question. It only suggests the point to be examined. The word Church is not always used in the same sense. Sometimes it designates the whole congregation of believers as they are scattered over the earth, but gathered into one body by the Holy Spirit, united by the one faith in Jesus, and thus built up a spiritual house before the eyes of God. Sometimes it means the external assembly of believers, with whom unbelievers are mixed, so that these latter also are included in the compass of its signification. God has conferred rights and privileges, powers and offices upon His Church. Do these powers and gifts belong to the external organization which is called a congregation or church, including all to whom the term is applied, or do they belong to the Church in the strict and proper sense? That is the point of our inquiry.

It will be borne in mind that the Church is "properly the congregation of saints and true believers," and that this its essential character is not changed when "in this life many hypocrites and evil persons are mingled with it." It remains what it is, notwithstanding the intrusion of foreign elements. The "hypocrites and evil persons" do not, by their mere outward association with the sincere and good, become "saints and true believers," the congregation of

whom is the Church. When it is asked, therefore, whether these "hypocrites and evil persons" have committed to them the rights and powers which belong to the "congregation of saints and true believers," our answer must be emphatically in the negative. These gifts belong to the Church, not to the hypocrites and evil persons who in this life are mingled with it, just as the virtue of wheat belongs to the wheat, and not to the tares that are mixed with it. This is antecedently so evident that any further argument might appear superfluous. Certainly, if the question is debateable at all, the burden of proof lies with those who deny what is so obvious. But the subject has difficulties, and in view of them doubts have arisen. It is therefore by no means a work of supererogation to give it earnest consideration.

That the important bearings of our question may become apparent, we direct attention at the outset to the fact, that it involves the decision of the seemingly more important questions, whether an outward organization or visible congregation in which there are no believers has any of the rights or powers of the Church, and whether an unbelieving person, acting in his own behalf, and not as an agent of others who have conferred powers which they possess, can legitimately administer the means of grace. Nay, it even forces upon us the question of such far-reaching import, whether the means of grace administered by an organization which contains no believers and therefore is no church, or by an individual who is not himself a believer and is not empowered by believers, can administer them efficaciously. People cannot give what they do not possess. Hence, if we deny that unbelievers have the rights and powers of the Church at all, it would seem to follow of necessity that they cannot impart the treasures which are committed to the Church for enjoyment and distribution. Let us not be in haste to draw such conclusions, remembering that the blessing is ordinarily bound to the means, not to the persons administering them, and that these means in the mercy of God may be valid and efficacious even when administered by persons to whom God did not commit them and who have no right to employ them; but let us not treat with indifference a subject that has such important bearings, and whose mis-

conception may lead to such dangerous consequences. On the other hand, it is plain to the view that, if hypocrites and evil persons, because they are in this life mingled with the Church, are regarded as becoming possessors of the Church's gifts and powers, it will lead them to embrace the delusion, as is the case in the Church of Rome, that righteousness consists in meat and drink, and rite and ceremony, and work and worry, and that whoever belongs to the external organization and performs the routine of duty can therefore justly claim all the promises and blessings which belong to the Church. The corruption of the human heart admonishes us to be wary in this regard, and the history of the Church gives us warnings which it would be suicidal to neglect.

God has committed heavenly treasures and gifts and spiritual powers and offices to His Church, and this Church is the "congregation of saints and true believers," not the Church as it appears in its external organization, in which hypocrites and evil persons are mingled with it; in other words, these gifts and powers are conferred upon those who believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, not upon any who do not believe, even though these unbelievers should be outwardly mingled with believers. So the Scriptures and the Church unmistakably teach.

To our Lord's question, "Whom say ye that I am?" "Simon Peter answered and said, Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God. And Jesus answered and said unto him, Blessed art thou, Simon Barjona; for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven. And I say also unto thee, that thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." Matt. 16, 16-19. The keys of the kingdom of heaven are the authority to use the Word, in which the King of Zion exercises His power. He alone rules and accomplishes His saving purposes in the Church, and He does this by His Word. To whom does He commit this Word with its mighty power? When our Lord says that He will give the keys to Peter, the

connection in which these words occur must be observed, if we would rightly understand them. Not to a certain person, whether he believed or not, were they committed, but to one who believed the truth in Jesus which flesh and blood had not revealed to him, and who confessed that truth to the glory of his Savior. Upon the rock of that truth and of the Christ, the Son of the living God, who is the content and substance of that truth, the Church is built. The gates of hell would prevail against it with ease, if it were founded upon a mere man; the gates of hell would have prevailed against it in fact when Peter fell, if it had been founded on the person of Peter. But it is founded upon that rock of truth which shall abide though heaven and earth should pass away, and upon which there always will be believers built, though many reject it and many fall. Of these believers and confessors Peter was the representative. What he confessed is what all true disciples of Jesus believe. He could speak and did speak for all of them. In that capacity of believer the keys of the kingdom of heaven were committed to him. This is evident from the circumstances. But it is placed beyond all dispute by our Lord's words in a subsequent chapter. Speaking of church discipline He there says: "If he neglect to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as a heathen man and a publican. Verily I say unto you, whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." Matth. 18, 17. 18. What is said of Peter is here said of the whole Church. What Peter received, all the other members of the Church received. What was given to the Church was given to Peter as a member of that Church.

On this point our Confessions are very clear and explicit. In the appendix to the Smalcald Articles, which treats of the power and primacy of the pope, it is said in reply to some arguments of the Papists: "They cite against us certain passages, viz. (Matt. 16, 18 sq.): 'Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church.' Also: 'I will give unto thee the keys.' Also (John 21, 15): 'Feed my sheep,' and some others. But since this entire controversy has been fully and accurately treated of elsewhere in the books of our theologians, and all things cannot be reviewed in this place,

we refer to those writings, and wish them to be regarded as repeated. Yet we will briefly reply concerning the interpretation of the passages quoted.

In all these passages Peter is the representative of the entire assembly of apostles, as appears from the text itself. For Christ asks not Peter alone, but says: 'Whom do ye say that I am?' And what is here said in the singular number: 'I will give unto thee the keys, and whatsoever thou shalt bind,' etc., is elsewhere expressed in the plural (Matt. 18, 18): 'Whatsoever ye shall bind,' etc. And in John 20, 23: 'Whosoever sins ye remit,' etc. These words testify that the keys are given alike to all the apostles, and that all the apostles are alike sent forth.

In addition to this, it is necessary to confess that the keys pertain not to the person of a particular man, but to the Church, as many most clear and firm arguments testify. For Christ, speaking concerning the keys (Matt. 18, 19), adds: 'If two of you shall agree on earth,' etc. Therefore He ascribes the keys to the Church originally and immediately; just as also for this reason the Church has originally the right of calling. [For just as the promise of the Gospel belongs certainly and immediately to the entire Church, so the keys belong immediately to the entire Church, because the keys are nothing else than the office whereby this promise is communicated to every one who desires it, just as it is actually manifested that the Church has the power to ordain ministers of the Church. And Christ speaks in these words: 'Whatsoever ye shall bind,' etc., and points out to whom He has given the keys, namely, to the Church: 'Where two or three are gathered together in my name' (Matt. 18, 20). Likewise Christ gives supreme and final jurisdiction to the Church, when He says: 'Tell it to the Church.']" *Smalc. Art. App.* § 22-24.

It is undoubtedly true that when our Lord commands us to tell it unto the Church, this is contemplated as an external assembly. Discipline cannot be exercised by men in the invisible congregation of saints as such. If we are to tell a matter to the Church, and the person concerned is to hear the Church, it is presumed that there is a congregation of

brethren assembled in some locality, to whom we can speak and whom we can hear. That is manifest. But it does not follow that the keys are given to all whom it may please to hold such a meeting. They are given to the Church, not to an assembly of unbelievers, and not to a motley multitude without reference to faith or unbelief. And the Church is properly nothing else than the congregation of saints and true believers. It is that, and only that, when it assembles before the eyes of men to exercise the keys, as it is when contemplated by the eyes of God in its essential nature and unity. The hypocrites and wicked persons who mingle with the believers when they form a visible assembly, and who thus share its name and offices, are no more really members of the Church than they were before, and the Church is no less really the congregation of saints than it was before. The Church is composed of believers, whether these be regarded as scattered throughout the world or as gathered in a certain place and performing certain offices. Though crowds of hypocrites manage to find their way into the outward and visible organization, the Church properly is still the believers, not the unbelievers. To these, whether contemplated as an invisible body scattered throughout the whole world, or as a local organization exercising the rights and performing the duties of the Church, the keys are given. This is shown by the words of our Lord spoken in immediate connection with the bestowal of the keys. He there adds: "Again I say unto you, that if two of you shall agree on earth as touching anything that they shall ask, it shall be done for them of my Father which is in heaven. For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." Matt. 18, 19, 20. The persons who have the promise that what they shall bind or loose on earth shall be bound or loosed in heaven, are those who are assembled in the name of Him to whom all power is given in heaven and on earth, and who has promised to be with His disciples every day unto the end of the world. They are those who have the promise that whatsoever they shall ask they shall receive. But these are none others than the believers. "All things whatsoever ye shall ask in prayer, believing, ye shall receive." Matt. 21, 22. "Verily, verily, I say unto you, what-

soever ye shall ask the Father in my name, He will give it you." John 16, 23.

This is taught with the same clearness in the other passage in which the bestowal of the keys is mentioned. St. John writes: "Then said Jesus again unto them, Peace be unto you: as my Father hath sent me, even so send I you. And when He had said this, He breathed on them, and saith unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whosoever sin ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained." John 20, 21-23. From this it is evident that only those who receive the Holy Spirit are authorized to remit and retain sins, or to use the keys of the kingdom of heaven. As such authority is in the other passages represented as given to those who are built upon the rock of truth and are gathered in Jesus' name, so here it is represented as given to those who have the Holy Spirit, since He alone leads souls into the truth and joins them to Christ.

Our Lord has committed the means of grace and the authority to administer them in His name not to unbelievers, but to the Church, i. e. to the saints and true believers. He has given the keys to them that are His. These keys are "the peculiar power which Christ has given to His Church on earth to forgive the sins of penitent sinners, but to retain the sins of the impenitent as long as they do not repent." So we confess in our Catechism. Man as he is by nature has no proprietary rights in the Word and Sacraments, and has no authority to employ them in the remission or the retention of sins. The ministerial commission renders this indubitable. Before His visible separation from His disciples "Jesus came and spake unto them, saying, All power is given unto me in heaven and on earth. Go ye therefore and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things, whatsoever I have commanded you: and, lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." Matt. 28, 18-20. That all power was given unto Him renders His commission and His presence necessary for the exercise of that power by men as co-workers with God. He therefore gives the commission to His disciples and promises them His presence until the end of time. Such commission and

such promise. He does not give to men who receive Him not. He has given them to the Church, which is His body. "Wherever the Church is," says our Confession, "there is the authority to administer the Gospel. Wherefore it is necessary for the Church to retain the authority to call, elect, and ordain ministers. And this authority is a gift exclusively given to the Church, which no human power can wrest from the Church, as Paul also testifies to the Ephesians (4, 8), when he says: 'He ascended, He gave gifts to men.' And he enumerates among the gifts especially belonging to the Church 'pastors and teachers,' and adds that such are given 'for the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ.' Where there is therefore a true Church, the right to elect and ordain ministers necessarily exists." *Smal. Art. App. § 67.* The Church alone, as the bride of Christ, has the treasures of the Bridegroom; but wherever there is really a church, that is, wherever there is a congregation of believers, the rights and powers of administering the means of grace exist, since Christ has committed them to His people, not to a select few or special class among His people. An unbeliever, or an assembly composed entirely of unbelievers, has no ownership in the heavenly treasures committed to the Church, and has no authority to dispense these treasures. They are given exclusively to the Church.

"Before Christ gives the command to forgive and to retain sins," says Luther, "He breathes upon them and says, 'Receive ye the Holy Ghost; whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted.' John 20, 22, 23. Here it is decreed that no one is able to forgive sins unless he have the Holy Ghost. For the words stand there clear and immovable. It will avail nothing to raise the cry that that is an article of John Huss or of Wicliffe, and has been condemned at Constance. Condemnation will not suffice; we want proof. Nor is it enough to answer that it is written, Matt. 23, 3): 'All therefore that they bid you observe, that observe and do; but do not ye after their works.' For that is said of preaching, to which office Christ sends His apostles, and did not yet breathe upon them nor give them the Holy Ghost, as He does here." "This I have said that we may have a good foundation in the matter. It is beyond doubt that no one can retain or for-

give sins unless he have the Holy Spirit so certainly that you and I know it, as these words plainly show. But that is no one save the Christian Church, that is, the congregation of all believers in Christ. She alone has the keys; of this you must not doubt. And whoever else appropriates to himself the keys commits sacrilege, is a wretched church robber, be it the pope or whoever else it may be. Of this Church every one is certain that it has the Holy Ghost, as Paul after Christ and all the Scriptures abundantly testifies, and as it is briefly expressed in the Creed, where we say: 'I believe that there is a holy Christian Church.' "Therefore the articles are so arranged in the Creed that the forgiveness of sins is mentioned after the holy Christian Church, and again the article concerning the Holy Ghost comes before the latter, in order to show that without the Holy Ghost there is no Christian Church, and without the Christian Church there is no forgiveness of sins." *Erl.* 27, 349-351. "The keys are not the pope's, as he pretends, but they belong to the Church, the people of Christ, God's people, or the holy Christian people throughout the whole world, or wherever there are Christians. For they cannot all be at Rome, unless the whole world be at Rome, which will not be for a while yet. Just as Baptism, the Lord's Supper, and the Word of God are not the pope's, but belong to the people of Christ and are called keys of the Church, not keys of the pope." *Ib.* 25, 364.

When it is thus proved that God has committed the keys to the Church in the proper sense, i. e. to the Church which is the congregation of saints and true believers, the proposition is established also that all the power of the Church is conferred upon believers, and upon no others; for the keys of the kingdom include all the power of the King who rules and reigns in it. Christ is Himself present in His Church and exercises His power in it by the Word and Sacraments; and those who are entrusted with the use of the keys are entrusted with all the King's power. "The delivery of the keys," says Polycarp Leyser, "is an ancient symbol of a certain power committed and entrusted; for he who has the keys has access to everything. Thus when a man commits the keys to his wife, he acknowledges her as his consort, and intrusts to her the charge of the house. In the same way the

keys are committed to house-keepers and stewards by their masters, and authority is thus given them over the chambers, cellars, chests, and all their contents. Thus too when a ruler is admitted into a city, the keys are delivered to him by the citizens, which is a token that they submit themselves to his power, and acknowledge his authority to admit into the city or to exclude from it. This figure our Lord here applies to the Church, the keys of which He promises to Peter and his colleagues, and thus teaches that He will appoint them His house-keepers and stewards, that they may open the treasures to the worthy, who are thus admitted to their possession and use, and that they may close them to the unworthy and profane, who are thus banished from the kingdom of God. Hence Paul says: 'Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God.' 1 Cor. 4, 1. The words 'keys of the kingdom of God' therefore embrace all those functions, powers, and authority, by which everything requisite for the kingdom of Christ and the government of the Church is performed, which cannot be better expressed than by this comparison of the keys." *Harm. Ev.* cap. 85, p. 1616. The same writer, a few pages further on, shows from Matt. 18, 18. that this "applies not only to the apostles, but to the whole Church," so that every Christian believer, not only every pastor, has the power of the keys.

There are two errors in reference to this subject against which we must be careful to guard. One is that ecclesiastical power is conferred upon a visible organization that calls itself a Church, whether there are believers in it or not. There can be no Church where there are no saints or true believers, and there can be no power of the Church where there is no church. The other is that ecclesiastical power is conferred exclusively upon certain persons in the Church who hold the pastoral office, so that the power is in the Church only because the pastors are in it, and the power can be exercised only by securing pastors in whom that power inheres. According to this view it would not be dependent upon the possession of the Holy Ghost and upon faith in the Lord Jesus, but a person might be a believer without having the keys and be an unbeliever and yet have them. The keys would thus not be conferred upon the Church, but upon a certain

class bearing office in it, whether they are properly members of the Church or not, and who might with their usurped power tyrannize over God's people, as the pope has done. Against both errors our Confession is directed, when it insists that the keys are given to the Church, not mediately by the bestowal of men who have the keys, but primarily and immediately, so that not the congregation, but the pastors as such, have them only mediately and secondarily. "For no one can deny," writes Luther, "that every Christian has God's Word, and is taught of God and anointed as a priest, as Christ says, John 6, 45: 'They shall be all taught of God,' and Ps. 45, 7: 'God hath anointed Thee with the oil of gladness above Thy fellows.' These companions are the Christians, Christ's brethren, who are consecrated with Him as priests, as St. Paul also says: 'Ye are a royal priesthood, that ye should show forth the praises of Him who hath called you out of darkness into His marvelous light.' 1 Pet. 2, 9. But if it is true that they have God's Word and that they are anointed of Him, they are also under obligation to confess it and teach and disseminate it, as St. Paul says: 'We having the same spirit of faith, according as it is written, I believed and therefore have I spoken, we also believe and therefore speak.' 2 Cor. 4, 13. And in Ps. 51, 13 the prophet says of all Christians: 'I will teach transgressors Thy ways, and sinners shall be converted unto Thee.' Thus it is here again obvious, that a Christian not only has the right and power to teach God's Word, but is bound to do it, if he would save his soul and retain the grace of God." *Erl.* 22, 146. It is precisely because Christian believers not only have the privilege, but the solemn duty to administer the keys, that they call men who shall act as their ministers in the public discharge of this duty; as the Confession says: "Wherever the Church is, there is the command to administer the Gospel. Therefore it is necessary for the Church to retain the authority to call, elect, and ordain ministers. And this authority is a gift exclusively given to the Church." *Smal. Art. App.* § 67.

According to the teaching of the Scriptures, to which our Confessions scrupulously and unwaveringly adhere, it is therefore apparent that not only the promise of eternal life is given to the Church in the proper sense of that word, but

also all the prerogatives of the Church in the present life, while it is waiting for the inheritance of the saints in light. They are all blessings and privileges of the Church, not of those who merely call themselves so and who mingle with it when the Church assembles to exercise its rights and perform its duties. It would be thoughtless to object, as has sometimes been done, that if this be true, the visible congregation has no powers and the keys are a useless gift in the possession of an invisible community which it is impossible to find. It is thoughtless, because the invisible Church, although we can not discern it by the senses, is by faith found in the visible community that is called a Church, and this is called a Church simply because the Church is there. Where there are no believers there is no Church at all, visible or invisible. When a term is used synecdochically, it is because that which the term properly means is there, although it forms but a part of that to which the term in a wider signification is applied. We do not in a synecdochical or in any other sense apply the term wheat to a measure of grain when there is no wheat among it. Dirt is not pepper, synecdochically or otherwise, though the mixture may synecdochically be called pepper in spite of the dirt. The congregation of saints and true believers does not lose its name and its rights and prerogatives because of the unbelievers that find their way into it. Every visible congregation in which there are such saints and true believers, because these are in it, is a Church and has the powers of the Church. This is evident from the words of our Lord in Matt. 18, where we are commanded to "tell the Church," which is possible only when there is a visible assembly, and yet the Church is so described that the name belongs properly not to all who thus visibly assemble, but to those who are assembled in Jesus' name and who make known their requests to God in believing prayer.

Equally evident is it that this is the doctrine of our Confessions. The fact that there is a people of God, notwithstanding that in the visible Churches there are so many who are not believers, is presented for our comfort. In spite of the hypocrites who mingle with sincere Christians in the outward organization, the Church remains with all her powers, and exists where two or three are gathered together in Jesus' name.

“This article has been presented for a necessary reason. [The article of the Catholic or Universal Church, which is gathered together from every nation under the sun, is very comforting and highly necessary.] We see the infinite dangers which threaten the destruction of the Church. In the Church itself infinite is the multitude of the wicked who oppress it. Therefore, in order that we may not despair, but may know that the Church will nevertheless remain [until the end of the world], likewise that we may know that however great the multitude of the wicked is, yet the Church [which is Christ’s bride] exists, and that Christ [in that assembly which is called the Church] affords those gifts which He has promised to the Church, to forgive sins, to hear prayer, to give the Holy Ghost,—this article in the Creed presents us these consolations.” *Apology* IV. § 9. Since there are so many wicked persons mingling with those who confess Christ, we could not know that there is a Church at all on earth, had not God given us gracious promises to which our faith can hold, and by which we are certified not only that the Church exists on earth and will remain until the end of time, but also that it exists wherever the Word is preached and the Sacraments are administered. Having these promises, we have the comfort to know that in that visible assembly which is called a Church, because the Church is there, notwithstanding the wicked that are mingled with it, the means of grace are legitimately used and the gifts promised to the Church are imparted.

Nor is there any ground for the objection, that if the powers of the Church be committed exclusively to the believers, the ministrations of hypocrites and ungodly men, who may be called to the pastoral office, would be invalid, and Christians would accordingly be in constant doubt whether they are really in possession of the promised heavenly gifts. No such consequences follow. “Though the Church be properly the congregation of saints and true believers,” says our Augsburg Confession, “yet seeing that in this life many hypocrites and evil persons are mingled with it, it is lawful to use the Sacraments administered by evil men; according to the voice of Christ (Matt. 23, 2): ‘The scribes and the Pharisees sit in Moses’ seat,’ and the words following. And the Sacraments and the Word are effectual by reason of the

institution and commandment of Christ, though they be delivered by evil men. They condemn the Donatists and such like, who denied that it is lawful to use the ministry of evil men in the Church, and held that the ministry of evil men is useless and without effect." *Art. VIII.* "Wherefore we hold," says the Apology, "according to the Scriptures, that the Church properly so called is the congregation of saints [of those here and there in the world], who truly believe the Gospel of Christ and have the Holy Ghost. And yet we confess that in this life many hypocrites and wicked men, mingled with these, have the fellowship of outward signs, who are members of the Church according to this fellowship of outward signs, and accordingly bear offices in the Church [preach, administer the Sacraments, and bear the title and name of Christians.] Neither does the fact that the Sacraments are administered by the unworthy, detract from their efficacy, because, on account of the call of the Church, they represent the person of Christ, and do not represent their own persons, as Christ testifies (Luke 10, 16): 'He that heareth you, heareth me.' [Thus even Judas was sent to preach.] When they offer the Word of God, when they offer the Sacraments, they offer them in the stead and place of Christ. The words of Christ teach us this, in order that we may not be offended by the unworthiness of ministers." *Art. IV. § 28.* Of their own right unbelievers have not the power of the keys, but the congregation that calls them confers upon them the right to act in their name, so that they become the instruments of the congregation of saints who delegate to them the power. The believers as such are priests and have the keys, and therefore have the right to administer the means of grace and consequently also to call persons to administer them in the public office. "Where there is therefore a true Church, the right to elect and ordain ministers necessarily exists. Just as in a case of necessity even a layman absolves and becomes the minister and pastor of another; as St. Augustine narrates the story of two Christians in a ship, one of whom baptized the catechumen, who after baptism then absolved the baptizer. Here belong the words of Christ which testify that the keys have been given to the Church, and not merely to certain persons (Matt. 18, 20): 'Where two or three are gathered together in my name,' &c. Lastly the declaration

of Peter also confirms this (1 Pet. 2, 9): 'Ye are a royal priesthood.' These words pertain to the true Church, which, since it alone has the priesthood, certainly has the right to elect and ordain ministers." *Smal. Art. App.* § 68. 69. It would be as unreasonable as it is unscriptural to suppose that the power which believers possess to administer the means of grace and to call men for their public administration would be nullified if they unfortunately chose an unbelieving minister. The call is valid, though the person called be unworthy.

But there is still another point requiring consideration. Even if there were no believer in a congregation, it would not follow that the preaching of the Word and the administration of the Sacraments, supposing this to be possible under such circumstances, would be without efficacy. We must distinguish between the keys and the authority to use them, and have no reason nor right to make the validity of the means dependent on the legitimacy of the administration. If a person be not a Christian, he has no proprietorship in the keys and no authority to employ them. But it does not follow that if he used the Gospel, which he himself does not believe, to comfort his neighbor, such use would be altogether without power and without effect. The Word has the efficacy in itself, and does not derive its power from the person to whom God has given it for use. No matter who employs it, it is "quick and powerful." Whether a person be rightly called or not, the Gospel which he preaches is the power of God. On this ground it is necessary to maintain that the preaching of a person who is neither a Christian himself nor called by persons who are Christians, would still be efficacious, provided that he preaches the Word, which is spirit and life. He has not the keys by his own right as a believer, nor has he had the right to employ them conferred upon him by those who possess them and therefore have a right to call men to administer them; but right or wrong he uses them, and they have the power to lock and unlock the kingdom of heaven, though he has come into their possession unlawfully. Believers alone are by God's gift proprietors of the keys. "Whoever else appropriates them to himself commits sacrilege and is a wretched church robber," says Luther. But

they do not on that account become impotent. The stolen key is still a key, and will effect the same in the hands of the thief as in the hands of its rightful owner. God would have everything done decently and in order among His people, but He has not subordinated His saving purpose to the order in which it is to be executed. The means of grace are more important than the authority to administer them, and the Lord has therefore mercifully made the means efficacious in themselves, not made their efficacy dependent on their legitimate administration, important as it is for the welfare of the Church and the successful prosecution of her work that the exclusive rights of Christians in regard to the keys be earnestly maintained and the order prescribed by the Lord be scrupulously observed.

When many of our theologians deny that baptism administered in organizations which, though they profess to be Christians, teach errors that place them outside of the pale of Christianity, has any validity, they are moved to such denial by other considerations than those of the absence of all authority to administer baptism. The public functionary in such an organization is not a Christian priest who has the power of the keys in his own right, nor is he called by Christian priests who could delegate to him such authority. When he uses them he is a thief and a robber. But that would not in itself render his use of the keys nugatory. What does render his work futile is the fact that he has not the Word of God. He has not stolen the keys; if he had, he could accomplish something with them, though he be a robber whom all Christians should avoid; but he has not the keys at all, stolen or otherwise. That which he calls baptism is denied to be the Christian sacrament of regeneration, not because he has no authority to administer it, but because he has not the Word of God, without which his ceremony is merely the application of water, and no baptism.

God has been pleased to make His Church the depository of the treasures secured for mankind by the sufferings and death and resurrection of His Son, and has given to her, as the Bride of the Lamb, all authority to dispense these treasures. That Church is the congregation of saints and true believers. Only these have the power of the keys.

Others who mingle with them in the visible organization have no rights and no authority of themselves; what they do has validity only because of the believers with whom they are mingled. In other words, it is always the Church, not those who are merely called so, that has the keys and the authority to administer them. The means of grace which the Lord has instituted and committed to the Church have the power in themselves to accomplish that whereunto they were given, and they retain that power even when they are stolen from their rightful owners. But the possession of them and the authority to administer them is a high prerogative and involves grave responsibilities. We must connive at no robbery and have nothing to do with those who commit the sacrilege. All the more should we be led to appreciate the gracious gift committed to the Lord's people, and be diligent in the rightful use of the keys for the accomplishment of the Lord's purpose, that the great salvation may be brought to souls, and that the name of the Lord may be glorified in the house of God, "which is the Church of the living God, the pillar and ground of the truth." 1 Tim. 3, 15. L.

"TEACHING OF THE TWELVE APOSTLES."

FROM THE GREEK.—WITH INTRODUCTORY NOTES BY G. H. S.

Early patristic literature has been more thoroughly studied and more enriched in the past few decades than ever before. This is owing partly to the interest naturally felt by Christian scholars in such an important field of inquiry, and partly to the investigations of apologetes in their offensive and defensive warfare against the various unbiblical theories of the origin and character of the Gospels. In the providence of the Head of the Church, the agitation and discussions provoked by the bold-faced rationalism of Baur and his Tuebinger school have proved highly beneficial to the interests of truth and of the Church. Not only have extant ancient Christian documents been examined and re-exam-

ined with an almost painful critical acumen, but treasures of early Christian writings, known only by name or from extracts found in other old writers in the Church, chiefly the works of the historian Eusebius, the Sticho-metry of Nicephorus and the Chronology of Syncellus, have been discovered, brought to light and made tell their tale in the defence of Gospel truth. Ever since Tischendorf found in the Codex Sinaiticus the long lost Greek original of the Epistle of Barnabas—or rather of its first part, which was known to scholars only in a Latin version—and a new version of Pastor Hermac, those who have had access to the cloisters, monasteries and libraries of the old Christian Orient have been on the alert in the hopes of finding still more and more valuable documents.

Nor has this search been in vain. Within the last ten years the Orient has given to the students of patristic lore no less than three most excellent works; namely, a good Greek text of the Clemens Epistles, the Diatessaron of Tatian, and now the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles. In 1875 that well known trio of young German scholars, Harnack, v. Gebhardt, and Zahn, had just issued the first fasciculus of what has proved to be the classical edition of the Apostolic Fathers, containing the two Epistles of the Roman Clemens to the Corinthian congregation, and in it had been able to use only the single Greek codex extant, namely the Alexandrian, described by the editors as "*mutilum, lacunis deformatum,*" when the learned world was surprised with the appearance in Constantinople by Philotheus Bryennios, then Metropolitan Bishop at Serrae, of an entirely new and excellent edition of the two letters, based upon a recently discovered manuscript. This Codex had been found by the editor in the Library of the Most Holy Sepulchre in Phanar, that is, the Greek quarter of Constantinople, and the care and scholarship exhibited in the edition of the text, as well as in the discussion of it, proved conclusively that Bryennios was a thorough patristic scholar and had put to good use his literary training secured through his studies at various German universities. The library in which the treasure was found is in a monastery belonging to the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. So much improved was the Clemens text by this new manu-

script that the publisher of the new German edition, Hinrich's of Leipzig, although only a few copies had been sold, immediately withdrew it from the market and went to the expense of publishing a new edition on the basis of the better document.

A few years ago another document of even greater importance came to light, namely Tatians Diatessaron. It was well known from the Church History of Eusebius, IV. 29, that Tatian (died 174), a pupil of the Christian philosopher Justin the Martyr, had written a *συνάφεια καὶ συναγωγή τῶν εὐαγγελίων*, i. e. a Harmony of the Gospels, called the Gospel of the Four, or *τὸ διὰ τεσσάρων*, i. e. through the Four, from which it appeared that he had acknowledged the authenticity of four Gospels, including John, and that this Diatessaron, if a reality, would have great weight in settling the troublesome question as to the apostolic origin and early recognition by the Church of the fourth Gospel. This work, too, has been found in an Eastern library, and from the full discussions by Harnack in Vol. IV. of Brieger's *Zeitschrift fuer Kirchengeschichte*, and by Zahn in a separate pamphlet, its authenticity and importance are fully established.

When Bryennios published his Clemens text, he announced that the same Codex from which he had drawn it contained also a Synopsis of the Old and New Testament by John Chrysostom, the Epistle of Barnabas, the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, the Epistle of Mary of Cassabolae to the Bishop Ignatius of Antiochia and a longer recension of the Ignatian Epistles; and it was a matter of no little curiosity to know whether this *διδασχὴ τῶν δώδεκα ἀποστόλων* was that early Christian document quoted already by the Alexandrian Clemens as *γραφὴ*, mentioned by Eusebius, Athenasius and Nicephorus. The publication of this section of the Codex by Bryennios—now of Nicomedia—under the title of “Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, from the Jerusalem manuscript, now published for the first time, with prolegomena and notes, together with a collation of unpublished part of the Synopsis of the Old Testament by John Chrysostom, from the same manuscript, by Philotheus Bryennios, Metropolitan of Nicomedia, Constantinople, S. T. Boutoura, 1883,” (pp. 8, 149, 75, 5 francs) has shown that this is the case.

Critics who are competent to judge, prominently Professor Harnack of Giessen, the *facile princeps* among German patristic scholars, do not hesitate to pronounce the document itself a most important contribution to the literature of the early church and a valuable source for that period, and pay high tribute to the scholarship and erudition of the editor, whose introduction and notes—written of course in modern Greek—are the result of the patient research and years of study.

That the appearance of this work was greeted with a royal welcome by Christian scholars everywhere is natural enough. Harnack published in No. 3 *a. c.* of the *Theologische Literaturzeitung* of Leipzig a long descriptive and literary account of the new book, and translated the last and most important half into German (the whole being about as long as the Epistle to the Galatians). The *Independent*, of New York City, in its issue of Feb. 28, reproduced the substance of this announcement and the whole of the translation. About the same time the Greek text was reproduced in Luthardt's *Kirchliche Zeitschrift* and a German translation of the whole appeared in his *Kirchenzeitung*. American scholars have been wide awake and have shown a commendable interest in the matter. Probably six to eight different translations and two editions of the Greek text made their appearance in this country, and all evince great care and labor. The *Churchman*, of New York City, in its issue of March 29, published a translation of the Teaching done by Professor Gardiner of the Berkeley Divinity School, and Mr. C. C. Camp, of Middletown, Conn. The *Andover Review* for April contained a translation by Rev. C. C. Starbock, preceded by a ten page introductory article, discussing on the basis of Bryennios' Prolegomena and Notes, the literary and historical value of the new document, by Professor Egbert C. Smyth. An excellent translation, probably by Professor Isaac Hall, Ph. D., appeared in the *Sunday School Times*; the Greek text, together with a translation, was published by John Alden, of New York, and an independent German translation by Professor Stellhorn in the May number of the *Theologische Zeitblätter*. Last comes the edition of the Greek text and translation, together with a few notes and short introduction, by Professors Hitchcock and Brown, of Union Seminary, New

York. The book is published by the Scribners at 50 cts. How great an interest was taken in this work by the American Church can be seen from the fact that on the day of publication no less than twelve hundred copies of the Scribner edition were sold.*

Leaving the literary discussion and looking at the contents and character of the new book, we are struck as much by what it does not contain as by what it does. The work is evidently written for catechumens. It is divided into two parts, the first embracing c. I. to c. VI., in which, in a manner quite common to the whole and more practical than didactic works of early Christian literature, the two ways, the good and acceptable, and the evil and sinful, are portrayed. From the beginning of c. VII., which opens the second part reaching to c. XVI., we learn that the candidates for baptism were to be taught and must learn the preceding six chapters before they would be baptized. For a catechism, even though primitive in character, it contains very little positive and direct instruction as to the character and faith of Christianity, and those who expect from the "Teaching" a great enrichment of our knowledge concerning the faith and doctrines of the early Church will be disappointed. It is not a Vademecum of doctrine and dogma, although the doctrine of the Trinity is clearly taught and others presupposed, but rather a guide and hand-book for practical Christian life, not so much, however, for the individual as such and his relation to his God, but rather for the individual in his relation to the outward organization of the Church, its cultus, government and external form. The new document offers more instruction as to the character and nature of these external features of the earliest Church than to its internal faith. Even in chapter VII., which treats of baptism, and chapter IX., which treats of the Lord's Supper, the form and manner of external use of these sacraments, and not

* The writer wishes to state that nearly all these literary aids have been consulted for portions of the introduction of this article, that the translation is based upon the Scribner version, with such corrections as a careful and repeated comparison with the Greek and with the other translations suggested. As far as labor is concerned it has the merits of a new and original version.

their doctrinal contents are treated of. Hence whatever may be the contribution of the "Teaching" in regard to this latter feature, must be drawn more indirectly than directly from the contents.

But all the greater will be the gains of a study of this document for Christian life, worship and church organization. Although the first part appears to contain only an enumeration of virtues and vices, an admonition to pursue and cultivate the former, and to flee the latter, yet when taken in connection with the complex of the early literature of the Church, it is an admirable index to the spiritual tendency and life of the Church in those days, and shows what great importance was laid on the practical side of Christianity. When compared with similar ethical documents of those days, such as that magnificent Letter to Diognet and the Pastor of Hermas, this exhortative portion of the book finds its proper historical importance. It is not an isolated writing of this kind, but is characteristic for the period which produced it.

But richest in contents and most productive in results are the closing chapters from VII. on. The opening chapter of this section, although it makes no mention, nor even presupposes, infant baptism, is an important contribution to the question as to the manner of baptism in the early church, showing conclusively that the immediate successors of the Apostles and of the Apostolic Church, as little as did the Apostles and the New Testament Church, did not teach immersion as the method of administering this ordinance, but taught the very opposite. Chapter XI. sqq., are very instructive in showing how careful the early Christians were in guarding the doctrines of true faith, and warding off the attacks of false prophets. They tell us plainly that in those days the form of sound words were not a matter of indifference, but of the greatest care. In this connection the relation between Christians of different sections, when going from one place to another, their hospitality and entertainment, is characteristic for the primitive church. Chap. XIV. recognizes the Lord's day, i. e. Sunday, as the day for worship. This is of considerable importance, as there are not a few who maintain that the New Testament times and early

Christianity still adhered to the seventh day as the holy day, and that the change to the first was not made until some centuries later. Chap. XV. treats of church government, and plainly inculcates the scriptural doctrine of congregational rights in the selection of their own pastors and spiritual teachings. This section contains very little comfort for adherents of an ecclesiastical hierarchy, be they Roman or Anglican. The importance of this section in explaining the character of church government and congregational life in those days, has been duly recognized by those who have studied the document. Bryennios has well shown, to the satisfaction of those capable of judging, that the "Teaching," is the foundation of the so-called "Apostolic Constitutions," of the patristic age, the largest old collection of rules and regulations for the outward conduct and arrangement of the Church. Further he has shown how influential this document was in the early Church by tracing references and allusions to it, and imitations of it, in other early works, as the Pastor of Hermas, the Epistle of Barnabas, Clemens of Alexandria, &c.; and Smyth has reproduced a number of these items. Of course these are but a few of the many good things the "Teaching" contains, and will reveal to the close and observant student. Scarcely anything but the general character and tendency of the work can be given now, together with those lessons which it bears on its surface. Later and more close study will doubtless bring to light much that is now yet hidden.

The "Teaching" is one of the oldest literary remains of the Christian Church. Like the "Apostolic Fathers," it was written in the second, latest third generation of Christians. Its contents, especially when considered in connection with other early books that show its influence in spirit and expression, show that it is evidently a work of the middle of the second century. Harnack, than whom there is no one more capable of judging and whose critical proclivities would rather persuade him to put the date as late as possible, says that it was written sometime between 120 and 160, and is contemporary with the Pastor of Hermas. Even aside of the contents, the age alone of the document would entitle it to a careful study.

TEACHING OF THE LORD, THROUGH THE TWELVE APOSTLES,
TO THE GENTILES.

CHAP. I.—Two ways there are, one of life and one of death, but there is a great difference between the two ways. The way of life, then, is this: First, thou shalt love the God who made thee; secondly, thy neighbor as thyself: and all things whatsoever thou wouldst not have befall thee, thou, too, do not to another. But of these words the teaching is this: Bless them that curse you, and pray for your enemies, and fast for them that persecute you: for what thank *have ye* if ye love them that love you? Do not the gentiles also the same? But love ye them that hate you and ye shall have no enemy. Abstain from the fleshly and worldly lusts. If any one give thee a blow on the right cheek, turn to him the other also, and thou shalt be perfect; if any one compel thee to go one mile, go with him two; if any one take thy cloak, give him thy coat also; if any one take from thee what is thine, ask it not back; for indeed thou art not able. To every one that asketh thee give, and ask not back; for to all the Father desires to give of his own gracious gifts. Blessed is he that giveth according to the commandment; for he is guiltless; wo to him that taketh; for if, indeed, one taketh who hath need, he shall be guiltless; but he who hath no need shall give account, why they took, and for what purpose, and coming under arrest shall be examined concerning what he did, and shall not go out thence until he pay the last farthing. But it hath been also said concerning this *matter*: Let thine alms sweat in thy hands, until thou knowest to whom thou shouldst give.

CHAP. II.—Now a second commandment of the teaching *is*: Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not corrupt boys, thou shalt not commit fornication, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not practice magic, thou shalt not use sorcery, thou shalt not murder a child by abortion, nor what is begotten shalt thou destroy. Thou shalt not covet the things of thy neighbor, thou shalt not forswear thyself, thou shalt not bear false witness, thou shalt not revile, thou shalt not remember injuries. Thou shalt not be doubled-minded nor doubled-tongued; for a snare of death is the

double tongue. Thy speech shall not be false, nor empty, but filled with doing. Thou shalt not be covetous, nor rapacious, nor a hypocrite, nor malicious, nor arrogant. Thou shalt not take evil counsel against thy neighbor. Thou shalt hate no man, but some thou shalt reprove, and for some thou shalt pray, and some thou shalt love above thy life.

CHAP. III.—My child, flee from every evil thing, and from everything like it. Be not inclined to anger, for anger leadeth to murder; nor jealous, nor contentious, nor passionate; for of all these murders are begotten. My child, become not lustful; for lust leadeth to fornication; nor foul-mouthed, nor lofty-eyed; for of all these things adulteries are begotten. My child, become not an omen watcher; since it leadeth into idolatry; nor an enchanter, nor an astrologer, nor a purifier, nor be willing to look upon these things; for of all these things idolatry is begotten. My child, become not a liar; since lying leads to theft; nor avaricious, nor vain-glorious; for of all these things thefts are begotten. My child, become not a murmurer; since it leads to blasphemy; nor self-willed, nor evil-minded; for of all these things blasphemies are begotten. But be meek, since the meek shall inherit the earth. Become long-suffering and pitiful and guileless and gentle and good, and tremble continually at the words which thou hast heard. Thou shalt not exalt thyself, nor permit over-boldness to thy soul. Thy soul shall not cleave to the high, but with the righteous and lowly thou shalt converse. The things that befall thee accept as well-wrought, knowing that without God nothing occurs.

CHAP. IV.—My child, him that speaks to thee the word of God remember night and day, and thou shalt honor him as the Lord; for where that which pertaineth to the Lord is spoken there the Lord is. And thou shalt seek out daily the faces of the saints that thou mayst be refreshed by their words. Thou shalt not desire division, but shalt make peace between those who contend; thou shalt judge justly, thou shalt not respect persons in convicting for transgressions. Thou shalt not waver whether it shall be or not. Become not *one who* for taking stretches out the hands, but for giving draws them in; if thou hast *anything*, by thy hands thou shalt give a ransom for thy sins. Thou shalt not hesitate to give, nor when

giving shalt thou murmur, for thou shalt know who is the good dispenser of the recompense. Thou shalt not turn away the needy, but shalt share all things with thy brother, and shalt not say they are thine own: for if ye are partners in that which is imperishable, how much more in the perishable things? Thou shalt not take off thy hand from thy son and from thy daughter, but from youth thou shalt teach *them* the fear of God. Thou shalt not lay commands in thy bitterness upon thy slave or handmaid, who hope in the same God, lest they perchance shall not fear the God who is over *you* both; for he cometh not to call *men* according to the appearance, but to those whom the Spirit hath prepared. And ye, servants, ye shall be subject to your lords, as to God's image, in modesty and fear. Thou shalt hate every hypocrisy, and whatever is not pleasing to the Lord. Thou shalt by no means forsake the Lord's commandments, but shalt guard what thou hast received, neither adding to it nor taking from it. In the church thou shalt confess thy transgressions, and shalt not come forward for thy prayer with an evil conscience. This is the way of life.

CHAP. V.—Now the way of death is this: first of all it is evil, and full of curse; murders, adulteries, lusts, fornications, thefts, idolatries, magic arts, sorceries, robberies, false testimonies, hypocrisies, duplicity, craft, arrogance, vice, presumptuousness, greed, foul speech, jealousy, over-boldness, loftiness, pretence; persecutors of the good, hating truth, loving falsehood, knowing not the reward of righteousness, not cleaving to *that which is good* nor to righteous judgment, on the watch not for good but for evil; far from whom are meekness and humility, loving vanities, pursuing reward, not pitying a poor *man*, not laboring for the distressed, not knowing him that made them, murderers of children, destroyers of the image of God, turning away the needy, oppressing the afflicted, advocates of the rich, lawless judges of the poor, universal sinners: may ye be delivered, children, from all these.

CHAP. VI.—See that no one lead thee astray from this way of the teaching, because apart from [contrary to] God does he teach thee. For if thou art able to bear the whole yoke of the Lord, thou shalt be perfect; but if thou art not able, what thou art able, that do. And concerning food, what thou

art able, bear; but of that offered to idols, beware utterly; for it is a worship of dead gods.

CHAP. VII.—Now concerning baptism, thus baptize ye: having first uttered all these things, baptize into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, in living [i. e. running] water. But if thou hast not living water, baptize in other water; and if thou canst not in cold, *then* in warm. But if thou hast neither, pour water upon the head thrice, into the name of Father and Son and Holy Spirit. But before the baptism let the baptizer and the baptized fast, and whatever others can; but the baptized thou shalt command to fast for one or two (days) before.

CHAP. VIII.—But let not your fastings be in common with the hypocrites; for they fast on the second day of the week and on the fifth; but do ye fast during the fourth, and the preparation *day* [i. e. Friday]. Nor pray ye like the hypocrites, but as the Lord commanded in His Gospel, thus pray: Our Father who art in heaven, hallowed be Thy name, Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done, as in heaven, so on earth; our daily bread give us to-day, and forgive us our debt as we also forgive our debtors, and bring us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil, for Thine is the power and the glory forever. Three times in the day pray ye thus.

CHAP. IX.—Now concerning the Eucharist, thus give thanks; first, concerning the cup: We thank Thee, our Father, for the holy vine of David Thy child, which Thou hast made known to us through Jesus Thy child; to Thee be the glory forever. And concerning the broken *bread*: We thank Thee, our Father, for the life and the knowledge which Thou hast made known to us through Jesus Thy servant; to Thee be the glory forever. Just as this broken *bread* was scattered over the hills [i. e. as grain] and having been gathered together became one, so let Thy Church be gathered together from the ends of the earth into Thy kingdom; for Thine is the glory and the power through Jesus Christ forever. But let no one eat or drink of your Eucharist, except those baptized into the Lord's name; for in regard to this also the Lord hath said: Give not that which is holy to the dogs.

CHAP. X.—Now after ye are filled thus do ye give thanks:

We thank Thee, holy Father, for Thy holy name, which Thou hast caused to dwell in our hearts, and for the knowledge and faith and immortality which Thou hast made known to us through Jesus Thy child; to Thee be the glory forever. Thou, Almighty Sovereign, didst create all things for Thy name's sake; both food and drink Thou didst give to men for enjoyment, in order that they may give thanks to Thee; but to us Thou hast graciously given spiritual food and drink and eternal life through Thy child. Before all things, we thank Thee that Thou art powerful; to Thee be the glory forever. Remember, Lord, Thy church, to deliver it from every evil and to make it perfect in Thy love, and gather it from the four winds, *it*, the sanctified, into Thy kingdom, which Thou hast prepared for it; for Thine is the power and the glory forever. Let grace come and let this world pass away. Hosanna to the son of David! Whoever is holy, let him come; whoever is not, let him repent. Maranatha. Amen. But permit the prophets to give thanks as much as they will.

CHAP. XI.—Whoever then cometh and teacheth you all these things, before spoken, receive him; but if the teacher himself turn aside and teach another teaching, so as to overthrow *this*, do not hear him; but *if he teach*, so as to promote righteousness and knowledge of the Lord, receive him as the Lord. But in regard to the apostles and prophets, according to the ordinance of the Gospel, so do ye. And every apostle who cometh to you, let him be received as the Lord; but he shall not remain *more than* one day; if however, there be need, then the next *day*; but if he remain three days, he is a false prophet. But when the apostle departeth, let him take nothing except bread enough till he lodge *again*; but if he ask money, he is a false prophet. And every prophet who speaketh in the spirit, ye shall not try nor judge; for every sin shall be forgiven, but this sin shall not be forgiven. But not every one that speaketh in the spirit is a prophet, but *only* if he have the manners of the Lord. So from their ways shall the false prophet and the prophet be known. And no prophet who orders a meal, in the spirit, eateth of it, unless indeed he is a false prophet; and every prophet who teacheth the truth, if he do not that which he teacheth, is a false

prophet. But every prophet, proved, true, acting with a view to the mystery of the church on earth, but not teaching *others* to do all that he himself doeth, shall not be judged among you; for with God he hath his judgment; for so did the ancient prophets also. But whoever, in the spirit, says: Give me money, or something else, ye shall not hear him; but if for others in need, he bids *you* give, let no one judge him.

CHAP. XII.—But let every one that cometh in the Lord's name be received, but afterward ye shall test and know him; for ye shall have understanding, right and left. If he who comes is a traveller, help him as much as ye can; but he shall not remain with you, unless for two or three days, if there be necessity. But if he will take up his abode among you, being an artisan, let him work and so eat; but if he have no trade, provide, according to your understanding, that no idler live with you as a Christian. But if he will not act according to this, he is one who makes gain out of Christ; beware of such.

CHAP. XIII.—But every true prophet who will settle among you is worthy of his support. Likewise a true teacher, he also is worthy, like the workman, of his support. Every first fruit, then, of the products of wine-press and threshing-floor, of oxen and of sheep, thou shalt take and give to the prophets; for they are your high-priests. But if ye have no prophet, give *it* to the poor. If thou makest a baking of bread, take the first *of it* and give according to the commandment. In like manner when thou openest a jar of wine or oil, take the first *of it* and give to the prophets; and of money and clothing and every possession take the first, as seems right to thee, and give according to the commandment.

CHAP. XIV.—But on the Lord's day do ye assemble and break bread, and give thanks; after confessing also your transgressions, in order that your sacrifice may be pure. But every one that hath controversy with his friend, let him not come together with you, until they be reconciled, that your sacrifice may not be profaned. For this is that which was spoken by the Lord: At every place and time, bring me a pure sacrifice; for a great king am I, saith the Lord, and my name is marvellous among the Gentiles.

CHAP. XV.—Now appoint for yourselves bishops and deacons worthy of the Lord, men meek and not avaricious, and true and proved; for they, too, render you the service of the prophets and teachers. Despise them not, therefore; for they are the ones who are honored of you, together with the prophets and teachers.

And reprove one another, not in anger, but in peace, as ye have *it* in the Gospel; and to every one who erreth against another, let no one speak, nor let him hear *anything* from you, until he repent. But your prayers and your alms and all your deeds so do ye, as ye have *it* in the Gospel of our Lord.

CHAP. XVI.—Watch for your life's sake; let your lamps not go out, and your loins not be relaxed, but be ready; for ye know not the hour in which our Lord cometh. But ye shall come together often, and seek the things which befit your souls; for the whole time of your faith *thus far* will not profit you, if ye do not become perfect in the last time. For in the last days the false prophets and the corruptors shall be multiplied, and the sheep shall be turned into wolves, and love shall be turned into hate; for when lawlessness increaseth they shall hate one another, and shall persecute and shall deliver up, and then shall appear the world-deceiver as the Son of God, and shall do signs and wonders, and the earth shall be given into his hands, and he shall commit iniquities which have never yet been done since the beginning. Then all created men shall come into the fire of trial, and many shall be made to stumble and shall perish. But they that endure in their faith shall be saved from the curse itself. And then shall appear the signs of the truth; first the sign of an opening in heaven, then the sign of the trumpet's sound, and thirdly, the resurrection of the dead; yet not of all, but as it hath been said: The Lord will come and all the saints with Him. Then shall the world see the Lord coming upon the clouds of heaven.

“HE SHALL BAPTIZE YOU WITH THE HOLY
GHOST AND WITH FIRE.” MATT. 3, 11.

BY REV. H. J. SCHUH, A. M., DETROIT, MICH.

The passage Matt. 3, 11. is a favorite quotation with those who oppose the scriptural and Lutheran doctrine of the efficacy of Baptism. John the Baptist here says: “I indeed baptize you with water unto repentance: but he that cometh after me is mightier than I, whose shoes I am not worthy to bear: he shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire.” It is very common to hear the sects argue from this passage, that Baptism is mere water, and that so-called water-Baptism is of no benefit to the soul. The only Baptism which they recognize as conferring any spiritual virtue to the recipient is what they are pleased to call the “fire-Baptism” of the Spirit. Just what this “fire-Baptism” is, it would be difficult to ascertain from their utterances. At least it is something which a man receives when he is truly *converted*, according to their understanding of this term. The fire-Baptisms that are claimed to be received at the annual revivals are very numerous. It is only to be regretted that so many prove to be *wild-fire* Baptisms. According to this notion the Holy Spirit does not work through the water in Baptism, but is in some mysterious way poured out over the applicant for conversion without any visible means. They read the above passage about thus: “I indeed baptize you with water only, without the Spirit; but He that cometh after me shall baptize you without water, with the fire of the Holy Spirit.”

But like so many other samples of exegesis which the sects use to bolster up pet opinions, this does but very poorly, even when the passage is taken entirely by itself; and when it comes to be considered in the context in which it occurs and with reference to the scope which it evidently has, it shows up in a different light altogether. When prejudice is laid aside and the mind of the Spirit is honestly sought after in the words of the holy text, altogether a different result is reached.

In answering this fire-Baptism explanation of the above passage many have fallen into another *exegesis* which we cannot but consider equally faulty, although perhaps less

dangerous. The words: "He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire," are construed to refer to the wonderful outpouring of the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost. This explanation, however, we cannot at all harmonize with the scope and context of the passage. Of course, such an exegesis is not at variance with the analogy of faith, but in our explanations of Scripture we should not only endeavor to keep within the bounds of the "rule of faith," but we should endeavor to make sure that we have properly understood the sense of the particular passage under consideration.

To understand this passage properly, it will be necessary first to consider to whom and to what kind of persons these words were addressed. They were uttered by John the Baptist. He was a mighty preacher of repentance. And like all preachers of repentance he had two classes of hearers. We read in the fifth verse: "Then went out to him (John) Jerusalem and all Judea and all the region round about Jordan." But these multitudes were not all composed of the same kind of persons. Some came "confessing their sins," and were baptized "for the remission of sins" (Mark 1, 4.) But there came others also. These said within themselves: "We have Abraham to our father." (Verse 9.) They imagined that because they were the carnal descendants of Abraham they had no need of repentance. Because after the flesh they were the children of Abraham, they felt safe that they must inherit the promise made to the patriarch and to his seed. Prominent among such hearers were the Pharisees and Sadducees. To the multitude in general John addressed himself in these words: "Repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." "But," we are told, "when he saw many of the Pharisees and Sadducees come to his Baptism, he said unto them: 'O generation of vipers, who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come?'" &c. To this generation of vipers, whom Jesus at another place calls hypocrites (Matt. 23, 27.) he says: "I indeed baptize you with water, but he that cometh after me . . . shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire." Is it likely that John, when he beheld these self-righteous hypocrites come to him, who as a class were known to him as impenitent boasters of their carnal descent from Abraham, saw in them the persons upon whom the Holy Ghost should be poured out on the day of Pentecost? Did

he not rather but too plainly intimate that in spite of their pedigree they would not escape the wrath to come?

When John addressed the whole multitude (Mark 1, 8): "I indeed baptize you with water, but He (Christ) shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost," we may presume that very many among them were, as penitent sinners, waiting for the consolation of Israel. For these John has a comfort. He points them to the Messiah who is at the door, and comforts them with the rich measure of the Spirit that God's people shall receive in the near future by Christ's ministry. But when he *specifically* addresses such a generation of vipers as the Pharisees and Sadducees, he certainly can not intend to speak to them words of comfort. The whole passage shows plainly that he means to terrify and not to comfort these hardened sinners. John knew full well how to bind up the broken-hearted, but here were hearts that needed first to be broken. He tells them that their being children of Abraham after the flesh will avail them nothing, if they bring not forth fruits meet for repentance. For God could by an act of His justice and an exercise of His omnipotence reject them for their impenitence and raise up children unto Abraham from the stones at His feet, in whom to fulfil the promises made to the father of the faithful. Yea, He says this is not only a *possibility*, but (verse 10) the time has even now come when "the ax is laid at the root of the tree, that every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit shall be cut down and cast into the fire." He means to impress them with the fact that they are in imminent danger. The same line of thought is illustrated in the 12th verse under the figure of a man with a winnowing fan. The time is now at hand when God shall separate the wheat from the chaff in His kingdom,—the wheat to be garnered, the chaff to be burned. Is it likely that He would have introduced between these two figures, whose object is to terrify those whom He looks upon as in carnal security, a reference to the outpouring of the "Comforter" over the congregation of true believers on the day of Pentecost? This would have been entirely foreign to the object He had in view, it would be against the tenor of the whole address. If He meant to say that the Holy Ghost would thus be poured out over them, whom He rebukes as

impenitent sinners, could this in any way induce them to repent? John, of course also preached the Gospel. He pointed the multitude to Christ with the words: "Behold the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world." But when he addressed himself *specifically* to "a generation of vipers," he did not cast pearls before swine. To them he preached the law in all its rigor.

The word "fire," in the connection in which it stands in the verses preceding and following, marks with awful significance the kind of baptism that is here meant. When John says in the 10th verse "every tree which bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down and cast into the *fire*," there can not be the shadow of a doubt what the word "*fire*" means here; and when in the 12th verse we read, "but He will burn up the chaff with unquenchable *fire*," its meaning is equally clear. In both cases it means the just punishment which the wrath of God will visit on the wicked. And when the word "*fire*" occurs in the verse between, addressed to the very same persons, and, as it were, in the very same breath, can it mean a blessing which God confers on the pious, and all this without the slightest intimation that it is to be taken in a different sense here, than in the verse previous and in the one succeeding?

The work of the Holy Ghost, whose fullest measure should be given when Christ appeared, is a twofold one. He not only comforts the penitent sinners and fills them with holy joy, but he declares the wrath of God to the impenitent. When by the fanning of the winnower the wind descends on the threshing floor, it descends on the wheat and on the chaff alike, and yet with entirely different results. The wheat is cleaned to be gathered into the garner—the chaff is blown off to be burned. So the Holy Ghost speaks to all through the Word, but not with the same effect upon all. Through its application it becomes manifest what is wheat and what is chaff, who are believers and who are unbelievers. The same breath which makes and purifies the grain, blows off that which stubbornly refuses to be made grain. Only the chaff is burned up. Only to the impenitent will God be a consuming fire.

But it may be asked, if John looked upon the Pharisees

and Sadducees as impenitent hypocrites, how could he baptize them at all? And that he did baptize, at least some of them, is evident from his own words: "I indeed baptize you with water." It must be remembered here that although John knew the Pharisees and Sadducees, *as a class*, to be hardened sinners and treated them accordingly, he could not take it upon himself to pass judgment on individuals. He could not tell unerringly, who among those coming to him and professing penitence and desiring to be baptized, were sincere and who not. He was only the servant to administer the sacrament, "I indeed baptize you with water." They might refuse its inner effect to cleanse from sin. He could not do more than he was doing—exhort to penitence and baptize those who confessed their sins. But his Lord could do more. He would not judge by outward appearances. He would separate the righteous from the wicked. He would blow out the chaff from among the wheat. This generation of vipers might deceive John, but they could not deceive his Lord. If they despised John's baptism of *water* unto repentance for the forgiveness of sins, they should be immersed in the baptism of the *fire* of God's anger, which shall consume the wicked.

This seems to us to be the only construction that does justice to the context. Undoubtedly in such passages as Acts 1, 5: "For John truly baptized with water; but ye shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost not many days hence;" and Acts 11, 16: "Then remembered I the word of the Lord, how that he said 'John indeed baptized with water, but ye shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost,'" the baptism with the Holy Ghost refers to the outpouring of God's Spirit on the day of Pentecost. But we can not consider these as parallel passages with Matt. 3, 11. It is a different class of persons that is addressed. The object had in view is a different one. And in Matt. 3, 11. the baptism with the Holy Ghost is coupled with that of fire, whilst in the other passages this is not the case. In fact, we know of not a single passage in which the children of God are said to be baptized with fire. *Fire*, however, is very frequently used as a symbol of God's wrath. Aside from the 10th and 12th verses of the passage under consideration we would refer to the following: Deut.

32, 22, "For a *fire* is kindled in mine *anger* and shall *burn* into the lowest hell, and shall consume the earth with her increase, and *set on fire* the foundation of the mountains." Ps. 79, 5, "How long Lord? Wilt Thou be *angry* forever? Shall Thy jealousy *burn like fire*?" Ps. 89, 46, "How long Lord? Wilt Thou hide Thyself forever? Shall Thy *wrath burn like fire*?" Isa. 30, 27, "Behold the name of the Lord cometh from far, burning with His *anger*, and the burden thereof is heavy, His lips are full of indignation and His tongue is a *devouring fire*." Jer. 17, 4, "For ye have kindled a *fire* in mine *anger* which shall *burn* forever." Nahum 1, 6, "His *fury* is poured out like *fire* and the rocks are thrown down by Him." Mal. 4, 1, "For behold the day cometh that shall *burn* as an oven; and all the proud, yea, and all that do wickedly shall be stubble: and the day that cometh shall *burn* them up, saith the Lord of hosts, and it shall leave them neither root nor branch." In this same sense we believe the word "*fire*" is used in Matt. 3, 11, as a *symbol of God's wrath upon the impenitent*.

WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICATION OF *Προφητεία* IN THE NEW TESTAMENT?

Προφητεία is read in the New Testament nineteen times in all. Concerning most of these cases there is entire harmony among Christian exegetes as to the signification of the word; but in regard to about half a dozen cases, being mostly Pauline passages, there is a discrepancy, some retaining also here the usual signification of the word, whilst others assume a new one. This latter class, of course, it is that we will have to look at especially.

Προφητεία is a word of later Greek, and a rare one withal. Yet its signification in profane literature is not doubtful in the least. It denotes the gift, the office, the activity of a *προφήτης* or of him who *προφητεύει*. A *προφήτης* is a person who *publicly* (*πρό*) *speaks* and *interprets* (*φημί*) *the will of the Deity* which has been revealed to him. He is the interpreter and expounder of divine oracles and revelations. So for example

the priest in Delphi whose office it was to form into words the enigmatical ejaculations of the Pythia was called *προφήτης*. Poets are called the *προφῆται* of the Muses. Then the word is also used to denote in general an interpreter or a declarer of mysterious things, an enthusiastic proclaimer or harbinger of something. In profane Greek *προφητεία* accordingly denotes the gift, &c., of interpreting the will of the gods.

In the Septuagint version of the old Testament *προφήτης* is the constant translation of the Hebrew *nabi*. This latter word invariably denotes a *proclaimer* or an *interpreter of divine revelation or will*. To be sure, sometimes also the pretended prophet of an imaginary god is called *nabi*, and Ex. 7, 1 Aaron is called the *nabi* of Moses. But these, as can be seen without any difficulty, are really no exceptions to the general rule. For if those imaginary gods had been real gods the pretended *nabi* could also have been a real *nabi*, and the usual signification of the latter word is not *in itself* changed in any way. And Ex. 7, 1 Aaron is only called the *nabi* of Moses because Moses is called his god. So this very passage shows most conclusively the general import of *nabi*, especially if we compare the parallel passage Ex. 4, 16: "And he" (Aaron) "shall be thy spokesman unto the people: and he shall be, even he shall be unto thee instead of a mouth, and thou shalt be unto him instead of God." According to this the signification of *nabi* clearly is, the *spokesman* or the *mouth of God*, or a *man who by immediate, direct revelation knows the will or the word of God and announces it to his fellow-men*.

That *προφητεία* denotes the gift, office, activity of such a man in the Septuagint translation of the Old Testament is beyond any doubt or dispute. Just as little is it, as far as we know, denied by anybody that in the greater number of passages in the New Testament where this word occurs it has the above usual signification, viz. in Matt. 13, 14; 1. Tim. 1, 18; 4, 14; Rev. 1, 3; 11, 6; 19, 10; 22, 7. 10. 18. 19. The passages that by some are mentioned as requiring another signification are chiefly Rom. 12, 6; 1. Cor. 12, 10; 13, 8; 14, 1-5. 22; 2. Pet. 1, 20. 21. We will accurately look at every one of them and see how the case stands.

Rom. 12, 4-8 in literal translation reads as follows: "For just as in one body we have many members, but the members

have not all the same business, so we many are one body in Christ, but, one by one, members of one another, and having gifts differing according to the grace given us: *whether prophecy, according to the analogy of faith; or the office of a deacon, in the office of a deacon; or he who teaches, in the teaching; or he who exhorteth, in the exhortation; who gives, in simplicity; who presides (rules), in diligence; who shows mercy, in cheerfulness.*" The question now is, Can any cogent reason be given why we should not here take the word *prophecy*, *προφητεία*, in its original and usual signification? For according to an old hermeneutical rule *a sensu vocis famosiore sine necessitate recedendum non est* (from the usual signification of a word we must not depart without necessity), as *quaelibet vox stat pro significato suo famosiore* (every word stands for its usual signification). Context and parallelism must determine whether such a cogent reason exists; if they require a signification of *prophecy* other than the usual one, we have to admit it; but not otherwise.

Before we decide this question we must direct our attention to the word *πίστις* (faith) contained in the same clause or sentence. This word in the vast majority of cases in the New Testament has the undoubted signification of *subjective* faith, or the heart's confidence and trust in God because of the merits of Christ. But by some it is claimed in a few passages to denote *objective* faith, or the heavenly truth revealed to man and to be embraced by faith. Our present passage is one of those for which this signification is claimed. And, in itself *a priori*, there is surely no reason why the word in Greek could not have this signification as well as the corresponding one in English (*faith*), in German (*Glaube*), and also in Latin (*fides*). But here, again, context and parallelism must decide. According to the context *πίστις* here denotes something that is a *general and universal rule and norm*, and hence something that is *firm, immovable, reliable*, and the same in *every instance and with every Christian*. For only such a rule meets the requirements of the case. Can *subjective* faith be such a rule? Is it the same with every Christian and in every instance, and therefore an unchanging rule and norm? Who would affirm this over against the many passages of Holy Writ that tell us in unmistakable language that subjec-

tive faith is not with all men, and not even with one and the same person at all times, of the same strength, clearness and comprehensiveness? If it is possible, as the Word of God and our experience teach us, that a man may be a true Christian, or, consequently, have subjective faith in his heart, and yet be very deficient and mistaken with regard to the knowledge of important doctrines of the Bible: how can *subjective* faith be the rule or norm according to which prophecy is to take place? What should or could, then, decide the numerous points in controversy, for example, between a Lutheran and a Reformed? *Subjective* faith or confidence in the Lord Jesus? Both claim to have it, and the Reformed, though defective and mistaken as to knowledge, may have confidence in Christ in a higher degree than the Lutheran who as regards knowledge is his superior. So context and parallelism compel us to take πίστις here not as *subjective*, but as *objective* faith. And this latter, viz. the sum of heavenly truths revealed in clear and unmistakable language, meets all the requirements of the rule that here must be denoted by πίστις.

And now, after this somewhat lengthy, but necessary digression, we turn to the original object of our investigation, and ask again, Does context or parallelism compel us to depart in Rom. 12, 6 from the usual signification of προφητεία as they have compelled us to do this with regard to πίστις? Or, to put it in another way, Is the sense of this passage as obtained by retaining the usual signification of *prophecy* against any passage of Holy Writ or at least not agreeable to the context? Let us see what this sense would be. The paraphrase would run thus: "If, according to the diversity of spiritual gifts granted the Church at the time of its foundation, anyone has received as such a gift that of prophesying or of receiving immediate revelations from God for the sake of proclaiming the same to his fellow-men, let him use this gift in such a way that he be always mindful of that sum of divine truths that has already been revealed in a clear, plain manner, lest he mistake the imaginations and fancies of his own heart, or perhaps even the whisperings of the evil one, for divine inspirations. Whatever is not in accordance with the Word of God already revealed and proved as His Word can not also be His Word or true prophecy." What can be said

against this interpretation? We do not think it open to any objection of real importance. Perhaps some one might say, Would it not be more necessary for the Church in general and in all ages to have such a rule with regard to the interpretation of prophecy than to have it as to prophecy itself, as this latter lasted only for some time in the Christian Church, whilst the former is to be employed as long as this world is in existence? And is it, therefore, not more probable that *προφητεία* means the former? To this we answer, First, mere probability can not be of any account in the exegesis of the Scriptures. If you *must* not, because of context or parallelism, depart from the usual signification of a word, you are not allowed to do it. Secondly, the rule you desire is contained in the rule that we find here. If even prophecy is to be judged according to the analogy of faith, how much more must this be done with mere human interpretation of the Scriptures? The first injunction implies the second. So our interpretation has the advantage of adhering as closely as possible to the usual and common sense of the words used, and of embracing also the only result of the other, somewhat arbitrary, interpretation. Thirdly, what would be the difference between *προφητεία* taken as interpretation of the Scriptures, and the *teaching* of which the second half of the next verse speaks? Would it not be the very same thing? And is it at all likely that in such an enumeration of different gifts the Apostle would speak of our gift twice and use entirely different words for it?

And so we hold that in Rom. 12, 6 there is not the least necessity, nay, more, not even the least probability that *προφητεία* has any other signification than the usual one. Essentially the same interpretation of this passage is given by Bengel in his *Gnomon Novi Testamenti*. There he remarks on *προφητείαν*: "This is the principle of the gifts of grace. See Acts 2, 17, 18; 11, 27; 13, 1; 15, 32; 19, 6; 21, 9, 10; 1. Cor. 11, 4 sq.; ch. 12 sqq.; Eph. 2, 20; 3, 5; 4, 11; 1. Thess. 5, 20; 1. Tim. 1, 18; 4, 14; Apoc. 1, 3, &c. When you compare these passages, it is clear that *prophecy* is a gift of grace by means of which heavenly mysteries, sometimes also future things, are brought to the knowledge of men, especially the believers, together with the explanation of the prophecies of

Scripture, which (explanation) could not be called forth by the common rules of interpretation."

The next passage that we will have to consider is 1. Cor. 12, 10. The context and scope is the same as Rom. 12, 6. Among the "diversities of gifts" given by "the same Spirit" are mentioned "the gifts of healing," "the working of miracles," "*prophecy*," "discerning of spirits," "the interpretation of tongues." Here already the immediate surroundings, the context in the strictest sense, show that "*prophecy*," *προφητεία*, is a *miraculous* gift of the Holy Spirit. Hence it can not be the common interpretation of the Holy Scriptures that we find in all the ages of the Church. Consequently there is not even the possibility, much less the necessity, of taking *προφητεία* here in another than the usual sense.

Another passage to be investigated is 1. Cor. 13, 8. There we read: "Charity never faileth; but whether there be *prophecies*, they shall fail; whether there be tongues, they shall cease; whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away." This verse refers to verse 2. of the same chapter, where the apostle says: "Though I have the gift of *prophecy*, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing." Here again we find *prophecy* in the midst of miraculous gifts of the Holy Ghost, and the case is therefore the very same as in 1. Cor. 12, 10.

The passage next in order is 1. Cor. 14, 1-5, reading as follows: "Follow after charity, and desire spiritual gifts, but rather that ye may *prophesy*. For he that speaketh in an unknown tongue speaketh not unto men, but unto God; for no man understandeth him; howbeit, in the spirit he speaketh mysteries. But he that prophesieth speaketh unto men to edification, and exhortation, and comfort. He that speaketh in an unknown tongue edifieth himself: but he that prophesieth edifieth the church. I would that ye all spake with tongues, but rather that ye prophesied; for greater is he that prophesieth, than he that speaketh with tongues, except he interpret, that the church may receive edifying." Manifestly the apostle here speaks of the same *miraculous* and *extraordinary* gifts of the Holy Spirit that he already spoke of in chapters 12 and 13. And of these extraordinary gifts he compares two,

the speaking in tongues and prophesying. Hence the case is again the very same as in the two preceding passages. The same thing must be said concerning verse 22. of the same chapter.

Only one more passage remains, viz. 2. Pet. 1, 19-21. It reads thus: "We have also a more sure word of *prophecy*; whereunto you do well that ye take heed, as unto a light that shineth in a dark place, until the day dawn, and the day star arise in your hearts; knowing this first, that no *prophecy* of the Scripture is of any private interpretation. For the *prophecy* came not in old time by the will of man; but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." Now we are at a loss to understand how anybody could cite these words as a proof for the assertion that *προφητεία* in the New Testament has also the signification of *interpretation of the Scriptures*. For here only the prophecies of holy men in times long gone by, speaking of the Messiah, and themselves in need of being interpreted, are mentioned. The word *prophecy* therefore retains also here its usual signification and cannot be understood in any other way.

Hence we must come to the conclusion that *προφητεία* has in all passages of the New Testament its original and usual signification, as the same has been stated in the beginning of this article. That is also the conviction of *Philippi*. In his "*Glaubenslehre*" he says (I, p. 42): "Prophecy is a communication of divine knowledge, a witnessing of the divine act of revelation (*Offenbarungsthat*), an interpretation of the divine idea in the divine Word expressed in that act. We, indeed, here take prophecy in a wider sense than that which is common and usual. But this conception is founded as well in the thing itself as in Holy Writ. The office of the prophets of the Old Testament did certainly not merely consist in foretelling future events, which is prophecy in the stricter sense, but also in testifying to, and interpreting, the revelation acts of the Lord in the past and at the present time. And also in the New Testament the conception of prophecy embraces every inspired (*gottbegeistert*) testimony concerning revealed truth communicated by God. Compare Rom. 12. 6; 1 Cor. 14; Eph. 2, 20; Tit. 1, 12." And in his excellent Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans he says concerning ch. 12, 6: "The

New Testament conception of prophecy is essentially identical with that of the Old Testament. Prophets are men who, animated (*beseelt*) and moved by the Spirit of God, in inspired language either reveal what is hidden in the future (Apoc. 1, 3; 22, 7, 10; John 11, 51; Acts 11, 27, 28; 21, 10, 11; comp. 1. Peter 1, 10); or make known what is concealed in the present time by declaring the secret counsel and will of God (Luke 1, 67 sqq.; Acts 13, 1 sq.; Eph. 3, 5), or disclosing the innermost thoughts of man (1 Cor. 14, 24, 25), and bringing his unknown deeds to light (Matt. 26, 68; Mark 14, 65; Luke 22, 64; John 4, 19; Acts 5, 3); or who in inspired and powerful language that carries all before it and that goes beyond the common measure of the faculty of teaching which, however spiritual, yet is founded on reflection, dispense instruction, consolation, exhortation to their hearers (Matt. 7, 28, 29; Luke 24, 19; John 7, 40; Acts 15, 32; 1 Cor. 14, 3, 4, 31). The prophet of the Old Testament had to prove his being sent by God by miracles (comp. Mark 6, 15; Luke 7, 16; Luke 24, 19; John 6, 14; 9, 17.) But since the completion of the prophecy of the Old Testament by Christ and the outpouring of the Holy Ghost upon all flesh (comp. Acts 2, 17, 18), on the one hand, indeed, the prophetic authority and fulness of gifts has passed over to the Apostles, but, on the other hand, the latter at least also to the whole Church in the form of charismatical gifts, where then prophecy and miracles, the *προφητεία* and the *ἐνεργήματα δυνάμεων*, 1 Cor. 12, 10, appear separate and divided among several individuals. From this we see why the Apostles, indeed, are also called prophets, Eph. 2, 20; 3, 5, but not all the prophets are also Apostles or men who are endowed with still other gifts than the *προφητεία*, Eph. 4, 11. The conception followed by Zwingli, Calvin and almost all older Lutheran theologians, according to which the *προφητεία* is said to have consisted in the gifts of interpreting the books of the Old Testament, especially the writings of the prophets, has rightly been abandoned since Baumgarten, and may to-day be looked upon as antiquated. It can, indeed, appeal to the classical use of *προφητεύειν*, according to which *οἱ προφητεύοντες τοῦ θεοῦ* are such as interpreted the answers of the deity given through the prophesying woman at Delphi, so that *προφήτης* would denote an interpreter of divine oracles.

This conception, however, has no foundation in the passages of the New Testament, in which the prophets are described, according to the nature of the case, as *interpreters of divine revelations that had been given them by immediate inspiration*; although they in a given case could indeed set out from the holy writings; but then they gave a *prophetical*, and not a mere (human) interpretation of the prophets."

St.

THE AESTHETIC IN WORSHIP.

Aestheticism, as it is conceived and preached by some modern would-be reformers, who find the true end of life in art and its enjoyment, is not to be commended. Under such treatment it becomes an evil. There is no more virtue in looking back wistfully to the beautiful "Gods of Greece" than there is in hankering after the appetizing flesh-pots of Egypt. It only betrays a lack of intelligence when apostles of aestheticism rail against mammon-worship as base and degrading and laud the worship of beauty as noble and elevating. An art-gallery may be relatively a better thing than a bag of gold, but as an end both are perversions of powers that might be used for noble ends, and both are bad. When men professing to have an important message to deliver go about preaching: "Love art for its own sake, and then all things that you need will be added unto you," they should not wonder that Christians consider them fools. So far as the true end of life is concerned they might as well preach: Love bread and butter for their own sake, and then sufficient provision will be made for human wants.

But the opposite extreme, according to which art is an evil that must as such be shunned, is just as unfounded. Both theories rest upon the false assumption that the aesthetic faculty is moral in its nature, and that its products and gratification must therefore be in themselves good or evil. While one party therefore finds the great moral end of man attained in the creations and enjoyments of art, another party sees in these only the work of the flesh. The one

thinks it in itself good, the other regards it in itself evil. Accordingly there have been men and are men now who make war upon all art when introduced into the service of the church, and talk about "ungodly big fiddles" and about "the devil in the organ." The wild work of iconoclasts is a matter of history, and the error which led to it has not yet been banished from the world.

According to the Scriptures all powers and gifts committed to man are to be consecrated to God and used for the glory of His name and the edification of His people. Poetry and music, painting and sculpture have therefore a place in the house of God as well as rhetoric and logic. "Every creature of God is good, and nothing to be refused, if it be received with thanksgiving; for it is sanctified by the Word of God and prayer." 1 Tim. 4, 4. 5. The earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof; why then should not all that is beautiful be employed to render attractive the habitation of God and the place where His honor dwelleth? It is a singular fancy that all things fair and bright belong to the devil, and must not be permitted to enter the sacred precincts of Jehovah's temple. Though sin has entered the world with its desolation and death, God still beautifies the earth with the gaiety and fragrance of flowers and the songs of birds; and of the Church He said: "The glory of Lebanon shall come unto thee, the fir tree, the pine tree, and the box together, to beautify the place of my sanctuary; and I will make the place of my feet glorious." Is. 60, 13. That which should take place spiritually is fitly symbolized by bringing to the Lord's house the lovely things of earth to make it a joy to the people. It was meet that the house built for the Lord should be "exceeding magnificent," and there is no reason why we should not now bring our gifts to make the sanctuary beautiful exceedingly. Surely the fact that the Church's treasures are of a higher kind than gold and silver and precious stones, or sweet growths of nature and rare products of art, does not imply that externally the Church shall have no comeliness.

But this fact does import that there is something higher and nobler than nature and art with all their beauty and attractiveness. The Church is a spiritual kingdom, and its

gifts and purposes are spiritual. Its members are "buiided together for a habitation of God through the Spirit," and all its work and appliances must aim to bring souls to the Saviour, that they may be "built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ Himself being the chief corner stone," and that, being thus built upon the true foundation, the gates of hell may not prevail against them. It is therefore a radical mistake when the beautiful and the pleasure which it affords to human nature is regarded and treated as itself an end for which the Church exists and for which it must labor. That is the perversion which has driven many to doubt and some to deny the legitimacy of employing art in the house of God. They are certainly right in rejecting any theory that makes the Church an institution whose office is to gratify the natural desires of the human heart. It is just as little designed to represent beauty in order to meet an aesthetic as it is to teach science in order to meet an intellectual want. Not only is it objectionable to introduce art in its baser forms into the Church, pandering thus to the unhal- lowed tastes of men in their depravity. About that there can be no dispute among Christians. That which by repre- sentation or association suggests the obscene and impure can surely claim no place in the holy temple of the Lord. Neither is it objectionable only to admit into the sanctuary such artistic productions as afford pleasure by gratifying absorbing passions that are of the earth, like erotic or patri- otic song and spectacle. It is generally felt among Christians that such works of art do not accord with the solemnity and sanctity of the holy place. But there is good ground for ob- jecting to more than this. It is not only the kind of artistic representation, as determined by the character of the senti- ment to which it appeals, but the relation in which art is made to stand to religion, that must be taken into account. What must be condemned is not only making of the house of the Lord an indecent or worldly art gallery, or concert hall, or theater, but making of it a place for exhibitions and enter- tainments at all. That the exhibition is moral or religious will not save it from condemnation. The show is a desecra- tion of the temple, whatever the character of the show may be. It is an abomination to have operatic performers in the

choir and histrionic performers in the pulpit, exhibiting themselves and their skill for the admiration and entertainment of the crowd that flocks to the show. The Lord's house is a house of prayer; its nature is ignored and its purpose frustrated when it is made an exhibition hall. Its object is to bring to men the grace of God unto salvation, not to afford them pleasure by gratifying the aesthetic faculty while the curse remains upon their souls.

It would, however, be merely running into the other extreme of error if we hence concluded that art must be banished from the church entirely. If many abuse it by assigning to it a place for which it was not intended, doing great damage to the church by substituting beauty and its pleasure for the grace of God that bringeth salvation, it does not follow that it is in itself an evil, or that it cannot be employed legitimately in the house of prayer. In itself it is indifferent; it may be employed in the service of Satan, but it may be employed also in the service of God. If not all Christians employ the arts of painting and sculpture in their places of worship, they do have buildings and hymns and sermons, and thus employ the arts of architecture, poetry, music, rhetoric. It would be marvelous if any intelligent Christian should maintain that a building must be unsightly in order to please God; that the hymns must be doggerel in order to be devout; that the music must be discordant in order to be sacred; that the rhetoric and elocution must be repulsive in order to be effective. When it is argued that God does not need our stately churches, our beautiful hymns, our grand chorals, our elegant oratory, we must grant all that is thus claimed. But does God need our forbidding meeting houses, our lame verse, our harsh discords, our bungling address? What virtue can there be in bad architecture, poetry, music, rhetoric? God needs neither our tasteless blundering nor our artistic skill. The sincere worshiper in Jesus' name is acceptable to Him, though His prayer be offered in bad grammar and his song be shockingly out of tune; and the hypocrite's worship is an abomination to the Lord, though it be brought in the most elegant forms. But that proves nothing to the point. If we have buildings in which to meet for worship; if we have songs of Zion to sing; if we have sermons to preach, should

these be offensive rather than pleasing to good taste? If we can have a church that is beautiful as easily as a church that is unsightly, if we can have a service that is pleasing and attractive as easily as one that is repulsive and forbidding, should we not rather choose the beautiful than that which offends the taste? It is a sophistical shifting of the question when the essence is set against the accident, and it is asked in a tone of triumph whether the Gospel and the faith of the worshiper are not more important than the beauty of the worship. Certainly they are. That is just what we maintain. The preaching of the truth unto salvation and the praise and prayer of the people assembled in the name of the Lord are paramount. For these the Church is established, and these must be in vogue in her assemblies, whether the form be homely or beautiful. If we cannot have the requirements of good taste complied with in the form, let us continue in the apostles' doctrine and fellowship, in the breaking of bread and in prayers at any rate. Beauty must not be the end and object. But if in pursuing the legitimate object for which the Church is established we can have beauty also, so that the taste of those who assemble may not be offended, but, as far as possible without detriment to the purpose to be accomplished, gratified and conciliated, it would be mere misanthropical determination not to please and suicidal resolution not to win, if we rejected the attractive and selected the repulsive in our forms of worship. Art has a legitimate place in the house of God, but it must be auxiliary. It must not rule, but serve. Architecture should help to accomplish the end for which the church is built, by its sacred and spiritual suggestiveness; poetry and music should aid in giving expression to the spirit of worship, contributing by the form to the interpretation of the sense, and affording their support to the soul in its efforts to give utterance to its experience; rhetoric should assist in giving embodiment to the truth in all its loveliness and power; even painting and sculpture may be employed to contribute their share in sustaining the spirit of devotion which the Holy Spirit has wrought. Such external helps can be made very effective in the worship of God's people. They cannot convert souls; they cannot preserve faith; but they can and should lend their aid in the

outward expression of the soul's inner life. They are not an object in themselves, but they can be made an efficient handmaid in the attainment of the Church's object.

Man does not cease to be human when he becomes a child of God by faith in the Lord Jesus Christ. The sanctifying power of the Holy Spirit is exerted upon all the powers of his soul, but he still thinks and feels and wills. As his knowledge of Christ has not made his knowledge of God's works in nature false or worthless, so his delight in the one altogether lovely does not render him blind to all beauty and deaf to all harmony. The heavens still declare the glory of God and the firmament still showeth His handiwork, though revelations of glory more precious than these have been made to the soul through the Gospel of Christ. The lilies of the field are not less fair when we learn to know the saving grace of Him who arrayed them in such loveliness. Our feelings are still human, and beautiful forms and sweet harmonies still affect us. That belongs to our nature, not to our sinfulness. Christianity puts away the abuse, but secures the right use by its sanctifying power. The believing as well as the unbelieving soul is disturbed by false logic and false rhetoric and false grammar in the preacher. It does not on that account prize the good tidings of salvation less, but it is on that account less able to give undivided attention to the message. False notes in singing will not render the praise unacceptable to God, but they will annoy the regenerate as well as the unregenerate man. On the other hand, the tasteful adaptation of all the accessories of worship to the end which they should subserve not only does not disturb, but it supports the worshiper in his devotions. Even those who frown upon all ministries of art in the house of the Lord have no doubt felt the influence of good churchly surroundings in giving thoughts and feelings the proper direction, and perhaps have, notwithstanding the barrier which prejudice has interposed, been conscious of giving all the more attention to the matter of a sermon on account of the winning way in which it was presented, and engaged more fervently in the devotion on account of the well-chosen words in which it was expressed and the concord of sweet sounds by which that expression was aided and rendered more adequate.

Even in regard to those who have not the spirit of praise the beautiful may be made conducive to the ends of the Church. Whatever can, without detracting from the holiness of the Lord's house and the purpose for which the Church has been established, be done to induce people to enter the holy temple and hear the tidings of salvation, should be done with cheerfulness. The Church must not be made a place of amusement, and nothing must be introduced for the purpose of furnishing attractions to those who will not have the word of truth and will not worship, but who would come to hear and see theatrical and operatic performances. That would be a prostitution of the sanctuary to the desires of the flesh. Whatever of art is employed must be in the service of worship and tributary to the inculcation of divine truth and the expression of human devotion. But as both the sacramental and sacrificial elements of worship require external forms to adapt them to the wants of men, who are corporeal as well as spiritual beings, these forms may be attractive as well as repulsive—they may gratify as well as offend good taste. It would not only not be in accord with the spirit of Christian love designedly to drive people away by intolerable violations of all aesthetic laws, but it would be a policy of uncharitableness as well as of unwisdom. When we have the preaching of God's Word and the praying of God's people we have all that is essential in the Church, and if the best form in which we can have these does not satisfy those who are without, so that on that account they will not come and hear, we cannot help it and need have no compunctions on that account. But if we choose hideousness when we could have beauty just as well, and could by choosing the latter induce many to come in and hear the Word, who are not yet under grace so that they could endure the offense of the form for the sake of the substance, we are not guiltless. Such a theory and practice rudely repels souls instead of striving to win them, at the same time that it fails to use art as an auxiliary in the edification of those who are already in the Church.

We have no sympathy with the sensuousness of the Roman cultus, by which many are drawn to that sect for the sake of gratifying aesthetic feelings, while they are permitted

to hug the delusion that such excitement and exercise of the natural religious sentiment is Christianity and will save the soul. Unless a man be born again he cannot see the kingdom of God. But we do plead for such application of good taste in the worship as will help and sustain the spirit of devotion in those who by the grace of God possess it, and will aid in drawing men into the house of the Lord, that they may there hear the truth which makes man free, and behold the beauty of the Lord and worship Him in the beauty of holiness.

L.

TEMPORARY CALLS TO THE MINISTRY.

It is the practice in some churches to appoint ministers for a certain period of time, or to make a contract with them, stipulating that the connection formed may be dissolved by either party upon due notice. The arrangement is supposed to have some manifest advantages, and as it falls in with the notions which many entertain of the church's liberty, it has found occasional advocates even among Lutherans. Can such a practice of giving and accepting temporary calls be tolerated in the Church?

In his *Pastorale Evangelicum* the distinguished theologian J. L. Hartmann (died 1680), in answer to the question whether any one can promise his services or his ministerial labors to the Church for a definite period of years, writes as follows: "We say no: 1. Because such a call impertinently prescribes to God, who extends the call, a fixed time, after the expiration of which the called person intends to retire from the Church, be its circumstances what they may, whereas it is not the province of ambassadors to dictate to their Lord how long they shall represent Him. 2. Because in such a transaction carnal considerations are involved that should be kept at a distance; for such a one thinks, if the matter should not be productive of satisfactory results—if there should be no treasures to gain or should be many disappointments to bear—he will have an easy way to escape from these perplexities. 3. Because of many disadvantages which it involves: for a

congregation might thus be deprived of a minister just at the time when his fidelity renders him most acceptable, and through such frequent changes the church benefices, as is well known, are much reduced. If now the further inquiry is made, whether it be permissible to call a minister of the Gospel upon a condition with regard to time, so that if the patrons should no longer desire to hear or tolerate the pastor, he must depart and take up his residence somewhere else, I reply: We are servants of God, and this office is God's: He calls us to it, though He does it through men. This sacred work must therefore be treated in a sacred manner, and not with human arbitrariness. Men can hire a shepherd or a cowherd for a time, and if his services no longer please them, they can at the appointed time, though not just when they please, dismiss him; but to deal thus with the shepherd of souls is not in the power of any man. Nor can the minister of the Word himself, if he would not become a hireling, accept the holy office in this manner. Certainly those who are called cannot diligently and faithfully discharge their office, but will become flatterers and say what is pleasing to the people, otherwise they must stand in hourly expectation of having notice served that their ministrations are no longer wanted." *Past. Ev.* p. 104.

So decidedly were our theologians averse to such temporary calls, that some of them even denied that such a vocation is valid, maintaining that it is a mere human contract which cannot confer the ministerial office. Whether the limitation of the call to a specified time invalidates the call, or the divine appointment in regard to the call nullifies any human appendages that conflict with it, is a debateable question; but that those who make such additions and those who stop to accept them commit a grievous sin, is capable of clear proof.

The Head of the Church is Christ. His Word alone is authority in it, and He alone appoints the ministers who are to preach the Word and to administer the Sacraments. Its ministers are the ministers of Christ. This is certainly beyond dispute. "Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God." 1 Cor. 4, 1. We are the ministers of God, not only because that which is to be administered is divine, but also because the

appointment to the office is divine. "Take heed therefore unto yourselves," says St. Paul to the elders of the Church at Ephesus, "and to all the flock over the which the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers, to feed the Church of God, which He hath purchased with His own blood." Acts 20, 28. Not man, but the Holy Spirit called them to the sacred office of feeding the Lord's flock. Again it is written: "God hath set some in the Church, first apostles, secondarily prophets, thirdly teachers," 1 Cor. 12, 28, and in Eph. 4, 11. 12 it is said of Christ that "He gave some, apostles; and some, prophets; and some, evangelists; and some, pastors and teachers; for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ." The Lord of the Church appoints His own servants and ambassadors, that they may not go forth in their own name, or that of man, but in the name of the Lord. "Now then we are ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech you by us: we pray you, in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God." 2 Cor. 5, 20.

That this call is now not given immediately, but through the congregation to whom the person called is to minister, does not detract from the divinity of the call. He who is not a minister of God, a servant of Christ, has no right to officiate in the house of God and the Church of Christ. The Lord calls His ministers still, although He calls them through the congregation of His people, and those who are thus mediately called are His ministers and stewards and ambassadors just as certainly as those who were called immediately. The congregations are only the instruments whom the Lord uses to extend the call which He gives. Thus we read of apostolic times: "As they ministered to the Lord and fasted, the Holy Ghost said, Separate me Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto I have called them." Acts 13, 2. The Holy Ghost gave the call, though men were used as agents. The ministers called through human instrumentality are God's ministers: He hath set them in the Church and given them their instructions as His servants.

But if God gives the call, the congregations being simply His instruments in designating the person and communicating the divine vocation, what possible right could these peo-

ple have to affix conditions and make restrictions which God has not made, and especially conditions and restrictions of such far-reaching import as that of determining when the call shall cease to be in effect? When God gives a vocation, no human power can render it null. He who gives it can alone decide how long it shall be in force, and it is an arrogant interference with divine prerogatives when a man or a body of men presume to declare that for a given time, and no longer, it shall be valid, or that either party may terminate it at pleasure. The instrument must not presume to be the Lord. "Be not ye called Rabbi; for one is your Master, even Christ." Matt. 23, 8. If thus Christians are to be careful not to usurp authority over each other, how much more careful should they be not to admit into their souls the thought of usurping authority over the Master Himself. But this is manifestly done when the Master calls a servant, and the people interpose with the presumptuous addition of a stipulation in regard to the duration of the appointment. The Lord appoints, and the people by such addition declare that the appointment shall stand, not as long as the Lord pleases, but as long as they please. They thus, instead of being humble instruments to execute the will of the Lord, proudly usurp the authority which belongs alone to Him.

But if this be the case, some reply, the congregation could have no right at any time to dismiss a minister. Rightly understood, that is so. The Lord who calls has alone the right to remove His servants. The congregations can be only instruments in the work. No one has authorized them to depose a minister whom the Lord has appointed and has not deposed. He may call such a minister away by death or by transfer to another charge; or He may employ the congregation as His instrument to dismiss as He employed it to call a pastor. But when it acts as His instrument, in the one case as the other, it can do nothing more than execute His will. It cannot dismiss a servant of God whom his Master has not dismissed. Such arrogance in other relations is so preposterous that it would expose a person to ridicule. If foolish people would undertake to discharge another's servant, they would merely be laughed to scorn. But that is just what a congregation presumes to do when it undertakes to

discharge a servant whom the Lord has called and whom He will keep in His employ as long as He pleases, not as long as the people to whom he is to minister may think good. If they would depose a servant in his Master's name, they must show that he has refused to perform his Master's will and is dismissed according to the Master's Word. The members of the Church have high prerogatives, having committed to them the keys of the kingdom of heaven; but they are not in any such sense kings and priests that they are now no longer subject to the King in Zion. He still calls His ministers, and no one can prescribe to Him how long He shall choose to keep them in His service.

A person who is willing to enter into a contract with people to serve them as pastor for a given time, after the expiration of which his office terminates, or to serve until either party shall be pleased to give notice that the official relation shall cease, is a hireling, not a minister of Christ. The baneful consequences of such a sinful interference with the divine order to call ministers in the Lord's name, who shall then be ministers of the Lord, will not fail to follow. When the people once entertain the idea that they are lords, who employ the minister to be subject to their authority, instead of calling him in the Lord's name to be subject to His Word, they will not honor him as the minister of Christ, but regard him as a hired servant to be at once discharged if in anything he fails to do their pleasure.

L.

HOMILETICAL DEPARTMENT.

Contributions to this department are respectfully solicited.

C. H. L. S.

FIRST SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. 1 JOHN 4, 16-21.

A.

THE SAVING AND SANCTIFYING LOVE OF GOD.

I. *The love of God saves us.* V. 16-18.

1. *By Christ Jesus.* In Him the merciful love of God hath appeared to us sinners—By Him is our salva-

tion accomplished—He brings us near to God—He quiets our fearful hearts, brings them peace, yea boldness for the day of judgment. (16 C—18.)

2. *By faith in Christ Jesus.* (V. 16 a.)

II. *The love of God sanctifies us.* V. 19–21.

1. It constrains us to love and serve God.

2. It constrains us to love and serve the brethren; and so to love is to be holy, for love is the fulfilling of the law.

C. H. L. S.

B

THE PROMISES AND THE PROOFS OF THE LOVE OF GOD.

I. *The promises of the Love that God hath to us, are*

1. Fellowship with God.
2. Blessedness in God.

II. *The proofs that we are in the love of God, are*

1. Our love to God.
2. Our love to the brethren.

PARTITION FROM THE GERMAN OF GEBLER.

SECOND SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. 1 JOHN 3. 13–18.

A.

THE SOURCE AND THE SIGNS OF SPIRITUAL LIFE.

I. *The source whence our spiritual life is derived is Christ.* V. 16.

1. He is the Life.
2. He laid down His life for us that by His death we might live.
3. We who believingly know His love have passed out of death into life.

II. *The signs which give evidence of our spiritual life and of which mention is made in our text, are these:*

1. That we endure the hatred of the world. V. 13.
2. That we love in deed and in truth. 14. 15 & 17–18.

C. H. L. S.

B.

THE LOVE OF OUR FELLOW MEN.

- I. *Love passive.*
- II. *Love active*, with Christ as our example in both.

ADAPTED FROM THE GERMAN.

THIRD SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. 1 Pet. 5. 6-11.

A.

THE GOOD SOLDIER OF JESUS CHRIST CHARACTERIZED.

- I. *He is humble and submissive.* V. 6.
 1. That the mighty God order his life and direct him in its warfare, is to him a matter of course.
 2. If God should lead him in ways that are dark and into danger from which there seems to be no escape, he is content, for his God has a mighty hand.
- II. *He is careful for nothing.* V. 7.
 1. His business is to serve Him who has called him.
 2. To see to his support is his Master's business.
- III. *He is sober and vigilant.* V. 8.
 1. Temperate in the affairs of the body, of the mind, and of the passions.
 2. A good eye, and that faithfully put to use.
- IV. *He is steadfast in the faith.* V. 9.
 1. The faith whence is the true spirit of a Christian soldier.
 2. The faith by which he is furnished with the weapons of certain victory (for himself and his brethren in the fight).
- V. *He is led from strength to strength.* V. 10.
 1. The God of grace who employs him by Christ Jesus perfects him here.
 2. He is finally exalted to eternal glory.
- VI. *He gives all the glory to God.* V. 11. C. H. L. S.

B.EXHORTATIONS AND CONSOLATIONS FOR THE SUFFERING
AND SORROWFUL.I. *The Exhortations.*

1. Humble yourselves under the mighty hand of God.
2. Cast all your care upon the Lord and trust in Him.
3. Be sober and vigilant.
4. Resist steadfast in the faith your adversary.

II. *The Consolations.*

1. The same afflictions are accomplished in your brethren everywhere.
2. The strength of God's grace will be made perfect in your weakness.
3. The time of your sufferings is short and quickly passeth away.
4. You are called by the God of all grace to an eternal glory by Christ Jesus.

FROM THE GERMAN OF BECKER.

FOURTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. ROM. 8. 18-23.

A.GROANINGS AND TRAVAILINGS WHICH HAVE A MOST
GLORIOUS PROMISE.I. *Such are the groanings and travailings*

1. Of the whole creation,
 - a) Which is in the bondage of corruption, i. e. subjected to the crying abuses of vanity, or the sinfulness of man.
 - b) Which is subject to vanity not willingly and therefore groaneth and travaileth in pain.
2. Of the children of God.
 - a) Who are subject to the sufferings of this present time.
 - b) Who cry for deliverance from all evil.

II. *The promise of a glorious deliverance is given*

1. To the creature.

- a) For God hath subjected the same in hope.
- b) This hope shall be realized in the day of final redemption.

“Thus the Apostle teaches that the creature shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption in which, till the day of judgment, every creature which God hath made must be the man-servants and the maid-servants, not of the godly, but of the devil and of wicked people . . . This they do not willingly, no more than we desire to be subject to the Turk; but the creature submits and waiteth: for what? For the glorious liberty of the children of God, when it shall not only be delivered from its bondage, and no longer serve the wicked, *but it shall be made free and much more beautiful than it now is, and thenceforth serve only the children of God* and no longer be held captive, as it now is, by the devil.” Luther. Erl. IX p. 117.

2. To the children of God.

- a) Redemption of the body.
- b) Possession of the eternal inheritance.

C. H. L. S.

B.

THE SUFFERINGS OF THIS PRESENT TIME.

- I. *Their extent.*
- II. *Their source.*
- III. *Their end.*

ADAPTED FROM THE GERMAN.

FIFTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. 1 Pet. 3, 8-15.

A.

Int. Matth. 5, 16.

THE WAY OF WINNING SOULS.

- I. *Sanctify Christ the Lord in your own hearts.* 15 a.
 - 1. You cannot endear Jesus to others unless He be precious to your own soul.
 - 2. You must begin with yourself and never be forgetful of self in this work.

II. *Give account of the hope that is in you.* 15 b.

1. With meekness, knowing that you have nothing but what you have received.
2. With fear, conscious of the supreme holiness of what is committed to you.

III. *Support the doctrine by your life.*

1. Doing the works of love and mercy. 8-11.
2. Bearing the evil returns of hatred. 12 b-14.

IV. *Trust wholly in the Lord for light and strength.* V. 12 a.

1. He sees you.
2. He hears you. C. H. L. S.

B.

THE EYES OF THE LORD ARE UPON US.

I. *In our sufferings, and that should comfort us.*II. *In our wrong-doing, and that should restrain us.*III. *In our good endeavors, and that should encourage us.*

FROM THE GERMAN OF COUARD.

SIXTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. ROM. 6, 3-11.

A.

OUR BAPTISM.

I. *What it hath done for us.*

1. By it we were made partakers of the death of Christ.
 - a) That is, the death of atonement.
 - b) Therefore we are justified from sin.
2. By it we were engrafted into Christ.
 - a) Into Christ as the living Vine.
 - b) Therefore we are branches of the Vine.
3. By it we were quickened unto the life of Christ.
 - a) The life by the Spirit of God.
 - b) Therefore we have received the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

II. *What it requireth of us.*

1. That we grow up as the children of God.
2. That we walk as the children of God.
3. That we hold fast to the hope of the children of God.

C. H. L. S.

B.

THE LIFE OF CHRIST IN THE SOUL OF THE BELIEVER.

- I. *When it begins.* V. 3. 4.
- II. *Wherein it consists.* V. 5-8.
- III. *How long it endures.* V. 9-11.

FROM THE GERMAN OF STARK.

SEVENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. ROM. 6, 19-23.

A.

WHATSOEVER YOU DO, O MAN, REMEMBER THE END.

I. *The service of sin ends in death.*

1. The evils of life, temporal death, spiritual and eternal death.
2. These things are the wages of sin—its natural, inevitable and just penalties.

II. *The service of God ends in life.*

1. In life eternal; or in that spiritual life made perfect and glorious, in which this service originates, &c.
2. In life which is however not the wages of our service, but the free gift of God in Christ Jesus.

C. H. L. S.

B.

SHALL WE SIN BECAUSE WE ARE UNDER GRACE?

God forbid! for

- I. *Whom ye obey, his servants ye are.*
- II. *Whose servants ye are, his wages ye receive.*

FROM THE GERMAN OF MUNKEL.

EIGHTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. ROM. 8, 12-17.

A.

BEHOLD WHAT MANNER OF LOVE GOD HATH BESTOWED
UPON US; FOR WE ARE HIS CHILDREN.

- I. *We have the nature of children.* V. 14.
1. We are born of His Spirit.
 2. We are led by His Spirit.
- II. *We have the consciousness of children.* V. 16.
1. God's witness of Himself in us.
 2. Our consciousness of God's indwelling.
- III. *We lead the life of children.* V. 12-13.
1. We mortify the flesh.
 2. We walk in the spirit.
- IV. *We have the privilege of children.* V. 15.
1. Access to the Father's heart and help.
 2. Wherefore we have no fears, no cares, no wants.
- V. *We have the sure hope of children.* V. 17.
1. For a while the true glory of our estate is hidden; we labor for and suffer with Christ.
 2. In due time we shall inherit with Christ and be glorified with Him.

C. H. L. S.

B.

HOW THE SPIRIT OF GOD LEADETH THE CHILDREN
OF GOD.

- I. *He mortifies in them the deeds of the flesh.*
- II. *He worketh in them the joyous confidence of children.*
- III. *He beareth witness of their adoption.*
- IV. *He maketh them the heirs of God.*

FROM THE GERMAN OF PETRI.

CLEAR PREACHING.

(From Dr. Blaikie's "For the Work of the Ministry," p. 53.)

Next we notice clearness as another great quality of effective preaching. It is plain that no vivid impression of a truth can be conveyed to others by one who sees it mistily and expresses it vaguely. "Fire low," says Dr. Guthrie; "the order which generals have often given to their men before fighting began, suits the pulpit not less than the battle-field. The mistake common to both soldiers and speakers is to shoot too high, over people's heads, missing by a want of plainness and directness both the persons they preach to and the purposes they preach for." *

It sometimes happens that plainness in the pulpit is hindered through an erroneous idea of what is due to its dignity. This leads some preachers not only to speak in an artificial tone of voice, but to make use of circumlocutions for the very purpose of avoiding plain terms. Probably this habit arises from unconscious unwillingness on the part of the preacher to come into near mental contact with the people—a grievous error, since such closeness of mental contact is one of the chief aids to spiritual impression. In other instances the use of unusual words is a wretched piece of pedantry, a device of the preacher's for showing off the superiority of his training.

But a fault of this kind is trivial compared to that of preaching on a subject that has not been clearly thought

* In Tennyson's '*Northern Farmer*' the effects of this mistake are hit off with remarkable cleverness, though doubtless with a dash of exaggeration. The farmer is dying, and is turning over his past life in a half-accusing, half-excusing spirit. Naturally he thinks of his relation to his parson, and here is his statement of how he improved the ministrations of his spiritual guide:

"And I hallus com'd t's church afoor my Sally wur dead
An' eerd un a bummin' awaay, like a buzzard clock ower my yead,
An' I niver know'd what a mean'd, but I thowt a 'ad summut to saay,
An' I thowt a said whet a owt to a said, an' I comed awaay."

The farmer would never have been content with this view of his duty if the parson had started like the great Preacher (Jesus)—"Behold, a sower went forth to sow."

out. There is a snare in natural fluency, the fluent man being often tempted to neglect clearness and directness of statement and simplicity of method. He is tempted to dispense with that most useful, though often intensely irksome, process—getting hold of his own thoughts, ascertaining precisely what they are, and separating them from every particle of obscurity. Perhaps he thinks it enough in his preparation to get hold vaguely of a thought, and trust to its clearing itself, as it were, and coming out with sufficient plainness, under the excitement of delivery. Far more may be expected *ultimately* of the man who, though at first he sees his subject enveloped in mist—sees a fragment of an idea here, and the shadow of one there, and knows that there must be a connection between them, but is baffled, bewildered, and almost maddened as he attempts to define and express them—perseveres, nevertheless, with the persistency of a martyr, jots down with his pencil everything as it occurs to him, concentrates his attention more earnestly, keeps his temper, walks about his room, is frequently on his knees, or with his hand over his eyes; possibly finds it necessary to take a walk in a retired place, or to wait till a night's sleep shall have freshened his brain, or given him a better point of view; but at last, when his work is finished, finds an abundant recompense for these pangs of parturition in the clear consecutive form in which his thoughts come out. If we admire the marvellous precision, clearness, and force of the thinking of John Foster, it will be well for us to remember what labor composition cost him, how very far the pen which *he* wielded was from that of the ready writer. Nothing can be more valuable than the mental discipline of clearing the obscure and marshalling the tangled in our own minds; nor does it follow that the same toil and trouble will always be required. A habit of clearness will be attained, which will by-and-by supersede the necessity of the efforts through which it was acquired.

THE COLUMBUS THEOLOGICAL MAGAZINE.

This Magazine is designed to supply the want, long since felt, of a Lutheran periodical devoted to theological discussion. Its aim will be the exposition and defence of the doctrines of the Church as confessed in the Book of Concord. Theology in all its departments is embraced within its scope, though for the present special attention will be given to the controverted subject of predestination.

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C O L U M B U S

W. L. G. 1884



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THE EV. LUTHERAN CHURCH.

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THE NATURE OF THE WILL.

It is not a novel subject that we propose to consider in this essay. Both in philosophy and in theology it has been a topic of discussion for centuries, and not infrequently has it given rise to protracted and even angry controversy. In some of its aspects heathen philosophers gave it earnest thought long before the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us, and since His advent Christian sages have employed the additional light which the New Testament gives in laborious efforts to elucidate it. But that does not furnish sufficient ground for assuming that any further attempts to find a way through its mazes would be idle and worthless. A question with which the ablest minds have grappled and in which they failed to reach a result which the world was willing to regard as final, cannot indeed be settled by a few MAGAZINE articles. We have no such presumptuous thought. Nor have we any time to waste on metaphysical speculations that profit nobody and lead to nothing. But we have the conviction that the investigations of ages have made some points clear respecting the powers of the human mind and their relations to God and the world, and that some of the afflictions which have recently been brought upon the Church are largely a result of sinning against the light of nature and revelation to which man has access. Something is known concerning the human will in its powers and relations and liberty, and what is known should be utilized as a barrier against errors that are mischievous, however sincere and well-meaning the men may be who disseminate them.

Our aim is practical, notwithstanding that the subject is largely philosophical. The anthropological questions which have occupied so prominent a place in theological discussion ever since the days of Augustine, have by recent controversies been forced anew upon the minds especially of Lutheran Christians, and old errors have been advocated with a zeal and supported by a personal influence that has rendered them powerful for evil. Under such circumstances it becomes a duty to give the matter involved careful attention, though it require the consideration of topics that are somewhat abstruse. We indulge the hope that an essay designed to assist brethren in threading their way through the intricacies of a subject that deeply concerns them as Christians, will not go forth without our Heavenly Father's blessing.

From the fact that man is sinful and thus has, in his present natural condition, no power whatever to will or to do anything spiritually good, coupled with the assumption that not only the acceptance of the saving grace offered by the Holy Spirit in the Gospel, but even the refraining from wilfully rejecting the offer would be such a spiritually good volition, it is inferred that man's will can have nothing to do with deciding who shall be saved and who shall be damned, but that this must be dependent absolutely upon the will of God. The same theory of divine decrees determining the fate of man which others reached by taking the divine sovereignty as a starting point is thus the outcome of their reasoning. It is argued by the latter that if God is absolute Monarch, His will cannot be conditioned by anything that man can will or think, believe or perform, and consequently whatever may be the destiny of an individual soul, it is so because God had so willed and decreed: the soul that is saved, is saved because God wills it so; the soul that is damned, is damned because God wills it so. That God could have the will "that all men should be saved," and yet that only some should be saved in fact, and that He should be the absolute Sovereign and yet decree that the criterion of salvation should be "He that believeth shall be saved, he that believeth not shall be damned," is pronounced impossible, because it is supposed to be in conflict with the divine sovereignty. So, commencing with man's sin and inability as a starting point, it is

argued by others that as man can do absolutely nothing and God must do absolutely everything when a soul is saved, salvation can be bestowed only on whom God wills, so that all are saved whom He wills to save and those whom He does not will to save must inevitably be lost. That man could be helpless and powerless for good, and yet that God should make the individual's salvation dependent on his use of the means of grace and his refraining from wilfully foreclosing the ordinary way to the Holy Ghost, is supposed to be in conflict with man's natural inability, as the refraining from wilful resistance to divine grace is presumed to imply some power for the spiritually good in the human will. Thus by a process of reasoning which is specious, the dreadful conclusion is reached which in theology is called Calvinism and in philosophy bears the name of Determinism or Fatalism.

So far as this matter bears upon the salvation of man from sin and death it can be decided only by an appeal to the Scriptures. But it is antecedently probable that men who approach the Scriptures with a false theory will labor to bring the words of the Holy Ghost into harmony with their preconceived opinions. An error thus begets other errors. "A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump." The Scriptures are interpreted according to the proportion of faith, and men only stultify themselves who claim that every passage is to be explained independently of every other and without reference to the harmony of the whole. Man would cease to act as a rational being if the convictions of truth which are already formed were ignored in making additions to his stock of knowledge. False doctrines eat as doth a canker and soon vitiate the whole theological system. The subject before us is an example in point. Luther was saved from predestinarianism, to which in his earlier years, under the influence of Augustinianism, he was strongly inclined, by his conscientious adherence to the biblical doctrine of the means of grace. Calvin was impelled to reject this doctrine, though it was with a struggle against the force of evidence in its favor, because his predestinarianism rendered it necessary for the sake of consistency. Many have been led into a false exegesis by their false philosophy. It therefore seems to us important to examine in the light of consciousness as well as in the

light of revelation some topics bearing upon the controverted subject. A correct view of the will in its powers and relations will contribute much, we are assured, to a correct apprehension of the Holy Spirit's work upon the soul, and will be a safeguard against misapprehending inspired words designed to lead men into the truth.

We begin with an inquiry into the nature of the human will.

I.—WILL DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER POWERS.

Man has a body, in virtue of which he forms part of the material universe. But he has also a soul, which has none of the qualities of matter. "The Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul." Gen. 2. 7. He was made in the image of God, who is a Spirit. His soul is a spiritual, as his body is a material entity or substance. This substance can be known in consciousness by its operations, as material substances can be known through sense by their phenomena. It is conscious of knowing and feeling and willing. These are things which it can do. We therefore say that it has the faculties of Intellect, Sensibility, and Will.

But when we thus classify various operations of which we are conscious, it must be borne in mind that this is done on the basis of powers, not of parts. The soul is a spiritual entity. It has no parts. The fire in my grate consumes the coal, gives light in the room, makes me comfortable by its warmth. These are things which it can do, not distinct parts of the fire. It is one and the same fire that does them all. The soul can know and feel and will. It is one and the same soul that performs these different operations. The intellect is the soul regarded as knowing; the sensibility is the same soul regarded as feeling; the will is again the same soul regarded as putting forth volitions. The name given to a faculty designates the soul so far as it is capable of performing a certain kind of action. It is the whole soul, not merely a part of it, that is meant when we speak of the intellect or will, but it is the whole soul with regard to only one kind of power that it possesses, just as it is the whole

fire that we mean when we speak of its giving light, although this is but one of the powers which the fire has. The soul is a unit and acts as a totality.

The soul has faculties or powers. It can do something. Is it in that respect exactly like all other creatures? The earth can move; the rock can fall and crush the vegetation in its path; the water can flow and toss; the wind can wave the corn or uproot the forest; the tree can grow and the rose can bloom; the lamb can skip and the lion can roar. Everywhere we see manifestations of power. Man can utilize this power to run machinery which his mind, in the exercise of its power, has contrived. He uses fire and water and wind and electricity to accomplish his ends. But the fact that man utilizes powers that are found in nature points to a difference of which we must take account. The earth will not move and the rock will not fall and the water will not flow of themselves. Matter will go when there is a force to send it, and will stop when that force is spent; or it will move, by inherent gravity or levity, when hindrances are removed, and will continue in motion until its course is again obstructed. When the rock falls from the mountain to the valley below there is destructive power in it. But it will lie where it lodges and never move again until some superior power moves it, or until a way is cleared for it to pursue its downward tendency in accordance with the law of gravity. It has no power to make another valley into which it could precipitate. The tree grows. It gradually pushes itself upward and increases its bulk. Its power is great to overcome obstacles to its growth, but it has limits assigned to it beyond which it cannot pass. The shrub will never become a tree, and the tree will not increase in height forever. God has set for every creature its proper bounds. Power is given to each after its kind, and beyond that it can never reach. All power in matter is the power of the divine will apportioned to each creature according to His good pleasure. The reason why gold is so heavy and gas is so light, why the daisy is so small and the cedar of Lebanon so large, why the lamb is so weak and the lion so strong, is that God willed it so and made them so. His power is in each and all according to the measure of His will. So it is also in man. He is a creature, like the

rest. He is a dependent creature, like the rest. But that decides nothing with regard to the specific powers of man. God made creatures with various powers. The stone has not the same purpose and the same capacities as the plant, nor the plant the same as the animal. Each was created after its kind, the kind being determined by the will of the Creator. Of what kind was man?

That he was endowed with superior powers is certain from the inspired record. We read there: "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. So God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him: male and female created He them. And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth." Gen. 1, 26-28. The creature into whom God breathed the breath of life, so that he is not composed merely of the dust of the earth, who was made in the image of his Maker, and who was ordained to have dominion over other earthly creatures and was commanded to subdue the earth, must be endowed with powers commensurate with his high destiny. And so we find it. As to his body he is subject, indeed, to the laws of matter; but he has also a mind that can think and can will. He has intellectual and moral faculties that lift him above other creatures and qualify him for the dominion to which he was appointed.

The human body has powers in the same sense in which these are ascribed to other material bodies. I can lift my foot and move my hand. By such movement power can be exerted upon other bodies. The book is taken from the table by the power of the hand. But as the hand moves the book, so the hand is moved by some other power. The law of causation applies to all material things. No change can take place without some power to effect it. This the mind recognizes by intuition as necessary. There can be no event without a cause. All changes in nature are explicable only by

assuming that there is a first cause to which all power can be traced and which operates through all intermediate causes. "He that built all things is God." Heb. 3, 4. And He that built all things gave them their place and their powers, and preserves them and directs them according to the purpose of their creation. "Forever, O Lord, Thy Word is settled in heaven. Thy faithfulness is unto all generations; Thou hast established the earth, and it abideth. They continue this day according to Thine ordinances; for all are Thy servants." Ps. 119, 89-91. The whole universe is and moves according to the will of its Creator, and all creatures serve Him in the execution of His will. "For of Him, and through Him, and to Him are all things; to whom be glory forever." Rom. 11, 36. His will, operative through all time and in every creature according to the purpose for which He made it and to the nature which He gave it in pursuance of this purpose, is the underlying cause of all things. To this man is no exception. He is made for the service and glory of God, like all other creatures, and he, as well as the sun and moon and stars of light, the fire and hail and snow and vapors and stormy wind fulfilling His Word, (Ps. 148), is called upon to praise his Maker.

But sun and moon and fire and hail have no will, and therefore have no responsibility. They do unflinchingly what God has commanded them. They are never at fault, and never miss their aim. God directs them, and they have no power but such as God exerts through them. Whatever they do is therefore good, except so far as God permits their power to be used by voluntary creatures for the accomplishments of their evil designs. He made all things good, including Satan and the angels that are now evil, and including man, who is now fallen and sinful. "God saw everything that He had made, and behold it was very good." Gen. 1, 31. The one power that made disturbance in the harmony of nature, and that failed and still fails to execute the divine purpose, is the power of will with which some creatures were endowed.

It does not lie within the scope of our inquiry to examine the question, why the Almighty Maker of heaven and earth was pleased to bestow upon a creature a power so dangerous. If such a creature, in consequence of the evil

resulting from the abuse of his power, should proudly and rebelliously raise such a question in the spirit of reproach and blasphemy, it would suffice to say with St. Paul: "Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?" Rom. 9, 20. If the question be asked devoutly and reverently, with the purpose of knowing more of the marvelous ways and workings of our adorable Lord, whose name is Wonderful, it would probably be sufficient to answer, that it seemed good to Infinite wisdom and love to make such creatures as men and angels for His glory and their happiness, and that the accomplishment of this purpose necessarily involved the bestowal of a power that could be abused for evil as well as used for good.

But our present end is attained by bringing clearly into view the fact that there is in man a power which is different from the forces manifested in the material universe. While the powers which are usually denominated physical causes are all traceable to the first cause in the will of the Creator, there is manifestly in man a power that originates action. We say this is manifest, because the various other powers with which he is endowed are otherwise directed than as God directs them and are made to conflict with the Creator's will as revealed to man. That originating power lies in the human will. If this be regarded as a part of the complex machinery of the universe, so that wills are moved in accordance with the divine plan just as planets are moved, and just as unerringly accomplish the purpose of the Creator by impulses that come from Him as the One First Cause that moves the whole, there could be no such thing as sin, which is the violation of the Creator's will, and no such thing as human will and human responsibility, but will would be only the name for a special force coordinate with other forces in matter.

There is such a power as will, and it is different from physical power. This difference lies not only in the fact that it exists in man who has dominion over all other earthly creatures. Man has physical powers also. Force is exerted through his bodily organs. He puts forth muscular energy and employs his limbs as instruments for the execution of his

designs. So he is acted upon, like other matter. His body may be moved by extraneous forces. Even within him there is much which belongs to nature and over which he has no direct control. The heart and lungs perform their work independently of intelligence and will. Physiology and psychology are distinct departments. The subject matter of the one lies in the domain of the natural, that of the other in the domain of the spiritual.

But even this does not adequately differentiate the will. Man's psychological powers are not all of the same kind. The soul regarded as intellect can obtain knowledge, and retain it, and elaborate it. That is what by divine ordination it can do. The soul as sensibility has emotions and affections and desires. These are functions which God created it to perform. It was made for this. These are the powers which its Creator gave it, and it is in these respects capable of accomplishing its purpose. If it fails to know and to feel as God designed, it is because there is a failure somewhere in regard to the use of the powers bestowed. So far as God uses them as his instruments they can no more fail of their end than the sunshine and rain which He employs for His purposes. The powers are just as certainly in the soul as they are in the sun, each having its own design and each being endowed after its kind. Why do not the intellect and the sensibilities perform exactly the work for which they are designed? Does God not direct them unerringly as He does other creatures less highly endowed? The only answer that nature and revelation give is that man has a will which can also direct, and which may direct contrary to God's will the powers subject to it. Only when other wills interfere with the Maker's will does anything in nature or in man go awry, or miss its aim, or come short of its design. Nothing in air or earth or sea goes wrong so far as God directs it; only when the will of Satan or of man maliciously or ignorantly misdirects the powers of nature are they agents of mischief. Man has a will that is distinct from God's will. It is made after the image of God, but it is human, not divine. Just because it is will, but not identical with God's will, it could go wrong, and it unhappily did go wrong even in Eden.

II.—CHARACTER OF WILL POWER.

The will is a power, but what can it do? It has no specific action coordinated with that of the intellect and the sensibilities. It cannot do anything distinct from other powers. It is not an instrument that is adapted to a kind of work peculiar to itself, but a personal power that uses all other powers as instruments. What a person can do bodily or mentally he can do by the energy of his will. I sit down at the table and write. I can do this by the power of my will. My will moves my body and uses my bodily powers to accomplish the purpose of my soul. The bodily action is not the volitional action. There was an act of the will antecedent to the movement of the body. The latter is the effect of the former. The cause of the bodily action is the prior mental action called a volition. The will is the causal force that puts the bodily powers in motion. Every creature has properties of its own, in virtue of which it is adapted to certain ends. The bird was made to fly, the fish to swim. It can do these things. Clay can be hardened, iron can be softened, under the influence of heat. Heat can do these things, clay and iron are capable of these things. But all matter is in itself inert; it is will that moves it and produces effects through each creature after its kind. My body can bend, and my hand can hold the pen and move it in writing; but the body and the hand that can be thus employed will not sit down and write of themselves. Something must move them. That which moves them is will; that which moves them, when these are my own personal acts, is my own will. The body is the instrument of the will; the will is the source of the bodily action. When I write, I direct my attention to the subject which I am endeavoring to elucidate. I make mental effort. The mind is collected and concentrated. I am performing a mental act that is not volition. It is an act of the intellect, not of the will. I think, and that is not the same as I will. Willing is different from thinking. Both are acts of the soul, but they are mental acts of different kinds. I fix my attention upon my theme because I will it. The thinking is an effect of my willing. I make personal effort and in such effort make use of my discursive faculty to accomplish my

end. The will is the cause of my intellectual action. The power of my intellect is used in thinking, as the power of my hand is used in writing. God made the former to perform intellectual, the latter to perform physical labor. To this they are respectively adapted; for this they respectively have power. But that which employs these powers is will. They move as God, in accordance with His creative design, directs them by their inherent nature, or by external forces acting upon them, or as man, by the power of will with which he is endowed after the image of his Maker, exercises his dominion over them and controls their action. Man's mental as well as his corporeal powers can be used as instruments to do the work for which they are adapted. Only the will cannot be thus employed. There is no special work for which it is adapted. It is made to employ other powers as instruments to accomplish that for which they were by their nature designed; it cannot be employed by other powers to accomplish a specific kind of work for which it was created and endowed. There is no such work for it to do, and it has no such endowment. Its action without other powers to serve as its instruments would be mere beatings of the air. The volition to meditate or to write would be bootless without an intellect or a hand wherewith to perform these actions. The will is the personal power which sets in motion all the other powers under the person's control.

It is therefore not strictly correct to coordinate the will with the intellect and sensibilities in a classification of the soul's powers. The power to know and the power to feel are secondary causes. They may be employed according to their design, just as the eye and ear may be employed as instruments according to their nature. But the will is a primary power of personal beings. It causes action, and uses the other powers of the soul, as well as the powers of the body, to attain ends which the person has chosen. It puts forth energy, but that energy merely sets into operation forces which the instruments possess in virtue of their Creator's will. All power is of God, and He upholdeth all things by the Word of His power. His will creates and preserves all creatures; man's will can neither create nor preserve what is created, but it can subdue and direct and use the powers which God made

and upholds. Thus it uses directly and primarily the powers which God has given to each individual. I can use my powers of body and I can use my powers of soul. But I cannot in the same sense use my will. I can do nothing with it. It is not something distinct from myself and cannot be instrumentally employed by myself. I can will to think or to write, but I cannot will to will. When I will, the volition is accomplished and the energy has gone forth, not to effect a volition, but to effect an action through other powers which are subordinate to the will. These other powers are partly in the soul, and therefore are of the same spiritual nature with the will. In that respect they are of the same kind and are rightly placed in the same class. But they are subordinate to the will, as this employs them as well as the bodily powers in producing effects. On the other hand, the will is under the guidance of the intellect and is largely influenced by the feelings, of which relations we shall speak further on. In that respect it would seem to hold a place of subordination to the other mental powers. But still it retains its independence and its mastery, as this is manifest in the power which it possesses of determining action against the judgment of reason and the impulse of feeling.

III.—WILL THE EXPONENT OF PERSON.

The will is not, indeed, absolutely independent of the individual's nature. We recognize the truth contained in the words of Dr. Harless when he says: "As self-will is antecedent to self-consciousness, and this latter is kindled into being by the actuality of the former, so also the difference between the will as an *actus* and the will as a *potentia* presents itself to the awakened consciousness. I know that I am what I am not by willing it, but that I can will in virtue of what I am. That is to say, my self-existence is the potentiality of my will, not my will the potentiality of my self-existence. Since I do not recognize myself or my will as my creator, I become conscious of a created causality of all my actual being independent of myself, which I distinguish as my proper nature from my willing self-life and place as the impulse of nature in relation to my self-will. For this self is not a self con-

ditioned by its own abstract willing, but an organic composition and collective effect of different factors or forces which are neither separately nor collectively products of my will. If this were not the case, I could organize myself according to my own will." *Christliche Ethik* § 5, p. 23. There is a natural basis of our personal life, in virtue of which each individual is akin to every other individual that shares the same nature; and certainly the individual person can never divest himself of the nature which gives him his specific being. But it is true, nevertheless, that his own personal life centers in his will, and that his own personal character, his moral individuality, depends upon his will. The nature that is common to us all renders me human and gives me all the powers and all the infirmities which belong to humanity as a whole, but it does not render me the particular individual that I am and determine the personal character that I possess. If it did, there could be no differences among men, and all individuality would be impossible. As there are other influences determining physical and intellectual differences between individuals possessing the same human nature, so there is a personal will power that determines the individual moral character. I am an accountable moral person not in virtue of what I am by the necessity of my nature, but of what I may be in virtue of my possessing a will of my own.

In contemplating man, especially with regard to his volitive power, we have before us the greatest of the mysteries in creation. The personal pronoun represents a complex being that is partly material and partly spiritual. I have a body and I have a soul. But what is that subject of which this is predicated? The reply must be that it is that compound unit which soul and body constitute. I am body and soul. I would not be man without them, and therefore could not without them be the individual I am. The little word *I* designates the whole, and of this whole any part can be predicated either as constituent or possession. When I say that I am a soul, the subject is the same as when I say that I have a soul, though it is manifestly regarded in different aspects. The being composed of body and soul is soul in one of its component parts, as it is body in the other; the being composed of body and soul has a soul as well as a body. That

which has it is only so far distinct from that which it has as it has another constituent element. Self, the I, is not something distinguishable from the body and soul, as substance is something distinguishable from its properties. But, keeping all this in view, we must still maintain that what a man is, as a moral person, depends on his will. He is a man, no matter what he wills. But the fact that he is a moral being, whom his Maker holds accountable for his actions, gives the will, as the executive faculty in man, an importance that does not attach to his other powers. He is morally what he wills, not what his other powers, whether psychical or physical, perform as instruments controlled by other powers. The knowledge which I possess, the feelings which I experience, are not myself and not indices of my character. Not even the intellectual powers by which I know and the emotional powers by which I feel are the moral person for which that word I stands. The soul is a unit indeed. We would misapprehend the whole subject if we assumed that the intellect is a distinct substance and the sensibility is another distinct substance, both different from the will. The same soul that wills, also knows and feels. But only the will is the criterion of the moral self, because only the will in all cases exerts the power of the person. Neither in psychical action aside from willing, nor in physical action, is the deed necessarily my own. All the powers of my soul and body may be set in motion by other powers than those of my own individual self. The will is the only exception. That is the index of myself. What that does is mine and only mine. The circulation of the blood takes place in my body, but I have no responsibility for it, except so far as my voluntary action may disturb it. The muscular action produced by causes other than my volition is not properly mine, though my organs are used in its performance. There is a certain necessity of perception that places this beyond the pale of personal responsibility when objects present themselves to the senses. The sights before my eyes, the sounds about my ears, within certain limits force their cognition upon me. I can close my eyes or turn them away, but I cannot, without changing the conditions by an act of will, prevent the impression upon my organs of sense and the perception of the

object making such impression, and I cannot even by an act of will change the conditions until after the first impression is made, so that this is inevitable. To a certain extent knowledge is thrust upon us. I can refuse to give attention to what has forced itself upon me and can thus prevent further cognition, but I cannot refuse to see or hear while all the conditions of seeing and hearing exist. The perception of this paper, as it lies before my open eyes, is inevitable. In the operation of the discursive faculties the same is true. We cannot resist the force of evidence when it is once brought before the mind. Conviction is necessary when valid proof is furnished and understood. All control that self can exercise over the intellect in this particular must be directed to the determination of the area within which evidence shall be admitted to the mind. We cannot resist it when it is once admitted, but we can refuse to give attention to subjects, and to proofs respecting subjects in regard to which we desire to avoid conviction, or can fix our attention upon such topics and proofs only as are coincident with our purpose or desire. When the evidence is once admitted into the soul it carries us along by necessity. We may refuse to make any practical account of the conviction thus forced upon the intellect; we may decline to allow it any governing influence over our conduct; but we cannot by an act of will invalidate it or nullify it for the rational faculty. Moreover, the same necessity reigns in the domain of the sensibilities. It is not optional with us whether the pathetic or the ludicrous shall move our feelings. We may restrain the expression of sentiment; we may resist the impulse to weep when our souls are sad or to laugh when they are merry; but the grief and the joy will come when the objects adapted to excite them are presented, whether we like it or dislike it. Therefore neither in the intellectual nor in the emotional is the proper expression of self to be sought. I am not to be judged by what I cannot help.

It is true that an individual's thoughts and sentiments are not to be disregarded in estimating his character. So far as he expresses them they will aid in such estimate, because the expression lies itself in the domain of his will, and thus furnishes an index to what he wills. And even when he in-

voluntarily manifests his thoughts and emotions, these may be indicative of mental constitution and temperament that are not without influence upon the will, and of mental disposition and habit that have not been formed without being influenced by the will. They are criteria by which the state of will may be approximatively ascertained. But it is only in this respect that they can properly enter into our estimate of a person's character. Self is concentrated in the will. What I will, not what I know or feel, shows what I am. Facts and fancies with which I will have nothing to do present themselves in my soul; affections and desires which I abominate make their appearance in my consciousness. They are mine in the sense that they have come into my soul and encumbered my property. But only what I will indicates what I morally am. Thoughts and feelings that I have sanctioned are properly mine, because, whatever may be their source, I have appropriated them by the choice of my will; thoughts and feelings that are not thus sanctioned and appropriated are not properly mine in a moral sense. They are intruders upon my premises. They may trouble me; they may ruin me; they make it necessary for me to wage war against them, if they are not eventually to conquer me; but they are not, as long as they have not conquered my will and thus made me their captive, any part of myself or any index of what I am. This is the indisputable teaching of St. Paul in the 7. chapter of his epistle to the Romans. "Now if I do that I would not," he argues in verse 20, "it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me." The argument is this. If there are in me thoughts and feelings which I do not *will*, they are activities of my soul indeed, and in that sense I perform them; but as, properly speaking, I do only that which I will, *I* do not do these things,—though they be in me and, when they are outward actions, proceed from me,—because I do not *will* them. The will is the exponent of the I. What I *will*, that *I* do; what I do not *will*, *I* do not do.

That only the regenerate man can speak as the apostle does concerning good and evil and man's relation to them, thoughtful readers need not be told. The unregenerate man's I is captive under sin; he *wills* the evil, and therefore he does

it; only the regenerated do not *will* the evil, and therefore only of them can it be said that *they* do not do it. "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin." 1 John 3, 9. But the truth here enunciated and illustrated in the case of believers is of universal application. Only that which is willed is the expression of the moral self. Even the unconverted, the imagination of the thoughts of whose heart is only evil continually, are not to be held accountable for actions which are involuntary, and which therefore are performed through them rather than by them. If they do not will what they do, it is no more they that do it. The difference between these and the case presented by St. Paul is that all that they do is evil, so that although they, like believers, do some things which they have not willed, they, unlike believers, will only the evil, and that continually. If there is one form of sin which they do not will, it is only to throw the force of their will upon another form. There are evil actions which they do not will; there is no good action which they do will, or in their corrupt condition can will.

If the doctrine thus presented should seem to any one in conflict with our confessional statement concerning original sin, "that this disease, or original fault, is truly sin, condemning and bringing eternal death now also upon all that are not born again," it could only be because several essential points have been overlooked. The first is that this moral person is by nature corrupt in all his powers, and that consequently the will, whatever choice it may make or action it may originate, will only perform the evil. However the power of will may be exercised, it can never rise above the mire of sin into which humanity has fallen. Man lieth in wickedness, whether he wills or not, and the consequence must be that when he wills, it will always be according to the wicked nature which no human volition can make otherwise. His nature is sinful, and he is therefore a sinner before he wills, and always sins when he does will. Secondly, the question whether a person is responsible for an action must not be confounded with the other question whether he is punishable for the condition in which it is unavoidable. Our Confession does not say that an act performed ignorantly by a child is to be morally estimated in the same way as an

act performed by a person of mature years, whose knowledge or possibility of knowledge is justly taken into account. The moral character of the act is judged by the will, which makes it necessary to consider the degree of intelligence as determining the possibility of right volition. The moral condition of the person's nature, as distinct from his acts, which may be good or bad in the sphere of civil righteousness notwithstanding his deadness in sin, is a matter for separate examination. The guilt of original sin, as the guilt of our nature independently of all action, psychical or physical, cannot be judged in the same way as the guilt of actions resulting from personal choice.

IV.—RELATION TO INTELLECT AND SENSIBILITY.

The will is the dominant power in the human soul, whence all personal action emanates. It determines all that self does and is therefore the exponent of all that self is. But while it, as the executive faculty, employs all the other powers of the soul as well as all the powers of the body in its service, it again stands in intimate relations with the other psychical powers in forming its determinations. These powers do not determine it; they are rather determined by it. But they are not therefore without influence upon its determinations. The soul that wills is the soul that knows and feels, that judges and desires. So close is this connection and so obvious is the influence exerted by other powers upon the will that up to a recent period the sensibilities were indented with it and the soul's powers were divided into the two classes of intellect and will. In many instances even intellectual operations were not clearly distinguished from it. But those mental powers and functions which are conditions and regulatives of volition are not themselves will. We must recognize the relation between the soul's powers, but not confound them.

When we perform the mental action called willing, there is some object to which that action has reference. That object must be known as a condition prerequisite to the volition. When we will to take up a pen and to engage in writing, the knowledge of the instrument and of the action is presup-

posed. Aimless action cannot be voluntary. The mind that wills must at least have the design to perform an action, if not to produce some result by means of that action. Mechanical, or even instinctive motion, is not voluntary. An action of the intellect cognizing objects and ends with reference to which the will is to exert its power, is indispensable to volition. Moreover, there is no action of the will without a previous act of the intellect discriminating between objects and actions. Before we put forth a volition to write, the question presents itself whether that or some other act is to be performed, or whether pen or pencil shall be employed. The mind cannot avoid considering what is best. That consideration may be quite inadequate; it may be so hasty as scarcely to be observed in consciousness; but it is implied in volition, and always takes place in some measure, however insufficient that measure may in many instances be regarded. This judging of the propriety or fitness of the act or object is obviously also a function of the intellect, not of the will. The intuitive act of knowing and the discursive act of judging are both necessary antecedently to the action of the will.

But equally necessary is the activity of the sensibility. When we perform the operation of willing there is always a previous inclination or pressure toward the object in respect to which the volition is to be put forth. We never will to take up an object or to engage in an action without having a desire for it. There are many things cognized in regard to which we put forth no volitions. We do not want everything that we see and do not will everything that we can do. We select objects and actions. But we do this in consequence of solicitations. Only when a desire is excited does the will exert its power. Such desire is the impulse of the sensibilities. This is necessary to volition, but it is not will. Both the intellectual and the emotional powers are necessary as conditions of volition, but both must be distinguished from will. The function of the will, which, when the object about which a volition is to be employed is perceived, and the impulse which tends to produce the volition is given, issues the mandate ordinarily resulting in the action contemplated, is specifically different from that of both the mental powers whose action is antecedent and prerequisite.

Desire is clearly distinguishable in consciousness from volition. It is an impulse in our nature toward the thing desired, but is under the subject's control, so that what nature desires the person may ordinarily refuse to will, the exceptions, if any such are admitted at all, being those abnormal cases in which a person has permitted himself to be enslaved by habit. I desire to walk in the garden and enjoy the freshness and the fragrance of this beautiful morning, but I do not will it. There are reasons that induce me to suppress the desire. My personal will power is master over the impulses that spring up in my soul. Desire can of itself produce no action in a voluntary agent. It may be strong as a motive, but it is the will alone that can originate the action which gratifies it. Those who maintain that desire is not specifically different from will, but merely a lower grade of the same function, have been misled by the fact that desire reaches outward and looks to action for the supply of its demand. It exerts an influence toward action, as do also considerations of reason, but directly it accomplishes nothing. Classifying it as a grade of will would not wipe out the distinction between its impulse, which may or may not lead to a volition, and the volition which alone produces results. It would only be that grade of will which is powerless to originate action, i. e. which has no will power and is not will. Desire is a step towards volition, as cognition is a step towards desire; but cognizing an object is not desiring it, and desiring an object is not willing the action necessary to obtain it. The volition of such an act may follow when the desire arises; but the fact that it may follow only shows that it has not taken place, and in many cases, as all experience testifies, it never does take place. The act of desiring may lead to another act of an entirely different kind, and the act which gratifies the desire never occurs until that other act of an entirely different kind has taken place and originated it. Without a volition the desire will clamor in vain. Even when the volition follows the desire, the two are easily distinguishable. The one is a powerless longing that effects nothing, the other is an imperative mandate that is instantly obeyed and that originates the action necessary to gratify the desire.

But the volition frequently does not follow the desire. We do not always will what we desire, as we do not always will what reason dictates as best. One motive may be counteracted by another, so that the volition to which it might lead is not put forth. A person may have a strong desire to enjoy the tempting shade on a summer day, whilst his sense of duty prompts him to perform the labor of his calling and resist the temptation to self-indulgence. He desires the enjoyment, but he does not will it; if he did, he would abandon his work and indulge in the pleasure. Motives of duty and motives of pleasure do not always coincide in the human soul. They often cross each other. Indeed, in man's sinful condition they generally clash, and harmony is restored only when by the grace of God His will becomes our pleasure. And not only is there a conflict between the two principles of conscience and concupiscence, but in each of the spheres indicated by these terms there are similar antagonisms. One employment comes into collision with another in which we are moved to engage; one enjoyment which we desire is set aside by the desire to indulge in another. Hence it is obvious that the desires and affections which act as motives do not and cannot in each case result in a corresponding volition, much less are the desires themselves volitions. The remark so often made, "I want to, and yet I do not want to," expresses the common experience in this regard. There is a desire, and yet there is no will, because there are considerations and corresponding impulses which hinder the volition.

Desire and will are indeed so intimately associated that the one is often put for the other. In popular language the words are often used interchangeably. But the difference between them should not on that account be overlooked in an analysis of our mental powers. Even those who often use the terms promiscuously are ready to admit the difference when it is brought to their attention. When one says that he desires to take a walk, he does not mean that he wills it, and when he wills it he does not mean merely that he desires it. The one is followed by the action, the other is not, at least not until the volition ensues. That one word is sometimes substituted for the other does not militate against the plain fact that there is a distinction and that this distinction

is recognized in consciousness, though in language they are sometimes identified. When our blessed Lord in His agony prays to the Father, "Not my will, but Thine be done," Luke 22, 42, He manifestly does not place an act of His will in opposition to the will of His Father. Such an interpretation would make the patient Bearer of our sins a rebel against the divine decree which He came to execute. He submits the desire of His human nature, which yearns for relief from pain, to the will of His Father, which is that He should bear our stripes, and His volition is in perfect accord with that of His Father. When Abraham willed to offer his son Isaac in faithful obedience to the will of God, he did what his paternal heart could not desire. How much his soul suffered in the bitter conflict of duty with the desire of his nature the simple narrative suggests to all who have the capacity to feel. He willed the sacrifice because God willed it, but willed it with amazing self-denial, and his joy was accordingly great when the bitter cup passed away. Willing and desiring are not the same. The will has not performed its functions as long as action is not originated, however strong may be the solicitations on the part of the sensibilities.

V.—CHOICE.

Still more apparent is the difference between the functions of the will and those of the intellect. None who give the subject close attention will be likely to confound willing with knowing in its presentative and representative forms. But in one point difficulties have been found. It is that which is brought to view in the word choice. This has been regarded as an act of the judgment, and thus as a function of the intellect, while it has been held at the same time to be an essential element in volitional action. Choice, it is alleged, is an act of the will, and as it is made by a discrimination which belongs exclusively to the discursive power of the intellect, willing is so far an intellectual operation.

To prevent confusion on the subject it will be necessary to remember, that while the various powers of the soul pertain to one and the same subject, and all work together and have a dependence upon each other, their offices are not the same.

The same soul knows and feels and wills, and its volitions are influenced by its knowing and feeling, as these are in turn influenced by its volitions. But the volition is not on that account an act of knowing or of feeling, nor is any intellectual or emotional act, though it may be necessary for volition, on that account a volitional act. They are all psychical acts, but they are of different kinds and must be specifically distinguished, though as psychical acts they are generically the same. Such distinction is none the less important, though it may be less manifest, when the action of one power conditions that of the other.

The word choice designates an act of the will which involves an intellectual element. But that intellectual action, though it is implied in the act of the will, is not properly choice. The judgment decides that one book is larger than another, that one chair is costlier than another, that one apple is sweeter than another. This is a purely intellectual act. But this act is not yet a choice. So far it is entirely distinct from willing. Such a judgment involves no preference and no election. One may choose the larger or the smaller book, the costlier or the cheaper chair. Only when the will is determined to the object or kind of object is there properly a choice. But that determination of the will is not an intellectual act, as is the comparison and decision made by the judgment. It is an act of will. Choice therefore pertains entirely to the will. So far as the act of judgment is not will it is not choice.

“The determinations of the will,” says Dr. Harris, “are of two kinds—choice and volition. In choice a person determines the object or end to which he will direct his energies. In volition a person exerts his energies or calls them into action; or he refuses to do so. Volition is a determination because a person exerts his energies or refrains from exerting them at will. He determines whether to exert them or not. The motor force of a stone, on the contrary, is not *exerted* by the stone, but it is communicated to it. Choice is self-direction. Volition is self-exertion or self-restraint. Both are self-determinations.”* In these words the place which choice

* Philosophical Basis of Theism, p. 349.

occupies among the soul's functions is clearly pointed out. It belongs to the will, and only to the will. But the distinction between choice and volition is not so apparent. Unquestionably the will determines the object as well as the action. The determination to exert or not to exert energies would be blind and bootless if they were not directed to certain objects or ends, and the will's work would be insignificant, if some other power than the will gave the exerted energy its direction and end. In that case the person's volitions might be utilized by other powers as man may utilize the winds or waters, but the person would be reduced to a mere instrument, differing from mechanical contrivances only in the one point that others could not know when the machine may choose to run. But while it must be insisted that choice belongs to the will, its differentiation from volition as a co-ordinate activity of the will seems to us unfounded. We choose not only objects or ends; we choose also to act or not to act. We put forth volition with regard to objects and ends as well as with regard to acts. I will to write means that I have chosen to write; I choose to write means that I will to take up my pen and perform the action necessary to that end. When we choose an act, the volition is the immediate cause of the exertion of our energies in its production. My pen instantly moves in obedience to my volition. When we choose an object or end our energies are also at once exerted. But the act and its product lie in a different domain. That I will serve my Lord Jesus is a volition, as well as that I will write this moment in pursuance of my calling as a servant of my blessed Lord. That I will do the work of my calling at this moment is a choice, as well as that I will serve the Lord that bought me with a price. The one is the determination of my energies to the performance of a single act, such determination being incited by the sensibilities and regulated by the intellect, but absolutely controlled by neither. The other is the determination of my energies to the attainment of a certain end, under the same incitements and regulatives, and with the same freedom, or absence of necessitating forces. In the one case the energies manifest their force in the action determined; in the other they do not at once manifest themselves in any physical action, but they are just as certainly

exerted in the disposing of the various intellectual and emotional forces and placing them in readiness at call to originate physical action when the proper opportunity is presented. The man who makes the plan for constructing a dam and digging a channel puts forth energy to utilize the water for mill purposes as well as the person who places the wheel and opens the sluice. The soul puts forth its energy in determining its objects and its ends, and that energy is volitional. The judicial process preparatory to fixing the choice is not itself choice, as the various feelings that enter into the process and exert their influence in the determination is not choice. The choice is the determination of the will to objects and ends, but that determination is volitional, just as the determination of the will to an individual action is volitional. The soul knows and feels, and its knowledge of objects and ends are conditions of volition and affect the determinations of the will, but the mere discriminating judgment is not choice, and the choice is always volition, though the one mental determination involve many acts which for the present are performed only mentally, and which will be performed physically only when the proper time arrives. The volition to visit New York to-morrow exerts the soul's energies, bending my powers and putting them into action in that direction, just as certainly as the volition to arise from my chair is one step towards getting ready for the journey. The choice is not made until there is a volition determining the object and end, and the volition is not put forth until the objects and ends have been considered. The volition not only determines that our energy shall be exerted, but also in what direction it shall be exerted. Choice and volition are one and the same act of will. Man not only wills, but wills intelligently. Being an intelligent creature, he cannot will otherwise than intelligently. He cannot exert his energies without directing them to an object. In an executive act of will the determination of the action is at the same time the determination of the object to which it shall pertain. I cannot determine to reach for an object without determining upon which object my hand shall be laid. It is true, the object may have been chosen before the action is performed. But such prior choice was only a prior

volition by which energy was put forth in directing the mental powers to that object, as the subsequent volition is only a subsequent choice by which energy is put forth in directing the physical powers to the action. President Edwards, notwithstanding the wrong use that he made of the fact in his argument for necessitarianism, was right in saying that "an act of the will is the same as an act of choosing or of choice."

Dr. Hazard remarks*: "In my view the will is that by which the mind *does* any and every thing that it does at all, or in the accomplishing of which it has any active agency. Limiting its function to the phenomena of choice seems to me peculiarly unfortunate. Our choice is merely the *knowledge* that one of two or more things suits us best; and as we have just shown, knowledge cannot be determined by the will." Identifying choice with knowledge, he finds the argument of Edwards against the liberty of will unanswerable, if it is conceded that choice is will. But it is an error to allege that choosing is mere knowing. It is true that knowledge is a prerequisite to choice, because it is a prerequisite to will. Mere exertion of energy, without object or aim, is not willing: a steam engine can do that as well as man. But the knowledge which is indispensable to volition is not itself choice. When one book is declared costlier than another there is no choice expressed, though there is a recognition of the fact. When one book is pronounced more beautiful than another, there is a fact of a different kind recognized, but there is no choice manifested. A person may choose the one less beautiful. The more beautiful may suit him best as regards his taste, but may not suit him best under the circumstances; these being such that his taste is not accepted as the criterion of choice. When a person declares one book good and the other bad, he does not by such declaration express a choice. It is still a question which he will choose. The mere intellectual acknowledgment of the superiority of one object in any respect over another is not a choice. Manifestly the inferior may be and often is chosen. Men do not always choose what they know to be the best. Before there is a choice there must always be a desire for an object, and

* *Man a Creative First Cause*, p. 16.

that desire may run counter to the judgment. The bad may be chosen, though the conscience protests; the good may be chosen, though the flesh relucts. It does not accord with the facts to say that our choice is merely the knowledge that one of two or more things suits us best. We may know what suits our reason best, and not choose it; we may know what suits our appetites best, and not choose it. The drunkard's reason may decide for abstinence from the intoxicating cup, but he chooses to drink it; the just man's appetite may clamor for forbidden fruit, but he chooses to abstain from it. The choice is not necessarily determined by the person's environments or by any extraneous forces. It is not mere knowledge and thus necessitated. It is a determination of the will to exert energy in one of the various directions that are presented to the intelligence. All volitions fix the choice. Which of the various objects shall be acted upon, when the will exerts its energy, is determined by the same act which determines that the energy shall be exerted. If the will were a substance or entity distinct from the person that has intellect and sensibility as well as will, this would be liable to the objection that the will cannot know and thus cannot discriminate in regard to objects and ends; but when the fact is kept distinctly in view that the soul that knows and feels is the soul that also wills, such an objection is without point. The will is exerted by an intelligent being that has power to act and that wills the accomplishment of ends by willing the actions and directing them to the objects and instrumentalities necessary to attain them. It determines as well what shall be done as that something shall be done; it does not determine that an act shall be performed without determining what; it does not determine what without at the same time determining that it shall be done. The what is not settled—the choice is not made—as long as the determination of the action is not fixed. We sometimes speak, indeed, of a second choice, implying that a choice is sometimes made without involving a volition. But when such statements are closely examined it will be found that what is called the first choice is no choice at all, but simply that which would under other circumstances be chosen, but under existing conditions is not chosen. The so-called first choice

is not the choice made, because there is no volition connected with it. When I say that my first choice is to perform a journey in a carriage, but in the absence of such a conveyance I choose to go in the saddle, my meaning evidently is that I would will to go by carriage, if the opportunity presented itself, but as there is no such opportunity, I will to go by the other mode. There is only the one choice, and that is the one fixed by my volition. I would choose otherwise under other circumstances, but that only asserts that, under other circumstances I would put forth other specific volitions in accordance with the one generic volition or choice to perform the journey.

VI.—GENERIC AND SPECIFIC VOLITION.

Volitions are of two kinds, generic and specific. We may decide upon a course or plan of action which involves a number of acts in pursuance of a general end, or we may decide upon some special action to be performed at once, which, so far as it lies in our power, immediately follows the volition. One is generic and regulative, the other is specific and executive. When a mechanic determines to build a house or a scholar determines to write a book, the general determination includes a number of special acts, all of which are decided in the one generic volition. Each action of the mind, each movement of the body that is requisite to accomplish the chosen object is involved in the general determination. But each mental and each physical act is the result again of a special volition. The hand does not drive a nail or take up a pen, in pursuance of the purpose formed, without originating each action by a new impulse of the will. If the general purpose were itself productive of external acts without intervening special volitions, there would be unintermitted action in pursuance of the end, and there could be no action in conflict with the purpose formed. But the fact presented to every observer is that action does often cease entirely in all persons, that it varies in different individuals, and that desultory volitions occur which are at variance with the governing purpose. The mechanic may, without abandoning his purpose to build the house, put forth many a volition that not only does not further, but that does hinder that purpose. He not only needs rest and wills to take it, but he may have

good reason in the circumstances to direct his labor for a while to a different end, as he may be moved by evil impulses to neglect his business and seek pleasure. So the man who has made virtue his choice may, without ceasing to be a virtuous man in his governing purpose, put forth special volitions that do not accord with his character. His degree of light and strength will necessarily influence his special volitions, though the generic volition remain unaffected by the desultory volitions which sometimes, though unintentionally, conflict with it.

These generic volitions or governing purposes are not merely intellectual decisions as to what would be preferable in the abstract, or what under any supposed circumstances would be preferred; they are actions of the will in the concrete case presented. When a person determines to pursue a given profession, this determination is not merely a recognition of the fact that such employment suits him best. It may not be that which his judgment decides to be in itself the most advantageous; it may not be that to which his feelings incline most. He chooses surgery, though his judgment pronounces the Gospel ministry preferable and his inclinations give gardening the preference. He has not merely a fact to perceive and to record, but a determination to make. If everything tended in one direction and brought about in the mind an inevitable result that presents itself as choice, there would of course be no room for self-determination in such generic choice, because there would be no room for will in any proper sense. But the fact is plain in consciousness that in the complex conditions presented there is a power in the soul that determines the course, just as in the complex conditions presented there is a power in the soul that determines the individual act. The judgment deliberates, but the intellectual decision is not necessarily the choice made. The choice is made when the soul determines, whether that determination decides what does suit us best or what shall suit us best. It is a determination made by the will, not a determination of the will by extraneous circumstances. I can choose the right, though I should not see honesty to be the best policy and though the desires of the heart should incline to the wrong. What is true in regard to each executive

volition is true also in regard to the generic volition. What the mind can do in determining an individual act, it can do also in determining a course of conduct.

When a governing purpose is formed, the same question arises as when choice is made of an object; namely, whether this is properly a volition. Some regard it merely as an act of the intellect; some refer it to the will, but distinguish it from volition. It is not an act of the intellect, because the decision of a person's judgment in regard to the preferableness of an object or course determines nothing in regard to his actual preference or choice. It is not a distinct species of willing that is to be co-ordinated with volition, because the choice is never made without an actual volition and consists simply in the determination made by a volition. I never put forth a volition to write without determining in that very act what I shall write. When the student resolves to write an essay required of him, he may sit down to do the work without having selected a theme, and thus may not have determined what he shall write. But he has not put forth the volition to perform the act called writing until he has determined what words he will put on his paper. As soon as the volition is put forth, energy is exerted and letters are formed, and as long as he deliberates about the words to be written there is no volition to perform the manual work of writing. What he has previously formed is the purpose of writing an essay, which involves a series of acts, mental and physical, each of which will be performed when the executive volition is put forth originating the special act. But that purpose is itself a volition, in which energy is put forth as well as when a special act is determined. In the latter a change is effected in the domain of the physical; in the former also a change is effected, but it is in the domain of the psychical. When I will to write, my muscular power is called into exercise and my pen moves; when I will to write an essay, my intellectual power is called into exercise and my thoughts move, though no physical power is exerted to put the thoughts on paper. The same is true in case an object is chosen before the act having reference to that object is willed. I shall go East next week. That determines the action so far as the mind is concerned. Whatever intel-

lectual and emotional power is necessary to accomplish this end is put forth by the determination. When the time comes upon which my judgment has fixed as appropriate for the physical execution of the purpose, the special volition calling the muscular power into action shall be put forth. The volition to go rests in the mind until that time; it becomes an outward action when the physical powers are called into exercise as well as the psychical, which were exerted before. There is psychical power that is not will. The will determines and directs these powers. It is the soul's power to determine all the powers within its reach, and all such determinations are volitions, whether they refer to ends or means, to objects or acts, each volition resulting in the exertion of power, either psychical or physical. The choice of an object or end is a volition that exerts the powers of the soul in fixing that object or end as the point to be aimed at, and the volition of an action is a choice that exerts the powers of the body in its performance. The will determines the psychical purposes as well as the physical acts of the person, and in both cases it does so by volition.

VII.—DESULTORY VOLITIONS.

It is certain that there are desultory volitions which, as they do not accord with the settled disposition or governing purpose of the person who puts them forth, are not a reliable index of his character. They do not give expression to the soul's reigning tendency and therefore do not manifest what the person truly is. They indicate what is in his nature, but not what the moral condition of the individual or particular person is whose nature thus finds vent. The word will is often used to express the dominant purpose of the soul. But this does not prove that what is called an executive volition is not an act of the will, nor that desire and will are the same. Therefore it does not prove that we have failed correctly to set forth the nature of the will when we divide its operations into those which are executive and those which are generic and distinguish both from judgments and desires, and when we regard the will as the only proper exponent of the individual's self.

It does not prove that executive volitions are not properly acts of the will. For although there are acts of this kind which do not harmonize with the governing purpose and may therefore be correctly said to be in conflict with the personal character, they are not on that account involuntary. They merely show that the human soul is capable of inconsistency. When a man wills one thing to-day and another to-morrow, the valid inference is that his will has changed, or that he has made a mistake, not that one of the acts was independent of the will. The fact is well established that persons often put forth volitions which run counter to their governing purpose, though the latter remains the same. It would of course be incorrect to allege in such cases that the will was changed. Such change may result from the frequent repetition of inconsistent volitions, but an inconsistent volition does not necessarily imply it. The latter results from mistaken judgments in regard to the acts required by the governing purpose, or from hasty decisions under the influence of feelings which result in volitions before the judgment has had sufficient opportunity to discriminate, and therefore before the will could make an intelligent choice. A person who has the fixed purpose to do right has not by such generic volition decided in every special case what is right, nor has he eradicated from his nature all the evil from which spring impulses to wrong. He may therefore, without abandoning or relaxing his generic volition, will an act of evil that contravenes his choice of the good. He does this, under the influence of the evil still within him, through a mistake of his judgment or through a failure promptly to exercise his judgment. In the former case he has not consented to the wrong, but by mistake willed an act that is wrong with the intention to will an act that is right. In the latter case from lack of vigilance he was carried away by the evil impulses within him, without giving intelligent consent to the evil act which he rashly willed. The governing purpose can stand in either case, because there is no action to repel it, as there would be if the evil were intelligently chosen, though it were but in a single act. The will cannot in the same sense choose right and wrong at the same time, nor can it do this at different times without changing; but it can choose right in general.

and at the same time, through mental or moral infirmity, choose a particular act that is inconsistent with the general choice, just as a person may sincerely accept a general proposition and, in his ignorance, deny a particular proposition which it necessarily implies. Such an inconsistent volition is none the less a volition on account of the lack of judgment or the lack of vigilance which results in such inconsistency. But in such cases the executive volition is not a correct exponent of the person's character. In this respect it is of great importance to mark the distinction between volitions. It is incorrect to assume that specific volitions are no volitions at all, or even that desultory volitions not in harmony with the governing purpose are not to be classed with volitions. But it is correct to allege that not all executive volitions are proper exponents of self. The specific acts of will usually indicate what the person is, because it is rightly assumed as a rule that a person does what he really chooses. "By their fruits ye shall know them." That these fruits are exceptionally other than the tree which bears them, is abnormal, and cannot set aside the rule. We can make allowance for an occasional rotten apple, without making that the criterion by which the tree is judged. The person who has chosen righteousness may occasionally do a wrong thing, but his executive acts will be right as a rule, notwithstanding the occasional exception. That such occasional wrong is not a proper expression of self is owing to the fact, not that the will is not truly the exponent of self, but that in such expression, as in everything else that is human, there is imperfection.

VIII.—FREEDOM.

Man can choose his course and determine his own actions. He has liberty. In this respect he is not what nature forces him to be, but what he chooses to be. He was designed to have dominion over the creatures around him, not these over him. The theory of determinism is irreconcilable with the divine ordinance, "Replenish the earth, and subdue it." Gen. 1, 28. Man is indeed a part of what we call nature, and has his place with other parts in the general plan of the Creator. Not everything is dependent on his will. His body

is subject to natural laws, like all other bodies. There are organic energies perpetually at work within him which are not conditioned nor regulated by his will. But he is a being that is conscious of self and that is endowed with rational intuition, so that he can know the beautiful, the right, and the good. He is a person, not merely a body, like a mineral, or a body with life, like a plant, or even a body with life and sensation, like a brute. He is a living soul, rational and self-determining. Influences are exerted upon him by nature around him. But when such influences are exerted the difference between personal and impersonal beings becomes manifest. While the latter are driven by forces in nature, the former choose their ends and make these forces subservient to their purpose. Man is not necessitated by that which gives him the occasion to act; on the contrary, he uses his intelligence and by the power of his will employs the energies in nature to effect what would not have taken place without his volition. The winds and waters do not toss him helplessly about, but he subdues them and employs them to propel his ships and run his mills. He is a responsible being because he has such power. For that which is done by other beings that put forth energy he can not be held accountable. We censure no man for the damage done by floods in the ordinary course of nature; we all censure the man who dams the stream and turns the current over his neighbor's land for the destruction of his crops. We censure him because his will is the cause of the damage done, as without its intervention the results would have been otherwise. He is good or bad, not according to the circumstances in which he is placed, or the influences which they exert, but according to the volitions which he puts forth.

There are energies in our nature which impel to action, but they are not uncontrollable forces which drive us irresistibly, we know not whither. Man is not a machine, but a person. He has impulses that tend to action, but he need not be their slave. This has not become otherwise by the fall. He is now a corrupt being, but still a person that determines his action. Although all are partakers of the same corrupt nature, and are therefore by nature all alike in moral depravity, as they are all alike in the possession of intellect,

sensibility and will, each has a distinct individuality as a separate person, and what each such person morally is, depends not on his nature, but on his personal volition. It is true, he cannot rise above the level of his nature, and as that is depraved, he never can lift himself by the action of his will above that depravity. So far, therefore, as the spiritually good is concerned there are no springs of action in him; in that respect he is dead. Only by the introduction of other powers than those which lie in his nature can there ever be spiritually good volitions. But man is a moral person still, not a block, nor a plant, nor a brute. In the lower plane of the natural, which does lie within his corrupt powers, there is still a relatively good of which man is capable. It is what our theologians usually call civil righteousness. "We confess that there is in all men a free will, which hath indeed the judgment of reason; not that it is thereby fitted, without God, either to begin or to perform anything in matters pertaining to God, but only in works belonging to the present life, whether they be good or evil. By good works I mean those which are of the goodness of nature; as to will to labor in the field, to desire meat or drink, to desire to have a friend, to desire apparel, to desire to build a house, to marry a wife, to nourish cattle, to learn the art of divers good things, to desire any good thing pertaining to this present life; all of which are not without God's government, yea, they are, and had their beginning from God and by God. Among evil things I account such as these, to will to worship an image, to will manslaughter, and such like."* Among such good things, and between such good and such evil things man still has the power to choose, and according as his volitions are good or evil is he morally good or evil as a person. That he is in every case condemnable before God on account of the depravity of his nature is a subject that requires separate consideration. So far as there are determinations in man without supernatural intervention, they are determinations made by the person and fix his moral character as a personal being. His volitions are not mere manifestations of nature and thus indices of what he is by nature; in that respect all men are the same, having one and the same human nature, and that by

* Augsburg Confession, Art. XVIII.

which each individual is differentiated as an individual is morally the same; but volitions are that which makes the moral difference between different persons. Nero is bad because he wills the bad, Socrates is good because he wills the good: both are alike in the moral quality of their natural powers and both are alike in their moral possibilities. The difference lies solely in their different choice, which renders their moral character different.

IX.—MOTIVE AND CAUSE.

As he was originally, so is man still a rational creature, whose movements are not the effects of mechanical forces, but of self-determination, and therefore as he was originally, so is he now a responsible being. He is responsible because self-determining. To comprehend how a man can act without being caused to act by forces lying outside of himself, is the difficulty in our problem at which many stumble. But it is a difficulty that we must encounter at some point, whatever may be the theory adopted, and the facts are so plain in consciousness that only unwisdom could set them aside to avoid the difficulty in thought. Chief of earthly creatures, man combines in himself the greatest wonders of creation. He wills with the consciousness that he could will otherwise, and the certainty abides in his soul, when he has willed, that he might have willed otherwise. I have willed to write this morning, but it was not by constraint, as my pen moves and the clock ticks without power in themselves of doing otherwise. I might have chosen to read or walk. There was nothing that necessitated any volition. It has no cause in any such sense as we attribute to that word in physical relations. I thought it expedient to write and I had a desire to write, but I am not necessitated to do what seems to me expedient and what I desire. The expedient is sometimes not chosen in fact, and desires are often overruled. We cannot comprehend a being that moves without being moved, and therefore contemplate with amazement the creature man, who has the cause of his action in himself, not in extraneous forces. But it would be unreasonable on that account to deny the fact that he wills and thus determines himself. We cannot comprehend origination, whether of object or action. Therefore

we are always perplexed when we endeavor to realize in thought the fact of creation. We experience the same perplexity when we endeavor to understand the mystery of originating action by the force of will. In this respect, as in many others, we are moved to exclaim with the psalmist: "I will praise Thee, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made; marvelous are Thy works, and that my soul knoweth right well." Ps. 139, 14. In this respect, as in many others, man was made in the image of God, that he has, though it be in but a small degree, the Creator's power of originating and thus of being a first cause. He can create, not objects indeed, but actions. He is fallen now. He has lost the divine image. But he has not lost that in which the divine image was placed as an attribute. He can know still, and still can feel and will, although he cannot without supernatural gifts know and feel and will the spiritually good. He can originate action still, but he cannot originate action in conformity with the divine will, for which alone he was created. Man is still essentially the same creature that he was before the fall, and still is an intelligent personal being that controls the powers of his nature by his will, under the guidance of his intelligence, although his knowledge and volition can never rise above that nature which underlies all his personal power.

All experience testifies that there are in every soul impulses which exert an influence upon volition. There are animal appetites which seek gratification through the bodily organs. These are usually designated by some epithet that refers to the organs of sense through which the appetite is gratified. One who permits these animal desires to gain the ascendancy is called a sensualist. Such is the drunkard, the glutton, and the debauchee. But there are impulses which by common consent are assigned a higher place. They are those rational feelings of affection and desire which are not dependent on the bodily organization and could exist and find gratification independently of the body. Such are the love of kindred and of country, of friends and of benefactors, the desire for power and fame, for knowledge and beauty. These are natural feelings which are morally indifferent and by which all men are moved to a greater or less extent. There is, however, still another class of impulses, which we univer-

sally recognized as higher and nobler. Even those who refuse to be governed by them admit their superiority. They are those moral feelings which are embraced in conscience. As this always sanctions the right, according to the subject's knowledge of the right, the conscientious man ranks higher in the estimation of mankind than those who are directed merely by their animal appetites or rational desires.

All these impulses of the soul tend to move the will for their gratification, and are therefore called motives. But they do not act as causes, producing volitions as their effect. Volitions are not caused in any such physical sense. There is nothing in man of which they are the effects. The person himself is their source. Neither the appetites nor the desires, neither love nor conscience exercises an irresistible power over the will, so that their action necessitates volition as a cause necessarily produces its effect. The rain softens the ground in the garden. That is the natural effect of the rain as a cause. The garden has no power to make it otherwise. I am hungry. But my craving for food does not supply my want. It is not a cause that moves my bodily organs to perform the actions necessary to satisfy my appetite. I continue to write notwithstanding the stomach's clamoring. I refuse to heed its demand for food. My will is mine, not my stomach's. I have a desire to visit a friend and enjoy his genial society. But I have work to do and I will not go. My will is mine; it is not the slave of my feelings. The appetites and desires do not act upon it as causes, but are all subject to my censorship: they can do nothing with my will without my consent and approval. In our nature there are no impulses stronger than those which have their foundation in bodily wants and whose gratification is necessary for the preservation of the individual or the species. But these appetites are no more irresistible in their nature than are the promptings and warnings of conscience, which are in most cases powerless to secure their end.

There are, indeed, diseased conditions in which the soul is enthralled and in which men have become slaves to certain passions. But that is not their natural condition. It is abnormal, though on account of the introduction of sin into

the world it is not infrequent. Men have become so by their own choice and therefore by their own fault. We are speaking of man as he is, not of individuals as they have become by the use or abuse of that power into whose nature we are inquiring. Man is not compelled to eat or drink when the impulse comes to perform these acts; he is not compelled to spend his time in enjoying the company of his wife and children when his business requires his attention; he is not compelled to study Bacon or enjoy Shakspeare when reason dictates taking rest; he is not compelled to obey the suggestion of his heart when a famishing family appeals to him for bread. He may yield to the motives which present themselves, or he may refuse to yield. Different persons act differently in the same circumstances. The person has control over his motive powers, not these over him. Not any power which offers incitements to the will, but the will itself, is the dominant power.

Upon close examination it will be found a mere triviality to say that the strongest motive necessarily results in volition and that therefore the motive causes the volition. If that means merely, as we presume it is generally intended to mean, that the will is determined by that which determines it, whatever that may be, there is no need for making much ado about it. We might say, in reply, that the will is not determined at all, but determines itself; that is, the person willing determines by his will what shall be done, but is not himself driven by anything in him or outside of him to will as he does, and making it impossible for him to will otherwise. He makes his own choice, and there is nothing that compels him to make it, though he has reason for making it. If, when people speak of being directed by motives, the meaning be that the will is determined by a strong appetite or passion, to which it has no power of resistance and by which it is helplessly driven along as a rolling thing before a whirlwind, the statement is not true. The will is designed to be master, not slave, and it is only when disorder and abnormal conditions are introduced that it becomes the slave. The willing person is to determine his own volitions, and these volitions are not caused by anything but the person who wills. "The cause is in my will—I will not come."

X.—THE WILL DETERMINES.

The will is not independent of the other powers of the soul in making its choice. The person wills, and in such willing exerts his power. But the person that wills has impulses that incite to action, and deliberates and decides before the volition is put forth. Our nature craves the pleasure found in the gratification of appetites and desires, and seeks relief from pain. That which affords such gratification or relief is therefore a solicitation to which the soul is not indifferent. The prospect of gratification forms a motive. But neither the appetency in our sensibility nor the judgment that a certain action would gratify it, is a cause that necessitates the volition of such action. We need not yield to the solicitation, and in many cases we do not yield. The work of the intellect is not completed when the judgment is formed that pleasure or relief from pain would follow upon an action in accordance with the appetency. We deliberate, and in such deliberation take into account other elements than that of immediate gratification. The act that affords pleasure may be seen eventually to result in pain; it may be found to be not the best means to attain the object in view. Our judgment, deliberating upon ends and means, may decide against the solicitations presented. That with such decision, when it results in choice, there will always be coupled a desire, is manifest. The mere comparative estimate of objects, by which the intellect decides one object or act to be higher or lower, larger or smaller, stronger or weaker than another, without involving an appetitive element, in virtue of which the one or the other kind satisfies a want or satisfies it in larger measure, is not a choice. This is a determination of the will, and in such determination the power of the person is exerted, as it is not exerted in the impulses of desire or in the judgments antecedent to choice. I cannot help seeing an orange when it is placed before my eyes; I cannot help the knowledge which I have of its sweetness; I cannot help the judgment that eating it would afford me pleasure; I cannot help the solicitation which it offers to my appetite; I cannot help desiring to eat it. These are not properly my personal acts, but necessities of my nature. Man is so constituted that

whether he chooses or does not choose them, these things will be so. But when I will, power is put forth that produces changes, and things are as I will them, not as they must be and as they therefore would be without my willing. In the production of such change the whole soul in all its faculties works together. The deliberation takes into account all the cognitions and feelings that enter into the consciousness at the time, and the soul determines the action and the objects concerned in the action. It decides intellectually and practically by putting forth a volition according to the character and the light which it possesses. This is not determined, but determines. My conscious self chooses between the different and often conflicting motives, between objects and acts. This self-controlling, self-determining power of the soul is what the word will is meant to express.

Whether we can comprehend it or not, the fact is clear in consciousness and experience that the soul sits in judgment upon the various impulses to action which present themselves; that it may choose, i. e. by a generic act of the will adopt a principle of right or of happiness that decides all individual actions coming under the general purpose; that it may, without abandoning such purpose, put forth executive volitions that are not in harmony with it, and desultory acts of inconsistency, arising from a fault of judgment when conflicting desires have arisen; that it may decline or fail to adopt a governing purpose serving as a self-chosen rule of action, and in the absence of such generic volition under the impulse of the moment decide each individual case as it occurs, with such deliberation as the circumstances may permit; and that the volitional acts thus performed are an index of the character. A man may become settled in habits of virtue or of vice, even without the light of supernatural revelation or the power of divine grace, forming his judgments of right and duty according to the light of conscience, or he may act thoughtlessly and carelessly, adopting no settled principle and caring for no result but that of immediate pleasure. He may make the choice that whatever contributes to his happiness shall be done, taking large or narrow views of happiness and of the means to promote it; or he may accept conscience as a guide, judging all acts by their conformity or non-con-

formity with the rule of right; or he may depend entirely upon each moment to suggest the appropriate volition, being actuated by caprice rather than by any principle. But whatever may be his standard or guide, it is the will that determines the action.

XI.—VOLUNTARY ACTION.

When we put forth a volition something results. If the volition is generic, that result is psychical and internal. It determines a disposition or habit, in accordance with which executive volitions are subsequently put forth as predetermined. When a young man chooses to become a minister of the Gospel, the determination shapes his whole subsequent course. Each special external act directed to the attainment of his goal requires a special act of will, but it requires no deliberation as to the end. That is settled. The same is true also in large measure of the means by which the end is to be attained. The generic volition covers all, and deliberation becomes necessary only when unforeseen circumstances require special decisions to adapt his actions to the new conditions. Action results from the generic volition as a consequence of putting forth will power, but the action is internal. The intellectual and emotional powers are put into operation to produce the result, which is a permanent decision or choice, and in effecting this personal power is exerted as effectually as when an individual act is chosen. When a person who has lived unrighteously in the world determines to order his life in future according to the moral law, his generic volition has effected a change within that is as clear in his consciousness as the change in his external conduct is to the eyes of others. That internal change has not taken place, as some suppose, prior to the volition, so that this is caused by a previous change in the thoughts and sentiments of the soul. Thoughts and sentiments, as they are necessitated by our nature and our surroundings, never of themselves change the personal character. They may incite, and may lead to isolated acts; they may lead to deliberation and thus be the occasion of a choice; but they are not causes necessitating volition and they cannot be productive, in

their perpetual change, of a consistent course of action. The character becomes fixed and the course becomes settled only by the decision of the will, and the generic volition is the exertion of energy whose result is the determination of all the powers to the chosen end.

When the volitions are specific, having reference to individual acts, the result is psychical or physical action. That it may be the former is evident from the fact that we direct our attention at will to one subject, then to another. It is as much a result of my volition that I now fix my mind upon the activity of my executive faculty as that my pen now moves in writing. We put forth volitional energy in recollection, running voluntarily along the line of associated ideas to find a topic that is in demand. We cannot think what we please and feel what we please; but neither can we do in the external world what we please. Our powers are limited. But to some extent we can by volition produce internal results as well as external. The will exerts its power to call into activity the mind as well as the body. Both have movements that are not under the control of the will, and both have powers that can be called into activity by the will. When the volition refers to an external action, the bodily organism, so far as its operations do not lie beyond the reach of volition, as in the processes of digestion and circulation, is called into activity immediately upon the issue of the will's mandate. My hand rises to my face and falls at my side instantaneously when I will it. So far as the matter lies in our power, the thing willed takes place at the moment in which it is willed. The cases in which action is suspended until a fitting opportunity presents itself is no exception. Such action, so far as it is a mental adjustment of all the conditions for its performance, takes place at once; if, so far as it is an act in the world of physical forces, its performance is delayed, this is simply because the will so determined it. What is willed, and so far as it is willed at the present moment, is done at once in obedience to the will's mandate. Any external act that is willed, but with the stipulation that its execution shall take place at some future period, will require a special executive volition for its performance when the contemplated time arrives; but the volition of the present.

with a prospective physical act to complete its purpose, is not meaningless and ineffective. The volition determines the faculties of the mind, and so far it is immediately accomplished; the subsequent volition will be merely for the determination of the bodily action in coincidence with the mental determination already accomplished by the prior volition. The exercise of will is in all cases the exertion of energy to call into operation the powers of mind or matter and to produce change in the soul or in the world of physical forces.

The action of mind or body which follows volition and of which this is the cause, must not be confounded with volition itself. The volition, or act of the will, and the action of mind or body designed to be accomplished by such volition, are clearly distinguishable. When I will to arise from my chair my body moves in obedience to the mandate, but the motion of my body is not the volition which caused it. The one is a physical, the other is a mental act, and the former is the effect of the latter. But they are always different acts, though both of them should be mental. When I will to examine the lily blooming in my window, not only are my eyes directed towards the flower, but my mind is employed about its structure and its beauty. The mental act of attention to the lily is not the mental act of volition which results in such attention. The former is an act of the intellect, the latter of the will; the former is the effect, the latter is its cause. The difference is expressed by the words voluntary and volitional, though unfortunately these words are also frequently confounded. The act of the will is volitional; the act which results from the exertion of volitional energy is voluntary. My will moves me to write; writing is my voluntary act, because it is the result of my previous volitional act.

XII.—THE POWER OF THE WILL.

So distinct is the act of the will, or volitional action, from the act which it originates, or voluntary action, that the former may take place without the latter. Ordinarily we do not will what it is impossible to execute. But it is an error to allege that we cannot will what it is not in our power to

perform. We may overestimate our powers, or we may rush forward wildly without having taken the trouble to estimate them at all. The result in either case may be volitions which it is not in our power to execute. But even when we have placed a proper estimate upon our powers of execution, it is not impossible to will what our judgment declares it to be impossible to perform, though it would certainly be unwise to put forth such volition. The folly of an act by no means places it beyond human power. The will may be, and sometimes is in fact, exercised without result. There is not always a way where there is a will. That depends upon a person's degree of knowledge and wisdom. Many from lack of knowledge engage in undertakings which those better informed would shun, because they know that all efforts in that direction must prove failures. And even that which is known to be impracticable may be madly undertaken. In itself it is not impossible for a man to put forth the volition to fly through the air like a bird. Such a volition would be followed by an action, like all other volitions, though the action might only expose the performer to ridicule. The person who so wills is foolish indeed, but he so wills notwithstanding. His unwisdom does not destroy the essence of his act as a volition. Moreover, there are instances of failure in which the intellect is not at fault, but in which there are hindering circumstances against which even the most careful observation and judgment could furnish no protection. A man may will to take up his pen or his plane and perform his customary labor, though his paralyzed arm refuses to perform the action willed. He may become aware of his misfortune only by experiencing the refusal of his bodily organs to obey the mandate of his will. This has done its work when its energy for the origination of action has been exerted, whether the action designed to be accomplished follows or not. To such exertion of power there is apparently no limit in the nature of the will. The person exerts his volitional energy in accordance with his desire and his judgment. These impose limits on the exercise of his will power, but do not limit the power itself. Under other circumstances he would desire and judge otherwise and would will otherwise. The power for different volition always exists. But while there is no

perceptible boundary to the possibilities of volition, there is plainly a limit to the power of execution. The effect produced can never exceed the forces naturally bestowed upon the instrumentalities employed. Even if it be maintained that all causal force is in will, which seems to us unquestionable when reference is had to first cause, the fact lies plainly in view, that the action of created will can produce no results in mind or matter above those which are possible to the created object called into activity. A person cannot by an effort of will make his memory or judgment, his hand or his foot, perform what these faculties and members are not endowed with power to perform. The will can call all the powers of mind and body into activity, and can accomplish what these are capable of accomplishing. It can exert its energy with a view of doing more than this, but such volitions cannot be executed.

It must be observed, further, that the energy exerted by the human will does not ordinarily extend directly beyond the individual who exerts it. I can direct the powers of my own mind, not those of another; I can use the members of my own physical organism, not those of another. Whatever may be claimed for animal magnetism and mesmeric influences, these could only be regarded as lying outside of the ordinary powers and workings of nature. All that can be done by will power outside of our own person in its constituents of body and soul, must be accomplished indirectly. We have power to move another person physically, just as we have power to move any other mass of matter. We can push or drag a human being, just as we roll a stone or haul a log. There is no immediate connection between his body and my will, as there is between my body and my will. I exert my will power to cross the room and get a book, and my body rises, my legs are in motion, and my hand is extended. I exert the same will power for the same purpose with reference to my son who sits near, and he continues reading without moving a limb. My physical organism is subject to my will; his is not. I exert my will power to direct my mind's attention the subject of which I write, and such mental power as I have is concentrated upon that topic. I exert the same will power to the same end with reference to my son, and his

attention remains fixed upon his paper. It is only by using the medium of language to affect his intellect and his sensibilities that I can produce any action in him coincident with my will; that is, only by using means that will call his own volitional powers into activity in harmony with mine can I secure such action through him as I desire. His will is his, as my will is mine. If I desire to make use of the mental or physical powers which he possesses, I must secure the action of his will. My will controls only what is part of myself; all control over others is indirect.

In the fact that the power of the individual will extends only over each person's mental and physical energies it is implied, that he is not an absolute and independent sovereign, though he was made to have dominion over the earth. He is a creature, and as such is subject to the Creator. God made him for a purpose, and endowed him with all the powers necessary for its accomplishment. But to these he is limited. He is subordinated to his Maker's will. That will he can violate to his own confusion and misery, but he cannot overthrow. It would be absurd, as it certainly is unscriptural, to suppose that God would create a being with power to dethrone his Creator. Such a creature is inconceivable. It is the contradiction of supposing a created God—a creature that is superior to its Creator. The purposes of God cannot be frustrated. "There are many devices in a man's heart; nevertheless the counsel of the Lord, that shall stand." Prov. 19, 21. "I am God, and there is none else; I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure." Is. 46, 9, 10. "Let all the earth fear the Lord; let all the inhabitants of the earth stand in awe of Him. For He spake and it was done; He commanded, and it stood fast. The Lord bringeth the counsel of the heathen to naught; He maketh the devices of the people of none effect. The counsel of the Lord standeth forever, the thoughts of His heart to all generations." Ps. 33, 8-11. Eventually God's purposes are accomplished, whatever the creature may will or do. But it does not follow that men are mere machines which God has contrived for a certain purpose and which unerringly

move according to their Maker's will. Man is made in the image of God and has a will of his own. In virtue of this he can originate action that contravenes his Maker's will. He can disobey the law given for his guidance, and does disobey it. It is not God's will that he should be a piece of mechanism running by forces which he cannot resist and attaining results that he cannot know and choose. He is a moral being, and he is such because God willed to make him such. That implies that he could, by his original constitution and endowment, enter freely upon the mission which God assigned him. He could know the design of God and adopt it as his own choice. But that implied the other alternative of rejecting the divine plan and choosing another goal. He could not be an intelligent, accountable being without such alternative power. He made an unhappy choice in the beginning of human history, and our race now pursues a path of darkness that ends in death. But the creature has not thus become a sovereign, independent of his Creator. Not only did God in His eternal counsels devise a gracious plan by which His purpose with regard to man could be secured, notwithstanding the latter's evil choice in the beginning, but in His entire plan of the universe He provided metes and bounds beyond which the erring creature cannot pass. Man can choose. He can do this as unquestionably in his state of corruption as he could in his state of integrity. Though he is excluded from the domain of the spiritually good, he can still choose among the evils presented to his mind. But he was limited by the original constitution of his nature, and is still more limited by the depravity which his evil choice has superinduced upon his nature. While his will is not necessitated to act as it does, and while it is not hindered in making the choice that it does, it has its allotted sphere and cannot extend its activity beyond the boundaries of that sphere. Man cannot divest himself of his human nature and become literally a brute or an angel, though he can become such in character as to justify the application to him of these predicates by a figure of speech. There can be no volition, or no effectual volition, beyond the limits of his human nature.

These limitations of natural endowment pertain both to the exercise of volitional energy and the performance of

voluntary acts. It is impossible without first having objects presented to our intelligence and having desires awakened by their presentation to exercise volition. The limit of our knowledge must therefore, by the constitution of our nature, be a limit to the exertion of volitional energy. And as the objects which are cognized by our senses and through their cognition awaken our desires are not presented to us according to our choice and do not affect us according to our volition, we are in large measure dependent for the conditions of will on what seems accident, but is the result of providential direction. We can indeed to some extent choose our environments by changing our location, but what shall present itself to our senses each moment of the day and what shall be the effect of the presentation upon our sensibilities, is not absolutely dependent on our own will, though it may be largely influenced by antecedent acts of choice, especially by generic volition. Because cognition and feeling are necessary when the proper conditions exist, we are dependent ultimately upon God's government for the presentation of objects, whose cognition and influence through cognition upon the sensibilities are the conditions, though not the causes in any physical sense, of our volitions. Equally manifest is it that our voluntary activities have their limitations in our nature and thus render man a dependent creature. Neither mentally nor physically can I accomplish more than lies in the power which God has been pleased to confer. God is Sovereign and imparts gifts to His creatures as seems good in His sight. All my willing cannot give to my mind or my body other powers than the Creator has bestowed, and although I have my choice of action, that choice can be executed only within the limits which God has fixed. Notwithstanding his marvelous power of will which renders him, within his limited sphere, a first cause, man is therefore still subordinate to his Maker, and can claim no independent sovereignty.

There is no power which so distinguishes man from inferior creatures as does the will. It is that which constitutes him a personal being and which shows most plainly that he is created in the image of God. Lower animals move for the accomplishment of ends, but they are not able to comprehend the relation of the means which they employ to the ends

which they accomplish, nor intelligently to adapt those means to the ends. They act for ends, but the ends are those of the Creator, and they have no consciousness of design and no volition to accomplish it. Their action is instinctive. Such action is found in man also, and it works for its end more unerringly than volition guided by human intelligence. It works more unerringly because it is the working of the Creator, who never errs, through the creature as His instrument. But man can intelligently enter into the designs of his Maker and adapt his means to their accomplishment. He can choose, and thus consciously and volitionally direct his own course and execute his own purposes. In that lies his true superiority as a creature, as in that lies his great danger. He can choose wrong ends and wrong means. He has something more than instinct, which also works for ends, but only for the ends of the Creator, not of the creature. For that which is done by instinct there is no responsibility in the creature. It is will that renders man a person, and at the same time renders him an accountable being. He is responsible for what he wills, because that is his act, not the act of his Creator. It is originated by himself as a first cause within divinely fixed limits. Nowhere does the work of God seem so marvelous as in the human will. L.

THE POWER OF GOD'S WORD, ACCORDING TO THE LUTHERAN AND THE REFORMED SYSTEMS.

FROM THE GERMAN OF RUDELBACH'S REFORMATION, LUTHERTHUM UND
UNION BY G. H. S.

The chief and farthest reaching difference between the Lutheran and the Reformed churches consisted, and consists to the present day, in the importance attached to the Word of God and the power attributed to it, as also in regard to the relation of the inner to the outer word, or, in other words, the relation between the testimony of the Holy Spirit and the spoken word. This is the fundamental difference, which conditions all the rest, and which, according to the difference

of standpoints, was the real Shibboleth of the two churches wherever they exhibited their activity, on the pulpit as at the table of the Lord, in action as well as in word and writings. We will here permit Luther and his friends, as the first among the representatives of our church, to speak on the one side, and chiefly Oecolampadius and Zwingli on the other, both in clear-cut and carefully selected words, and every honest reader will have to confess that there is a contrast which includes not only a pro and con., but even the clearest and most apparent yea and nay.

It was Luther's aim with his communion and with the Apostolic church to stand on the powerful, mighty, effective and all mediating Word of God alone. The Word of God, they said with Holy Writ, is the everlasting and firm foundation of faith, for it is the everlasting seed out of which we are regenerated. They reasoned in this manner: The Word which in the beginning was with God and which was God, and which sustains all things with its omnipotent power, this same Word brings all things to us in spiritual matters also, namely the communion with the Lord, the forgiveness of sin, the participation of His body and blood in the Holy Supper, and finally the resurrection from the dead (John 5, 25). Just as the eternal and essential Word of God, the Son namely, became flesh, thus too the Word out of His mouth is the universal medium of the whole spiritual creation, and it is true of the birth from God as of the origin of all things what the psalmist says (Ps. 33. 6 V. 9): "By the Word of the Lord were the heavens made: and all the hosts of them by the breath of His mouth. . . . For He spake, and it was done; He commanded and it stood fast." Indeed, the spiritual man is not only born, but also sustained by this Word; for man lives not by bread alone, but by every word that proceeds from the mouth of the Lord. This power of the Word of our Lord Jesus Christ is, however, the same whenever we repeat it at *His* command. It calls Him into our midst, so that He not only breaks bread for us, but is Himself our true bread of heaven and of life. Just herein consists the glory of the New Testament office which has an *eternal* clearness, because it embraces that which *abides*; just herein lies the great importance of the consecration of the bread and the wine in the

Holy Supper, because the Word of the Lord brings to us in the earthly elements the heavenly food and the drink of immortality. For the Lord Himself has appointed the Word for this purpose that it should not, like human speech, only *signify*, but should *give* to the faithful everything which He in mercy has promised. For that reason He has also appointed stewards for this Word, who shall at the proper times feed His people with this Word. The Word then, in its deeper and real sense, is not only the *generative*, but also the *preservative* principle in the church, as the Lord Himself says, (John 15, 7): "If ye abide in me, and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will, and it shall be done unto you."—This fact accordingly determined Luther and his friends to associate most intimately the eternal Divinity of the Lord and the omnipotence of the Word, so that they spoke with the apostles, (John 6. 68, 69): "Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life. And we believe, and are sure, that Thou art that Christ, the Son of the living God." From this standpoint it was impossible for them to ask further as to the *How* of the mystery; "The Lord hath said," was sufficient for them, for the effects they experienced in the life of the Word. The faith, which is born out of the power of the Word of God, is that which reaches out as far as it can grasp the Word of the Lord (Matt. 15, 28), but is affected in its innermost being whenever doubt enters the heart (James 1, 6, 7).—All to whom the Word of the Lord is in reality a word of power and might (Matt. 7. 29), of spirit and of life (John 6. 63) will not doubt that our church has here spoken in accordance with apostolic precept and the rule of faith, and that in her application of this doctrine to the Holy Supper she reproduces the mind of the primitive church, is a matter of as little doubt. For according to the general doctrine of the primitive church it is the Word of the Lord which makes the elements the mediums of the body and blood of Christ. But now let us proceed to the explanations proper.

"The Word," says Luther in his book against the heavenly prophets, "the Word it is that does it: For were Christ given and crucified for us a thousand times, it would all be in vain, except the Word would come and bestow it upon us, and give it to us, and say, 'This is for thee; take it,

and keep it!' It has not been commanded us to search out how it takes place that our bread becomes and is the body of Christ. It is God's Word which says it, and therefore we cling to it and believe it. For with us faith and the Word are not without the thing upon which they trust." In the same manner the authors of the Swabian Syngamma substantiate their doctrine. "All the Words of God," they say, "are miracles. With the Word follows the very thing which the Word is and indicates.—What kind of miracles we find in the bread and the cup of the Lord, we will clearly show. Christ says, 'I am the way, the truth and the life,' and has proved Himself beyond a doubt as the truth through signs, wonders, wisdom and the sending of the Holy Spirit, all of which are a seal and confirmation of the truth of Christ, and when He among His miracles says to the sick of the palsy or to the sinning woman, 'Thy sins be forgiven thee,' are not the forgiveness of sins contained in these few words? Most assuredly. And when He commands the Apostles to wish peace to the people to whom they were sent to preach, did not the words 'Peace be to this house' truly contain within themselves this peace, and did they not truly bring this peace unto the hearts of those who dwelt in the houses into which they entered and where they were received in faith? Most certainly. If then in these and similar cases the word is followed by the thing itself, why do you think it so strange and impossible in regard to the words, 'This is my body,' and 'This is my blood?' But because God is omnipotent in His words, and the Word brings into the bread and wine that which is in it, namely the body and blood of Christ, you have the miracle which we receive and teach in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, namely the miracle of the Word, according to which the body and the blood of Christ in the bread and wine, solely through the power of the Word, are distributed.—Therefore if the Word brings God with all His grace with it for our faith, then it can also bring Christ bodily in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. For if the blood of Christ is to cleanse and deliver us from sin, death and hell, as St. John says in his first epistle, then it must be present, because no absent thing can cleanse. The Word does all things, it holds all things, it brings all the gifts of God."

This living conception of the living Word determined the Lutheran theologians from the beginning to describe the true interpretation of scriptures as one bound by the Word of God, and as attained through "clear, transparent, plain words, against which no one can object." "If you want to know," says Brenz in his excellent Defense addressed to Martin Bucer, "wherein those err who want to see a figure of speech in the words, This is my body, I can easily tell you. It is the same as is done when a person, hearing Christ's words, 'I am the light of the world,' takes the light in a figurative sense; or when He says, 'I am the resurrection,' understands thereby a figure of a resurrection. For as by the words, 'I am the light of the world' the light is brought to us, and, whosoever receives it in faith receives also the true light; so also by the words, 'This is my body,' the body of the Lord is brought to us.—The reason why we do not agree with the pope is, because he falsifies the Gospel through human opinions and dreams. And the reason we do not agree with you, is, because we think that you do violence to the Word of God, and because you seem to us to take away from us the gifts which the Word brings us, something that we in no wise will permit. We confess that Christ, in the words, 'This is my body,' does not give us the figure of His body, but the body itself. The *body*, not the figure, feeds our souls. But whatever the bread contains of the body it has from the Word, and the bread is the body only in so far as the Word brings the body to us."

In accordance with this the general conception of a sacrament was formulated among the Lutheran theologians, according to which the signs, immediately when the Word of the Lord has been uttered, are not without that which they signify, but the whole becomes a holy act, in which the relation of the sign and the thing signified is ordered by God in such a manner, that the Word through the former and in it truly brings us the latter and seals it and through faith appropriates it. With fitting and sharp words they not only lay bare the errors of their opponents, but show also whither it must lead when the spoken Word, which has the promise and which carries the grace with it, is considered as a mere outward and hence passing affair. "Without reason or scrip-

tural grounds to do violence to the words," says Luther, "is sacrilege; therefore we beg of the brethren, for the sake of Christ and of all we love in Christ, that they guard against this error, which has no foundation whatever, and cease to lead souls astray. For here lies the greatest danger to souls." "Your sacramental spirit," says the Swabian Syngramma, "has the intent, with the outward word to deprive us of the outward Christ. That is the nature of this spirit, for it asks, What is the outward word? Is it not the letter? Are they not syllables? Can the syllables and the words save us? and questions of this sort. The next step will be that it asks us, Which is the outward Christ? and answer, Is He not flesh and blood? But flesh profiteth nothing; cursed be he who believes on man. To this it will come, if we imitate you."

How deeply the conviction of the power of the Word was implanted into the heart of our church is seen even in the misconstruction of it on the part of the opponents, as when Oecolampadius says, "They want to pay us off with other empty words, and say, God's Word it is; to this we will cling and this we will believe." But they thought that they could never formulate the antithesis strongly enough; for to them the word was a sound, or again like everything corporeal, a sign with a meaning. But it was impossible for them to be content with mere opposition; they, of necessity, had to proceed to the negation; they could not consider the preached and the spoken Word as the source of faith, and in thus leaving the standpoint of the church, they were more and more driven to the fanatical opinion concerning the inner word, which, torn loose from the body of the revelation, evidently is only a shadow, which corresponds exactly to the mere sign in the sacrament. That we do hereby not accuse them of something which they refuse to accept, is evident from the following passages. In plain words Zwingli says in his book concerning the true and the false faith: "The word which we hear is in no wise the word through which we believe; for if the word which is heard or read could make us believers, then we all would believe. The word of faith inheres in the spirit of the believer; it is itself judged by no one, but the outward word is judged by it." But Oecolampadius explains this still more clearly. "Christ," he says,

“has not given the outward words such power, that they should possess His body and in essence convey it to us. In general it is not the nature of words to accomplish such things, but it is their nature to convey the meaning of things, which before had gained in the souls of men an inner concept or an inner word; for whatever the outward words contain over and above the sound, they have from the inner spirit and the inner word. Hence, in the same manner, the body will essentially be in the inner words, in the soul of man, which inner words are more noble than the outward. It is true that the words ‘This is my body,’ are not mere historical words; for then they would be a matter of as little importance to us as it is that Christ went to the Mount of Olives, to which He now no longer goes. But if there is in the words a command or ordinance of God, then let the word of this command be shown to us. It is not said here, ‘Bread, become my body,’ as is said concerning the creation of light, ‘Let there be light,’ and to the leper, ‘Be thou clean!’ And even where it has the appearance of being a word of command, where is the ordinance for future times, that this should come to pass, as is the case in prophecies? Therefore, we may turn and twist the words as we will, they turn out to be nothing but words explanatory of the ceremonies which were then established by the Lord. . . . How dare we attribute to the outward words that the divine word has been put into the outward word, since the Apostles themselves wished to be considered as nothing but those who plant and water, but that not they, but God gave the increase? And thus it is. In the Scriptures there is nothing known of a power indwelling in the word. I know well that the Apostles announce all things with their words. But that the things themselves accompany the words to the believers, I will not admit, for the honor belongs to God. They think the Spirit is wrapped up in the words and is inseparable from them. If it were thus, then no teaching would be in vain; the spirit would not be idle. But the inner, constant word, and the outward, are as far apart as are law and grace. But grace is not contained in the law, and as we speak of outward words, so too can we speak of ceremonies, emblems and sacraments. Yet the word is more powerful, because it is nearer to the in-

ner word. Yet one and all are not able to teach the least, much less, do something greater. Their office is only to signify, to exhort, to remind. The outward word does not give faith; it does not comfort, it does not honor, it does not enlighten; but our inner, heavenly teacher is Christ. . . . Accordingly the words, to speak accurately, are only warning signs, which should excite us to search in us for those things which the words signify, not that we are to learn these things through the words, but that we seek in us the truth, and thus be instructed. Within us, within us it must be received by faith."—Finally, Zwingli summarizes the whole in these words: "The church should not be founded upon the word which is spoken or written, but upon that which shines within the heart. The church argues through the word of faith which is taught through the spirit in the hearts of believers." And Oecolampadius, in order to destroy what he considers the visionary views of our church, has the hardihood to compare our doctrine with which he ought to have been acquainted from the church fathers and especially from the Scriptures, with the mass swindle of the Papists and the sorcery of Babylon. "Here you can see," he says, "where the devil shows his hand, who consigns the sorcerers and superstitious people to such errors as though there were secret and hidden powers in characters, signs and words. To such sorcerers the bishops, priests and monks have aided much, and have practiced them themselves. Now they would find great aid in this opinion. Babylon must have all kinds of sorcery, in order that it may not know God; Jerusalem will set her hope upon God her Lord."

But after the Word had once been emptied of its power, then the sacrament in general had to sink into a shadow; only the spirit of man could give it any importance. Nothing can be more closely united and more false than Zwingli's and Bucer's doctrine, namely the sacraments are only public declarations or tokens of faith in Christ; that they rather assure the church of our faith, than that they strengthen us in faith; that they have no power to cleanse the conscience, and do not even belong to the order of salvation. For "grace and the Holy Ghost do not need a vehicle," says Zwingli; yes, it is even presumption to seek to bind the Spirit to any

outward sign ; for, He rather gives His gifts, how, when and where He will."—Thus the conception of the sacrament was pressed down even below that of the elements in it, and faith and the Spirit, which were to take its place, saw only the ruins of the divine order and institution. In this line it was a necessary consequence yet to add that the sacraments of the Old and of the New covenants were essentially and in their effects identical ; that we had no advantage over the children of Israel in this regard, for they too had partaken spiritually of Christ ; and that as little as it was necessary for them to partake of Christ in the paschal lamb, so little is it necessary that we have Christ essentially in the bread and thus eat Him.

HOMILETICAL DEPARTMENT.

Contributions to this department are respectfully solicited.

C. H. L. S.

NINTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. 1 Cor. 10, 6-13.

A.

Introduction. Beloved in Christ! When the Lord called Moses to deliver Israel from Egyptian bondage, He said: I have surely seen the affliction of my people which are in Egypt, and have heard their cry by reason of their taskmasters ; for I know their sorrows : and I am come down to deliver them out of the hand of the Egyptians, and to bring them up out of that land, unto a good land, and a large, unto a land flowing with milk and honey. Exod. 3, 7. 8. Now when the Israelites were led forth to possess the promised land, many murmured against the Lord and repeatedly provoked Him to holy anger. In His righteous indignation the Lord lengthened the way to the land of promise, multiplied the days of journeying, destroyed the rebellious and idolatrous among His people, and the end was that, of the many thousands brought out from the land of Egypt, but two, Joshua the Son of Nun and Caleb the son of Jephunneh, were permitted to enter the land of Canaan. Numb. 14, 30. "Now these things"—says the Apostle—"happened unto them for ensamples : and they are written for our admonition, upon whom the ends of the world are come." Text v. 11.

He who would enslave us and hold us captive, is more wicked, more cruel and more obdurate than was the Pharaoh and taskmaster of Israel; for he is the prince of darkness, the Pharaoh of hell. But the good God has seen our sorrows, heard our cry, and come to our deliverance. To set us free from the power of darkness and death and to bring us to a land of light and life, He has given us one greater even than was Moses. "For God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him, should not perish, but have everlasting life." The Christ of God and our Savior has come; He has accomplished the work of deliverance. For us, yes, and for the whole world, He has wrought out an eternal redemption. In Him we believe and, by His own assurance, we are free indeed. We now belong to Him who has purchased us with His own blood. Our home is in heaven where our Jesus is. There is our promised land, our Canaan. There we long to be, thither our eyes are directed, and on the way that will surely lead us there, God has set our feet. Will we walk that way, and walk it to its very end? Will we without fail possess the land of eternal rest and enter then by its pearly gates the city of gold whose light is the very glory of God? Will you and I surely enter the kingdom which the Father hath appointed unto us by Christ Jesus?

What say you in answer to this question? Say you that you cannot know anything about it? If so, how can you have a moment's rest of soul?—Say you, without doubt I shall enter heaven? If so, whence is your certainty? The Scriptures teach us that it is a precious thing to have our hearts established with grace, and they admonish us to hold fast the profession of our faith without wavering, and to give diligence unto the hope of the eternal inheritance. And again they say; "Let us therefore fear, lest a promise being left us of entering into rest, any of you should seem to come short of it." Heb. 4, 1. And St. Paul, pointing to the significant history of the Israelites who perished in the wilderness, exhorts: "Let him that thinketh he standeth, take heed lest he fall." Text v. 12.

There is then a sure and safe way to God's kingdom of heaven and glory, and there is also a certain hope of reaching its end for all who will walk that way according to the direction of God and in His strength. But on the other hand there are also false ways—false hopes—and a false security. Of these we are admonished to beware, and rather give diligence to make our calling and election sure so that an entrance may be ministered unto us abundantly into the everlasting kingdom of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ. To this end, and to assist you in this, I inquire:

HAVE YOU A CERTAIN HOPE OF ENTERING THE KINGDOM
PREPARED FOR YOU OF GOD THROUGH CHRIST?

- I. *To you who say: Why should we not, who should hinder us?*
I answer: You and your sins.
1. Learn of Israel; for to this intent is its history written. Text v. 6-11.
 2. Being careless, or trusting in self, you fall into sin, and by your sins you may perish on the way. V. 12.
- II. *To you who say: How can we, and whence should that be? I answer: Of God, your faithful savior.* V. 13.
- He, who of His infinite mercy by Christ Jesus hath redeemed you and won you for Himself and His heaven,
1. He setteth a limit to the temptations that would come upon you in the way; and
 2. His strength He maketh perfect in your weakness.
- C. H. L. S.

B.

TAKE HEED LEST YOU FALL.

- I. *Lust not after evil things.*
- II. *Wait on the Lord, your faithful God.*

FROM THE GERMAN OF MUENKEL.

TENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. 1 COR. 12, 1-11.

A.

Int. The great diversity of gifts with which God favors His people. The abuse to which they are put at times by one or the other among Christians: this seems to have been the case in the congregation at Corinth—is the case now; hence the timely instructions of the Apostle

CONCERNING THE RIGHT USE OF THE GOOD GIFTS OF GOD.

- I. *Whatever gift you have, of the Lord have you received it.*
 1. Your unworthiness.
 2. God's goodness and wisdom.
- II. *Whatever ministry employs you, the Lord is your Master.*
 1. Obey Him.
 2. Trust Him.
- III. *Whatever you have or do, it is to profit withal.*
 1. To the good of man.
 2. To the glory of God.

C. H. L. S.

B.

HOW THE HOLY SPIRIT MANIFESTS HIMSELF IN THE
HEARTS OF MEN.

- I. *In this, that He turns them away from the service of dumb idols.*
- II. *In this, that He leads them to the Lord Jesus.*
- III. *In this, that He makes them efficient for the common good.*

FROM THE GERMAN OF KUEBEL.

ELEVENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. 1 Cor. 15. 1-11.

A.

BY THE GRACE OF GOD I AM WHAT I AM.

- I. *Divine grace hath redeemed me.*
- II. *Divine grace hath brought me to faith.*
- III. *Divine grace doeth good through me.*

FROM THE GERMAN OF AHLFELD.

B.

WHY IS THE GOSPEL PREACHED UNTO YOU.

- I. *That you may receive it.*
- II. *That you may stand in it.*
- III. *That you may be saved by it.*

FROM THE GERMAN.

TWELFTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. 2 Cor. 3. 4-11.

A.

THE GLORY OF THE GOSPEL.

The Gospel

- I. *Is not a mere letter, but is Spirit.*
- II. *Doth not kill, but maketh alive.*
- III. *Abideth forever in all its truth and glory.*

FROM THE GERMAN OF DR. PALMER.

B.

SINAI AND GOLGATHA.

- I. *On Sinai a mighty prophet—On Golgatha the bleeding Lamb of God.*
- II. *On Sinai the letters written in stone—On Golgatha the quickening Spirit.*
- III. *On Sinai death and damnation—On Golgatha righteousness and life.*
- IV. *On Sinai a station for pilgrims in the wilderness—On Golgatha an ever-abiding home.*

FROM THE GERMAN OF GEROK.

THIRTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. GAL. 3,
15-22.

A.

OUR SALVATION IS NOT BY WORKS, BUT IT IS THE GIFT
OF GOD'S FREE GRACE.

- I. *God has promised man salvation as a free gift of His grace, and this promise is sure and unchangeable. V. 15. 16.*
- II. *The power and the validity of the promise is in no way annulled by the law. V. 17. 18.*
- III. *The real and proper object of the law is not to save mankind. V. 19.*
- IV. *Neither was Moses a true Mediator. V. 20.*
- V. *Besides, the law is powerless to save. V. 21.*
- VI. *But faith in Christ Jesus is the true way of salvation. V. 22.*

FROM THE GERMAN OF COUARD.

B.

HOW ARE WE JUSTIFIED?

- I. *Not by any legal worth or merit.*
- II. *By the free grace of God through Christ.*
- III. *Through a true and living faith.* C. H. L. S.

FOURTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. GAL. 5,
16-24.

. THE TRUE CHRISTIAN WALK.

- I. *What must we do in order to avoid sin and to serve God to His glory?*

1. Walk in the Spirit.

Remember that you Christians are a spiritual people.

1 Pet. 2, 9. Rev. 1, 6. Tit. 3, 5. 6. 1 Cor. 3, 16. But as saints approve yourselves also :

- a) Do not only receive the Spirit's witness concerning Christ with gladness, but let Him also have the mastery in you and over you always unto every good work.
- b) Disregard not the thoughts and motions which the Spirit awakens in your hearts.
- c) Resolve joyfully and gladly to serve God all the days of your life. Luke 1, 74 &c.

2. Do not fulfill the lusts of the flesh.

That is, as Paul explains it, follow not your own desires, thoughts and pleasures.

Here now St. Paul describes the wonderful conflict between the flesh and the Spirit. V. 17. The Spirit is the Holy Spirit of God, active in our hearts. The flesh is our own corrupt nature of body and soul. Of this conflict you may read something Gen. 8, 21; Matt. 26, 41; Rom. 7, 23; &c.

3. Crucify the flesh together with its affections and lusts.

Christians check the flesh, even if it pains them so to do. Gen. 4, 7. 1 Cor. 9, 27. Sin will dwell in the Christian's heart—but he must not suffer it to have any dominion over him. The work is difficult.

Following these three rules, keep constantly before your eyes the crucified Jesus.

II. *What reasons have we to move us so to live?*

1. Why shall we walk in the Spirit?

The text says: If ye are led by the Spirit, ye are not under the law. V. 18. What that means, the Apostle tells us in v. 23. Comp. Rom. 8, 1. and Ps. 115, 15.

2. Why are we not to fulfill the lusts of the flesh?

See v. 21 b. and comp. Eccl. 11, 3.

3. Why are we to crucify the flesh?

Answer: they who do this, are Christ's.

III. *The signs by which we can know whether we live to the flesh or to the Spirit.*

See what Christ says Matt. 7, 16. 20. Likewise Paul v. 19–22.

FROM THE GERMAN OF HERBERGER.

FIFTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. GAL. 5, 25-6, 10.

IF WE LIVE IN THE SPIRIT, LET US ALSO WALK IN THE SPIRIT.

That is

- I. *In meekness toward our erring brethren.*
- II. *In watchfulness as to our own hearts.*
- III. *In thankfulness toward those who teach us the Word.*
- IV. *In remembrance of the end.*
- V. *In well-doing toward all.*

SIXTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. EPH. 3, 13-21.

CHRIST IS TO DWELL IN THE HEART.

- I. *Of every child of God.*
- II. *According to the riches of His glorious grace.*
- III. *Through faith.*
- IV. *In love.*
- V. *That it be filled with all the fulness of God.*

SEVENTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. EPH. 4, 1-6.

KEEP THE UNITY OF THE SPIRIT.

- I. *How?*
- II. *Why?*

EIGHTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. 1 Cor. 1, 4-9.

RICH IN ALL THINGS.

- I. *In faith.*
- II. *In love.*
- III. *In hope.*

(Note: These last 4 disp. are from the Epistol. Perikopen of A. Nebe.)

T H E COLUMBUS THEOLOGICAL MAGAZINE.

This Magazine is designed to supply the want, long since felt, of a Lutheran periodical devoted to theological discussion. Its aim will be the exposition and defence of the doctrines of the Church as confessed in the Book of Concord. Theology in all its departments is embraced within its scope, though for the present special attention will be given to the controverted subject of predestination.

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The friends of the Magazine are requested to give such aid in its circulation as their circumstances permit.

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T H E

COLUMBUS THEOLOGICAL MAGAZINE

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No. 5.

LIBERTY OF THE WILL.

In a former article on the will we endeavored to point out and explain the nature of that faculty. This seemed to us necessary for the understanding of important questions of theology. All discussion of the moral nature of man, and especially of his relation to the supernatural power of grace by which his regeneration is effected, involves the will, and can be conducted intelligently and effectively only when the nature and powers of this faculty are clearly apprehended. But this requires the consideration of a point which we have thought best to reserve for a separate article. It is the vexed question concerning the liberty of the will. The difficulties involved should not deter us from the examination of a topic which, though it is largely philosophical, has such far-reaching influence in the decision of important theological questions. Our purpose now is, not to consider the natural powers of man as related to divine grace, in which aspect our theologians usually treat of free will, but to elucidate the liberty of the will in general. We hope thus to secure a basis for the clear exposition of man's natural powers as related to the supernatural operations of divine grace upon the soul.

It might be expected that we should begin with a definition of liberty. The word is used so vaguely, that a distinct conception of that which it imports would seem the first condition of a lucid presentation of the subject. But we must seek to obtain a clear apprehension by some other process than that of definition in the strict sense. It is not possible logically to define it, because it belongs to a class of

cognitions which are in their nature indefinable. It is an intuition. To a blind man it would be impossible to convey any idea of what we mean by red and blue; to the man who sees, it would be superfluous even if it were possible, because his own use of the proper faculty furnishes the information which words cannot impart. To a man that has never experienced what the word pain imports, no power of language will make its meaning intelligible; to the man who has learned it by his own experience no definition is requisite. What is true of the primary intuitions of sense and consciousness is equally true of those of reason. All pure intuitions, as they lie at the foundation of human knowledge, must be obtained by each individual for himself: they cannot be communicated from one to another. We therefore deem it a hopeless task to convey by definition the idea of liberty to one who does not possess it, and to one who does, such a definition would be useless even if it were possible. What can be done, and what seems to us necessary to be done, is to show the different relations in which liberty is considered, to guard against confounding these different relations, and to prove that the intuition which we call liberty properly belongs to the will.

We regard it as unfortunate that, in discussions of the subject, liberty has so frequently been confounded with power. There certainly are circumstances in which, because of the intimate relation between the two, the question of liberty resolves itself into a question of power. We shall have occasion to speak of the subject in that phase. But even for a correct view of such cases it is important to distinguish between them. To confound them must lead to error. At a superficial glance, indeed, the two seem identical, and popular language therefore does not carefully distinguish them. When we ask whether the will is free to choose between two acts or between acting or not acting, we may state substantially the same question by asking whether it can choose, or has power to choose, between them. But that does not prove that the two things are precisely the same. On a closer examination it will be found that they are not. There may be a question of liberty that is not in the proper sense a question of power. It seems to us necessary, at the beginning of our inquiry, to set forth and illustrate the distinction.

That the freedom of an agent presupposes power in such agent is evident. Prior to the question whether an agent does a thing freely must come the question whether he can do it at all. That too is plain. Power must therefore certainly be taken into account in considering liberty. But that does not imply that the two are identical. The one presupposes the other; they are not the same thing. This is easily seen when liberty is considered independently of its relation to the will, where special difficulties surround it. When we inquire whether a man has freedom to walk or to speak, it is readily perceived that we are not inquiring whether he has the power to perform these actions. Understanding by power that which produces action or effects change, not, as the term is sometimes improperly made to signify, the right or authority to produce the action or make the change, we always assume the existence of power before we begin the inquiry concerning liberty. First comes the question whether an agent has the power to perform a given act; then only comes the additional and different question whether he is free to perform it. Has a mineral liberty of locomotion, or a vegetable liberty of speech? Is a stone free to change its location or a tree to use the language in which men communicate their thoughts? To such a question it is difficult to give a categorical answer. We might reply in the negative; for how can they? We might reply in the affirmative; for who hinders them? In either case the answer is felt to be unsatisfactory. Minerals and vegetables have respectively no power to move and to speak. That is unquestionable. But just for that reason the question concerning their liberty is inappropriate. Are they not just as free as any other part of creation? If the question of liberty be entertained at all respecting them, there is no reason to deny that they have it in the respect mentioned, though they have no power to perform those acts. But the question cannot reasonably be entertained. We can with propriety inquire whether a given animal has liberty of locomotion, or whether a certain man has liberty of speech, because they have the power to move and to speak. This lies in their nature, and is therefore presupposed when it is asked whether they are in these respects free. But where the power does not exist, the question of liberty is entirely out of place. There is neither liberty nor

bondage where there is no power. In regard to locomotion a plant is neither free nor unfree: it was not made to move from place to place, and as it has no such power there is no propriety in such predicates. It would be absurd to speak of the liberty of will in creatures that have no will, simply because it is absurd to speak of liberty where there is no power.

It is an improper use of the word power, and one that must introduce confusion, when it is employed to designate that which is properly liberty. Man has naturally the power to speak. When the question is raised concerning the liberty of speech it only mystifies the matter to speak of the power to use the power—the physical power to use the physical power and the moral power to encounter the physical and moral powers that set themselves against such use. Minds intent on truth will avoid such needless complications. That the persons concerned have the power to speak is at once assumed when such a question arises. Its possession is implied in the question that is raised. Whether they have liberty of speech, not whether they have power to speak, is the point of inquiry.

Liberty may be considered in the two aspects presented by the origination and the execution of an act, or in those of liberty to and liberty from a thing. When I allege that I have freedom of speech, I may mean either that I am not forced to speak, or that I am not hindered from speaking. I am not compelled to do it, but am free to refrain from it. There is no necessitating power which compels me to speak, whether I choose or do not choose; I am free from it, or from the necessity of doing it. But I am also free to it, or from interfering forces that will not permit me to do what I choose. No one interposes obstacles that prevent the exercise of my power to speak. I am exempt in the exercise of my power from restraint by other powers. There are no hindrances placed in my way, and I have liberty of speech also in that regard. No one compels me to speak, and no one hinders me from speaking when I have chosen to speak.

In both respects liberty is distinct from power. It is an accident of the latter, not identical with it. It is an agent's exemption from the power of other agents. When we are restrained or hindered in the execution of our purpose, we

say that in that respect we have no liberty of action. There is an obstacle placed in the way of the exercise of our power. To say that in that respect we have no power could only mean that we have not the necessary power to remove the barriers which other powers have placed in the way of an effective exercise of our power. We have power, but we are not free to use it. When it is asked whether a person in chains is free to move, we do not mean to inquire whether he has the power of motion in general, but whether there is any impediment to the exercise of the power of motion which he is assumed to possess. We do not ask such a question when it is known that there is no power that could be restrained. We may ask whether a man is free to walk, because he has the power and may be hindered in its exercise; we never inquire whether a table or a chair is free to walk, because it has no power, and all questions pertaining to its exercise are therefore absurd.

The same is true also in reference to the other aspect in which liberty is presented. When it is asked whether an agent is free from coercion in performing an act, or whether he is at liberty not to perform it, the question is again not properly concerning his power. This, as in the other case, is presupposed, although the agent's relation to such presupposed power is different. In the one case the question is whether the power which he has is hindered in its exercise by restraining powers; in the other case it is whether he is impelled to action by constraining powers. In both cases liberty is not power, but exemption. In the one case the question is whether he is exempt from forces that hinder his action; in the other case it is whether he is exempt from forces that coerce his action. In both cases freedom presupposes powers and contemplates the agent in relation to the power of other agents; in neither case are freedom and power identical.

We do not deny that in the controversy concerning necessity and free will the points in debate are sometimes so stated as to make that which is ostensibly a question of liberty really a question of power. We may ask whether we have the power to speak, though we mean to inquire whether we have liberty to speak. Such inaccuracies in language are

not infrequent, and they are in most cases rendered sufficiently clear by the circumstances to prevent misapprehension. But when we ask whether men are free in willing, or whether they will by necessitation, and mean thus to inquire whether they have the power to will or whether they are driven by extraneous forces, like creatures without will, or like mechanical contrivances, the inaccuracy leads to confusion, because it is really power that is meant, and not liberty. The import of the question whether I am free from necessity in willing is not whether I have the faculty of will, or the power to will; that is presupposed in the very statement of the problem; but it is whether I am exempt from the dominating influence of other powers in the origination of my personal actions. The very idea of freedom implies that there is power in the subject concerning whom it is predicated. By identifying power and liberty necessitarians clandestinely shift the question, and the advocates of freedom are thus placed at a disadvantage. Strictly speaking the question of liberty is irrelevant where there is no power, and to discuss the question of power under the name of liberty is resorting to logical legerdemain. If I have no power to will, i. e. to originate volitions, I can have no more liberty to will than my pen can have liberty to think. There is no power in either case, and therefore no propriety in such predicates. If my soul, while it seems to put forth what we call volitions, i. e. exertions of personal power, is merely a tool or implement in the hands of another being whose power is thus exerted, as my pen is an implement by which my power is exerted and my will is accomplished, it can of course have no liberty of willing, as it can be properly under no bondage in willing, because properly all willing is out of the question. There is no power of willing, and therefore no relevancy in the question whether there is liberty of will. The point of debate between necessitarians and freedomists is mainly, not whether the human will is free, but whether man has the power to will at all, which is an entirely different thing.

It is in this aspect that power and liberty are made to coincide; not that they are the same thing, but that in regard to the will the question respecting freedom from necessity is practically the same as that respecting the power to

will. A man may be forced to walk when he does not will it, and we rightly say that he is not free in his walking. Another power may set his limbs in motion, and he walks by coercion. Even in such corporeal action it might be disputed whether the word walking is properly applied. The man does not properly walk, but rather is walked. So far as the person is concerned, there is no walking; it is merely the body, not the man that walks. When we speak of the will, the relation of the person to the action is such that a coerced volition is an absurdity. An action which I perform by some organ of mind or body may be performed by some other power that usurps this organ. e. g. another man may use my hand to perform an act which I do not will. But my will is not such an organ that could be usurped by another person. It is mine; it is purely personal; it never can be another's. Some other being may use my body for the accomplishment of his will, but he does this by exercising his will, not by exercising mine, and the act or acts thus performed are his, not mine. Hence it follows that when the freedom of the will from coaction is denied, the power of willing is by implication denied also. If man is a machine that is impelled by other forces, he has no power to will. When liberty is identified with power the dispute is really whether man has a will at all or not, i. e. whether he has the power to will.

The subject of moral power and its relation to liberty will require more extended treatment than we can give it in this connection. We advert to it here only for the purpose of remarking that in this relation also power and liberty are not the same. When it is asked whether a person is free to pluck the fruit and flowers in his neighbor's garden, the question is not whether he has the physical power to walk thither and use his hands for the performance of such an action, nor is it whether he is restrained by chains and manacles from the exercise of such physical power. The subject lies in the sphere of moral obligation. And here too power and liberty are different things. If his neighbor has not given him permission to perform the act mentioned, he is not free to perform it, because the law prohibits it. But has he not the power to perform it? He can will it and he can execute his volition. Whether he will exert such power depends on his

character, but that man has the power to transgress moral law is unquestionable. The proposition that he is not morally free to do it does not mean that he has not physically or that he has not morally the power to do it. Its purport manifestly is that there is a hindrance to the exercise of the power which is assumed to exist.

Our inquiry here is into the liberty of the will, and into its power only so far as that may be necessary to elucidate its liberty. But the subject requires some further explanations. When we claim that the will is exempt from hindering forces and is thus free to act, we do not mean that its power is unlimited either in regard to willing or to executing volitions.

Man, like all other creatures, has his own prescribed sphere, and, like all other creatures, has therefore his natural limitations. No reasonable person, least of all a Christian, would think of discussing the freedom of the human will on the assumption that human power is infinite. Man is not God. He has not omnipotence. He is a creature, and as such he is subject to his Maker. He has not absolute liberty, as he has not absolute power. He is limited in his faculties, and there could be no propriety in making inquiries as to his liberty beyond these limits. He may indeed will beyond his powers of execution. His will power cannot legitimately be measured by his power of performance. He has will, and to the power of will in the abstract there is no apparent limit. But he is a creature, and his will is that of a creature. He may will anything and everything that comes within the range of his intellect and sensibilities, but the range of these is limited. Within these limits he may will what he has no power to execute; willing and performing what is willed are different things. It is not wise to will what we know ourselves unable to execute; but men are not always wise, and do not always know, before the effort is made, what lies within the compass of their ability. It is not impossible for man in his folly and presumption to will even the dethronement of God and the enthronement of himself as monarch of the universe. Such things have been, and such stupendous follies man is capable of repeating. In this respect there seems to be no boundary line beyond which human stupidity and

human arrogance cannot pass. But still man is subject to his Maker and to the limitations which this implies. If these limitations are not found in the intrinsic nature of will, which man has in common with his Maker, after whose image he is formed, they certainly are found in the nature of man as a finite creature. His will cannot rise above that which is presented to his intellect and which moves his desires. A judicious mind will not put forth the volition to perform an act which it perceives to be impossible, and the observation of this fact has led some philosophers to maintain that he cannot exercise such a volition. But a man can be a fool. He is not by his nature and constitution limited to that which is wise, as he is not limited to that which is right. Every soul is conscious of a power to will what it cannot perform, and facts prove that men often, from lack of reflection, do will what they know to lie beyond their power of execution, as they often, from lack of knowledge, put forth such volitions. But be that as it may, it is beyond all dispute that men cannot will what they do not know and do not desire. Beyond the limits of human cognition there can be no human volition. When we inquire whether the will is free, this is necessarily presupposed. It is unphilosophical to encumber the question with matter so irrelevant as that of the natural limitation of the will's power. Whether the will is free to choose what it has no means of knowing and what it cannot desire because it does not know, is as irrelevant as to ask whether that statue is free to deliver an address. We are inquiring whether an agent is exempt from hindrances in the exercise of its power, not whether it is free to become a different creature from what God made it and to exercise other powers than God gave it.

But it is a legitimate matter of inquiry, in connection with our subject, whether the will can act in the whole sphere for which God designed it, or whether there are not other restrictions placed upon it than those which God fixed in the nature of His creature. There is no power in man to will what he does not know, and there is therefore no propriety in the question whether he is in that respect free: he is neither hindered nor unhindered in the exercise of a power which he does not possess. But man was made with powers which ex-

tended far beyond their present range. He had power to know and desire and will the good. The Scriptures teach, and all experience confirms the teaching, that man is now without spiritual knowledge and holy affections, and that "the imaginations of the thoughts of his heart are only evil continually." He does not will, and under the circumstances he cannot will, the spiritually good. Is he then in that respect free? It might be presumed that, keeping in view the distinction made between power and liberty, the question cannot be entertained, because where there is no power all queries concerning liberty are irrelevant. But the answer is insufficient and unsatisfactory. The case is unique. Man had the power as God made him; he was designed to have the power; it belongs to the integrity of his nature as God created it. Men cannot fully quit themselves like men without it. The introduction of sin into the world has despoiled him of his noblest power. While we maintain that his will is free from any hindrances to the exercise of its power, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that this power itself is not now in its normal state. It is under a restriction which does not lie in its nature as it proceeded from the hand of God. The point is one that pertains to the power rather than to the liberty of the will. In that respect it seems foreign to the subject under consideration. But the lack of power to exercise the will in any sphere for which God created it is itself a lack of liberty. It is hindered in its proper action. Therefore our theologians discussed this subject under the head of natural power or free will, using these terms synonymously. So far as there is no power in man to do good, it would seem irrelevant to inquire whether he is free in that regard. There is no relevancy in the question whether men are free to fly; they have no such power, and are neither hindered nor unhindered in its exercise. But so far as the power to do good belonged originally to man's nature the question whether he is free in that direction is perfectly proper. There is relevancy in the question whether a bird that has lost its wings is free to fly. It is hindered from doing what it was by nature designed to do, and has therefore lost its liberty. Man is under the bondage of sin; he is not free in the direction of the spiritually good. But that is a subject of too much importance to be dismissed with a mere incidental

remark, and we shall therefore devote to it a separate article. For our present purpose it will suffice to state that when we claim liberty for the will in the sense that it is exempt from hindrances in its action, we do not mean that God has placed no limitations upon human nature, including the will, nor do we mean to allege that man, including the will, is free from sin and its thralldom. What we contend for is that man's will is free from hindrances to the exercise of its divinely appointed functions, except in the sphere of the spiritually good, in regard to which it is held in the bondage of sin.

It will be observed that the question is not whether man is free to execute what he has willed. That depends upon circumstances, and has nothing to do with the subject under consideration. Our inquiry is into the liberty of willing, not into the liberty of performing actions according to the will's determination. Whether I am free to will the act of writing is not the same question as whether I am free to perform the act of writing. I may be free to write without willing the act, and I may will to write without being free to perform the act. The will is a power designed to originate action. As soon as that power goes out it may encounter obstacles which prevent the accomplishment of the end for which the power was exerted. The hand may be paralyzed and thus fail to obey the will's mandate in the performance of its accustomed work. Man or natural forces may block the path with I had willed to pursue, and thus prostrate the design for the execution of which my volition was put forth. We may will what it does not lie in our power to accomplish; we may will what other powers will not permit us to accomplish even though it otherwise lay in our power. But evidently in such cases the volition is free, though the execution is not. The will has freely willed, though the work willed has not been accomplished. The volitional act is free, whether the voluntary act, or the act designed to be effected by the exercise of will power, be hindered or not. Liberty to put forth volition does not imply liberty to execute the volition put forth. The act of willing and the act of doing what is willed are entirely different and must be distinguished. Man is not hindered in willing, though he may be in executing what he wills.

It has thus become apparent that as power is distinct from liberty, the limitation of power in any creature in order to accomplish the Creator's design cannot properly be adduced in proof that such creature is not free. In that sense no creature is free, because all things are subject to God, placed under His authority by creation, and directed according to His will by His providence. But that means only that all things have their sphere. Every creature has its purpose, is adapted to that purpose, and, so far as disorder is not introduced by other powers than the Creator's, accomplishes that purpose. Not a mineral, plant, or animal is so created that it cannot fulfill its mission. To say that any creature in virtue of its natural limitations fails of its end, is an impeachment of God's wisdom. And so far as the creature is exempt from extraneous forces that hinder the accomplishment of its purpose, it is free. In that sense all creatures are free by nature. God gave them the power necessary to subserve the purpose of their creation, and put upon them no limitations or restrictions that would thwart or in any measure hinder that purpose. The stone has not the power of growth, the plant has not the power of locomotion; but they are not on that account unfree, because they are not on that account hindered in the fulfilment of their design. So man, in this respect, is free when he is exempt from forces that would hinder the exercise of his powers in the attainment of his end. Like all other creatures, man was made for a purpose, and the Creator did not thwart His purpose by putting such bonds upon His creature as would prevent the exercise of powers necessary to accomplish it. In this point of view the denial of man's freedom is manifestly imputing unwisdom and inconsistency to God. No limitations of human power, and no affixing of conditions as essential to their exercise, can detract from the liberty of man in the use of his powers for the attainment of the end for which God made him. Only sin, which is not an original element of man's nature and which is not of God, places a limit upon him that curtails his liberty.

Not only is man unhindered in the exercise of his will and thus free, but it is inconceivable that he should be otherwise. We can understand how limits can be prescribed by

the Creator in the nature and constitution of the mind, so that volitions which are possible with God or angels cannot emanate from the human will. We can understand how a man's ignorance may limit the area of his volitions, so that one person can will what another can not. We can understand how sin excludes from the whole domain of holiness and thus makes volitions impossible that otherwise might, in accordance with the Creator's design and endowment, have been put forth. But that there should be any hindrance to the exercise of the will when all the conditions exist for volition, is beyond comprehension. Influences may be brought to bear upon the intelligence and upon the sensibilities, so that the action of the will is otherwise than it would have been without such influences. But this only changes the conditions of volitional action; it does not hinder the willing when the conditions of such action exist. The man who wills to stay at home because he feels unwell, though he would have willed to go to his place of business if the illness had not set in, has motives at work that influence his willing. But he wills freely to stay at home. The volition to pursue his vocation under the circumstances was not obstructed; it never was put forth. He was hindered indeed from willing what he would have willed if the circumstances had been different; but that is merely saying that the will is so constituted that it wills freely according to the circumstances. These in the case mentioned induced him to put forth a volition that under other circumstances would have been different, but the volition which he did put forth was not hindered. He did not will to engage in his customary occupation, and no power put anything in the way of his willing according to his judgment. He might have willed to go to his customary work, though the volition would have been unwise or its execution would have been impossible. Nothing hindered the person to will as he deemed best; when his will was ready for action, it acted without any obstruction and without any conceivable possibility of obstruction. The matter, indeed, resolves itself into the self-evident proposition that the will is free to will what it wills. If there were any impediment to willing, the volition would not ensue. But that would imply either that the conditions of volition did not exist and that therefore there was no will power exerted, or

that when such will power was exercised an obstacle presented itself that rendered it ineffectual. In the first case there would be no infringement of the will's liberty to will, as there was no power exercised that could be hindered in its action. In the second case any obstacle that could hinder the exercise of volitional power and prevent the completion of volition must present itself in consciousness. But such a presentation in consciousness is unknown. On the contrary, the testimony of consciousness, in all the forms in which it makes itself heard on the subject, is in favor of liberty. Nay more, the mind cannot even recognize the possibility of a hindrance to volition when all the conditions of willing exist and the will power is accordingly exerted. I may be influenced by circumstances in the exercise of my will, so that I freely do not will what I might otherwise freely have willed; but what power could hinder my willing when I will? The opinion that there are hindrances to the exercise of the power of willing otherwise than as sin presents such a hindrance, and that to this extent the will is not free, has its root in a confusion of ideas. Either natural limitations to the human faculty of will, or hindrances to the performance of acts willed, neither of which have any relevancy to the subject of the will's liberty, are confounded with impediments to the exercise of will under the proper conditions of its action. Assuming the power to will, the liberty to exercise it is undeniable, and whenever the volitional power is exercised at all the volition is at once complete. Nothing can hinder it. There may be that which man has no power to will, and there may be many things which he has no inducement to will, but that does not interfere with his liberty to use the power he has and to exercise it when his judgment and desire furnish the inducement. A post-volitional act, to which the act of will is designed to give rise, may fail for want of sufficient power to overcome resisting forces. We may will to remove a rock and be foiled in our efforts. But we cannot in the same way be baffled in an effort to will. If there be power to will at all, there is nothing that can prevent the volitional act, although the voluntary act, which is post-volitional, may be hindered. There are no efforts to will which do not result in volition: the effort is itself the exercise of will. Even in generic volitions, where there are some-

times vacillations continued through months and even years, there are no efforts to will that are not volitional acts, though there are desires and counter desires that wage a war before the volitional power is exercised. When this is exercised the volition is an accomplished fact, and nothing internal or external can hinder it.

But this presents the subject only in one of its aspects. It has another side that is of equal importance. The question is not only whether man is unhindered in the exercise of his volitional power, but whether he is exempt from other powers in calling it into action. This is the main point in controversy between those who maintain the freedom of the will and those who deny it. The question in this aspect is whether man is a free personal agent, or whether he is an instrument employed by other agents for the accomplishment of their purposes.

It is a very inadequate view of the will that contemplates it merely as an instrument which the agent employs. I can use my hand, but another power may interpose to hinder its movements according to my will. It is an instrument employed by my will, as the pen is an instrument employed by my hand. I will to write, and employ primarily my hand and secondarily my pen for the purpose. My hand may be held, at the instance of another will, by a hand more powerful than mine, and my purpose is frustrated; my pen may break or be taken away, and again my purpose fails. Is the will similarly an instrument which I employ to accomplish my design? Manifestly it is not. My will can not be held, when I will to write, as my hand can be held when I will to write. The exercise of the power in my hand may be hindered; the hand is not free when a superior power holds it and prevents the act of writing in obedience to the volition put forth. The will can not be hindered, though my hand be held; the volition to write has been freely accomplished, although the end is not attained on account of lack of liberty in the instrument. Such a relation does not exist between me and my will. It is not my instrument, so that I, having formed a purpose and put forth my energies to accomplish it, could fail on account of any interference with the free action of the will. If it were an instrument in my employ, my

efforts could fail because the instrument is unfree, as my efforts to write may fail because my hand or my pen, as the instrument employed, is not free. But that is absurd. My effort is my volition. My will is not something distinct from myself, so that I could exert the power in me, but fail of my purpose because the power in my will is inadequate to sustain or execute, or is hindered in the expression of my power. My power of action is my will. The effort of my will is the effort of myself. It is not my instrument, but my personal power. It is only a confusion of thought when some philosophers speak of choosing to will or not to will, of willing to will this or not willing to will that. The person does not will to use his will as he wills to use his hand. He has no will which he could will to use as such an instrument. When he puts forth his personal effort he uses all the will he has, and it is absurd to speak of personal power which lies back of the will and which may employ the will as its instrument.

But this leads us into the very heart of the difficulty which has been the source of so much difference of opinion and so much controversy. Are there not forces within us and around us and above us that determine our exertion of energy or our exercise of will? If it is absurd to speak of personal effort that results in volition, must we not assume that some power other than that of our own person calls our will into activity? If it be claimed that man determines himself, is not the question forced upon us: what determines him to determine himself as he does? The doctrines of Determinism, Fatalism, Necessitarianism, Absolute Predestinationism are the result of mistaken efforts to solve the difficulty.

It is beyond all question that in every individual there are forces other than those of his will. His food digests and his blood circulates, whether he wills or does not will. So there are notions in his soul that are not the result of his volition. Thoughts and emotions come and go without his bidding. That these involuntary activities in soul and body have an influence upon the will is equally beyond question. The will cannot rise above the powers of nature. An evil heart cannot produce good volitions, nor can the will sunder

itself from the evil heart with which it is connected in the evil person. Neither can the ignorant and foolish soul will things that lie above the plane of its ignorance and folly. The person's nature and condition will necessarily make itself manifest in that person's volitions. As is the person's nature, so will his volitions be. Angels will as angels, and men as men. So good angels will as good angels, and evil angels as evil angels; good men will as good men, and evil men as evil men. In that respect the will certainly is not exempt from the influence of other powers. That is merely alleging that man is not God, and is therefore not absolutely independent in the exercise of power. He has human powers with human limitations, and can never lift himself above the sphere for which the Creator has made him, nor above the sin to which the catastrophe in Eden has reduced him. But all this does not prove that he is an instrument used by other powers and borne helplessly along to accomplish the ends of these other powers. If I can not lift myself above my nature, I can use my intelligence and will to make the best use of the possibilities that lie within the sphere of my nature and my environments. I cannot become an angel; with all my efforts I shall remain human. I cannot raise myself above the sin pervading the nature which I have inherited; but I need not be a fool or a villain. There is certainly room within the limits of humanity for manifold choice, and the question is whether each individual is determined by the necessities of his nature to be just what he is, or whether he has power as an individual person to will freely and make changes in his condition and surroundings. What we claim is that each person, as an individual, has a will of his own, and that if he cannot be anything else than a man, and, as matters stand now, anything else than a sinful man, he is not under a necessity of nature to be just the kind of sinful man he is. He is not compelled by his nature to be a sot or a murderer. He has the same nature which others have who are not sots and murderers, and has the same possibilities of choice within the limits of that nature. His power of volition is limited by his nature, but it is not necessitated within those limits. He is free to exert his energies according to his judgment, and is free, within the compass of his oppor-

tunities, to form enlightened judgments. All experience shows that, although there are forces of nature from which no man is exempt and which determine the area of human action, each individual has a personal will of his own and freely determines his own action within that area.

Some have endeavored to make it appear that such a view is contracted and fails to take into account factors which must become apparent on more mature reflection, and which no Christian could consistently deny. Even to heathen philosophers the dependence of man has been so obvious that they spoke of a Fate which governs all events, and therefore necessarily controls all wills as well as all other energies of mind or matter; and thinkers in modern times, constrained by the same facts, have recognized a necessitation of all our volitions by forces that secure order and harmony by carrying everything before them, whether these forces be called Chance or Providence, or whether they be blind powers in a machine that came into being and runs its course we know not how, or exertions of divine power directed to the accomplishment of an Almighty Maker's wise designs. If unaided reason has been led by its observation of nature to recognize such necessitation of man's willing, how much more, it is argued, should not men who accept the Bible as the Word of God, and who read in it that He made and governs all things, be constrained to believe that His omnipotent will, by an irresistible necessity, works out His purposes and therefore bends all forces in nature, including all created wills, to the execution of His decrees.

But such an argument, plausible as it is, will not stand the test of a rigid examination. Whether the Word of God teaches a divine government which lays necessity upon the human will in its operations is a question that is not decided by a rational deduction from the admitted proposition that it teaches a divine government. If reason cannot comprehend how it would be possible for God to accomplish His designs without so controlling the wills of His creature as to render choice and thus resistance of His will impossible, that is humiliating to reason, but it proves nothing. It may be possible with God notwithstanding man's inability to understand it. What the Scriptures teach on the point is not to

be determined *a priori* on philosophical principles, but must be learned from the Scripture texts which speak of the subject. But it is not true that the divine government of the universe logically implies a necessitation of the human will. This we concede, that when unaided human reason seeks to devise a theory which will explain the order of the universe and which, having accepted the doctrine that there is an Almighty Intelligence that has designed the whole and governs all to the accomplishment of His designs, will explain also how the end is attained notwithstanding the seemingly conflicting wills of His creatures, necessitarianism will be readily suggested and deceive by its plausibility, notwithstanding the insurmountable difficulties which it presents, but to which so many, in their eager haste to utilize it in points which it serves to explain, close their eyes. Fatalism, Determinism, Calvinism have had in the past and still have a certain fascination, because, whatever may be the inconsistencies of such a theory when the nature of God and His purposes are taken into account, it clears away difficulties in understanding the running of the great machinery of the universe, whatever may be its origin and its purpose. But the theory makes things clear only as the universe is contemplated in time and only in its interior adjustment of parts. When on such a theory we look back of it to God as its Author and Ruler, and forward to the results accomplished in their relation to the Author and Governor whose purpose is supposed to be achieved by each volition of the creature, all is dark. The charge of narrowness made against advocates of liberty is thus seen to come with bad grace from Necessitarians who, as soon as they look beyond the one point which their theory explains, become entangled in inextricable difficulties.

It has pleased God, among other creatures, to form man after His image, with those wonderful powers of intelligence which the history of our race has exhibited. He was appointed to subdue the earth and to have dominion over the other creatures which God placed upon it. That he has some power to know and compare and form judgments no one denies. Has he also a will, or is that which we call will only a sham, seeming indeed to be the exercise of energy that is

ours for the performance of actions which we have judged to be right or expedient and which we have chosen, but being in fact only the exercise of our Creator's energy through us as His instruments? Is the only difference between my volition to write and my hand's action in writing to be found in this, that my volition seems to originate the action, while in reality my will and my hand and my pen are all alike instruments of God, who uses one just as He does the other? Would it be possible for God to execute His will, if He had been pleased to form a creature that also has a will, and that might therefore originate action in contravention of the Maker's will? It would be sufficient for the answer of such queries, to point to the indisputable fact of consciousness, that I who write and you who read have a will, so that I can write or decline to write and you can read or decline to read, and to the other indisputable fact of Scripture and experience, that man can and often does contravene the will of God and that warnings are given and punishments are threatened in this regard. That God should recognize such facts so clearly as to give laws and denounce penalties on their transgression, and to declare the visiting of these penalties in many instances on actual transgressors, and yet that these facts should be only imaginary, is impossible, because it is impossible for God to lie. Man must therefore have a will that can not only choose and originate action of his own, but that can choose in opposition to God's will, as this is declared in His Word, and thus subject him to the divine wrath and the penalty of transgression. Man has a will, and that is the same thing as to say that he is a free agent and can originate action of his own. He is not the mere instrument which God employs to execute His will.

But it does not follow that, in a large view, God's purposes are thwarted by creature wills, and that thus the Creator's omnipotence is baffled by the creature. We do not understand, we cannot expect to understand, the reasons why God made all things as He did, and our finite minds, clouded as they are by sin, cannot comprehend, cannot reasonably expect to comprehend, the eternal purpose of God in all its wise adaptation of means to ends in creation and providence. But we do know, both from Scripture and experience, that

He was pleased to form a creature that could violate the Creator's will, and that did and does continually violate it. Man is a fact, and human sin is a fact, that is beyond all dispute. It is only a manifestation of that sin when men endeavor by subtle speculations to set aside the force of such fact as establishing the will's freedom from necessity, the outcome of such speculations being either that God wills sin and uses man as His instrument in committing it, or that sin is not really sin, because all that is called so is the work of the Holy One whose works are all done in righteousness. Why God made a being that could violate His will, or how He could make such a being, seeing that He is holy and good and wise, is not the question. Decide that as we may, the fact remains the same. Man has a will, and that will is so little necessitated by the Creator's will that it can put forth volitions contrary to His good pleasure. The creature can sin, and sin is a violation of the Creator's will as declared in His law.

This does not involve the absurdity, as Necessitarians charge, that the omnipotence of the Creator is overpowered by the impotence of the creature. No reasonable person would presume that in any given case in which God determines that a certain act shall be performed and man determines that it shall not, or vice versa, the puny will of man can obtain the mastery over the potent will of God. What God decrees must be executed, though it should involve the destruction of all creatures. The man who dares to set his will against God's can be crushed in a moment by omnipotence. Therefore the people of God are safe against the gates of hell. But that decides nothing to the point. The question is whether God had the will to make men, as He made the planets, to move only when He puts forth executive volitions that are to be performed through their instrumentality, and to move precisely as these volitions employ them, without any power in them to originate any action or effect any change whatever, or whether He chose to make man with a will of his own, leaving room, in assigning to him his place and office in the plan of the world, for the exercise of that will, even to the extent of putting forth volitions that are not right and salutary. If God resolved that I shall not

write to-day, certainly His resolve could be and would be executed. All my powers are in His hands, and if my will were not brought into coincidence with His will, He could palsy my hand or my brain, or destroy my life, and thus defeat any vain attempt that my will might make to thwart His purpose. So if He exerted the specific volition that I shall walk the streets to-day, He unquestionably has the power to effect that purpose. He can put my body in motion as He pleases, even if I should not have the will to exercise the necessary muscles and therefore did not move them voluntarily; and He has the power even to move my will against my judgment and my desire, although that would be equivalent to the destruction of my will and my personality and would reduce me to a mere machine. But all this is irrelevant. The question is not what God could do, or could have done. He could have made men something else than men, and could make something else of them now. He could have made them mere machines by which His volitions are executed; but did He make us so? The fact still stares us in the face that we can will, and that we can exercise that will even against the good pleasure of God. We can originate action that God would not originate, if He were using us as mere instruments to execute His volitions. This is so plain in the case of human sin that denial must seem preposterous.

Obviously when the power of man to force volitions of his own, and even to put them in opposition to the will of God, is asserted, it is not claimed that any purpose of the Ruler of the universe can be frustrated by the creature. To endow man with the power of will was part of the divine plan, and room was left for its exercise within the scope of that plan. Whether man chooses to act wisely or unwisely, to do right or wrong, the ends of God will eventually be accomplished. Man is limited by his created nature and by the providence which assigns to individuals their sphere of action, and when within these limits he undertakes what would counteract the purpose of God, his action is overruled, though his liberty is not destroyed. And as the general purpose and plan of God cannot be defeated by the free actions of the human will, because that purpose has contemplated these

actions and from eternity taken account of them in the formation of the plan, so the specific volitions of God cannot be frustrated, because these are not exerted in opposition to the general purpose, but in coincidence with it, so that where God from eternity has determined to grant men scope for the free exercise of their power of will, He cannot have determined, and cannot determine in time, to nullify that grant by the exercise of His omnipotence; in other words, what God has permitted me to will, He cannot have resolved that I shall not will. When He wills that men shall hear the Gospel, and men will not to hear it, the liberty of human willing is manifest, but it is equally manifest that, when individuals refuse to hear it, there is no divine executive volition placed against the human volition, so that the result would depend on the superiority of power between two antagonistic wills. God does not set His omnipotence against a man who refuses to go to Church. If He did, not only would the Church be planted in every place by His almighty power, but all men would be in attendance where the Gospel is preached. It would be well for men if they executed the will of God in this regard; but God does not employ His omnipotence to bring it about, and therefore it is idle to speak as if His omnipotence were defeated by man when it is not brought about. He could not, according to the purpose which he has formed and which He is executing in the history of the world, employ His omnipotence in such cases, because it is part of His plan to give scope to His freedom and yet accomplish His end. The will of God that we should hear the Gospel is not an executive volition at all, but His good pleasure revealed to men for their good, which, according to His established purpose, may be heeded or disregarded by His creature. It is as when we will the welfare of our fellow men, but with this difference, that we have not the power to execute our wishes, while God has the power, but has formed an eternal purpose in accordance with which man shall have liberty of willing and therefore His power shall not be exercised to constrain them. We desire our fellow man's good and therefore wish, in coincidence with God's desire, that they would hear the Gospel, using such persuasions as lie in our power to move their will in this direction, but

having no power to enforce our wish and therefore putting forth no executive volition in this regard. God desires man's good, and therefore desires and enjoins that he shall hear the Gospel, using manifold persuasions to move his will to choose this way of peace and happiness, but not using His almighty power to accomplish His desire, because this would be in contravention of His whole plan, according to which man has been endowed with will and shall have liberty to exercise it, even though in exercising it he make the evil choice that results in death.

"In the state of corruption" says Quenstedt, "there is in the will of man not only the liberty of contradiction or of action, but also the liberty of contrariety or of specification; not indeed so far as the choice between the spiritually good and evil is concerned, for that has been lost by the fall, but as regards the choice between this and that particular spiritual evil. There is in the will of man, in his state of corruption before conversion, 1) Liberty from physical necessity and from the necessity of co-action; for this is essential to it and hence could not have been lost by the fall; 2) Liberty of contradiction or action, which is choice between willing and not willing, acting and not acting; for the will of fallen man is not so determined that, the influence of the first cause and the application of second causes being assumed, he cannot still act or not act, or suspend action; 3) Liberty of contrariety or specification, not indeed between the spiritually good and evil; for this is lost by the fall, so that the will as depraved is determined only to the spiritually evil; that is, man in his fallen condition is destitute of all inclination to the spiritually good, and so his free will is, on account of the corruption of his nature, determined only to the evil in general. Hence the Scriptures describe corrupt man as blind in intellect, evil in will, rebellious in affections, and dead in sins, with total impotency in regard to the spiritually good. Gen. 6, 5; Matt. 7, 18; Rom. 8, 8. Hence Augustine says, lib. III. ad. Bonif. cap. 8. 'The captive free will is able only to sin.' Nevertheless there is in the will of fallen man that liberty of contrariety or of specification which lies 1) Between this and that spiritually evil in particular; for he is able most freely to choose between two or more spiritually evil things, and

voluntarily to apply himself as his intellect or desire suggests; 2) Between the naturally good and evil; for man in the state of corruption has liberty as respects natural and civil good and evil, both in general freely to choose, and to choose or not to choose this or that in particular. But this liberty is very languid, infirm, and crippled, so that unregenerate man is sufficiently consistent neither in the choice nor in the performance of natural and civil good." Syst. Theol. II. p. 176.

This is what we mean when we insist upon man's freedom in willing. He is not free from the sin which permeates his whole being and renders all his volitions evil, because he himself is in his nature corrupt. But he still has a will, and so far as his power extends, that is, so far as he wills at all, he wills freely. He is a sinful being now, and he cannot will otherwise than as a sinful being, so long as the grace of God has not rendered him a new creature, but as a sinful being he has liberty in willing.

It may be necessary to remind the reader that it is liberty of willing that is under consideration, not the liberty of executing what is willed, nor the liberty of accomplishing by specific volitions any purpose that may be formed. These are different things and must not be confounded. We do not claim that the plan of God in creation, according to which man is endowed with will, so that he can put forth effort by his own motion and in pursuance of special ends which are not God's, permits the execution of every act which man is permitted to will. We do not even claim that man has in every case power for such execution. He may will what he has not the ability to perform, and he may will that which he has indeed the power, but not the liberty, to execute. His will is free, but his action is not. A man has the power in his nature to commit murder. He is free to will it, though when he wills it he does so contrary to the good pleasure of God. He does it as a being whom God has designed to be a free agent, and with whose free willing, though it is often unhappy in its exercise, He therefore does not interfere. But whilst he is free to will it, he is not always free to execute it. God may by His providence interpose obstacles which render the external perpetration of the murder impossible, though inwardly by the act of will it has been com-

mitted. The freedom of the agent in his volitional acts, which are the proper activities of his own personal life as an individual, does not imply the freedom of his action beyond his person. In such external action there are others concerned as well as the individual who puts forth the volition; and while God's plan gives free scope to personal action by the will, He does not at the same time abdicate His authority as Ruler of the universe and divest Himself of the power to protect others against the abuse of the individual's liberty and to direct all action for the working out of His own purpose. Hence our assertion of human liberty of willing by no means implies that man is free to execute his own schemes, though these should contravene the purpose of the divine government. If God, in order to accomplish such purpose, sometimes foils the individual in his action, notwithstanding that he had the liberty of willing, it is equally certain that He will not permit human plans to be carried out that conflict with His own eternal plan. "The kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together, against the Lord and against His Anointed, saying, Let us break their bands asunder, and cast away their cords from us. He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh; the Lord shall have them in derision." Ps. 2, 2-4. God's purpose can be accomplished notwithstanding such counsels and men's freedom to form them. An individual may will to depose Christ as King in Zion, or any number may band together to exert their power in that direction. They are free to will it, but their willing it does not accomplish it. "Why do the heathen rage, and the people imagine a vain thing?" They can imagine the vain thing, but Jehovah reigns, and only what He permits can they execute. There is no interference with man's liberty of willing, and there is no need for any interference to secure the object of the divine government. But the execution is not as free as the willing; with that God does interfere, even to the destruction of His enemies, in order to work out His own plan and accomplish His own purpose. He "bringeth the princes to nothing, He maketh the judges of the earth as vanity." "The Lord bringeth the counsel of the heathen to nought; He maketh the devices of the people of none effect. The counsel of the Lord standeth forever, the thoughts of His heart to all generations." Ps. 33, 10. 11.

Since God has endowed man with will and does not prevent him from exercising the gift, His government of the world has to take into account many things that would not occur, if room had not been left for human liberty. Some of these occur simply by divine permission. God indeed supplies the power in the possession of each creature according to its kind, and He alone preserves this power. Since all is subservient to His will as the Governor of all, He cooperates also in the working of the various forces in nature and in man. But the intelligent creature with his power of will stands in a different relation to God, as the first cause of all, from other creatures that have no such power. He can originate action, and this may be against God's pleasure. He of course could not will a sinful thing if God had not given him the power to will and thus to choose. But God only permits such abuse of the will, as, when the wicked deed is externally executed, He merely permits the use of the bodily organs for such sinful ends. God does not approve them, but it does not please Him, at the sacrifice of human liberty, to exercise His power for their prevention. "My people would not hearken to my voice," saith the Lord, "and Israel would none of me. So I gave them up in their own hearts' lust, and they walked in their own counsels. O that my people had hearkened unto me, and Israel had walked in my ways." Ps. 81, 11-13. His counsels are worked out, even though men are unhindered in the execution of their evil volitions. But when necessary He hinders the deed, though the will is left free. Thus by removing the Child Jesus beyond Herod's reach, He prevented the murder which had been purposed, though He did not prevent the volition. Furthermore, God directs the free actions of men so as to attain results in accordance with His purpose. Not what Satan and wicked men design is ultimately accomplished, even when their actions are permitted, but what God wills. Thus we read in Acts 4, 27. 28: "Of a truth against Thy Holy Child Jesus, whom Thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do whatsoever Thy hand and Thy counsel had determined to be done." Not what the enemies of our Savior had designed was accomplished by His death, but

what God had purposed. So when Joseph was sold into Egypt the Lord's end was attained, though his brethren who sold him had other ends in view. Therefore Joseph said: "Ye thought evil against me, but God meant it unto good." Gen. 50, 20. Herod and Pilate and the brethren of Joseph all willed freely. God did not inspire them with the wicked thoughts and volitions which led to their action. They acted freely also in the cases mentioned, but to other ends than those which were attained. Their action, designed to be subservient to purposes of their own, were made subservient to the purpose of God. All power is in His hands, and He uses it to accomplish His own will, notwithstanding that He has been pleased to form intelligent creatures with wills, and thus with power to originate action of their own, which may be and often is different from that which He desires to have originated. Human liberty is not disproved by the fact which all Christians concede, that God sitteth King for ever, that His creatures cannot defeat the purpose of the Maker of them all, whose counsel shall stand and whose purpose shall be executed.

If it be objected that the doctrine presented, while it shows that there is no inconsistency between assuming a divine government that rules and overrules all for its purpose and a free will in intelligent creatures that can choose contrary to God's plan, still leaves the problem unsolved how such a government can attain its end in the individual agents who use their will against their Maker's pleasure, our reply is that this problem confronts us whatever doctrine we may hold concerning the freedom of the will, and presents less difficulty to freedomists than to necessitarians. If the will is free to act within certain limits even contrary to the good pleasure of God, who still attains the ends of His creation and government by frustrating human designs and hindering or overruling human actions that contravene His plan, though the volitions are not hindered, the perplexing question will arise, How could God, whose name is Love, permit men to will what must lead them to misery, even though He protect others against their evil designs? If He can, notwithstanding that individuals are permitted to run to ruin by the exercise of their freedom, accomplish His purpose, must not

that purpose be such as to include in the general plan of His creation this endless misery of the unbelieving and disobedient? We acknowledge the difficulty of such questions. It is the old problem of evil in the world of a God that is good—a problem that nonplusses all human thinking. As long as we keep in view ultimate ends of happiness that are to be attained by unhappy intermediate results, the subject is simple and the apparent inconsistency is easily explained. The love of God that seemingly cannot desire His creatures' pain may, guided by infinite wisdom, lead them through tribulation as the only, or at least the better path to happiness, bringing them through the intervening gloom to the glory beyond. In regard to the people of God this is known with certainty to be the course pursued by their merciful Father, who leads them through tribulation into the kingdom of God, and who gives them the comforting assurance that "all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to His purpose." Rom. 8, 28. What seems an infliction of evil is therefore only a means of conferring blessing. But this consoling truth concerning the afflictions of God's people will not explain the divine permission of evil, which, though God overrules it and uses it for the advancement of His saving work, and though on account of it the whole plan of salvation was formed as a part of the grand economy by which the universe is governed, is yet a bar to the happiness of many an intelligent creature whose will is employed in opposition to the saving will of God. Not only is the mystery of pain in the creature that, so far as any clear revelation is given us, has no compensation in a future world, not explained by this provision in the divine economy, but the final doom of the wicked in their endless agony is equally left in obscurity. If the goodness of God seeks the happiness of His creatures, it is clear that He may attain it notwithstanding such creatures' suffering, if only this is eventually brought to a close and the ultimate goal is reached. But how if bestowing the power of free will results in choice which is not overruled and made auxiliary to the ultimate and of happiness, but which issues in everlasting misery? We cannot deny the difficulty of finding a solution that will satisfy the human mind.

But for our purpose the answer will suffice, that it pleased God to make a creature with the power of will and thus of choice, though He foresaw that this creature would choose a path that must lead to misery. The question presenting itself is then this, whether it would be better not to create such a being as man and angels, with a free will that involves the possibility of sin and misery, or to create such beings even though the possibility of sin involve the foreseen reality. The fact that such a creature was made is not to be determined by our success in harmonizing such fact with the known attributes of the Creator. If Scripture and consciousness testify that man has fallen into sin and the proof is conclusive that the wages of sin is death, our reason may fail to find a satisfactory answer to the inquiry as to how this can be harmonized with God's goodness, but the fact is none the less obvious. To the presumptuous rationalist who would sit in judgment on the Creator and querulously criticise His plan, the appropriate answer is given by St. Paul when he says: "Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to Him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?" To the humble worshiper of God the sufficient answer is that God is wise and good, and made man thus in His wisdom and goodness, though to our limited vision the manifestations of these attributes are not in all cases apparent. It is not a humble and reverent spirit that would declare it better not to have made man at all than to have made him thus. God knows best, and we adore His wisdom and goodness, though we cannot with our limited capacities understand how the means which He employs are conducive in every instance to the ends of a universal love. The doctrine of man's freedom in willing leaves a problem without a solution that satisfies human reason, though it involves nothing which is contradictory and which the mind of a Christian could not therefore cheerfully accept. The necessitarian doctrine, on the other hand, only multiplies the difficulties. It makes that, even the permission of which we find it difficult to explain, an original and integral part of the divine plan. If the will is not free, the choice of evil, with the misery which it entails upon millions of mortals, is God's own choice. It is therefore

absurd for necessitarians to urge against us an argument which, while it only shows that advocates of liberty are unable to fathom all the mysteries of God's government, undeniably overthrows their own position by placing God in contradiction with Himself.

As against necessitarian theologians the doctrine of man's freedom in willing is absolutely safe. Calvinists effect nothing against us by urging that our doctrine denies the omnipotence of God, the immutability of His will, and the all-embracing reach of His government. He can do and actually does whatsoever seemeth to Him good, unhindered by created human wills; but He does not please to decide what volitions shall be put forth by creatures whom He has been pleased to endow with power and freedom to decide that for themselves. He does not put forth an executive volition that men shall, in any given case where a choice is to be made, put forth a particular one of two or more possible volitions, which divine executive volition may be baffled by a human executive volition choosing the contrary. Such freedom in man to thwart God's decrees does not exist and is not claimed. God put forth the executive volition in the creation of man that the latter shall have his choice, not that he shall have no choice and still have power to choose against God's choice. It is a confusion of ideas when the liberty which God gives to choose is supposed to overthrow the power which God has to decide otherwise, if He had been pleased to decide otherwise. God has no pleasure in the death of a sinner, and yet the sinner can choose death. He puts forth no specific volition that the sinner shall not die, which volition is rendered nugatory by a superior specific volition of the sinner. All human willing is idle against the absolute volitions of God. But God gives men liberty of willing, and therefore exerts no absolute volitions that would thwart His own purpose of giving man choice.

The same confusion underlies the objection that the doctrine of human freedom conflicts with the immutability of God's decrees. There are no divine decrees that conflict with God's creative plan. According to this plan man is free to choose. Although it is possible for him to choose what does not accord with God's good pleasure, God in His good pleasure

has not decreed the contrary of that which man in the exercise of his liberty shall choose. When a man puts forth a volition that is sinful, he wills what does not please God, but God has no need to change any decree on that account. He never decreed that such a man shall not sin, although it certainly is His good pleasure that no man shall sin. He forbids iniquity, but He never put forth the executive volition that it shall not be. If He had, sin never would have entered into the world. The decrees of God are in harmony with His whole plan of creation and providence, and cannot be rendered mutable by any free volitions of man, which were all contemplated in that plan from the beginning.

This will be a sufficient answer also to the third objection, that the doctrine of liberty in willing conflicts with the universal dominion of God. He is absolute Sovereign. His creatures are all subject to His government and can do absolutely nothing without His will. But His will is that man shall have a will and shall exercise it in freedom. If He chooses to form such a creature and govern him according to the nature which He has bestowed, just as He governs all other creatures according to the powers which He imparted and the design for which they were created, what right can this creature have to charge that by such a creation the Lord of all relinquishes His authority, at least as far as this creature is concerned? God still rules, and rules over man as well as over the rest of the universe, although He does not deal with man as He does with a stone or a plant, seeing that it was His pleasure to make him human, and not mineral or vegetable or brute.

That man in willing is free from physical necessity, or from outward compulsion in the exercise of his will, is a proposition that needs only be understood to be admitted. He is free from co-action or coercion in putting forth volitions. Even Calvinists and other advocates of necessity usually concede this much. Man has immunity as regards his will from all violence brought to bear from without and compelling him to will as he does. This is sometimes called interior liberty, or liberty in the subject, because the will acts by its own inherent power as God bestowed it in creation and preserves it by providence, not by any foreign force acting.

upon it from without and using it as an instrument. The source of its action is in the subject. The volition is the willing person's own act, not the act of some one else. It must constantly be kept in mind that we are speaking of will, not of the acts following volition. It is of volition that we claim freedom from coercion, not of the physical action to which volition gives rise, but which may also be affected by the volition of other agents. A man may be so overcome by physical force as to be made the unwilling instrument to take his neighbor's life. The deadly weapon may be forced into his hand, and his arm may be forced to deliver the fatal blow. But can any power force him to will it? We emphatically say no, and appeal with confidence to every man's consciousness for the proof.

It belongs to the very essence of the will to be free in willing. The will cannot be forced without ceasing to be will. A person may be placed in circumstances in which he wills otherwise than he would if his surroundings were otherwise. The force of circumstances influences his volition. Thus a man within the walls of a prison does not will what he would if he were at large. His impulses are to return to his home and there enjoy the comforts which the prison does not afford. But he knows that his action is hindered, and that it would be useless to resolve upon going home while the walls of his prison render the execution of such a volition impossible. He is not free to go where he pleases, and therefore the acts of his will are limited by his judgment, which confines them to that which is possible of execution. But is his will on that account not free? He has the power to will the walking home as well as the walking to and fro in his cell, and there is nothing that hinders the exercise of that power but his own judgment in the matter. When it is maintained that in such a case there is no liberty of will, the willing and the doing are manifestly confounded. He is not free to carry out a volition to return to his home, but he certainly is free to will it. That his prior knowledge of the impossibility of executing such a volition prevents him from putting it forth, is no more a proof that his will is not free than is the fact that his judgment decides against

walking to and fro in his cell a proof that he is not free to will it.

So far as man is the subject of motions over which his will has no direct control, as in the pulsation of his heart, all questions of liberty are irrelevant. The will has nothing to do with them. So far as he wills at all, he wills freely. What is a necessity of nature is not as such a matter of will or choice. A person may have little or no control over that which furnishes the main motive for his action, but he is free to will or not to will the action to which the motive impels. A criminal under arrest may have motives which strongly incline him not to go to prison. His desire is to remain at large. That is his preference. But he wills to accompany the officer, relieving him of the necessity of applying force. He wills freely. As regards his body he is not free, i. e. he is not at liberty to go whithersoever his pleasure might direct him. His desire is to be with his family, but this is not in his power. Whether he wills to go to prison or does not will to go, the result will be the same; for thither he will be brought. But as regards his will the case is otherwise. He need not will to go. There is nothing that can compel him to will it. He may choose not to go, notwithstanding that the presence of power to compel him supplies him with strong motives to will it, seeing that he must go in any event, and that his refusal would only subject him to trouble. But he can will not to go, and many under such circumstances do so will in fact. They are dragged to prison; they do not will that which is done. They will the reverse. The action of the will is the exact opposite of that which is externally done, but in the doing of which they have no agency. The will is free, though they are not free to execute that which they have willed, and no human government has a police or an army of sufficient power to force them to will what they do not choose. "Liberty," says Gerhard, "is assigned to choice, in the first place, in respect to its mode of action, because it is such that the will, so far as it is such, acts freely, i. e. it is not forced or violently driven by an external power; nor does it act merely by a natural instinct, but of its own accord, by an internal principle of motion, accepts or rejects a thing. In this sense free and voluntary are synonymous, so that to say the will is not

free is the same as if a person should speak of a warm thing that has no warmth. This is called freedom from compulsion, in virtue of which the will cannot be forced to do anything contrary to its inclination; also freedom from necessity, so far as necessity is taken for force and violence (but not for inmutability). Others call it interior liberty, by which the will is moved *ἐκουσίως*, spontaneously, freely, without coercion, by a power implanted and *προαιρέσει*, and has within it the principle of its own motion. Others call it liberty in the subject. This liberty, since it is a natural and essential property which God has given the will, has not been lost by the fall. The substance of man has not perished; therefore neither has the rational soul; therefore neither the will; therefore neither the essential liberty of the will. The will is an essential power of the soul, and the soul is nothing else but the essential powers or faculties themselves. Therefore while the soul remains, its essential powers, intellect and will, also remain. Again, the power of willing freely and without compulsion is essential to the will; therefore as long as the will remains, this power also remains. Hence Augustine says that the will is always free, but is not always good." *Loci XII, § 4-7.*

But this is not all that must be claimed and that our theologians do claim respecting the liberty of the will. We recognize the difference between freedom from external violence and freedom from a necessity that inevitably attains its end through the will, though there is no resort to violence in attaining it. But we cannot concede that man's will acts by the force of necessity, even though this necessitation be conceived as involving no coercion, but as operating with the power of instinct, bearing the will along as the brute is moved to supply its wants. "The form of free choice," says Quenstedt, "consists not in interior liberty, or in the freedom from external force and compulsion, which is equivalent to spontaneity and belongs also to the brutes. For to constitute free choice immunity from compulsion, in virtue of which one is moved and determined to do a thing voluntarily and without external violence, is not sufficient, for such immunity from coercion is improperly called liberty, inasmuch as it also belongs to brutes, which spontaneously go to their food; but

it consists in such indifference and freedom that the will is not necessarily determined to one thing, but, all the requisites for action being given, it can, in accordance with its own liberty, do either this or that, can choose one thing and reject the other, which is freedom of specification; can either act or not act, which is freedom of action." *Theol. Did. Pol.* II. p. 175. The human being has something more than the mechanical liberty which the clock has to do its work unhindered until it is run down; he has something more than the animal liberty which the bee has to build its honeycomb, doing this of its own accord, though it cannot do otherwise; he has the rational liberty of choice, so that he can act or not act, act thus or otherwise. "Liberty from coercion man has in common with the brute, but liberty from necessitation he has in common with God and the angels." *Quenstedt, Ib.* p. 172.

Whether man has such freedom from necessity is the main point of controversy in regard to the liberty of the will. Necessitarians generally concede that he has freedom from external violence, or from coercion, as it is too obvious that the denial of this would logically involve the contradiction of a will that wills when it does not will. They therefore concentrate all their force of argument upon the question, whether there is a necessitating power, be this denominated Fate or Nature or God, which produces each volition in man, so that this is not under his control and could not be otherwise than it is. Are we so made that our wills are under the control of other powers than our own and move as such extraneous forces dictate, or are we personal beings that can originate action and have liberty of choosing otherwise?

We urge, in the first place, that the nature of the will implies its liberty. The difference between compulsion and necessity of immutability we have conceded. The latter is the genus, the former the species. That a man cannot will otherwise than he does, does not necessarily mean that he is compelled by violence to will as he does. He might be so hemmed in by circumstances that no choice is left, there being but one action possible, and the mind might be so formed that when but one action is possible, or when one action is inevitable, that action is willed, or apparently willed. But whether the will be conceived as driven by an

external force against its own determination, which is the palpable contradiction of a will that wills what it does not will, and which, if it have any intelligible meaning, is intended to say that the will is not different from any other natural agents, i. e. that the existence of a will is a mere illusion, or whether it be conceived as forced by an extraneous power, which, though it does not apply the direct coercion of violence, still leaves no choice, the result is the same. There is no will where there is no power of choice. If man acts by necessitation, he is a nicely adjusted piece of machinery in which all volition is illusory. Human intelligence so makes a clock that the motion of the hands on the dial and the striking of the bell will indicate the time. Its proper motion may be unhindered, and in this sense it is free—a sense in which freedom may be predicated of a stone also when it rolls down the hill. But the clock cannot do otherwise than it does, because it has no will. It moves as it was made to move, and its movement is in obedience to the will of its maker, who has so arranged the parts and their mutual influences as to produce certain designed results. It is not a free agent, though some would say that it has full liberty to the work for which it is made, while it has no liberty of alterity, i. e. it cannot do otherwise, and is therefore not free from necessity. Strictly speaking, it has no liberty at all, because it has no will, and whatever power it may be said to have is in the being who made it and whose will it is made to execute. Is man such a machine, contrived by a mightier mind and wrought by a more skillful hand than those which man possesses? That God would be able to create such a wonderful being must be conceded. He could make a machine that would move differently under different circumstances, and that would seem intelligently to adapt itself to its environments and to choose its motion in accordance with them. It is not reverent to measure the power of God by our ideas of what is possible for man or possible for any being. Let us admit that He could make a creature to move as man moves, with all the semblance of intelligence and free volition, and yet that, like a clock, would move mechanically, but according to laws of which we have no knowledge, its judgments of expediency or right, and its choice seemingly

dictated by such judgment in the circumstances, being merely so many unaccountable phenomena of the marvellous machine's motion according to the Maker's will, the question would still be, not only whether man is such a machine, but whether it could in any proper sense be said to have a will. It would move as directed by a will, but that will would not be its own, as the clock moves according to its maker's will. There would, if man were so constructed, be no more propriety in predicating will of him than of my hand or of my pen which are moved as my will directs. According to the necessitarian theory what each individual seems to will is the result of a necessity in his nature or environment, and he can no more choose otherwise than a planet can choose a different path from that which it pursues or a rosebush choose a different flower from that which it displays. The will is thus regarded as a piece of machinery that differs from other mechanical contrivances only in presenting the delusive appearance in consciousness of having alternative power and of possessing the power to originate action, while in fact it no more has either than has a clock. The intellect may long and carefully ponder a subject, and the choice may be made with solicitude and seem the result of earnest and protracted deliberation, but Necessitarianism regards the whole as the inevitable result of natural forces, just as a plant among the rocks forces itself into the light under difficulties. If God or Fate or Nature thus works through man as an instrument, that which we call will is nothing more than a specific form in which the action of a foreign power becomes manifest, and the seeming determination of human actions by man himself through the will is all a delusion. Therefore we maintain that the question whether man has freedom of will resolves itself into the question whether he has a will at all. If what I choose is only seemingly, not really my choice, but the choice of some other power that uses me as its instrument, and if that which I seemingly determine is really determined by some one or something that uses me as a tool, I have the semblance of a will, but not the reality. It belongs to the essence of will to choose. Where there is no power for this, there can be no will. But where I can make my own choice between two or more actions or objects, or be-

tween acting and not acting, I have liberty from necessitating forces that would preclude such choice. It belongs to the essence of the will to be free from all extraneous powers, that it may choose. Will is choice, and choice is freedom from necessity which leaves no alternative. The denial of liberty in willing is therefore the denial of the power to will. Power and liberty are indeed not the same. There may be power where there is no freedom to exercise it. Thus man has the power of will, but since the fall that is limited to the sinful; he is not free to exercise it in the sphere of the spiritually good. But when it is denied that he can exercise a power at all, it is a mere delusion to maintain that he possesses it. Man is not free to choose the good; his will is in bondage in that respect: but if he is not free to choose at all, his will is not limited in certain respects and so far unfree, but he has no will at all.

The speculative difficulty involved in the doctrine that the will has alternative power, or the power of choice, should not be permitted to conceal from our eyes the facts of consciousness. It is unphilosophical to renounce our intuitions in order to save a theory. Man can choose. He it is not necessitated to will only the one act that is willed. In that case the will would not be his, but that of the being who made the choice and determined the act: he would be merely the agent for executing another's will. Man can himself choose. The speculative difficulty in regard to causation will remain the same, whether man be regarded as making the choice, or whether that choice be made by some other power whose choice man executes. It is argued that the volition is an effect, and must have a cause. But whatever may be the cause, it is productive only of that volition and could not have been productive of any other. Therefore choice is an impossibility. There can be no cause that produces its effect and at the same time might have produced another. The argument is plausible. But the facts remain as they are, and cannot be displaced by speculative difficulties, just as the facts of sense remain notwithstanding the perplexing objections of idealists. How can we know that there is anything external to us when all the evidence lies in the ideas that are within us and that might be there even if there were no ex-

ternal world? People still trust the evidence of their senses notwithstanding. But the difficulty in regard to the will is not so formidable. There is no good ground for transferring to mind the notions of causation as we have found them applicable to matter. In physics we are accustomed to regard a cause as correlated to its effect. Each cause is assumed to be unipotent, and alternativity in the operation of any cause seems impossible. So we have learned the fact to be in regard to material causes. But will is not matter, and there is no reason why the laws of matter should be applied to its operations. On the contrary, there is ample reason why this should not be done. If material causes are observed to be unipotent, human volition is observed to be exempt from such unipotent causation. If our willing is to be considered under the category of causation at all, that cause can therefore not be of the same nature as physical causes. The will has power of choice, physical forces have not. They do what the will that moves them direct them to do, and can do nothing but the one thing which that will has determined. Physical causes are unipotent because they act only when the determination to one thing has been made by the power that uses them: that they must do, and they can do nothing else. But man has a will, and that means that he is not a physical second cause which is determined by a will to which it is subject, but a personal being that can determine action. If any one pleases to call this alternative causation, we see no reason to object. But we do object to the *petitio principii* which, assuming that it is causation, assumes also that it is physical causation and therefore in-alternative, thus denying that it is will under the guise of denying that it is free. The whole difficulty is removed when we remember that man was made in the image of God, and is not a mere implement used by another being who makes the choice; or, if any one thinks that it still remains, it is a difficulty that attaches to will as such and must, if it is a valid reason for denying choice in man, have equal validity against choice in any being. If it is in the abstract impossible that a being should have the power to will either of two things, since the adequate cause of either could be productive only of the one volition and could not be the ade-

quate cause of the other, inasmuch as only one is produced in fact, then it would be impossible even for the Creator to will otherwise than He does, and the result is Fatalism in its worst form. Not only is the power of choice possible, but man would not be man without it, as he would have no will.

In proof that man is free in willing we appeal, in the second place, to the facts of consciousness, as these lie before every man in his own soul. Even supposing that it were not strictly correct to allege that all men are conscious of liberty in willing, inasmuch as liberty is rather a condition of the operations presented in consciousness than an operation itself, yet the evidence furnished is of convincing force to every mind that does not resist it in the interest of a theory. Every soul that observes its own action is assured that its volitions are in its own power, and that it never wills without being able to will otherwise. When it is urged that consciousness is not a competent witness because of the peculiar character of that which we call liberty, our answer is that we can be conscious of liberty in willing just as we can perceive liberty of external action. We can see whether anything coerces the movement of a man's hand when he performs an act, and we can see whether any powers interfere to prevent its performance when he exerts power that aims at performing it. The mind has all that is necessary for the cognition of liberty in external actions and internal operations, and decides by the aid of sense in the one and by the aid of consciousness in the other case. It is a mere subterfuge, when the question is respecting the liberty of an external action, to say that sense is not a valid witness; it is equally a subterfuge, when the question is respecting the liberty of an internal operation, to say that the evidence of consciousness is invalid. The evidence in a question of liberty has the same validity as in a question of cause or of substance. If the appeal to consciousness be disallowed, there is no means left to ascertain the truth but that of revelation, and all debate on the subject must necessarily cease, except among those who receive the Scriptures as their guide. But man will not submit to the dictate denying them the right to refer to the testimony of their own souls. To this they will continue to appeal, and to its testimony

they will give ear, whatever men may urge against its validity, just as men abide by the testimony of their senses, notwithstanding all protestations of idealists that such testimony proves nothing. By consciousness we know that when we put forth a volition it is our own free act; that we were not necessitated by an extraneous power which we could not resist; that we might have willed otherwise, notwithstanding all the influences urging us to will as we did. No operation of foreign forces presents itself in consciousness as causative of the acts of volitions; the power of self does present itself as active in the choice which is effected. I am as certain that the acts of my will are free as I am that they are mine, and I have my certainty by the same kind of evidence. They are not only operations in me, but they are operations of my own soul, for which nobody else and nothing else can be responsible. The operations of the will are traceable to no source but the personality of him whose operations they are. They are self-originated. That is the universal testimony of consciousness. There are numberless instances in which there are no volitions corresponding to the motives pressing upon the will and clamoring for action. If the action of the will were necessitated, such a phenomenon would be impossible. In that case the motive assumed to be rendered necessary by the circumstances would in turn render necessary the corresponding volition. Against a motive with the irresistible force of necessary causation it would be absurd to speak of opposing anything that would hinder its action. But the fact is clear in consciousness that motives do press towards definite volitions and that the will does resist them. Every soul has ample opportunity to observe this in its own experience. The instances are not rare in which the clamors for will-action in a certain direction are silenced and the tide of impulse is rolled back from the will. It can resist these impelling powers that are called motives. It is free from necessitation by forces within the soul as well as from compulsion by powers external. Necessitarians argue, indeed, that the cases in which we are conscious of resisting motives, and in which therefore there is a semblance of freedom from necessity, are just the cases in which there was no volition, necessitated or otherwise, and that therefore these

instances are irrelevant. If there had been a motive strong enough to produce volition, it is urged, there would have been no possibility of resisting it and the volition would have been necessary. But that is a sophism. It is argued that all volitions are necessitated proximately by their motives, and when we appeal to consciousness in testimony that the motives which press upon the will are often resisted and therefore often fail to effect volitions, it is replied that these are not necessitating motives, and therefore not motives at all in the sense contemplated. But that simply means that when there are motives necessitating volition these motives are necessitating. That we do not deny. But we do deny that motives are necessitating at all, and we appeal in proof to the fact of consciousness, that they can be resisted and often are resisted and rendered ineffective. So far at least, as these cases are concerned the freedom of the will from necessitation by motive is manifest; and if there are any cases in which there is no such liberty, consciousness knows nothing of them, and the assumption that there are is therefore merely a speculative hypothesis against the facts of intuition. Moreover, it is plain to every mind that where there is such a conscious resistance of motives there is not simply an inertia of the will. It is not only not a slave, but it is a master. It often makes a choice in opposition to the clamoring desires, as when one has a strong appetite for food or drink, but resists its impulse from considerations of health. Necessitarians may insist that in such cases there is still an irresistible motive that counteracts another motive which proves itself to be resistible; but consciousness decides that one is no more irresistible than the other, and that the will is lord in its own domain of volitions and exerts its power in freedom. The person, to whom all the powers of knowing and feeling and willing belong, is master of his own actions, and exercises the mastery in his volitions.

It is this that makes him a responsible agent. He could have no responsibility for his actions if he were not free. This is our third proof of the will's freedom. A rock has no account to render if it deals destruction around by thundering down the mountain. It could not do otherwise. The plant is not responsible if it grows where it can only be an

injury to other plants or to men. It does the only thing it can do, and none but fools think of punishing it for its action. Only where there is will can there be accountability. But there is accountability, not because there is action, as in the brute, but because there is action emanating from a person who has choice and liberty of specification and action in will. What in no sense lies in our power we cannot feel the obligation to do, we cannot be justly punished for not doing. We do not forget man's inability to do good and the punishment awaiting him for not doing good, but doing the evil to which his nature prompts him. We shall speak of that in another connection. Suffice it here to say that God does not demand of man what man was not made to perform or was not originally endowed with power to perform. All humanity cries out against the tyranny of lords who require of their subjects what they know to be impossible, and who punish them because they do not perform impossibilities. Legislators who make laws that cannot be obeyed, and who denounce and inflict punishments for disobeying them, are miserable tyrants. Knowing that the penalty must be inflicted, whatever efforts may be put forth to obey the law and escape that penalty, their legislation is simply giving utterance to their purpose to torture those over whom they have power. The Egyptian task-masters who required the tale of brick without furnishing the straw, thus making demands with which there could be no compliance and inflicting punishment for delinquencies which they themselves rendered inevitable, were inhuman despots, and all mankind condemns them. The heart cannot otherwise than hate even God, when it falsely holds Him to be a cruel Monarch who has pleasure in torturing His poor creatures. Luther was unquestionably right when he said of a false explanation of a Scripture text: "That is an ungodly interpretation; for how would it be possible, if one has such an opinion of God, that he should not be His enemy, since on His own will alone it would depend whether all men are saved or not." Erl. 2, 86. The accountability of man is based on his liberty in willing. If man is necessitated by the created constitution of his nature, or by the power of God, to will and act as he does, it would be folly to reproach and injustice to punish him for so

willing and doing. The thought would be shocking to man's moral sense that the Creator so made him that he must act as he does, and then inflicts pain upon him because he does what he must. Such an internal necessity in virtue of his creation would be the work of his Creator, and would relieve the creature of all responsibility, because he has no choice. The machine moves as it was made to move, and all responsibility for its necessitated motion rests on the maker.

Nor is the case different if it be assumed that there is an external necessity which moves the will and determines its volitions. If man is driven, without any power of choice, at each step to put forth just the volition which is actually effected, so that his acts of will are but so many effects of causes over which he has no control, how can he be held responsible for effects with which he has no personal connection? He is but a tool in the power of another who has used him; and if he has had the misfortune to be used for evil purposes, he cannot help it, and is no more accountable for it than the revolver is for the murder in the commission of which it was used. The doctrine of man's responsibility for his actions cannot be maintained without maintaining alternative power in the will. If this is not free from necessity there can be no justice in the infliction of punishment.

The legitimate consequence of necessitarianism is the overthrow of all moral distinctions. If man once sincerely believes that whatever he wills is only the necessary effect of some cause that impels him and against which he has no power—that all determinations, though they may seem to be those of his own soul, are really those of some other power that employs him as an instrument—he cannot feel any responsibility for his acts and would do violence to his own convictions if he in any case pleaded guilty. Though he may recognize an act as wrong, he could not recognize the wrong-doing as rendering him guilty. And these logical consequences have been drawn in fact, though the inducement in most instances is strong not to express the conviction. Thus Diderot is quoted as saying: "Examine it narrowly, and you will find that the word liberty is a word devoid of meaning; that there are not, and that there cannot be free beings; that we are only what accords with the general order,

with our organization, our education and the chain of events. These dispose of us invincibly." Then he draws the inference: "But if there is no liberty, there is no action that merits either praise or blame; neither vice nor virtue; nothing that ought either to be rewarded or punished." And no one will wonder at the practical lesson that he derives from the wild speculation: "Reproach others for nothing and repent of nothing; this is the first step to wisdom." The conclusion is fairly drawn; it is the premises that must be blamed. Certainly not all necessitarians press their theory to such a conclusion; but it may be well to remind writers of that school, when they endeavor to fasten upon advocates of liberty the charge of atheistic tendencies, basing the charge upon an erroneous view of causation which begs the whole question in debate, that as a rule atheists are necessitarians, though not all necessitarians are atheists. The drift of speculation that discards the Bible is undeniably in the direction of Determinism and Fatalism.

In the fourth place, we urge against Necessitarianism that it makes God the author of sin, assuming that the fact of sin's existence in the world be still admitted. If the Creator uses the creature as man uses an implement, so that what the individual does is God's deed through him, as what my hand or my pen does is my work through such organ or instrument, the sin which he commits is God's, as the writing which my hand and my pen do is mine, and no philosophical mystification of the subject can make it appear otherwise. Indeed, necessitarian writers, Zwingli and Calvin among them, have virtually admitted this, while they formally sought to refute the objection. Teaching that the acts which God performs through man as His instruments are sinful so far as man is engaged in them, but good so far as God, who is their true author, originates them, wipes out all distinctions between right and wrong, or rolls back the guilt of sin upon God. It is futile to reply that the sin lies in the will, and that man wills evil while God wills good in the same act. It is futile, because the question is about the volition, not merely the act. If the will in man to violate the divine command was necessitated by the decree of God, the will of God in necessitating such a volition could not be different in

moral quality from the volition which was thus originated. The same act may be different in moral quality as the purpose is different; but if the purpose in man is bad, not he, but God who necessitated it, is the author of the bad purpose, not only of the bad act resulting. If man has not himself originated the bad purpose, in other words, if man has not the liberty of will, but all must be referred to the decree of God, either there is no sin, or God is its author.

Finally, what is given by the human intelligence in the contemplation of the soul's powers is taught also with unmistakable clearness in the revelation delivered us in Holy Scripture. The Bible does speak of a bondage under sin and of a liberation by grace. Man is not by nature free from sin and death; "the truth shall make you free." Those who reverence the Word will let that stand. But that is not the matter now under consideration. The question is not here whether man, in his present depraved and disordered condition has all the ability with which God originally endowed him, nor how the introduction of sin as a disturbing and destroying element affects the will's liberty; but it is whether man has freedom to will in any case otherwise than he does will, in other words, whether he has a will at all. That he has such liberty is so obviously implied in all the admonitions and warnings, in all the rebukes and commendations contained in the Bible, that the proof is presented on every page. Man is everywhere treated as an accountable being, and accordingly rewards are promised and punishments threatened to encourage right and discourage wrong action. All this would be unintelligible if man had no liberty of choice and put forth volitions as a tree puts forth its leaves. "Choose you this day whom ye will serve" (Joshua 24, 15) could not be addressed to beings who had by their creation no power of choice. "How shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation" (Heb. 2, 3) could not be spoken of creatures with whom but one course is possible. St. Peter's argument showing the heinousness of Ananias' sin strikes every reader as forcible, because every reader is conscious of the liberty upon which it is based. "While it remained, was it not thine own? and after it was sold, was it not in thine own power? Why hast thou conceived this thing in thine heart?" Acts 5,

4. Ananias was free to sell or not to sell his land ; and after in his liberty he had chosen to sell it, he was free to give or not to give the proceeds to the apostles for the support of the poor. He chose not to give it, but to claim the credit of having given it. There was no necessity of any kind laid upon him to give his possessions, and his lying was therefore a wanton deception to which there was no motive but vain glory. It was all a matter of liberty, there being no necessity to sell nor to give nor to lie. This liberty of choice is, within the area of its power, so unrestrained, that even the will of God may be contravened. Our Savior says : " O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets and stonest them which are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not ! " Matt. 23, 37. That, indeed, is the root of all our woe, that man, in the exercise of his freedom of willing, opposed and, as a consequence of the first fatal error, still opposes the will of his Maker and thus misses his goal and his happiness. Never could the fall have taken place if it had not pleased God to make man an intelligent being with the power of willing, and thus with freedom from compulsion and necessity. Such a being he is still, although by his abuse of liberty he has excluded himself from the whole domain of the spiritually good. He is still free, though he is not good. Hence our Confession says : " Concerning free will our churches teach, that man's will hath some liberty to work a civil righteousness, and to choose such things as reason can reach unto. " " We confess that there is in all men a free will, which hath indeed the judgment of reason ; not that it is thereby fitted, without God, either to begin or to perform anything in matters pertaining to God, but only in works belonging to this present life, whether they be good or evil. " Augsb. Conf. Art. XVIII.

While then the will is not free from obligations imposed by the Maker and Monarch of all, and while it is not free from sin and the dominion which it exercises and the misery which it entails, it is free from compulsory and necessitating powers. This is involved in its nature as will, which is the power to choose and to originate action ; this is implied in man's nature as a moral and responsible being ; this is the

testimony of human consciousness and divine revelation. Indeed it is a necessary presupposition in the whole Christian system, as without it there would be no guilt and no need of salvation. L.

ATTRIBUTES OF DIVINITY.

BY REV. H. J. SCHUH, A. M., DETROIT, MICH.

Our Catechism defines God as a "*Spirit who is eternal, almighty, omniscient, omnipresent, holy, righteous, merciful and faithful.*" Dietrich, quest. 160.

How often do we mention these attributes of Divinity without a proper appreciation of their import! God is incomprehensible. We cannot even properly conceive the genus in the above definition. "Spirit" is a thing which, in spite of all attempts at accurate definition, must still ever remain more or less of a vague idea. Even our own spirits or souls offer scores of unsolved problems; how much less can we finite creatures understand what an infinite, uncreated spirit is! We define God as a spirit with certain attributes, and yet we only understand these attributes approximately. We only catch glimpses of His glory. The rays of His majesty reach us only broken by our limited capacity of comprehension. "Now we see through a glass darkly." 1. Cor. 13, 12.

When we define God as *eternal* we mean that He is without beginning and without end. This is easily said, but not so easily understood. We poor mortals, in our present state, are limited to time in all our thinking, just as we are limited to space. Whatever is outside of these circles is beyond our reach. Where these end the infinite begins.

We may try to get an approximate idea of eternity by comparison. The life of man seems long when compared with the life of the insect which lives but a few hours. Yet how very short is the average life of man to-day when compared with the age of his ancestors before the flood! Seventy or eighty years are a mere hand-breadth when compared with

the life of Adam or Methusaleh. Yet Methusaleh died and passed away, but the earth on which he trod still exists, the mountains on which he gazed with awe are still the admiration of the world. Mathusaleh seems a youth when compared with these "everlasting hills." Yet what are these six thousand years since time began, when we speak of Him in whose sight "a thousand years are as but yesterday when it is past and as a watch in the night." Yes, "before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting thou art God." Ps. 90, 2. All the days in the stream of time are less than a drop in the bucket compared with the flood of eternity. If all the earth were a sand heap and but one single grain were carried away every thousand years, still the limit of eternity would not be reached when the last grain was removed: it would indeed be no nearer than when the work began.

So we may make comparisons, but it is like the prattle of children. Who can dip the ocean dry with a spoon? And yet it would be easier to do this than to press eternity into forms comprehensible to the human mind.

How easy it is to say: God is *almighty*. How readily do we define this in the statement that God can do whatsoever He wills! And yet who can have a proper conception of what this means? All our ideas of force are baffled, all our conceptions of strength are bewildered, all our notions of power vanish, when brought to bear on divine omnipotence. How strong a man seems when compared with the worm which he unconsciously crushes under his heel! And yet what is the strength of man when compared with that of the horse? How majestically Job describes the war-horse! "Hast thou given the horse strength, hast thou clothed his neck with thunder . . . He paweth the valley and rejoiceth in his strength. He goeth on to meet the armed men. He mocketh at fear and is not affrighted." 39, 19-23. And yet what is the horse when compared to the power of steam in its appliances in machinery? Yet what a toy is a steam engine when compared with the pent-up forces in the bowels of the earth! The earthquake makes the very mountains tremble, and the earth itself rolls like the sea, and towers of

strongest masonry reel and rock like a drunkard and fall to the ground. Yet the earthquake is the merest touch of the heel of the Almighty on his footstool. Job says of God: "He is wise in heart and mighty in strength: who hath hardened Himself against Him and hath prospered? Which removeth the mountains, and they know not, which overturneth them in His anger; which shaketh the earth out of her place, and the pillars thereof tremble." 9, 5-6.

See how majestically yonder steamship moves from its dock. A thousand horses could not budge the load which it carries as easily as a boy pulls his toy wagon. Yet behold this monster of strength out on the high seas. It has become a frail bark at the mercy of the elements; a mere nutshell tossed about by the mad waves. The hurricane shatters it to pieces on the rocks, as a peevish child dashes a cup to fragments on the floor. Yet the hurricane is a mere breath of omnipotence. Think of Him who holds heaven and earth in the hollow of His hand, sending the earth and the whole planetary system out into space, as a boy would spin his top or pitch his ball!

In a very few words we define the *omniscience* of God as that attribute by virtue of which He knows all things. And yet what do we know of omniscience? All the knowledge of which we can conceive is limited. We may have seen or heard of men who were very prodigies of knowledge, and yet all they knew appeared to them a mere hand breadth in the untraversed fields of knowledge before them. We know a great deal more than we did twenty years ago, for we are learning every day. Twenty years hence, though we may have advanced in some departments of knowledge, yet we will have forgotten a great deal. God never learns—He never forgets. Knowledge comes to us by slow processes of observation, and reasoning. To God everything is immediately present. We designate ideas by words to hold them—God needs no such forms of thought. Often what we suppose we know is mere deception. Very frequently "things are not what they seem." God's knowledge is perfect. All the hidden things of nature, all the mysteries of our physical and mental organization, are known to Him better than the artisan knows the workings of the machine which is the work

of his hands, better than the mother knows the nature and disposition of her child. God knows not only all that is known, but all that it is possible to know. To Him there is no such thing as invention or discovery. He knows the contingencies of the future as well as the facts of the past. In truth there is to Him no such thing as past and future, but all is one eternal present.

The *omnipresence* of the divine Being is just as incomprehensible. In fact when we endeavor to go beyond the simple definition that God is everywhere, we can do little more in the illucidation of this attribute than to guard against wrong conceptions. God is not spread out over space like light or air. His presence is not limitable by space. The manner of His omnipotence is not local. No boundaries can contain Him. In this sense we can say that God is nowhere just as well as we can say He is everywhere. The whole divine Essence is everywhere in Heaven and on earth. He is in every particle of matter, yet not as though He constituted a part of it, or as though it were a part of Him. Neither is His presence merely ideal, as a friend is present to us in thought, or dynamic, as the sun is present all over the earth with its light and heat, but real and personal. After the manner of omnipresence God is present even in hell. And no doubt the majesty and righteousness of the ever present God is the torture of tortures to the "spirits in prison." The psalmist says: "Whither shall I go from Thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from Thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, Thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, behold Thou art there." Ps. 139, 8. Luther says: "God is present everywhere, in death, in hell, and in the midst of His enemies, even in their hearts." Erl. 41, 371. On the passage Isa. 66, 1: "Thus saith the Lord: The heaven is my throne and the earth is my footstool," Luther comments thus: "What can Isaiah mean to say in this passage? St. Hilary also says concerning it that God is essentially present at all places, in and through all creatures in all their parts and places, so that the world is full of God, and He fills all things, and yet is not enclosed or embraced by it, but is at the same time outside of and above all creatures." Erl. 30, 60.

Even that part of the divine essence and attributes

which God has revealed to us in His Word, furnishes more material for thought than the human mind from the beginning of the world to the end of it can properly digest. Then he must be foolhardy indeed who imagines that he can perfectly apprehend the essence or attributes of divinity. How immensely insignificant does man appear in all his powers and attributes when compared with God! And yet how often does he behave as though heaven and earth, yea God Himself, must bow to the dictates of his reason!

HOMILETICAL DEPARTMENT.

Contributions to this department are respectfully solicited.

C. H. L. S.

NINETEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. EPH. 4,
22-29.

A.

Int. Thoughts:—1. Ever and anon the cry is raised that Christianity is a failure. a) Its falsity, Matt. 24, 35; 16, 18; &c. b) The lying spirits who raise the cry.

2. True it is, however, that the "Christianity" of some individuals is a failure, an utter failure—a self-deception, and as to others, a fraud and an offense.

3. Notwithstanding all the assaults made upon the Church from the time of its establishment on to this day, and despite the repeated predictions of its overthrow, it still exists and flourishes: its walls are expanded day by day and the children of God within them go from strength to strength.—At the same time there are within the Church now as in all time past, those whose profession of Christ is insincere—such as have the form of godliness but experience not its power—such as have never rightly learned Christ; in short, people who would be called God's people and yet not be it.

Transitus: In our to-day's lesson St. Paul raises his voice in warning against a lifeless Christianity. He tells his peo-

ple that it will not do to come out from among the heathen and call themselves Christians, and at the same time bring their old heathenish hearts along and continue to walk in heathenish ways. He shows them the necessity of new hearts and of new lives—a lesson always in season and to the point. From St. Paul's words let us learn again the important truth, that

TO BE A CHRISTIAN IMPLIES A RENEWAL OF THE WHOLE
MAN.

I. *A renewal which takes place in the spirit of his mind.* V. 22-24.

1. When he putteth off the old man; (that is, the mind as by nature sinful and in life corrupted). V. 22.
2. When he putteth on the new man; (that is, a mind righteous and holy). V. 24.

This renewal is the work of God: He creates in us a new heart and renews a right spirit within us—it is gradual, and a lifelong process—it takes place under pains of hard labor and severe conflicts—and no one is a Christian before God except by this regeneration and renewal of his inner spiritual nature.

II. *A renewal which shows itself in his daily walk.* V. 25-29.

By way of example the Apostle mentions that the Christian, the man so renewed

1. Puts away lying and speaks the truth; v. 25 (and this in all the spheres of life: in the family, in society, in business, &c.).
2. Is not given to anger, but is peaceable; 26.
3. Resists the devil and his temptations, in all things; 27.
4. Steals not, but is industrious and charitable; 28.
5. Is chaste, and in every way strives to edify all about him; 29.

C. H. L. S.

B.

THE CONSTANT WORK OF GOD'S CHILDREN.

I. *What they do in behalf of themselves:*

1. They put off the old man ;
 2. They put on the new man.
- II. *What they do in behalf of the brethren :*
1. They speak the truth ;
 2. They follow after peace ;
 3. They support the needy.

FROM THE GERMAN OF SOMMER.

TWENTIETH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. EPH. 5,
15-21.

A.

Int. Thoughts.—1. “The days are evil!”—Compare our own with Apostolic times. E. g. worldliness, idolatry, false science now as then ; but in our favor, religious liberty, &c., for among us “the Word of God is not bound,” but may have free course, whereas St. Paul was imprisoned for his faith’s sake. Still, even now, “the days are evil!”

2. How are we to demean ourselves in these evil times ?
—As God directs.

THE GOOD WALK OF A CHRISTIAN IN DAYS THAT ARE
EVIL.

- I. *He does what God would have him do.* 15-17.
1. He inquires into the will of the Lord ;
 2. Knowing the Lord’s will, he does it—and that is wisdom, and thus he is preserved against the low cunning and the destructive foolishness in which so many seek refuge in evil times.
- II. *What God would have him do he does in His Spirit.* 18.

The man of the world relies upon his own strength—and when this would fail him, he resorts to wine and strong drink. And what are the results?—Not so the Christian : his life and strength are of the Lord. “Be filled with the Spirit.”

- III. *Whatever he does is done unto the Lord and for the good of others.* 19-21.

C. H. L. S.

B.

GOOD COUNSEL IN EVIL DAYS.

- I. *Be vigilant.*
- II. *Redeem the time.*
- III. *Grow in knowledge.*
- IV. *Be sober.*
- V. *Sing psalms.*
- VI. *Give thanks.*
- VII. *Serve one another—in evil days.*

FROM THE GERMAN OF GEROCK.

C.

FAMILY WORSHIP (ad v. 19).

- I. *It sanctifies our homes.*
- II. *It unites our hearts.*
- III. *It strengthens our hands.*

FROM THE GERMAN OF FUCHS.

TWENTY-FIRST SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. EPH.

10, 10-17.

A.

Int. Brethren.—What think you of a man, if a man he can be called, who, in time of war, though he see his house and home, his wife and children, even his own life, in extreme jeopardy, is yet so blindly indifferent, so cowardly and mean in heart, that he raises not so much as a finger in defense of himself and his own? Thanks to the activity and bravery of his neighbors, and by the victory of his fellow-citizens over the common foe, the wretch may be saved from the fate he so richly deserves; but though he may escape with his miserable life, the meanness of his soul and of his behavior will ever be held in contempt by all fair-minded men. And there are just such people, plenty of them. They would rather run the risk of losing all they have than willingly give a dollar for the protection of their property—they

hope that others will pay. Rather than fight for their lives, they will hide away or run—they hope that others will fight for them. Such are a reproach and disgrace to any nation, and to be fastened to the pillory for a whole summer and winter together were a punishment not at all too severe for them.

Now a class of people who act no better part, we meet again in another and higher plane of life. We know that all the powers of darkness are arrayed against the kingdom of God's dear Son; and that Christ and Christians are engaged in continuous warfare against these evil powers. We know that in this world the salvation of men's souls is as yet not put beyond the reach of all danger; that their old foe and destroyer never rests; and that, to secure themselves, they must be vigilant, active and brave, in doing battle under the Captain of their salvation, even Christ Jesus.—In this holy warfare, how pitiful is the position assumed by some Christians, and how inglorious the part they play in it! Having yielded to the lusts of the flesh—a thing of daily occurrence—they in a manner regret it and, like frightened children, cry over it, but as to putting forth some efforts toward crucifying the flesh, not a thought of it, though exhorted again and again to do so in the strength which the Lord giveth. The temptations and the snares of the world are pointed out to them; but they will do nothing for their own escape, though they may allow others to step in between them and the evils which threaten their destruction. In steadfastness of faith to resist the devil, as they are called to do, appears to them an unreasonable imposition. Too careless and indolent to do anything for their own safety and advancement, it is wholly out of the question, of course, that they should do anything in defense of their fellow Christians or in furthering the cause of their Lord. However quick and efficient they may be in the affairs of this world, in spiritual things they are drones, and to their fellow Christians they are a stumbling-block and an offense.

Brethren! how is it with you? Are you fully conscious of it that the life of a Christian is one of hard work and of constant warfare? And if so, what part do you take in it and how do you conduct yourselves?—On this very matter

the veteran soldier and saint, the Apostle Paul, addresses you to-day. He was one of the first enlisted under the flag of our good King; and one who, when about to lay down his arms at his Master's bidding, could say: "I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith: Henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous Judge, shall give me at that day: and not to me only, but unto all them that love His appearing." 2 Tim. 4, 8. To give heed to the words of a soldier thus approved, we will do well.

THE GOOD FIGHT OF FAITH.

I. *Against whom?*

II. *How fought.*

C. H. L. S.

B.

THE HOLY WARFARE OF CHRISTIANS.

I. *The call by which they are invited to enlist.*

Holy is the call of the Lord, which He extends to all Christians, and in which He would encourage them to do battle and bestow upon them the needed strength.

II. *The cause, in behalf of which the fight is to be fought.*

The fight is for God's kingdom and against the powers of wickedness and the devil's kingdom.

III. *The weapons to be used in it.*

Paul describes them as three in kind:

1. Weapons of a preparatory sort. V. 14-15.
2. Weapons designed for protection. V. 16-17 (Faith and Hope).
3. Weapons for the assault—The sword of the Spirit. V. 17.

IV. *The triumphant issue of the fight.*

That ye may be able to stand. V. 11. and 13.

FROM THE GERMAN OF HEUBNER.

TWENTY-SECOND SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. PHIL.

1. 3-11.

A.

Int. Thoughts.—1. The 3. Art. of the Creed: "I believe--- the communion of saints."—The importance of this part of our confession.

2. What, in the words of our text, is termed "the fellowship in the Gospel" is nothing other than this communion of saints—and the Apostle as he here lays open his heart to his dear Philippians is a living example of that fellowship.

OUR FELLOWSHIP IN THE GOSPEL.

I. *In the gifts of the Gospel.*II. *In the work of the Gospel.*

C. H. L. S.

B.

PAUL'S REMEMBRANCE OF HIS PHILIPPIANS.

I. *He gives thanks.* V. 3-5.

1. *For what?* For the fellowship of the Phil. in the Gospel of Christ; that is, that they have in faith received the Gospel of God's grace in Christ and accepted the eternal and heavenly treasures of salvation; and then, that they had spread this Gospel. How St. Paul came to Philippi, the capital of Macedonia, is stated Acts, 16, 8, &c. The congregation was in a flourishing condition, and hence he remembered it "with joy."

2. *To whom?* To his God, who had called him into His service and sent him to Philippi. He gives the glory to God and not to himself; for faith is not the work of man but of the Holy Ghost. Neither does he thank the Philippians for their conversion; for man by "his own reason and other natural powers cannot come to Christ" &c.

II. *He is hopeful.* V. 6-8.

1. *He hopes for what?* That God, who has begun the good work of calling, enlightening and sanctifying the Philippians will also finish it by keeping them in the true faith until the day of Christ, i. e. of His coming to judgment.
2. *On what is his hope grounded?*
 - a) On the faithfulness of God v. 6. God is not like men who begin a good work but fail to finish it. What God begins he will perfect in glory if men will not maliciously resist Him.
 - b) On his own love to the Philippians. 7-8. He had them "in his heart," loved them even as Christ loved them; and in such love he could not but hope the best of them and trust that they would not hinder God's work in their behalf. By the grace of God he defended and confirmed the Gospel, and his Philippians were partakers of the same grace.

III. *He prays.* V. 9-11.

1. *For what?* That the love of the Philippians to God and Christ might increase—that they might grow in the knowledge of God's love in Christ to them—and richly experience that love.
2. *And why?* 10-11. (That they bring forth fruits of righteousness to God's glory).

In this way every true pastor gives thanks, hopes and prays in view of his people. This has been my prayer from the first day of my presence with you until now; and so will I continue to pray, hope, &c. May God accept my prayers for Jesus' sake.

FROM THE GERMAN OF FUCHS.

TWENTY-THIRD SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. PHILIP. 3, 17-21.

A.

- Int. Thoughts.*—1. Gal. 4, 4-6. a) V. 4-5; b) v. 6.
2. Accordingly we are still required to do the law; a)

not to be saved, but because we are saved; b) not as servants, but rather as children of our Father's house.

3. Yet how foolish, thoughtless, tardy, faithless, guilty we all are in the doing of our Father's will.

THE APOSTLE'S ADMONITION TO GODLINESS OF LIFE.

I. *He advises us to learn from others.*

(So we do in the affairs of this life, and quite often with profit to ourselves.)

1. From "the good"—to be followers of them. V. 17.
 - a) Above all of Christ—also of Christians.
 - b) This implies that we should so live that we may be examples to others.
2. From the bad—to avoid their ways. 18-19.
 - a) From the lovers of ease, of pleasure, of vain-glory, of money, &c.
 - b) From those who err from the truth, following false prophets.—Their grievous end consider.

II. *He points us to our high and holy estate.* 20a.

1. "—Our conversation (rather citizenship) is in heaven."
2. "For our conv. . . ." This he sets forth a ground for godly living.

III. *He reminds us of the coming of our Savior, the Lord.* 20b-21.

1. To judge,
2. To glorify us.

Let us not anger the Judge—let us gather strength from the coming of our Savior.

C. H. L. S,

B.

SOMETHING ABOUT THE FOES AND ABOUT THE FRIENDS OF CHRIST.

I. *Who are the foes?*

1. False teachers who have departed from the pure

Scripture doctrine—who by false teaching blaspheme the name of Christ—who destroy souls.

2. Those who will not suffer for Christ's and righteousness' sake—who will see good days in this life.

II. *Who are the friends?*

1. They who believe in Christ, who believe that He has reconciled them to God with his sufferings and death.
2. They who suffer patiently for righteousness' sake.

FROM THE GERMAN OF BRENZ.

TWENTY-FOURTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. COL. 1, 9-14.

A.

- Int.*
1. The mercies of the past year.
 2. Glad and grateful hearts.
 3. If we come short of any real and needful good, our's is the blame.

AT THE CLOSE OF THE PRESENT CHURCH-YEAR, WHAT LACK WE YET?

- I. *In wisdom, the attainable fullness.* 9.
- II. *In good works, a greater fruitfulness.* 10.
- III. *In patience, more strength and joy.* 11.
- IV. *In gratitude, deeper humility.* 12.
- V. *In our citizenship, a fuller sense of its supreme glory.* 13-14.

Seeing what we lack, let us not forget for a moment what we have received, and thank God for it. C. H. L. S.

B.

THE BLESSEDNESS OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE KINGDOM OF GOD'S SON.

- I. *Wherein this blessedness consists:*

1. In this that God has made us meet to partake of the inheritance of the saints in light.
2. In this that He has delivered us from the power of darkness.
3. That through the blood of Christ we have redemption.

II. *What it requires of us:*

1. That we increase in the knowledge of God and of Christ.
2. That we give thanks to the Father for his grace through Christ.
3. That, as citizens of the kingdom, we walk worthy of our Lord.

FROM THE GERMAN OF BRANDT.

TWENTY-FIFTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. 1 THESS.
4, 13-18.

A.

“AND SO SHALL WE EVER BE WITH THE LORD!”

- I. *The truth of this assurance.* V. 13-17.
- II. *The comfort of this assurance.* V. 18. C. H. L. S.

B.

THE HAPPY LOT OF THOSE THAT DIE IN THE LORD.

- I. *They are not dead, they sleep.*
- II. *They sleep, but they shall be awakened.*
- III. *Awakening, they shall rise to glory.*

FROM THE GERMAN OF SOMMER.

TWENTY-SIXTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. 2 THESS.
1, 3-10.

A.

THE COMING OF THE LORD UNTO JUDGMENT.

- I. *To take vengeance on them that know not God.*
- II. *To be glorified in His saints.* C. H. L. S.

B.

THERE REMAINETH A REST FOR THE PEOPLE OF GOD.

1. In this life the people of God have trouble and tribulation.
2. But this shows that the promised rest is reserved for the future.
3. On the day of retribution it will be given to them who continue unto the end.

FROM THE GERMAN OF GENZKEN.

TWENTY-SEVENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY. 2

PET. 3, 3-14.

A.

BEHOLD, I COME!

- I. *Though I tarry, yet will I come, and quickly.*
- II. *My reward is with me, to give every man according to his work.*
- III. *Look for me, and be ye ready.* C. H. L. S.

B.

THE DAY OF THE LORD.

1. A day of the revelation of His power and glory for all who have not known Him.
2. A day of condemnation for all who have not believed in Him.
3. A day of salvation for all who receive Him in faith.

FROM THE GERMAN OF FLOREY.

T H E COLUMBUS THEOLOGICAL MAGAZINE.

This Magazine is designed to supply the want, long since felt, of a Lutheran periodical devoted to theological discussion. Its aim will be the exposition and defence of the doctrines of the Church as confessed in the Book of Concord. Theology in all its departments is embraced within its scope, though for the present special attention will be given to the controverted subject of predestination.

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T H E
COLUMBUS THEOLOGICAL MAGAZINE

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No. 6.

THE BONDAGE OF THE WILL.

The doctrine which has been set forth concerning the liberty of the will may seem to conflict with the uniform teaching of the Church, that in spiritual things the will is bound. But this can seem so only upon a superficial view. To say that the will is free, and yet to maintain that the will is not free, unquestionably appears to be a contradiction. So it would be if the will in both cases were considered in the same respect. What is necessary to harmonize the two statements is expressed in the 18. article of our Augsburg Confession: Concerning free will our churches "teach that man's will hath some liberty to work a civil righteousness and to choose such things as reason can reach unto, but that it hath no power to work the righteousness of God, or a spiritual righteousness, without the Spirit of God; because that the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God. I Cor. 2, 14. But this is wrought in the heart when men do receive the Spirit of God through the Word." The will is free to choose; it is free from necessity when it chooses. Man never wills as he does because he has no alternative; it would not be will if he had no choice. He never wills as he does because necessity drives him irresistibly to the volition; in that case he would be merely a nicely contrived machine that has the semblance indeed of willing, but not the reality. He is free from coaction and from necessity. But that does not imply that he is free from sin and the influence of sin upon his will, as he certainly is not free from the obligation which

divine law imposes and from the misery which follows transgression.

We have had occasions in a previous article, to point out the fact that human liberty is never absolute. Man is a creature of limited powers, and the action of his will is subject to the limitations imposed by his created nature. The same restrictions are laid upon his liberty. Not that there are any forces that compel it from without or necessitate it from within. It is free. Man chooses and determines his own action. But it is self-evident that he does this within the limits of his human powers and natural environments. He cannot will as God; he can will only as man. He cannot will that of which he has no knowledge and that to which he has no impulse. So far as this is a limitation placed upon him by the original constitution of his nature, it pertains to his power as a creature, not to his liberty. So far as the will has power, there is no restriction upon its exercises. Nothing can hinder us from choosing when the proper conditions of willing are presented in the intelligence and the sensibilities, as nothing can force us to will otherwise than self determines. Even in spiritual things the will acts freely so far as it wills at all. There can be no compulsion of the will, as that would involve its destruction. The denial of its freedom from coercion and necessity, in spiritual as well as in all other things, would be a denial that there is any will, and this would involve the negation of the whole domain of the moral and the spiritual.

But that does not exhaust the subject. There is an underlying question of power that materially affects the other question of liberty. So far as God in the original endowment of His human creature has placed limitations upon the human power of willing, liberty cannot be a legitimate subject of inquiry. Freedom and bondage are not predicable at all where there is no power that might be subjected to restraints or constraints in its exercise. What the will, in virtue of its created constitution and original limitations, cannot do at all, it cannot do freely or unfreely. But the Scriptures teach and experience indicates that there is upon the exercise of human willing a restriction which God did not impose in the creation of man. All creatures as they

came from the hand of the Creator were pronounced good. To this man was no exception. On the contrary, he was so in an eminent sense. He was made in the image of God, and his Maker declared, when His work was finished, that all was very good. The good was his appropriate sphere, and for this his faculty of will was especially designed. Hence so far as there is any interference with the action of his will in this domain, the inquiry is proper whether it is still free. He certainly is free in the sense that he still chooses and is still responsible for his choice; for that is merely saying that he still has a will and has not ceased to be the human creature which God made him to be. He does not, since sin entered into the world, put forth volitions because external violence is applied to coerce such will action. That would mean that he does not will the mental action at all that presents itself in the semblance of personal volition, but that some extraneous power has taken possession of his faculty and used it as a tool. Neither does he put forth volition because spontaneous forces move him as instinct moves the brute, so that he has no voice in determining his volition and no choice of object nor of action, as he has no voice and no choice as regards the circulation of his blood. He still has a will of his own, and his volitions are utterances of his own predilection and pleasure. But notwithstanding this the fact is plain that his original powers do not act according to their original design; that there are influences exerted upon him which are not involved in the positive constitution of the soul and its natural environments; and that he does not now will as he would if these restraining and enslaving forces were not exerted upon him. It is manifest also that he has not the ability to deliver himself from these influences that restrict his volitions. His will has no power to will the spiritually good; sin has confined it to the domain of evil. It is thus subject to other limitations than those which lie in its finite nature and in the earthly conditions under which that finite nature works out its destiny. It cannot act in the whole domain which the Creator assigned it. In this respect it is said to be in bondage.

But thus presented it is seemingly a question of power, not of liberty. If the will has no power to act in the do-

main of the spiritually good, the conclusion would appear necessary that it is in this respect neither free nor unfree. Where there is no possibility of action there can be no propriety in the inquiry whether action is free. But that fails to make account of the important distinction between disability inherent in the original constitution and accidental disablement. The man with palsied limbs cannot move, as the marble statute cannot move. But there is a difference. The latter is unable to move by the constitution of its nature; the former is rendered unable by superinduced infirmity. It is not proper to speak of the statue's freedom or unfreedom of motion; it is proper to speak of the paralytic's liberty or lack of liberty of motion. The one is endowed with power to move, the other is not; the one is hindered in the exercise of that power, the other has no power that could be hindered. In the case of the palsied person the power to move is wanting, but it is wanting merely by accident. Therefore we can with propriety say that he has no power of motion, and yet, because such power belongs to his nature, with equal propriety say that he is not free to move. Disease hinders the motion for which naturally he has power. In this sense the will is in bondage under sin. It has lost the power to will the good, though by creation it had such power. By the disease of sin it is hindered in the action which originally belonged to it. The will is not free to exercise the power inherent in its nature.

The will "hath no power to work the righteousness of God." So the Scriptures plainly teach; so the true Church has always confessed. This truth is sometimes expressed by saying that in spiritual things the will has no liberty. But the very fact that this is but another form of expressing the same thing gives us a clue to the sense in which the words are used. Certainly none of our theologians mean to say that when the good is willed, the will acts by necessity, being driven by a power which it cannot resist, so that it does not choose the good which it wills, as the clock does not choose the motion of its wheels or the planets do not choose their orbits. When the good is willed at all it is willed just as freely as is the evil or the morally indifferent. But in man's fallen condition he has not the power to will the good. The

abstract power to choose and put forth volitions is the same precisely as it was before the fall, just as the abstract power of perception and judgment are the same as before. But the faculty of will, like all other human faculties, are powers of a complex unit which we call man, and man is not now what he was before sin entered into the world and effected his ruin. The natural and the spiritual were equally his domains by his original constitution and endowment. But in consequence of the fall his understanding is darkened, so that he knows nothing of the spiritual; his desires and affections are turned away from the spiritually good, so that this is repulsive to him, and his hostility is aroused when it is brought to his knowledge; and his will, being dependent in its action on the light furnished by the intellect and the motives supplied by the sensibilities, and thus limited in its operations to that which lies within the range of those coordinate powers, acts only in the domain of evil, never rising above this lower plane into which man has fallen, and attaining at best only that which, in this low estate, is relatively good. But as the will acts freely when it wills the good, so it acts freely also when it wills the evil. It performs its appropriate functions according to the power given it, by nature though this power is confined to that which is evil. There is no such coercion exercised upon his soul that he can no longer choose and no longer originate action as a personal cause. What he wills he chooses freely, though the area of his liberty is limited by his exclusion from the whole domain of the spiritually good. And this exclusion again is not of such a nature as to eliminate from his soul all capacity for willing in that sphere. It could will the good and can be brought to will it again. But the limitation has taken place by the loss of the original holiness which was the condition under which the good could be willed. In consequence of this his cognitions do not extend to the spiritually good and his desires do not go out towards it. He cannot will the good, because sin has limited his choice to the evil. By such limitation he is in bondage, though his volitions are still free within the area of his confinement, just as the criminal is in bondage when placed within the prison walls, though in the space enclosed by these walls his motion be free.

The Scriptures very clearly teach that both with regard to the intellect and the sensibilities sin has limited the action of man's will. In its unregenerated condition it has no power in regard to that which is purely spiritual. As God made him he pleased his Maker and had the power to please Him in all his volitions and consequent actions; as he has become since the fall he not only does not please God in his condition and volitions, but cannot by any power that he possesses render himself or his volitions pleasing. "God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually." Gen. 6, 5. Not only were there evil imaginations in the heart, but every imagination was evil; not only were they infected with evil, but they were only evil, nothing but evil; and not only were they so at times, but evil continually. The wickedness of man was great. "The carnal mind is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." Rom. 8, 7. Whatever is in our corrupt nature, as flesh born of the flesh, is in opposition to God, from whom we have fallen, and our natural or carnal mind has nothing but repugnance and rebellion against the Holy One who created us. Such enmity to God can cease only when the Spirit of God renews the soul after the divine image in which it was created. Therefore St. Paul writes: "You hath He quickened who were dead in trespasses and sins, wherein in time past ye walked according to the course of this world, according to the prince of the power of the air, the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience; among whom also we all had our conversation in times past in the lusts of our flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind, and were by nature children of wrath, even as others." Eph. 2, 1-3. There is no power in us by nature to work righteousness; but just because such power was ours, and we were not created like the brutes that perish, we were children of wrath by nature, and remain such until God restores us to spiritual life. Hence the renewal which takes place by the Holy Spirit restores the image of God in knowledge and holiness, as the same apostle writes: "Ye have put off the old man with his deeds, and have put on the new man which is renewed in knowledge after the image of Him

that created him." Col. 3, 9, 10. That ye put off concerning the former conversation the old man, which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts, and be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and that ye put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness." Eph. 4, 22-24. The sin that has entered into the soul of man and pervades all its powers hinders all volition in the sphere of the spiritually good, for which man was designed and endowed. It destroys the liberty of willing just as bodily disease destroys the liberty of external action. Hence our Lord says that "the truth shall make you free;" and when the Jews objected that they were never in bondage to any man, "Jesus answered, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin." Job 8, 32-34. There is bondage of the will where an element not originally in the nature of man hinders the exercise of its essential power of willing in the sphere for which it was designed and in which alone its appointed goal can be attained.

This bondage of the will, dark and dreadful as it is, does not conflict with that liberty for which we contend. While man cannot rid himself of the chains which sin has fastened upon his will and which confine his volitions to the domain of evil, his will is free from coercion and from necessity in willing what it wills. In its confinement there is nothing to compel it in the exercise of its power. No man has a right to say that he did not choose the evil and therefore can have no responsibility for it. Neither is there anything to hinder its action so that the subject could claim exemption from the consequences of evil volitions on the ground that a higher power failed to interpose for the prevention of such acts of will as resulted in injury to men. God does interpose His power to make all things work toward the accomplishment of His benign purposes, but this interposition refers to the overruling of results arising from human acts, not to the liberty of willing. The latter is affected by God's governmental acts only so far as directing the circumstances in which the will is exercised has an influence on volitions. Never does Providence in this world take away the power of willing evil, so as to render this impossible; and never does He force upon the soul the good, so that the omission of this

would be impossible. Whatever God in His mercy or in His justice may do, He never destroys the power of willing and thus never removes from man the accountability for his volitions. When man wills the good, it is the same power of choice that is called into exercise as when he wills the evil, and it is equally his choice when he wills the evil. The will is unconstrained and unrestrained in both cases alike. In either case it is man that chooses and determines, not some other power to which he is a helpless and irresponsible subject, and in both cases man feels his accountability for willing or not willing, or, which is the same thing, for doing or not doing.

But since the fall the area of power and liberty is changed. Man has no longer the knowledge of things spiritual. This alone would render it impossible to put forth volitions in that domain. These things do not present themselves among the objects from which he chooses, just as, when we think of taking a walk, the streets of a city in a foreign land do not come into view among the streets from which we are to select. We cannot choose among the spiritual things, because to us, as we are now corrupted by sin, they have no existence. The impossibility does not lie in the intrinsic nature of the will: that was made for the good, although it was created with power both for the good and the evil: but it lies in the adventitious circumstances in which man now moves since sin has entered into the world and darkened the soul. The imaginations of the thoughts of man's heart are now only evil continually, and as a consequence, not by the intrinsic nature of the will, but by accident, his power of choice is confined to that which is evil. His knowledge does not extend beyond this domain, and therefore his desires and volitions cannot extend beyond the objects which it presents. But more than this must be said. Even if the range of the intellect were wider than the domain of evil, the heart could find nothing desirable in that which lies beyond. Not only has the intellect been darkened by sin, but the sensibilities have become depraved as well, and hence there is to the natural man no beauty or loveliness in that which is spiritually good. We have no knowledge and no desires in that sphere. As we are constituted

now we would have no desires for it even if we had the knowledge. Men do not generally pursue the good which they know by nature, even though what they do know lies in the lower domain of mere nature. The revelation to the soul of higher truth brings new motive powers, and still many resist its influence. This proves incontrovertibly that not only the intellect, but that complex of sensibilities which we call the heart is averse to the good, so that even if it were known, it would always and by all be rejected in the choice which man in his fallen estate naturally makes. The motive power is all in the opposite direction, whatever may be the state of enlightenment, until the power of grace is exerted upon the soul. There is in man, as he now is by nature, neither the knowledge to bring spiritual things within the range of his will, nor the impulse which would render it an object of choice, even if it were within his range. To will anything in this domain is therefore beyond the powers of the natural man.

It is this that our theologians have in view when they deny liberty to the will in things spiritually good. They do not mean that the will is not free when the good is willed. With one accord they maintain that all volitions put forth at all are put forth freely. But just as unanimously they teach that man as he is by nature cannot will the good. Not that intrinsically the abstract human will is incapable of putting forth such volitions. The inability is accidental. It is owing not to any defect in the created nature of the will, but to man's depravation by sin. The range of man's knowledge and desire and therefore also of his volition, which originally extended to God and the good and had this for its chief object, has become narrower in consequence of the fall. The evil which was also, in the inscrutable plan of the Creator, placed as an alternative within the range of man's power of will, but which he could have rejected and was designed to reject in the free exercise of that power, was unhappily chosen and become the ruling principle, instead of the good to which he was inclined by original holiness of disposition. The heavenly light which brought spiritual things within the area of choice, and the holy affections which rendered them an object of choice, are lost by the

fatal transgression of divine law in Eden, and darkness of intellect and depravity of heart reign instead. Thus the power for good has departed from the human soul. That this necessarily involves the will in the general ruin is manifest. There is nothing that moves to the good. Man still wills, but his choice is confined to the objects which his darkened intellect presents and to which the depraved affections prompt, and these are all evil. He still chooses, but he chooses between the evils before him, not between the evil and the good. The latter is not even before his intelligence, and could not therefore be an object of his desire; it would not be an object of desire if it were presented to his intelligence, because the heart is corrupt and can find no beauty or pleasure in holiness. He would not be man if he had not will, and this would not be will if it were not free. He can will, and wills freely when he does will, as well since the fall as prior to that terrible event. But since the fall he lacks all power for the spiritually good, although he wills freely in the domain of the evil to which his choice is confined. Therein lies his bondage that he cannot use his will according to the Creator's design.

Hence it is that our old theologians use the term free will as identical with the term natural powers or natural ability. The disabled will is still free as against coactionism and necessitarianism. But the free will cannot choose that which is spiritually good. "It hath no power to work the righteousness of God." Hence Luther sings, and the Church sings with him,

"Free will God's righteousness judgment hates,
Its power for good has perished."

The will has not ceased to exist, neither has it ceased to be free so far as it acts at all. And it does act, but not in the direction of the spiritually good. To that the soul is dead. It still lives, but not to righteousness; it still wills, but not that which is pleasing to God. In that respect it has lost all power. Not that man could not will the good if he knew it and loved it. In that sense the power of willing the good is not lost. The evil is moral, not physical. But he cannot know it by nature, as he has been separated from God by sin

and finds in himself and in the world around him no light that reveals God and His good will. Nature around us and conscience within us tells of a mighty power and of our accountability to that power, but it does not show us God as the Father and Savior and Sanctifier, and does not make plain what His holy will requires for our salvation. And the heart cannot love God, because it does not know Him and because to its depraved disposition there is nothing lovely in His holiness. The will is thus in bondage to the corrupt desires and affections which prevent its action in the domain of the spiritually good. The person is corrupt, and the personal power which is exerted in the will cannot be otherwise. The natural will power is thus not free from evil, which has entered into the soul and become the motive freely determining the will, just as the motive freely determines the will when the soul is good. The bondage lies in the confinement of the person willing to a narrower sphere than that for which God designed him. In consequence of this his will is subject to the further enthralment arising from fears of pain and hopes of pleasure, which move it as it would not be moved if it were free from sin, and to the additional chains thrown around it by excited passions, which prevent intelligent choice, and by settled habits with their superinduced crowings for unreasonable gratification of animal appetites and desires. The will under such corrupt influences is not free to fulfill its divinely appointed mission and to reach its goal.

We deem it necessary to repeat, in order to guard against all misconception of our meaning, that the intrinsic power of willing is not lost, even when this power is contemplated in relation to the spiritually good; that is, when man is brought to know and desire the spiritually good it is not necessary that an essentially different will with intrinsically different powers, should be created before volitions can be put forth in that domain. The will, merely formally considered, will do its proper work when the heart is renewed, and that work, when the person has become good, will be good also, as it was evil while the person was evil.

It is necessary to observe also that the limitation of the will to evil is not in all respects of the same nature as its

limitation by providential or by self-chosen surroundings. There is a difference that is of moment for our inquiry. A person will not put forth executive volitions, the execution of which he sees to be impossible, and in that sense it is sometimes said that he cannot. He does not will to visit a friend in the city when he is on a ship in mid ocean, though he may strongly desire it. A person cannot will to read Homer in the original when he does not know of the existence of such a poet or of the language in which he wrote. But in the one case he has desires that will lead to corresponding volitions when circumstances become favorable; in the other case he has powers that may be so educated as to furnish him with all that is requisite for putting forth the volition to read the Iliad in Greek. In either case there is not only the formal power of willing these actions as well as any others, but there is the material content in the soul to render the volition possible. That is the case with all topics lying on the plane of nature. The prisoner does not will, in spite of chains and bars, to return to his loved ones at home. But he has all the conditions within him to will this, and is hindered only by his own intelligence. The invalid does not will to arise and pursue his vocation, when he knows that he has not the physical power to use his limbs. But all that hinders the volition is his own consciousness of his bodily infirmity. He possesses everything necessary for the volition, so that when the possibility of executing the desired act presents itself to his judgment, he is ready to will it. So all limitation of the area of choice arising from lack of knowledge may be remedied without going beyond the capacities and impulses remaining in our corrupt nature. It is not power in the sphere of the animal appetites, nor of the aesthetic and scientific desires, nor even of the moral impulses emanating from the conscience that is lost, but power in the sphere of the spiritually good. The natural man cannot will this, for the same reason that the prisoner cannot will to return to the bosom of his family or the illiterate man cannot will to read Homer. But that is not the only reason. He cannot obtain the necessary knowledge from any natural source. Neither intuitions or suggestions having their source in his own mind, nor contemplation of the works of God around

him, can furnish the necessary knowledge. A mental illumination through divine revelation is his only help. But neither can the requisite desires be awakened within him by any human exertion. His affections are all corrupt, his desires are all unholy. Even when they are morally good they are spiritually evil. They are good, so far as nature supplies a relative goodness. A certain civil righteousness is attainable. But this is not the righteousness which God requires, and is therefore not that which is meant when we speak of the spiritually good. Good desires can arise only when the Spirit of God works in the hearts of man through that heavenly light which is given us by the supernatural revelation contained in the Holy Scriptures. There is no power in man for holy volitions, neither is the power attainable by any human effort. The corruption of his nature is such that so far as the good is concerned it hinders all action of his will and renders him unfree. He not only does not will it under the circumstances, but, his nature being as it is, he cannot will it under any circumstances. That nature must not by necessity remain as it is and thus necessitate evil volitions forever. It may be changed. But it does not lie in man's power to change it. He is spiritually dead in trespasses and in sins.

In the estimation of some the liberty of will for which we have contended and still contend seems thus seriously prejudiced. How, they ask, can the will in any proper sense be free, when it is confessedly limited in its activity to that which is evil and entirely excluded from the whole sphere of the good? Our answer is twofold. In the first place, the liberty for which we contend is not absolute like the freedom with which God acts. The will can move freely within a certain sphere, and yet be limited in its action to that, so that it has no power beyond it. We are not unfree because we cannot fly in the air like a bird. As against those who teach that there is no liberty of alterity this would be a sufficient reply. The soul can still choose between alternatives, although the limits within which such choice can be made are very narrow. The person confined within prison walls may still have liberty of motion, though the lines within which the motion is possible under the area of liberty are small. Sec-

only, we have not denied that there is a sense in which sin does affect human liberty. The words of our Lord, declaring that the truth shall make those free who continue in His Word, are not meaningless. There must be bondage where liberation takes place. Such bondage there is where sin reigns. Not that the sinner is deprived of the power of choice and proper volitional action. He would not be a sinner in that case, nor could he be any more accountable than any other piece of mechanism. He would in such case not even be a man, as he would have no will. The sinner has all the essential powers of will and puts forth true volitional acts. But sin hampers him like a chain about his soul. It is not simply that the area of his volitional action is limited: that in itself would be no bondage, since all finite beings must have limits assigned them: but he is confined to the evil just as the convict is confined within the prison walls. He is still free to choose, although the area of his choice is limited by moral disablement.

When the word will is used in the wide sense, thus including the inclinations and desires which act as motives, the question is simply whether it has any power for the spiritually good. As our theologians employed the term in that more comprehensive sense the whole subject of sin as affecting free will presented itself in the aspect of inability. The words of our Confession, declaring that the will "hath no power to work the righteousness of God," do not mean that man's formal power of choice and volition cannot under any influences be used in the domain of the spiritually good. The allegation is not that man has no power to will, nor that to will the good lies beyond the power humanity in its normal state. The words do not imply that when saints are said to have walked with God and to have done His holy will, a mere fiction is placed before our imagination, or that, accepting the statement as fact, they did so without any will power or under the impulses of a will power which was not their own and which used them as the mechanic uses his tools. God might make such beings and be pleased with the work of His hands, as He made stars and flowers to move without a will of their own; but such creatures could not be man and could not be accountable for their motion. The truth

asserted in our Confession is that as man now is, a magnificent creature wrecked and ruined by the abuse of his free will, he has not even the knowledge, much less the inclination and desire to choose righteousness and put forth spiritually good volitions. While the abstract will has essentially the same powers with which God endowed it by creation, it lacks all the conditions under which righteousness can be willed, and in this sense it "hath no power to work righteousness." The intellect does not present the necessary objects and the sensibilities do not furnish the necessary impulses for volitions in that sphere. When, on the other hand, the word will is employed in the narrow sense, as embracing that which is sometimes called the formal will, it may be said still to have intrinsically the power of volition in any domain, though accidentally it cannot act in the domain of the good, since the conditions are wanting under which the intrinsic powers are exercised. No essentially different will is necessary for good volitions. These were exercised by the human will before the fall and may be exercised by the same human will again after the restoration. If we take the term will in the wider sense, as is usual with our theologians, the will has power for the spiritually good, because the desires, which are conceived as constituents of the will, are all evil and therefore all impelling power towards the good is wanting. If we take it in the narrow sense, it has no power because in consequence of the fall the conditions of willing in that sphere are wanting.

Power and liberty, as we have shown, are not identical. The latter presupposes the former. It is irrelevant to inquire whether the bat has liberty to sing. Where there is no power there is no propriety in raising the question of liberty. The bat cannot sing, and is therefore in that respect neither free nor unfree. The limits which God has assigned to the powers of any creature exclude all question of liberty respecting that which lies beyond these limits. But does not this rule out all inquiries concerning man's liberty in regard to that domain from which he is excluded by want of power? No doubt to many minds the question whether we can, by the powers which we now possess, have a knowledge of spiritual things, or can judge them to be promotive of our happiness ;

or whether we have, or by nature can have, any motives to pursue such spiritual things, supposing that a knowledge of them were imparted,—if it is answered, as it incontestably must be, in the negative,—will seem to render irrelevant all further question concerning our liberty in this respect. If there is no relevancy in asking whether a creature is free where it has not been endowed with power, there would seem, according to the doctrine which we have been advocating, to be no relevancy in the question of human freedom in the domain of the spiritually good, in which he is utterly powerless. We have, in our fallen estate, no power to obtain a knowledge of these things, we have, even if we possessed such knowledge, no power to desire them, how then could there be any liberty or bondage in the matter? To ask whether man is free in this regard would seem to be as irrelevant as to ask whether trees are free to walk or think or talk. The lack of power seems to place the whole subject beyond the proper purview of liberty.

But such reflections fail to make account of an essential factor in the question. It is true that there can be no propriety in asking whether a tree is free to walk or to talk, and this would prove, if the cases were analogous, that there is no propriety in asking whether men are free to work righteousness by willing it. In both cases there is a lack of power in the respect mentioned. But yet they are not analogous. Trees were not made to walk or to talk. The power for such actions does not belong intrinsically to their nature. The very conception of a tree excludes them. It could not be a tree if it possessed them. Whether a tree is free to do what a tree can by no possibility do, as it would cease to be a tree if power to do them were bestowed, is therefore an utterly irrelevant question, any attempt to answer which would be an absurdity. But the case is a different one when we ask whether man is free to will acts that are spiritually good. That in his present state he has no power for this is undeniable. So far his condition is similar to that of a tree in respect to walking. Both are powerless in the respect mentioned. But man was made to move in the sphere of the spiritual as well as in that of the natural. It originally belonged to his nature just as much to know God and to glorify

Him as it did to know the things cognized by sense and to love the visible objects appealing to natural affection. The tree could never walk at all, and therefore it is absurd to ask whether it is free to walk away from its roots. Whether it is free to push its trunk upwards would be a legitimate question. It was made to grow and thus to rise. Whether anything hinders it in thus executing the requirements of its nature may be asked with perfect propriety. It has natural power to grow, and its liberty of growth is infringed when obstacles are placed in its way that bend it or dwarf it. Man was made to do good, and when anything hinders the execution of that for which God designed him, the question of liberty is perfectly legitimate. He has no power to will the good, but it is not on account of the original constitution of his nature that he is thus powerless. It is on account of a limitation that has been adventitiously placed upon powers that originally belonged to him by creation. That this limitation is in his own nature does not alter the case, as it does not alter the case when a plant's growth is hindered by disease rather than by an external obstacle. No external force can directly hinder volition. The forces that interfere with its legitimate action are necessarily internal. Man can judge and will, and therefore the question is perfectly legitimate whether he can judge and will in any given case. It is not true, in the absolute sense, that man cannot now know and glorify God. He has lost the power for this, and yet he need not become an essentially different being in order to make its restoration possible. It belongs to him in his normal state, and when it is restored, he is merely restored to his normal state. He has not ceased to have a will, and it is a relevant question whether he is free to exercise it in the domain of the spiritual.

It is true, the special actions to which reference is had in this connection are entirely impossible in man's present natural state, and apparently his condition is precisely the same as if he had never possessed the power to perform them. But that fails to make account of an essential element in the problem. When we say that man has lost the power to know and love God, an explanation is necessary. The statement, taken absolutely, is not correct. He has not lost the power to

know and love. That belongs to the essence of man. If that had been lost, humanity would have been lost. A creature without intellect and without feeling would not be man. What man has lost is not the power to know and to feel, which belong to his essence, but the ability to know and love God and the good. Furthermore, even this statement requires some qualification. He has not lost the power in any such sense that it could not be restored without changing his essence. To the conception of man belongs the capacity to know and love God and righteousness as well as to know and love any other object. He can be made to know and love God, although not by any power in himself or in nature; and when he is thus made whole by the supernatural power of grace, there is no addition made that is foreign to humanity or that lifts him above humanity. On the contrary, he then simply quits himself like a man. The powers that originally belonged to his nature are then restored in their exercise to the entire range contemplated in their creation. That in their unrenewed condition they are limited in their exercise is owing to the leprosy of sin which pervades them, and on account of which all their operations are only evil and that continually. Man can still know and love, but all his knowing and loving are acts of a creature whose whole nature is sinful and from whom therefore nothing good can emanate. The acts are as the spring from which they flow. In such a condition the heart cannot love God and the good; if it could it would cease to be evil. In his natural condition of sinfulness man can still love whatever it is possible to love without holiness; he can still put forth volitions and that freely, though not volitions that are holy. But man's nature, though sinful, is not itself sin. Sin is an accident that can be removed and for the removal of which God has made provision. When that is removed, the faculties belonging to man's nature originally will perform their appropriate functions of knowing and loving God and trusting in Him. No new faculties need be created to this end. The new heart which God creates in man by His grace is no new substance which is substituted for the old sinful soul. It is a cleansing of the soul which has existed since the individual's life began and which will continue to exist forever. Sin is not the substance of man. It is not a substance at all. The new heart does not consist

in other faculties essentially different from those which belong to the sinner from his birth. The intellect and the sensibilities and the will which he had before conversion he possesses still after the Holy Spirit has accomplished His gracious work. Neither is sin his essence nor does regeneration effect any change in his essence. The powers of man, as to their substance and their essence, are the same human powers forever. Man did not become anything less than man by the fall; he does not become anything more than man by the restoration. To human nature normally belongs the power to will the good, and therefore to inquire whether the will is free in this particular is not analogous to inquiring whether the table is free to walk. The power of willing remains, though the quality of goodness has been displaced by the quality of evil. He still has the power to work, but not to work righteousness. He cannot use his will power for the spiritually good, and so far he is not free.

It would only betray a lack of comprehension to object that this is in conflict with our confession, which expressly rejects the opinion that original sin is "only an external impediment to these spiritually good powers, as when a magnet is smeared with garlic juice whereby its natural power is not removed, but only impeded." The proposition here condemned is certainly an error. It pronounces the nature good which God declares to be evil. That is in direct conflict with the teaching of Scripture. But what we maintain is an entirely different thing. The magnet remains a magnet notwithstanding the garlic juice which is assumed to be a hindrance to its appropriate action; the good heart, which God made to know and glorify Him, has ceased to be good and therefore ceased to perform any functions which require and presuppose goodness. It is still a heart, but the attribute of holiness is lost and that of wickedness has taken its place. There is no external impediment by which the proper action of the good is hindered. There is no good in it to be hindered. The magnet has lost its magnetism and no longer attracts iron, whether the garlic juice be applied or not. There is not "only an external impediment to spiritually good powers" in fallen man. There are no spiritually good powers. He still has powers, but they are not spiritually good. He

still has will, but it is only evil. Comparisons are often misleading and must be used with care. There is no analogy between man's loss of the divine image and the magnet's loss of its power to attract iron. The word magnet connotes such power of attraction; the word man does not connote the power to work righteousness. The power to attract is the essence of the magnet; the divine image is not the essence of man. When the magnet loses the power to attract it ceases to be a magnet; when man loses the divine image he does not cease to be man. The case would be analogous if we substituted the word saint for the word man. By the fall he lost that which made him a saint, not that which made him a man, as the iron loses that which makes it a magnet when it loses its attracting quality. The corruption of our nature is by no means a mere external hindrance to the exercise of holy affections and volitions, but a deadly poison that destroys all their original holiness and renders them only evil. The powers and faculties, however, still remain, notwithstanding their corruption. Therefore if the question be whether man has holy powers, it is not a question of liberty at all. He has not, and therefore there is no more relevancy in the inquiry whether he is free to exercise them than there is in the inquiry whether a corpse is free to express wishes in regard to its burial. But if the question be whether man can use his faculties in the whole domain for which they were designed, it becomes a question of liberty, because the use of his powers is hindered. He cannot do what by his creation he was designed and empowered to do, and he cannot do it because sin has put restraints upon his original powers of will, as disease puts restraints upon the powers of the body. In that respect his impotency is bondage.

Grave difficulties will be obviated by keeping in view these distinctions. If sin has produced such ruin in our race that man is no more free to will the good, has he lost the power to will entirely? If he still has the power to will, is that power changed so essentially that it can never will the good, as the brute can never will the good? If he is ever to exercise will in a higher sphere than that of the natural and carnal, must a new faculty be created within him? And if such a new faculty be created, is he in any true sense the

same person that he was before, seeing that the will belongs to his essence? Such questions are all obviated by simply keeping in mind that the will is the same in substance, whether it can will either good or evil, or is confined in its operations only to the latter. There is no essentially different will created when the person who was unable to will anything good is converted and receives such ability. The change is moral, not physical. The essential functions of the will are the same, just as the essential functions of the judgment are the same, whether we judge in questions of art or of ethics, whether we judge correctly or incorrectly. The will is the power to choose and put forth volitions, and this power is the same, as it has also the same volitional action, whether it extend over the whole territory within which it was designed to act, or be confined to a small portion of that territory, beyond which there is no desire to go and therefore no possibility of going as long as motives are not supplied. But the limitation of its action within the narrow bounds than God originally designed, though it acts freely where it does act, is a sufficient reason for speaking of a bound will, not in the sense that there is compulsory action, but in the same sense in which we say of a person who is confined within an inclosure, but has no restraint placed upon his movements in that space, that his motion is free, although in a larger view, as he cannot go beyond, he is not free. "Man's will is always free," says Augustine, "but it is not always good," and our theologians generally have approved the saying.

"If the question be concerning the liberty of rectitude," says Gerhard, "or concerning the power of deciding either way, of choosing or rejecting either good or evil, we maintain that this has perished. 'For man by the abuse of free will destroyed both himself and it; since when by free will he sinned, sin having become the victor, free will is lost: for of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought in bondage.' Thus Augustine writes. And in this respect he calls the will of man no longer free, but bound and captive. For after the image of God was lost through sin, this power of choosing the good, since it was part of the divine image, was also lost; and because man was not only despoiled, but also miserably corrupted by sin, the unbridled impulse to ev

succeeded in the place of that liberty, so that after the fall, in man corrupt and not yet renewed—either corrupt by their own will, as the first pair, or born of corrupt parents, as all their posterity—the will is free only to the evil, since such corrupt and not yet regenerate men are able to do nothing but sin.” “There exists therefore in man freedom of will along with the bondage of sin; for he both sins and is unable to refrain from sinning, and yet he sins freely and delights to sin. Although he is moved only to the evil, yet he chooses it freely, that is, spontaneously and of his own accord, not unwillingly or by coercion, moved to it by the entire impulse. To this must be added that in the choice itself of evils he uses a certain liberty.” Loc. 12, § 22, 23, 29. The will is under the bondage of sin, so that it is no longer free to will the good, though it wills freely in its bonds; that is, it is not impelled or hindered in its volitions by extraneous forces which render it irresponsible for its actions.

We have likened the condition of the will under the bondage of sin to that of a person in prison who is permitted to move freely in his confinement. The comparison illustrates what we mean by saying that the will is free in its bondage, and renders it apparent that there is no inconsistency in maintaining that it is bound in one respect while it is free in another. But there is a point in which the illustration may seem to fail and which requires some explanation to guard it against misapplication. The prisoner has the same power of locomotion which he possessed before his confinement. Can we say also that the will has the same power of action which it had before sin brought it into captivity? “It hath no power to work the righteousness of God.” There seems in this respect to be no analogy between the cases, and therefore, because this is the principal point to be kept in view, no relevancy in the comparison. But the matter seems so only when it is too hastily judged. The prisoner has the power of locomotion, as he had before; the sinner has the power of willing, as he had before. The prisoner is limited in the exercise of his power of motion as he was not before; the sinner is limited in the exercise of his power of willing as he was not before. In both cases the area of freedom is diminished. The one cannot walk beyond the prison walls,

the other cannot will beyond the evil. — Both are in confinement and both are free in the domain to which they are confined. The will has now the same essential power that it had when the first man was created. He could not have lost that without losing his humanity. Man would not be man without will, and will would not be will without the power of choice and of freely originating action. His bondage lies in the restraints which sin has placed upon his will, so that he now has no power in his corrupt nature to produce good volitions, as the prisoner's bondage lies in the restraints which are placed upon his locomotion, so that he cannot go beyond his prison walls.

Nevertheless it is true that the comparison does not illustrate the intricate subject in all its ramifications. The prisoner has desires to walk beyond the walls which confine him, and may use his power of action in the vain attempt to pass beyond them. But there are no desires to move the will to action beyond the limits of evil to which it is confined, and there are no efforts put forth to will beyond these limits. The comparison fails here, as all comparisons must at some point, because the things compared are different. Walking, like all other physical actions, is an effect produced by the will. A volition has no direct power beyond the person willing. Its execution may be hindered by forces over which it has no control. The action willed may therefore fail, though the volition is complete. But volition has no cause save in the will of the person. His cognitions and desires are conditions of volition, but they are not causes in the proper sense. Whether I will a thing or do not will it depends on something else than my knowing it and desiring it. The absence of these conditions precludes all volition in regard to the matter involved, but their presence does not secure it. Hence it is a solecism to speak of endeavoring to put forth a volition, but being hindered in the execution. The execution of the thing willed may be hindered, but not the execution of the volition when volitional energy is put forth. The exercise of the volitional energy is the volition. Desires may arise that lead to no volition. But they are not the exertion of personal will power. They are not, when they are resisted, vain endeavors to will, nor are they, when com-

plied with, the cause of the will's action. They are simply motives which may or may not lead to volition. The volitional energy in action is always a volition, and the volition cannot therefore be hindered when such energy is once put forth, though the execution of that which is willed may be prevented by other powers. Moreover, man under the bondage of sin can have no desires for the spiritually good. That is wherein his bondage consists, that he is confined to the evil. If he could know the good and bad motives for it, he could will it. He cannot, because sin has led him captive and bound him to its service. The prisoner can desire to return to the bosom of his family and can will it, because his body, not his soul, is bound; the sinner cannot desire to serve the Lord and will it, because his soul, not his body, is bound.

In this bondage the will does not act otherwise than volitionally. Sin does not force it by external compulsion, as the sheriff drags the unwilling criminal to prison. Nor is it driven by internal necessity as a brute is unconsciously driven by instinct or a clock is driven by machinery. When man in his depravity wills, he exerts the power of choosing which belongs to will, and does not perform some other operation which has the semblance without the reality of willing. But he wills only the evil. Sin has limited the use of his power of choice. This limitation has not reference to external action. The wicked can will the same acts, so far as these are mere motions of bodily members and organs, which the righteous man wills and performs. The bondage is not physical, but spiritual. It is qualitative rather than quantitative; that is, it does not refer to the actions performed as such, but to the moral and spiritual character of these actions. There are internal acts which an ungodly man cannot perform at all, because they are direct acts of faith and hope and charity, which virtues he does not possess; but even when he performs the same external acts as the child of God they lack the quality which renders these acceptable to God. They are not spiritually good, because goodness belongs to the person, not to motion or action as such. All operations of the human will belong to the category of good or bad, as they are movements of the personality that is good or evil. Sin has corrupted human nature, and every individual

person is bound by this corruption to the evil. That he can will, and will freely. But he can will only that. He is bound by sin, so that he can use his will power only in the service of sin.

This bondage may be compared to that of a body hindered in its proper functions by disease. The sick man cannot use his limbs to walk or to work. In his normal condition he has such ability. But his condition has become abnormal, and we say with propriety that he now has not the power to pursue his ordinary labor. Is he then not free to walk or to work? Instead of denying his liberty, should we not rather deny his power? If there is no power to use his limbs, is there any relevancy in raising the question whether he is free? Certainly, so far as there is no power of action there can be no propriety in asking whether he acts freely. But that does not reach the root of the matter. There is propriety in asking whether he is free to act, though there be none in asking whether the action originated has been hindered in the production of its proper effect. There is no action to be hindered when there is no power to originate the action. But the agent normally has power to act: it is therefore perfectly proper to inquire whether he is free to act. The sick man is prevented from using powers that normally belong to him. He is not free to act, because disease has disabled him. That forms an impediment to his action. His case is not the same as that of a statue. Concerning this we cannot predicate liberty of action, because we cannot predicate power to act. It never could walk or work. But to man such power belongs, and if he cannot exercise it, something must interfere as a hindrance. He is not free. Disease has bound him. Thus sin has bound the soul, so that it cannot will in the whole sphere which normally belongs to man. It cannot will the good, not because the good lay originally beyond the limits prescribed to the creature's finite will, but because the powers originally bestowed are diseased. Of a brute we could not properly say that it is not free to work righteousness. It never had power for such action, and in no sense can liberty or bondage be predicated of it in that respect. But man had the power by original creation, and that he cannot exercise it now is owing not to a change in the de-

sign of God respecting the powers and activities of His intelligent creatures, but to a calamity that has come upon them by the abuse of divinely imparted powers. The possibilities of working righteousness still belong to man, but he is in that respect bound and thus powerless.

By accident there is thus necessity laid upon the will to act only in the domain of evil. It is in the bondage of corruption. But it is still will, and not a piece of machinery. The soul cannot desire and love all that it was designed to desire and love, because some such feelings would imply the holiness which it has lost. But when the will acts, though all its actions are corrupt as is the soul whence they emanate, it acts as will, i. e. with the power of choice. It can choose between kinds of action, and between doing and not doing. The fact that, as between good and evil, the latter is always chosen as long as man is in his hereditary sinful condition, does not prove the contrary. As to the civil righteousness, which lies within the range of natural powers, the alleged fact is not real. It is not true that man in his unregenerate condition, as between the good and evil as he knows it, always chooses the evil. All experience contradicts such an assumption. The fact is that there have been men in heathendom, as there are infidels in Christian lands, who have striven earnestly after the good according to the light which they possessed. Whether men in this sphere choose the good or the evil depends upon circumstances, not upon the constitution of their nature. They are never driven by any physical force or animal instinct, so that they are conscious of inability to do otherwise or of having no responsibility for their actions. As to spiritual righteousness, that which is truly good in the sight of God, the case is indeed different. There is in the natural man no power to choose this. He always chooses the evil and only the evil. But that is not because he is so driven by some fatality against his inclination. It is because whatever he chooses, even though it seem to him good and be chosen because it seems to him good, is the choice of an evil heart and therefore evil by the nature of the case. That which is pleasing to God does not lie within the range of man's natural knowledge or natural motives, and cannot therefore be among the objects from which a choice is

made in his natural condition. As soon as it is brought within such range, impulses are inevitably given that lie not in nature, but that belong to the sphere of grace. But then the spiritually evil is no longer uniformly chosen. Some choose the good under these supernatural impulses, some choose the evil in spite of them. In both cases there is a consciousness that the willing was not by necessity. Neither grace nor sin is in such cases irresistible. The willing is not forced by a necessity laid on it from without, nor by a necessity imposed from within by the constitution of its own nature. The will is free in its willing, whatever it may will, which is simply another form of the proposition that it wills what it wills.

But that does not imply that there is no bondage of the soul. The Scriptures teach that it is enslaved by sin, and that only the truth given in the Gospel can make it free. Everything that hinders the exercise of its faculties according to their original endowment and design is an infringement of their liberty. All the powers were made to act in harmony with the will of God and thus in blissful harmony with each other. That harmony sin has disturbed by separating the soul from God, for the accomplishment of whose will it was created and in whom alone its happiness could be secured. It acts now in harmony with the will of Satan and thus contravenes its destiny and its happiness. The power of conscience cannot change this: it can only make us conscious of the discord and thus of our misery. Sin dominates the soul, and thus brings it into subjection to a foreign master. That it chooses the evil and wills it freely, i. e. in accordance with impulses lying within its own nature, not forced upon it from without, does not prove its freedom in every respect. While it is free in one respect, it is enslaved in another. The prisoner may move freely within his prison walls, or as far as the length of his chain permits, and still be unfree with regard to all that lies beyond these limits. Whether he is aware of this bondage or not, whether he has any desire to go beyond his prison walls or not, does not change the fact of his bondage, however important such questions may be in discussions respecting his happiness. But it is not correct to say that the sinner is satisfied with his chains and desires no more than his prison furnishes. He cannot desire the salva-

tion which is found alone in Christ. He does not, as he is by nature, know of such salvation, neither can he by his natural power wish it or apprehend it when the Gospel sets it before him. But in virtue of his conscience he can feel that something is wanting to him, that he is not, like other creatures, living in harmony with the law of his being. He can realize his misery and long for deliverance. In the nature of the case all such longings, though their gratification be expected not only in the beautiful and the true, but also in the good, will lie within the limits of the natural, and never extend to the spiritual, of which he knows nothing. That is the respect in which he is in the bondage of corruption. He wills freely when he wills, but he cannot will that which he was originally made to will and in which alone his destiny and his happiness is attained. In his nature, as God made it, lies such power of willing; in his nature, as Satan marred it, sin reigns and prevents the exercise of its proper functions, so that while the will moves freely in harmony with its sinful impulses, the soul does not move freely in harmony with the will of God, according to its original constitution and appointment.

It thus becomes manifest that there can be complete liberty only where the truth has made the soul free. As long as sin reigns there is no undisturbed action of our faculties, because conscience keeps admonishing us of the contradiction to our destiny and to our high calling to fulfill it; and even if all protests against the abuse of our powers ceased, they would still be in subjection to a master who has usurped authority and to whom of right no allegiance or service is due, that is, they would be in bondage. Where there is full harmony of all the powers of the soul with the will of God, and thus harmonious action among themselves in attaining the end of their creation, there is true liberty which is true happiness. Where this is wanting, there is bondage and misery.

L.

OPINION OF THE FACULTY AT ROSTOCK ON
PREDESTINATION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY T. M.

In the name and at the request of several members of the Ev. Luth. Zion's congregation at Columbus, Wis., you express a wish to the undersigned faculty to give a short answer to the question, whether in the doctrine of election, which according to the published minutes it has advanced in its 32. assembly in June, 1882, the Wisconsin Synod rested upon the word of Holy Scripture and the doctrine of the fathers, especially whether in this it was in harmony with the doctrine laid down in the symbolical books of our Ev. Lutheran Church. The undersigned faculty believes, that it should not refuse to make answer to this question addressed to it, and according to the expressed wish submits the same in the following as briefly as possible, confining itself to an exposition of the deciding point. This restriction is suggested by the fact, that a thorough exposition and demonstration of the doctrine of election as advanced by the Wisconsin Synod is not found in the published minutes of synod, whilst in answer to the question, whether they were willing to subscribe to everything, published on this subject by the Missouri synod, the declaration is made, that they acknowledge nothing except what they themselves confess. An exposition of the Scripture proof of the symbolical doctrine, by which the doctrine of the Wisconsin Synod must be measured, the theological faculty considers unnecessary, since the harmony of the doctrine of our symbolical books with the Scriptures is not questioned by the Wisconsin synod.

The doctrine of election advanced by the Wisconsin Synod conflicts with the doctrine of the Formula of Concord, because it conceives the election of the elect as absolute, that is, in no wise conditioned by the conduct of man.

Absolute predestination is asserted in and is identical with the proposition of the irresistibility of the work of grace in the predestinated individuals. For if the working of grace also in the predestinated is not irresistible, but of such a character, that also the predestinated by virtue of the liberty

permitted to them can resist and prevent it, the cause of their not resisting, or again falling away, cannot lie in the divine election and the working of grace directed by it, but the foreseen fact of their non-resistance and non-defection rather is the cause, that in distinction from others they are elected. In the Formula of Concord now the irresistibility of the working of grace in the predestinated is most positively excluded. The principal aim of the eleventh article of the Formula of Concord is to exclude the irresistibility of the divine working of grace, and on the contrary to establish the fact, that grace works resistibly also in the elect. This indeed the Formula of Concord has done in such a manner, that it most carefully aims at the same time, in close accommodation to Luther's doctrine, to surrender nothing of the justified and deeply conceived and sharply defined contrast of Luther's teachings over against everything Pelagian and synergistic, or to allow it even to become indistinct. It has further done it in such a manner, that it has not undertaken a complete exposition in all directions of the doctrine presented, nor was this its object.

In the Solida Declar. XI. § 40 it is written: "But as God has ordained in his counsel that the Holy Ghost should call, enlighten and convert the elect through the Word and that all those who, through true faith, receive Christ He will justify and have; He has also determined in His counsel, that He will harden, reprobate and condemn those who are called through the Word if they reject the Word and resist the Holy Ghost, who wishes to be efficacious and to work in them through the Word and for this reason 'many are called, but few are chosen.'" If few receive the Word, the cause of contempt, as stated § 41 is not the predestination of God, but the perverse will of man "who rejects or perverts the means and instrument of the Holy Ghost, which God offers him through the call, and resists the Holy Ghost, who wishes to be efficacious, and works through the Word, as Christ says (Matt. 23, 37): "How often would I have gathered thee together, and ye would not." And if many, § 42 adds, indeed receive the word with joy, but afterwards fall away again, the cause is not, as though God were unwilling to grant grace for perseverance to those, in whom He has begun the good work;

but the cause is "that they wilfully turn away again from the commandment, grieve and exasperate the Holy Ghost, implicate themselves in the filth of the world and garnish again the habitation of the heart for the devil; with them the lost state is worse than the first." Thus it is also said, § 32, that God, who has called us, is so faithful when He has begun a good work in us, that He also will preserve and continue it to the end, if we do not turn ourselves from Him, but retain firmly to the end the work begun, for retaining which He has promised His grace. And further § 21, that the good work which He has begun in them, He would strengthen, increase and support to the end, if they observe God's Word, pray diligently, abide in God's goodness, and faithfully use the gifts received.

All these utterances would mean nothing, if also in the elect faith and perseverance were not wrought in such a manner, that the possibility of resistance and final falling away is not excluded, and that, unlike others, they do not prevent the work of grace by their resistance, depends therefore on their conduct by virtue of the liberty which they have over against the working of grace. For otherwise the reason for the difference between the elect and the other called must be another than that assigned by the Formula of Concord. The words, "And thus many are called and few are chosen" at the close of § 40 would be without foundation. The reason that in contradistinction to the other called the elect accept Christ in true faith and persevere to the end in this faith would moreover lie in this, that in the elect grace would operate in a manner different from the other called, that is, irresistibly. Above all, every doubt concerning the true sense of the doctrine in the Formula of Concord is removed by what is said of final perseverance in faith. When the Formula of Concord says, that God is willing to complete the good work in those in whom He has begun it, that He has promised them His grace for perseverance, if they do not turn themselves from God, wilfully turn away, but observe God's Word, pray diligently, abide in God's goodness and faithfully use the gifts received, it declares without distinction concerning all, in whom God has begun the good work, both of those who persevere, that is, the elect, and of the others,

that God will work in them whatever is necessary that they may be able to persevere, but that He will not work irresistibly in one or the other, but in such a manner, that all, even those who persevere, can turn away from God. The Formula of Concord thereby affirms, that the perseverance or non-perseverance of those in whom God has begun the good work, depends on their conduct, that is to say, whether, as by grace they can, they observe God's Word, pray diligently, abide in God's goodness, and faithfully use the gifts received.

Augustine also, who conceives the operation of grace in the predestinated as irresistible and for this reason the election of the elect as absolute, indeed declares, that the cause of the resistance of the non-elect is not God, but their evil will. He can say this, because in opposition to determinism and every supralapsarian form of absolute predestination he maintains the freedom of Adam in the fall, and thus at the same time can hold that God did nothing and does nothing to effect, that the wicked have become wicked and remain in wickedness, that God on the contrary only suffers those who are not predestinated to remain in the wickedness in which they lie. But Augustine cannot affirm with the Formula of Concord, that it is the will of the Holy Ghost to work faith and perseverance in all the called. For, according to Augustine, if it were indeed God's will, He must work the good and perseverance in the good in all the called, and work it in the same manner in all as in the predestinated, that is, irresistibly, thus the resisting evil will would be overcome in all the called, and all the called would actually be converted and persevere to the end in the new life. Augustine therefore denies the universality of the divine gracious will, distorting the passages of Scripture in which this is set forth by means of arbitrary interpretation into a particularizing meaning, He makes a distinction between two different kinds of call, namely that which is so effective that conversion is actually and irresistibly brought about (*vocatio congrua*); and that which, although not ineffective, yet is not so effective, that conversion could be wrought (*vocatio non congrua*). He furthermore asserts, that God does not bestow nor will to bestow the gift of perseverance in good to all converted, but only to the predestinated, who therefore alone will be saved. In

order to keep in view the unquestionably anti-predestinarian position of the Formula of Concord, it must be observed, that again and again it emphasizes the perfect seriousness of the divine gracious will and working toward all the called, as it also most earnestly and repeatedly asserts, that in all in whom He has begun the good work, God will do everything necessary that they can persevere to the end.

The cause of the difference between the elect and the other called, according to the Formula of Concord, lies in the difference of the conduct of man over against grace, which is rendered possible by the liberty left to man over against grace. And thus according to the doctrine of the Formula of Concord election cannot be the cause, that, unlike the other called, the elect do not resist grace and not again fall away; according to the doctrine of the Formula of Concord the cause of their election in distinction to the other called must rather lie in their non-resistance and non-defection foreseen by God. This indeed is what the Formula of Concord means to affirm, when in § 40 it says, God has ordained in His counsel that the Holy Ghost should call, enlighten and convert the elect through the Word, and that all those who, through true faith, receive Christ, He will justify and save. Accepting includes the fact that those who "by true faith receive Christ" do not, as is in their power by their resistance, prevent the work of grace, which as the only efficient, but not irresistible cause works faith in them.

That the Formula of Concord, although asserting the utter inability of the natural man for good in opposition to everything Pelagian and synergistic, nevertheless precludes the irresistibility of the working of grace, appears from the II. Article, which treats of free will or the power of man. It is there taught, e. g. § 71 sq. that the pure doctrine shows us the means through which the Holy Ghost would begin and work in us conversion and renewal, and exhorts us not to frustrate this grace of God in us, but zealously to use it in consideration of the great sin which the hindrance and resistance to the working of the Holy Ghost would involve. In the same connection it is taught § 83, that "conversion is such a change through the operation of the Holy Ghost in the understanding, will and heart of man, that, by this

operation of the Holy Ghost, man *can* receive the offered grace. And indeed," it adds, "all those who obstinately and persistently resist the operations and movements of the Holy Ghost, which take place through the Word, do not receive, but grieve and lose the Holy Ghost."

No valid objection can be raised against the correctness of this exposition of the Formula of Concord from the statement of the Sol. Decl. XI, § 87, sq., that "it is false and wrong when it is taught that not alone the mercy of God and the most holy merit of Christ, but also that there is in us a cause of God's election, on account of which God has chosen us to eternal life." The connection shows, that this is directed solely against any meritorious cause in us, against all our merits and good works which we perform through our natural powers. But no good work is done, nothing in fact is done when we simply do not resist God, who through His working, without any assistance whatever on our part, produces the good in us, so that it originates simply not through us, but is alone of God, of God's power and grace, working however not irresistibly.

The passages quoted, Eph. 1, 5 sq. and Rom. 9, 11 sq. do not lead beyond the sense indicated above.

With reference to the teachings of the fathers of our Church, Luther indeed, influenced by the doctrine of Augustine, was entangled in the errors of the doctrine of absolute predestination, although from the very outset these errors were in contradiction to the fundamental thoughts of his doctrine, especially to his doctrine of the means of grace and the certainty of saving faith, and therefore disappeared more and more in his teachings. A few other theologians also of the time of the reformation held the doctrine of absolute predestination. From the time of the Formula of Concord however this doctrine is excluded from the doctrine of our Lutheran Church. The orthodox teachers of our Church from that time on indeed differ among themselves in the precise formulation, in the matter itself however they agree, inasmuch as they unanimously reject the irresistibility of the working of grace in the elect, and absolute predestination. See Hollaz, de Praedest. qu. 9.

We shall confine ourselves to a more extensive considera-

tion of the doctrine of Gerhard. As the Formula of Concord teaches, that God in His counsel has decreed that He would justify and save all who receive Christ in true faith, so also Gerhard teaches, that the decree of election is made in view of faith (*intuitu fidei*). De elect. et reprob. chap. 9, he explains, that God has elected those in Christ, of whom He foreknew that by the operation of the Holy Ghost through the preaching of the Gospel they would truly believe on Christ and persevere in faith to the end of life, as He has also decreed to cast away those of whom He foreknew that they would remain in unbelief.

§ 161: "Illos ergo omnes et solos ab aeterno a Deo ad salutem electos esse dicimus, quos efficacia Spiritus S. per ministerium evangelii in Christum redemptorem vere credituros et in fide usque ad vitae finem permansuros praevidit."

§ 163: "Quos Deus praescivit per evangelii praedicationem credituros et ad fidei obedientiam perventuros, eos in Christo elegit."

§ 164: "Ab aeterno Deus tale fecit decretum, scilicet reprobandi eos, quos praevidit in incredulitate mansuros, et eligendi eos, quos in vera fide permansuros praevidit." *

Eternal election therefore according to Gerhard is not absolute, but conditioned by the foreknowledge of faith and perseverance in faith. At the same time Gerhard maintains that we cannot have faith through our powers, but that it is solely a work of God in us. Equally firmly however he asserts that grace does not work faith irresistibly. In conversion, he says, the Holy Ghost finds man as one wholly want-

* § 161: All those, therefore, and they alone, we say, are elected from eternity by God to salvation, of whom He foresaw that by the efficacy of the Holy Ghost through the ministry of the Gospel, they would truly believe on Christ the Redeemer, and persevere in faith to the end of life.

§ 163: Of whom God foreknew that through the preaching of the Gospel they would believe and come to obedience of faith, those He has elected in Christ.

§ 164: God has from eternity made such a decree, namely to reject those of whom He foresaw that they would persevere in unbelief, and to elect those of whom He foresaw that they would persevere in true faith.

ing all powers to assist, since the spirit of unconverted man is blind; his will turned away from God and hostile to Him. Through grace man in conversion is changed from an unwilling to a willing person, since the Holy Ghost gives him new powers by which he can assent to the call, in such a manner however, that man is not immediately in a moment deprived of the power to reject grace, to prevent the work of the Holy Ghost. Very positively, furthermore, the view is rejected, that the grace of the Holy Ghost in conversion determines with a certain "physical" action the will to will and to choose the good; for in this case all whose conversion the Holy Ghost willed, would be converted with absolute necessity. The Holy Ghost indeed suffers Himself to be resisted; He permits His work to be hindered; He sees that many declare themselves unworthy of conversion and its fruits, eternal life.

De lib. arb. c. 6, sect. 1, § 57: "In conversionis opere Spiritus S. tale invenit subjectum, quod nullas habet ad cooperandum vires, siquidem mens hominis nondum renati est caeca, voluntas aversa ac Deo inimica; hoc igitur omni genere medendi atque auxiliandi gratia egit, ut eum quem convertere vult ex volente volentem, ex inimico obedientem faciat; illud vero non fit eo modo, ac si homine nec cogitante, nec cognoscente, vel etiam invito hominem convertat, ipsique vim afferat, sed Spiritus S. donat novas vires, quibus assentiri vocationi possit, nec tamen uno statim momento homini adimit veterem illam libertatem, vel potius miseram servitutem, qua oblatam gratiam repudiare possit; absit igitur ut dicamus, Spiritus S. gratiam in conversione physica quadam actione determinare voluntatem ad volendum et eligendum bonum (hoc enim ratione converterentur omnes immutabili necessitate, quos Spiritus S. sibi resisti, permittit opus suum impediri, videt multos se ipsos conversione et conversionis fructu, ipsa scilicet vita aeterna, indignos judicare. Voluntas igitur in omnibus hominibus est post lapsum; ut autem voluntas velit bonum spirituale, id non habet ex suis viribus, siquidem peccato servit; renovat igitur Spiritus S. in conversione hominis voluntatem ac donat ei novas vires, quibus instructa bonum actu velle et eligere possit, interim ex adhaerente naturae pravitate potest homo nolle bonum, potest Spiritus S. opus impedire, ac proinde neutiquam dicendum,

quod in conversione physica quadam actione gratia determinet voluntatem ad volendum ac eligendum bonum." *

In the beginning of § 57 we read: "Cum de ipso, ut ita loquar, puncto conversionis hic agatur, ideo caute navigandum, ne vel ad Scyllam Pelagianam, vel ad Charybdis absolute decreti deferamur. Sic ergo procedimus." †

Gerhard here distinctly emphasizes that in the manner stated we must teach in order to avoid on the one hand the Scylla of Pelagian errors, on the other the Charybdis of the absolute decree.

According to Gerhard, as also according to the Formula of Concord, eternal election is conditioned by the foreknowledge of faith and perseverance, not irresistibly wrought by grace, and therefore by the conduct of man with reference to

* In the work of conversion the Holy Ghost finds such an object as has no powers to cooperate, since the mind of man not yet converted is blind, his will turned away from God and hostile to Him. Grace therefore in every manner strives to heal and help, in order to change him when it desires to convert, from an unwilling to a willing, and from a hostile to an obedient person; this however is not brought about in such a manner, as if it converted man without his thinking or recognizing or against will, and offered violence, but the Holy Ghost gives new powers, through which assent to the call can be given, nor yet does it immediately in a moment take away that old liberty or rather deplorable slavery, through which man can reject grace offered to him. Far be it therefore from us to say, that the grace of the Holy Ghost in conversion determines the will by a certain physical action to will and to choose the good (for in this way all whom the Holy Ghost desires to convert would be converted by an immutable necessity); the Holy Ghost indeed suffers Himself to be resisted, permits His work to be hindered, sees many judge themselves unworthy of conversion and its fruits, namely eternal life. The will therefore is present in all men after the fall; but that the will wills the spiritually good, it derives not from its own powers, since it serves sin. The Holy Ghost therefore renews the will of man in conversion and gives him new powers; gifted with these it can actually will and choose the good, yet by virtue of the adhering depravity of his nature man is able not to will the good; he can hinder the work of the Holy Ghost; and in no manner can it be said, that in conversion grace by any physical action determines the will to will and elect the good.

† As we treat, so to speak, of the very point of conversion, we must steer cautiously, lest we be carried either against the Pelagian Scylla or into the Charybdis of the absolute decree. We therefore proceed thus.

grace, which works faith and perseverance, all of which was only foreknown by God.

With this doctrine of our Ev. Luth. Church now the doctrine advanced by the Wisconsin Synod stands in conflict. The Wisconsin Synod explicitly declares, that in the doctrine of election as held by it, the doctrine that God has elected in view of faith is rejected (p. 34). The Wisconsin Synod in general terms denies, that a difference in the conduct of man over against the means of grace can be assumed as a reason why of the many called only few are chosen.

In the minutes p. 31 sq. we read: "And now come our modern opponents and say: Certainly this we must maintain, that God desires that all men shall be saved. In no wise must we deny the universal gracious will of God and the uniform efficacy of the means of grace. But then *there must be a difference among men*, a difference in their conduct over against the means of grace. To this difference must be referred the fact that some are converted, others not. Otherwise we cannot maintain the universality of the gracious will of God and the constant efficaciousness of grace. It is true, not all use the same expressions But in this all agree that they refer it to a difference in the conduct of man over against the means of grace whether they are converted or not We therefore rightly claim, that our opponents are entirely in error in the doctrine of conversion; they rob God of the glory which is due Him, and give it to man, who merits only disgrace."

The Wisconsin Synod excludes not only all Pelagian, Semipelagian and Synergistic notions, that is, all concurrence of the natural will of man by its own powers to produce faith, but also that difference in conduct which is possible for man to exercise in view of grace, since grace does not operate irresistibly, and which exhibits itself in this, that some among the called by their resistance prevent the work of grace, others not. With this absolute predestination is established. The Wisconsin Synod declares that the Scriptures teach, that for Christ's sake and according to the good pleasure of His will God has from eternity elected certain individuals to eternal life, in whom from this cause He promises their calling, conversion and everything necessary for salvation,

and who therefore surely will be saved. Without respect to the foreseen conduct of the elect, election is designated as the cause that the elect are surely saved through grace. At the same time the work of grace in the elect is conceived as irresistible. For if without respect to their conduct faith and perseverance are surely wrought in the elect, so that they are surely saved, faith and perseverance are wrought irresistibly, by removing or overcoming that resistance which is in the power of man. The Wisconsin Synod, it is true, says (p. 47 and 56) that God does not work conversion irresistibly, but annuls this declaration by adding that it is God's grace and power, the powerful effect of God's grace in the Gospel, which breaks the resistance in a few (that is the predestinated).

It naturally follows that in such connection expressions which, accepted in the sense of conditional predestination, are true, like the statement of the Formula of Concord, that the eternal election of God not only foresees and knows the salvation of the elect, but it is also, from the gracious will and pleasure of God in Christ Jesus, a cause which procures, works, helps and promotes our salvation and what pertains thereto, at once acquire an incorrect and predestinarian sense for the Wisconsin Synod.

The doctrine of the Wisconsin Synod is certainly not identical with the Calvinistic doctrine. There are various forms of absolute predestination. By rejecting the Calvinistic form of absolute predestination, absolute predestination as such is not yet rejected. Over against Calvinism the Wisconsin Synod accepts indeed also the proposition of the universal gracious will of God and other propositions of the doctrine of the Formula of Concord and of our Church, which exclude absolute predestination and are advanced by old teachers of our Church as doing this. But the Wisconsin Synod, notwithstanding this contradictory relation which it openly acknowledges, adheres to its false predestinarian tenet concerning eternal election. In order to do this it falls back upon the claim, that God has not revealed His truth for us to harmonize a position which in itself is correct, but which could only be applied here if the statement of the Wisconsin Synod concerning eternal election were founded in the Scriptures.

It seems that opposition to Synergism has led to the doctrine of eternal election as advanced by the Wisconsin Synod. That which is false in the doctrine of election held by the Wisconsin Synod can certainly be combated rightly only when at the same time Synergism is most emphatically excluded. The Wisconsin Synod however in its opposition to Synergism has lost itself on the other hand in the errors of predestinarianism. Only then will it succeed in freeing itself from its error in the doctrine of election, if it retracts the proposition, that as a reason why out of the number of called few only are chosen, a difference in the conduct of man over against grace can in no wise be admitted, and acknowledges, that, since grace does not operate irresistibly also in the elect, the cause why unlike the other called, only the elect are elected does not lie in God nor in His eternal election and in His working, but rather in the foreknown fact, that the elect do not by that resistance which they are permitted to exercise over against the divinely operating grace, prevent the work of grace.

Dean, Senior and other Professors and Doctors of the theological faculty.

J. BACHMANN, DIECKHOFF,
L. SCHULZE, NOESGEN.

Rostock, May 30th, 1884.

THE INSPIRATION OF SCRIPTURE.

From the Examen of Hollaz, Prolegomena III, by G. H. S.

Question 15. What is the essence (*forma*) of Holy Scripture?

Answer. The internal essence of Holy Scripture is its divinely inspired (*θεόπνευστος*) sense, expressed in words dictated by the Holy Spirit.

Proof a. Of every word, whether uttered with the mouth or laid down in writing, the essence is its sense or power of signifying something. For which reason, if the sacred Scriptures are considered generically, in so far as they are a writ-

ten word, their internal and generic essence is the sense or signification of the words and phrases of which the holy men of God made use in giving the Sacred Scriptures.

Proof b. If the Sacred Scriptures are considered specifically as the Word of God, then their internal nature is the divine sense, because through this, as a reason *a priori*, the Sacred Scriptures find their specific character and are distinguished from any human writing whatsoever.

Proof c.) Because the conceptions of both the things and of the words were suggested to the sacred writers by inspiration, or an immediate dictation of the Holy Spirit, the divinely inspired sense, expressed in words dictated by the Holy Spirit, furnishes the adequate internal essence of the Sacred Scriptures. For by this additional feature are the Sacred Scriptures distinguished, not only from the writings of other men, of kings, rulers, philosophers, but also from the versions of Sacred Scripture prepared by human study; because these, if they conform to the original text, represent indeed the divine sense and furnish us with it; but they differ from the Scriptures, considered in their primitive text, as much as a writing does that must be believed for its own sake from a writing which is believed not on account of itself, but only on account of another and original writing to which it exactly conforms; or as does Scripture which is normative from Scripture whose normative character depends on another (*Scriptura normans et normata*).

Question 16. Are the conceptions of all the things which are contained in the sacred writings divinely inspired?

Answer. The conceptions of all the things which are contained in the sacred writings were given to the prophets and apostles by the immediate inspiration of the Holy Spirit.

Proof I. From the words of St. Paul, 2 Tim. 3, 16, "All Scriptures is given by inspiration of God." *Observation a.)* Here is to be understood not any writing whatsoever, but the Holy Scriptures, as is clear from v. 15. *b.)* *θεωπνοή* or *θεοπνευστία* signifies as well the antecedent divine motive power or peculiar impulse of the will to write, as also the immediate illumination through which the mind of the sacred writer is enlightened by a supernatural, and thus extraordinary, light of divine grace, and the conception of the things to be writ-

ten are suggested immediately by the Holy Spirit Himself. This divine inspiration differs from divine government; for this latter guards only against anything being written that is not truthful, proper and suitable, but through the former the conceptions of the things to be written are suggested by the dictation of the Holy Spirit. The divine direction can bring about an infallible Holy Writ, but not one divinely inspired. From this we argue: If only the mysteries of faith which the sacred books contain are divinely inspired, but the other things, which are knowable through the light of nature, depend merely upon divine direction, then the whole Sacred Scriptures are not divinely inspired. But, according to the testimony of Paul, the *whole* of the Sacred Scriptures are inspired. Hence not only the mysteries of faith, but also that which is knowable by the light of nature and is contained in the Sacred Scriptures, is divinely suggested and inspired.

Proof II. From the promise of Christ, John 14, 26: "The Holy Ghost shall teach you all things and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you." The Savior, in departing to the Father, promises to His Apostles the Holy Ghost, who will most fully fill their minds with heavenly doctrine, and will recall to their minds all the things heard from Christ, now either not yet sufficiently understood or again forgotten, so that, with this internal teacher and guide, they will be able to proclaim with their voice to the Gentiles or consign to writing everything necessary to be known. From which it follows that the conceptions of all things described by the Apostles were given to them by immediate divine inspiration.

The antithesis to this we find among the Papists, Socinians and Arminians, according to whose view the mysteries of faith indeed were given to the sacred writers by inspiration, but the things which were knowable from the light of nature by study, were indeed directed by divine guidance, so that they should be true, but they are not divinely inspired. Their arguments we will proceed to weigh.

I. Whatever the prophets and Apostles were able to know through natural reason and the knowledge of experience, for the acquisition of this they did not need a divine revelation. But historical, natural, moral and similar

matters are thus knowable. Hence, etc. The major term is correct, for whatever a person knows from the light of reason, he does not need the supernatural light of revelation to learn. *Ans.* 1.) In the name revelation lies a certain ambiguity which must yet be cleared up. The word revelation is sometimes taken in a narrower, sometimes in a wider sense. In the narrower sense it denotes the supernatural manifestation of hidden and secret things. For *revelare*, or *ἀποκαλύπτειν* means to uncover or make manifest things which, by virtue of their origin, are hidden, and, as it were, covered with a veil. Cf. 1 Cor. 2, 10; Gal. 1, 11; Matt. 11, 25. In the wider signification revelation is taken for the manifestation, though divinely made, of anything whatever, even if it could be known from the light of nature. In the former sense the whole argument is conceded; in the latter we deny the major term. 2.) The things which were made known to the sacred writers are considered either absolutely and in themselves, or in a certain respect, in so far as they had to be written in accordance with the divine will. In the first manner they had already before this been known to the sacred writers; not, however, in the latter. For although the sacred writers had certain things which are described by them as concepts of their minds before the act of writing, yet through themselves it was not known to them whether these things should be described by the will of *God*, or with what surroundings, or in what order or in what words. It does not infrequently happen that we dictate to an amanuensis things and words entirely unknown to them, yet he has not the right to add anything or omit anything, but is to be guided entirely by the mouth of him that dictates. Thus also is it the sacred amanuensis' duty to put down in writing nothing except that which is given by the Holy Ghost.

II. There are found in the Sacred Scriptures things of little moment and scarcely worthy that they should be mentioned by divine revelation, as the staff of Jacob, Gen. 32, 10, the cloak of Paul, 2 Tim. 4, 13. *Ans.* Whatever things God, even though they be small, thought worthy of being created, these He did not consider unworthy of supernatural revelation. For no reverential worshipper of God will consider that in the Scriptures as light and unimportant which has been inserted by the most wise counsel of God.

III. Many impious acts are mentioned in the Scriptures, and these cannot have been given by divine inspiration. *Ans.* These impious acts are mentioned as facts, but they are not approved as good. The historical revelation of them is divinely inspired, not for imitation, but as a warning.

IV. Whoever confesses that he and not the Lord asserts something, he, by that very act, confesses that not everything is inspired by the Lord. But the Apostle of the Gentiles, 1 Cor. 7, 12 avers this. We answer, that a distinction must be made between a general or implicit assertion and a special or explicit assertion. Paul confesses that the Lord has explicitly made no statement or sanction concerning the perpetual living of a believing husband with an unbelieving wife, and *vice versa*, but only what is *generically* and *implicitly* contained in the statements of Gen. 2, 24, Matt. 19, 16. This same thing the Apostle directs and applies in a *special* manner and *explicitly* to the present case. This he indicates with the words: "But to the rest speak I, not the Lord."

V. Whatever writer receives an account of the things he describes from men who were eye witnesses, the same does not receive it by divine inspiration. But Luke, a sacred writer, did this, Luke 1, 3. Hence, etc. We answer, Whatever facts St. Luke *before they were recorded* received from human witnesses, these were *in the act of writing* given to him by divine inspiration, so that he could write them in the proper order, with the right words, with the necessary surrounding circumstances, and without a failure or error of memory.

VI. John 19, 35 says, that he wrote *what he saw*, not what had been revealed to him. He thus, in His testimony concerning Christ, does not appeal to the divine inspiration, but to the sense of sight. We answer that John appeals as an eye-witness to what he saw, not that he thereby excludes divine inspiration, but in order to strengthen it. For he quotes the Word of God as revealed and as put into writing as well by Moses Ex. 12, 46 as by the prophet Zechariah 12, 10, The testimony of the Holy Spirit and of the Apostles here agree, concerning which the author of our salvation says, John 15, 26, 27: "The Spirit of truth, which proceedeth from the Father, he shall testify of me. And ye shall bear

witness, because ye have been with me from the beginning." The Apostles testify moved by the Holy Ghost, 2 Pet. 1, 21.

VII. In order that the things seen by the Apostles may be described truthfully, divine assistance and guidance suffices, preserving the sacred writers from error, nor does there seem to have been any need of a divine inspiration. We answer that the Sacred Scriptures are a homogeneous whole, nor is one portion assigned to divine inspiration and another portion not, but the *whole Sacred Scriptures*, as much as there is of them, is called by the Apostle *θεόπνευστος*, or inspired. They are called *θεόπνευστος* not on account of a mere assistance, overseeing or direction, but on account of a divine *dictation, suggestion and inspiration*. Observe that we speak of a *mere* guidance, and do not thereby exclude a divine direction as such, but join it to the *θεοπνευστία*.

Question 17. Are all the single words of which the Sacred Scriptures consist divinely inspired?

Answer. Each and every single word which is found in the sacred volume was given by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit to the prophets and apostles, and was dictated into their pen.

Proof I. Whatever Scriptures are in their entirety inspired, of these not only the sense and the facts indicated, but also the words, as the signs of the things, are divinely inspired. But the Sacred Scriptures, according to 1 Tim. 3, 16 are inspired thus. Therefore, etc.

The major term is correct, because 1.) The Apostle does not simply say, "Every word of God is inspired," for this a person might understand of the word of God essentially, as the divine sense, but he says All Scriptures, which denotes not merely the sense of Scriptures, but also the written words. 2.) The Apostle does not say, All the written things of God (*πάντα γεγραμμένα θεόπνευστα*) are inspired, but *πάσα γραφή θεόπνευστος*, All Scriptures are inspired, so that he declares not only the facts that are contained in the Sacred Scriptures are inspired, but that the very words have been dictated into the pen by the Holy Spirit. 3.) Concerning these Scriptures the Apostle speaks as those which Timothy read as a youth, and which he as a bishop should study and explain to his hearers. But he read and explained the Scripture in so far as they con-

sist not merely of facts, but also of written words. Therefore the whole Sacred Scripture is divinely inspired, not merely in so far as they consist of facts, but also of written words.

II. Whatever proceeded not from human volition as its source, but from a special impulse of the Holy Spirit, the whole of this, consisting of words and things, is of divine origin. But the Sacred Scriptures in their original Hebrew and Greek idiom did proceed thus. Therefore, etc.

The major term is allowed, because that invention or writing is called human which proceeds from human volition.

The minor is proved from 2 Pet. '1, 20. 21: "No prophecy of Scripture is of any private interpretation. For the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man: but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." We observe 1.) The Apostle Peter denies that any prophecy of Scripture is of any private interpretation, for this reason, because it was not uttered by, nor did it proceed from human will, but from the impulse of the Holy Spirit. But the Scriptures must be interpreted in so far as they consist of words and things. Therefore no word of written prophecy proceeds from human will, but from divine inspiration. 2.) The holy men of God are said to have written *as they were moved by the Holy Ghost*. Therefore not only the things, but also the *λαλία*, or the words of the Apostles as uttered by the mouth, are also thus written, having proceeded from the Divine Spirit, for by *λαλία* speaking either by the tongue or by writing is meant (which in reality do not differ) as is seen from Acts 3, 24. 3.) Although St. Peter primarily speaks of prophecy of the Old Testament and vindicates for this an immediate divine origin, yet by a fair and natural conclusion from Peter's expression it follows that the Scriptures of the New Testament, both in reference to words and to facts, are claimed to be by divine inspiration. This conclusion will become all the clearer, the more accurately the following argument is considered.

III. Whatever words the Apostles in the discharge of their apostolic office uttered with their mouths and committed to writing, these the Holy Spirit taught them. But the words extant in the volume of the New Testament the

Apostles uttered in the discharge of their apostolic office and committed to writing. Therefore, etc.

The major term is found in Paul's first letter to the Corinthians, chap. 1, 12. 13: "Now we have received not the spirit of the world, but the spirit which is of God; that we might know the things that are freely given to us of God. Which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth."

The minor term is clear in itself. For example: The words extant in the epistle to the Romans are words of Paul committed to writing, and these are manifestly in conformity with the words which he spoke in the discharge of his apostolic functions, on account of the exact harmony existing between the divine words as spoken by the mouth and as committed to writing.

IV. God instructed Moses in an immediate manner to write down words, Ex. 34, 27. 28: "And the Lord said unto Moses, Write thou these words: for after the tenor of these words I have made a covenant with thee and with Israel." Under these words which were to be written some commentators understand the exact words of the decalogue, others all the precepts of the law of Moses, moral, levitical and forensic. But which words Moses, by the command of the Lord, was to write, God Himself teaches him in an immediate manner cf. v. 10 and c. 19, 3 ff. What is true here of the Mosaic law is true also of the other divine writings. Therefore this is so frequently inculcated in the Scriptures, "Word of the Lord," "Thus saith the Lord," in order to show that these words are not of human, but of divine origin.

V. If each and every word which the sacred writers employ is not divinely inspired, 1.) Then no difference is to be made between the original text and the translations made by the study of man; if these are only in harmony with the authentic text, they express also an inspired sense, but not in inspired words. 2.) Then the emphasis, power or strength of the words of the one original text need not be elucidated with special care.

The antithesis to this we find in Erasmus, Suarezius, Episcopius, Beza, Vorstius and others, who deny that the individual words of the Sacred Scriptures were given by

divine inspiration to the prophets and Apostles. These argue

1.) That if each and every single word of Scripture is inspired by the one Spirit of God, then there would be but one method of expression in all the sacred writers, and one and the same style. But they differ much in style. Therefore each and every single word is not inspired. The deduction from the major premise, is correct, because the same author employs the same style. The antecedent is clear; for Isaiah, being born in high station and educated in a palace, is smooth; Amos the herdsman savors of the country; Luke, trained in Greek letters, writes elegantly. We answer a) It happens in human circumstances that *one* author of excellent talent and rare ability is master of various styles of expression. Certainly Cicero employed and practiced a grand, a medium, and a plain style in speaking and writing. The same peculiarity we find in divine matters. St. John, by a diversity of diction, weaves together the Gospel, the letters and the apocalypse in a diversity of arguments, to which the style is accommodated. For the Gospel of John explains the divinity of Christ with a gravity of words, the epistles, the glow of love by sweetness of diction, and the apocalypse the fate of the Church by methods similar to those of the prophets; yet all bear the marks of inspiration. Acts 2, 4: "The Holy Spirit gave to each to speak as He wished." He doubtless looked at the difference in the matter to be treated of, and accommodated His style to this. 3.) The style of the Old and of the New Testaments is uniform, as far as substance is concerned. Although, as far as the accidental feature of conformity of style is concerned, by a singular accommodation the Holy Spirit condescended to the talents, knowledge and ideas of the men whom He inspired; just as in a musical instrument the substance of the harmony and tone is one; but by a difference of pipes, some sharper, some duller, the wind that fills the pipes accommodates itself to these.

2.) If the knowledge of anything was acquired by the sacred writers through daily intercourse and association, then it was not given to them by inspiration. But the ideas of the words and the method of expression, in which the Sacred Scriptures are written, the sacred writers did acquire by daily intercourse and association. Therefore, etc. The major term

is correct, because a revelation is a manifestation of something unknown, of something that, as it were, is hidden under a veil. The minor is clear, because the sacred writers made use of words taken from the accustomed mode of expression, which they had learned through their intercourse with intelligent men. We answer, 1.) An ambiguity lies hidden under the name revelation as made plain above, and I now add a necessary distinction between revelation and divine inspiration. Revelation, according to the strict etymology, is a manifestation of the unknown; inspiration, however, is the act of the Holy Spirit by which an actual knowledge of things is poured into the intellect of the creature, by separation from its previous knowledge and ignorance. 2.) We do not maintain that each and every word was given by divine inspiration to prophets and Apostles, as far as the *knowing*, but as far as the *writing* is concerned (non ad sciendum, sed ad scribendum). For certain words unknown to the prophets and Apostles before the act of writing, the Holy Spirit first revealed to them; for He appropriated certain words out of the common mode of expression and applied them to divine things. But each and every word was dictated into the pen of the sacred writers, whether known to them before or not; just as it happens daily when men dictate letters into the pen of a clerk; they use words taken from the common manner of expression, whose power and signification was known to him before.

You say, that divine inspiration was not necessary for things known from the common mode of expression, but was superfluous. We answer that it was necessary in order to express the mind of the Holy Spirit correctly. For not was it permitted the prophets and apostles to put the divine sense into those words which they chose according to their own will, but it was their duty to follow and depend upon the mouth of the Holy Spirit as He dictated, in order that they might commit to writing the Sacred Scriptures in an order of words and context pleasing to Him, so that these might result in a manner in conformity with the mind of the Holy Spirit.

Quest. 18. Did the divine inspiration preserve the sacred writers from all error?

The divine inspiration, by which not less the things and the words to be spoken than those to be written were immediately suggested to the prophets and apostles by the Holy Spirit, made them free from all error as well in preaching as in the writing of the divine word.

Proof I. Whatever proceeds from God, the source of truth, in an immediate manner, this must necessarily be most true. But the whole Sacred Scriptures do proceed from God, according to 2 Tim. 3, 16. Therefore, etc.

II. The Word of God preached by the prophets and committed to writing is called a *λόγος βεβαιότερος*, a more sure word, 2 Pet. 1, 19: We have a more sure word of prophecy. The apostle here compares the Scriptures of the Old Testament with the voice of the Father resounding from heaven, v. 17. 18., and calls the former *more sure*, not in an absolute sense (non simpliciter); for nothing can be more sure than the voice of the Father heard from heaven; but in so far as this was confirmed by the testimony of Peter. Thus is the word of prophecy more sure than the testimony of Peter uttered with reference to the voice of the heavenly Father in respect to the conversion of the Jews to Christ. To these the prophetic word was surer than the apostolic word concerning the voice of the Father heard from heaven. For the authority of the prophetic word was confirmed by the progress of time, and the agreement of the fathers; but the authority of the apostolic testimony concerning the voice of the heavenly Father was of a more recent date and not yet sanctioned by consent of so many Jews. For which reason the prophetic word was more sure than the voice of the heavenly Father, in so far as the latter is asserted by the authority of Peter; and the consequence is that the former is more sure and infallible, preached and written by the prophets who could neither deceive nor be deceived.

III. The Spirit of truth led the apostles into all truth, according to the promise of Christ, John 16, 12. The Holy Spirit was the most faithful leader of the apostles, who led them as a mother does her child or a guide does the blind, by taking hold of their hands, and guided them into all truth, so that they could never err in propounding and explaining doctrines of faith.

The antithesis to this we find among the Socinians and Arminians, who maintain that the sacred writers at times, by a lapse of memory, erred; as also among the Copernican and Cartesian philosophers, who assert that the Sacred Scriptures sometimes accommodate themselves to the erroneous views of the people. The stronger of their arguments we will here examine.

I. Peter erred and was not in agreement with the Gospels. Gal. 2, 14. We answer that Peter did not err in a doctrine of faith, but in a certain special act; for he erred by not walking uprightly in the way of life and good customs, and thus Peter's fault was not one of doctrine, but of conversation, as Tertullian says.

II. John erred in worshipping the angel. Apoc. 19, 10. We answer that John erred in the person whom he considered the uncreated angel to be; he did not err in proclaiming or in writing the divine word.

III. Matthew erred 27, 9 in citing Jeremiah for Zechariah; the words cited there concerning the payment of the thirty pieces of silver are found in Zech. 11, 12. We answer, that the words of Matthew are, "Then was fulfilled that was *spoken* by Jeremy the prophet, saying." Concerning the *writing* of Jeremiah nothing is said in the text. What therefore Jeremiah said, this Zechariah, his disciple, wrote.

IV. Luke erred 3, 36 when he wrote "Sala was the son of Cainan," since, according to the testimony of Moses, Gen. 9, 12, he was the son of Arphachsad. We answer that this Cainan is spurious, and not found in the most ancient copies.

V. Paul erred in Hebrew 11, 21 in citing an erroneous translation of the Septuagint, "Jacob worshipped, leaning on the top of his staff," while Moses in Gen. 47, 21 says that he worshipped leaning upon the head of the bed. We answer that Paul does not contradict Moses, for both assert that Jacob leaned, offering civil respect to Joseph, Moses indicating the place, Paul the instrument upon which he sustained himself in his infirmity, namely the staff of Joseph.

You say, that Paul follows the Septuagint, which mistook in its translation the word *mitta* (staff) for *matta* (bed). We answer that Paul does not approve the license of the Septuagint in translation, but approves the thing itself as a real

fact, and expresses this that Jacob leaned over the head of the bed, resting upon the staff of Joseph.

VI. Twice Stephen seems to err, first when he, in Acts 7, 14. says that Joseph sent for his father to come to Egypt, and his whole household, consisting of seventy-five souls, since Moses mentions only seventy in Gen. 46, 27; secondly, when he asserts 7, 16. that Abraham bought a burial place from the sons of Emmor for money, because it was not Abraham, but his grand-son Jacob who bought this, according to Gen. 33, 19. We answer in reference to the first case that Stephen means one list and Moses another. For the latter does not embrace the wives of Jacob, as this is clearly stated in Gen. 46, 26. 27. Stephen however enumerates all who were called by Joseph into Egypt. Moses mentions the posterity of Jacob, Stephen the company. In reference to the second point, we observe that the ordinary Latin translates Stephen's Greek words incorrectly.

VII. Isaiah the prophet is commanded to write with "a man's pen," Is. 8, 1., i. e. according to popular and erroneous views, because many men judge only by external appearances. We answer, that Isaiah is to write with a man's pen not in order to accommodate himself to common methods of expression, especially not the erroneous, or to a difference from the divine sense, but through an accommodation for public benefit, and therefore he is commanded to write with a man's pen, i. e. as men are accustomed, on a piece of paper or open leaf, clearly, with distinct letters, so that all can read and understand.

VIII. If the apostles themselves can accommodate themselves to the opinions of the newly converted Jews, and concede to them the observance of circumcision, which, however, is abrogated by Christ in the New Testament (Acts 16, Gal. 5, 2. 3.) it follows that much more the Holy Spirit can accommodate Himself to the views of the masses in those matters when error is not connected with the danger of a loss of salvation, until this world, in which we know only in part, through a glass and a riddle, is buried. But the former is true. Therefore also the latter. We answer, that circumcision being abrogated and then permitted for the time being is but a poor comparison with erroneous speaking. And sec-

only to concede circumcision for a time means only that the act is permitted, but by the permission the act becomes neither good nor bad.

THE CONTROVERSY CONCERNING THE DOCTRINE OF PRE-DESTINATION IN THE NORWEGIAN SYNOD.

As most of our readers doubtless know, the situation in the Norwegian Synod with regard to the controversy on predestination has, in general, been this, that the congregations steadfastly cling to the doctrine of the Lutheran Church, as they and their fathers before them had learned it in their Catechism and in their books of devotion, and therefore almost unanimously rejected the new-fangled "reformatory" notions of the St. Louis men; whilst the majority of the ministers at first, from a habit and usage of long standing, were inclined to suppose that the venerated leader of the Missouri Synod would at last clearly prove to be right in this doctrine, as he had previously proven himself to be so in others, and then gradually, under the leadership of Revs. Koren, Ottesen and Preus, sen., and Prof. Larsen, went over to the Missourian camp. A good many congregations have had the doctrine in controversy treated and debated in their midst by the most able champions of both sides, and have then invariably taken sides with Dr. Schmidt and those that with him confess and defend the old Lutheran faith against semi-Calvinistic innovations. This is, e. g., the case with the congregation in Madison, Wis., where the theological Seminary of the Norwegian Synod is located, notwithstanding the fact that two professors of the three stationed there are decidedly adherents of Missouri; so it was in the "mother-congregation" of the Norwegian Synod at Koshkonong, Wis., served by one of the fathers of that Synod, Rev. J. A. Ottesen, for more than 20 years, and also in one of the congregations of Rev. Preus, sen., the President of the Joint Synod. This latter congregation even deposed their old and venerated pastor together with his son and assistant, when these would not be induced to subscribe to the confession which the congregation had accepted. Discussions among the ministers have also continually been going on, in pastoral conferences and in synodical meetings. The official organ of Synod, the "Kirketidende," has all along been in the hands of the Missourian party, its chief editor being Prof. L. Larsen, backed by Rev. V. Koren, the most able and energetic of the adherents of Missouri; and they have not been so very delicate and sparing in using its pages to further *their* ends. In sheer

self-defence Dr. Schmidt, if he wanted to get the ear of the people and show to the congregations the real state of affairs, was necessitated to publish another paper in the Norwegian language. This he has now been doing for almost three years. His "*Lutherske Vidnesbyrd, gamle og nye*" (Lutheran Witnesses, or Testimonies, old and new), published at first twice, now three times a month, have beyond all doubt been doing a very blessed work in enlightening the laity of the Norwegian Synod as to the real points at issue. Rev. Muus and Prof. Roalkvam have, especially of late, assisted Dr. Schmidt in cramming the pages of "*Vidnesbyrd*" with useful information, though Dr. Schmidt is the author of most of its articles as well as of those of "*Altes und Neues*," the German periodical still published and so ably conducted by him. The Missourian party, not daring, apparently, to monopolize the organ of Synod to a still greater extent, about two years ago began also to publish a new paper, entitled "*Noedtvungen Forsvar*" (Forced, or Extorted, Defence), that was intended exclusively to do battle with Dr. Schmidt's publications; but at an age of scarcely a year it died of weakness. Of late the Missourian party has again been using the "*Kirketidende*," as if it were their party organ. Some ministers have, in consequence of its partisan attitude, declined any more to act as its agents in their congregations or to recommend it to them for a renewal of subscription.

A remarkable feature of the controversy as it has been going on inside the Norwegian Synod is this, that the Missourian party never dared to make some of the most important and decisive utterances of the German Missourians their own. To be sure, they have, from the beginning till now, constantly been declaring that the German Missourians are all right, and that the doctrine of these is also theirs. But when, for example, the German Missourians had at last been forced publicly to admit that the doctrine of the Formula of Concord, *as they*, the Missourians, *understand*, or, rather pervert *it*, and the doctrine of our celebrated dogmaticians, the expositors and defenders of that confession over against Calvinistic misinterpretations and slanders, are not merely two innocent types of one and the same doctrine, but that the one excludes the other, the Norwegian Missourians still kept up, and are still keeping up, the pretence and sham that both can stand side by side. The German Missourians now distinctly and unmistakably say that e. g. Gerhard, the acknowledged prince of our Lutheran dogmaticians, is in conflict with the Scriptures and with our Confessions when he teaches that election, as he takes it, *viz.* in the strictest sense as denoting nothing else but the eternal decree that certain persons should *infallibly* get to heaven, has taken place *in view of faith* (*in intuitu fidei*). But the Norwegian Missourians

just as distinctly and unmistakably say, up to the present time, that Gerhard is *right* when he puts forth that doctrine, though they also say that he is at fault in at all taking election in so strict a sense. And why is this? Why do not the Norwegian Missourians, if they, as we doubt not, really are of one faith with their German friends, speak out as plainly as these, now at least, do, especially in this most important point of the present controversy, viz. *whether our Lutheran Church since the publication of the Book of Concord has been right in its understanding and explanation of the same, or not?* For, if the German Missourians are right, not a single prominent and recognized teacher of our Church can be pointed out who understood and interpreted the eleventh article of the Formula of Concord correctly. And who could have the correct understanding if not even the teachers of the Church had it? Why, then, we ask again, this singular conduct of the Missourian party in the Norwegian Synod? Of course, they are shrewd enough not to answer such a question publicly, nor do we claim to be a searcher of hearts; but still we think that all the circumstances, carefully considered, warrant us in saying that the cause is principally, if not solely, the fear of their congregations. For these have shown their attitude so clearly and emphatically as to leave no room whatever to doubt that they would *not* brook such a plain rejection of the doctrine of all the representative teachers of the Lutheran Church since the publication of the Book of Concord. And thus it is that the Norwegian Missourians when under the eyes of their congregations, in pastoral conferences and synodical meetings, and also in their Norwegian publications, have been careful to word their confessions and doctrinal statements so that they *could*, and, taken as they read, *must* be understood as containing in substance nothing else but the doctrine of Gerhard and the other dogmaticians of our Church. But whenever this had been pointed out to the Church, and the German Missourians had, at least in part, become suspicious of the sincerity of their Norwegian allies, Rev. Koren has been very anxious, immediately, to assure their German friends that in the words of Gerhard the notions of Dr. Walther, who in this very point rejects Gerhard as being in conflict with the Scriptures and our Confessions, are meant to be contained.

So it was last year when the pastors of the Joint Synod were assembled for two weeks, from April 25 to May 9, in Madison, Wis. Here the question was put: "Does at least an eternal predestination of individual sinners to the infallible attainment of the salvation to come belong as a constituent part to the 'election unto infallible attainment of salvation,'" (in other words: Does election in its strictest sense, in which our dogmaticians usually take it, form an in-

tegral part of election in its wider sense, in which the Formula of Concord takes it)? The answer was an unanimous *yes*. Another question: "Does this predestination *presuppose foreseen persevering faith*?" was answered in the affirmative by 80, whilst 1 voted in the negative and 21 did not vote at all. And the proposition of Rev. Koren: "This predestination *presupposes* in those men whom it concerns perseverance in faith" was accepted almost unanimously. And who that knows at all what the present controversy is about does not see at a single glance that in these sentences the Norwegian Missourians virtually conceded all that their opponents claimed? But when this fact had been announced to the Church, a "Norwegian brother in the faith," (no doubt Rev. Koren himself) made his appearance in the St. Louis "Lutheraner" and tried to show that notwithstanding these manifestly anti-Missourian utterances he and his friends were really good Missourians.

So again in the present year the pastoral conference assembled in Eau Claire, Wis., from April 19 to 27, almost unanimously accepted 17 theses concerning conversion and election that, as we showed in the *Lutheran Standard* and in the *Lutherische Kirchenzeitung* at that time, substantially contain the doctrine of our dogmaticians, of Dr. Schmidt, and of our own Synod over against the Missourians. This was so evident that even the paper of the small Missourian Synod in Germany pointed it out in the strongest terms, whilst the St. Louis papers did not dare at first to say anything concerning it. But when we had again announced this fact to the Church Rev. Koren had a lengthy article in "Lehre und Wehre," in which he again tried very hard to show that those manifestly anti-Missourian theses, prepared by a committee *whose majority consisted of "Missourians,"* were intended to convey the true Missourian sense.

And the same sad experience we will no doubt again have to make now, after the conference of the pastors of the Norwegian Synod in Decorah, Iowa. As we have shown in the last numbers of the *Lutheran Standard*, the separate "confession" of 64 theses, accepted and published by the Missourian party, is again couched in such words that an unsuspecting person who is not acquainted with the peculiar ways of this party in carrying on this controversy, could easily be deceived into thinking that they after all substantially agree with Gerhard and us. But if they should hold it necessary over against their German "brethren in the faith," they would beyond any doubt again contend that the words of Gerhard which they use are by them meant in a sense that neither Gerhard nor any one else besides a modern "reformed" Missourian would detect in them.

In contrast with this unfair, hypocritical mode of con-

troversy it is refreshing to find that *our* brethren in the faith in that synod, Dr. Schmidt and his friends, have always in the clearest way possible declared and confessed their faith and doctrine. No prevarication of any kind can be charged against them. This will also be seen from the "confession" which they at the conference in Decorah have accepted and now published. For want of space it cannot be given in this issue, but will appear in the next. It is signed by 68 ministers and professors, whilst the "Missourian" confession bears the signatures of 87 pastors and professors, the whole membership consisting of 198 ministers and professors. The congregations of the Norwegian Synod will now have to decide which of the two confessions they will adopt. We hope and pray that, in accordance with their position hitherto, they will not find much difficulty in choosing the right one.

St.

HOMILETICAL DEPARTMENT.

FIRST SUNDAY IN ADVENT. Rom. 13, 11-14.

A.

Int. Another church-year is past and gone. During another year we have been permitted to experience, with all Christian people on the earth, that the Lord our God "is merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth." Exod. 34, 6. Mindful of the manifold grace of God received in our hearts and homes, in the Church and in the State, we gratefully exclaim: "Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us, but unto Thy name give glory, for Thy mercy, and for Thy truth's sake." Ps. 115, 1.

But what of the year before us? Will the Lord be again with us in His goodness and mercy, so that we may want nothing needful and that we perish not by the way? When we bethink us of our own sinful, helpless and unworthy condition, and of the indifference, the neglect and willfulness with which we have requited past benefits, what shall we say? What can we expect? God forbids despair; rather would He have us to be confident and cheerful. "The mountains shall depart, and the hills be removed; but my kindness shall not depart from thee, neither shall the covenant of my peace be removed, saith the Lord that hath mercy on thee." Isa. 54, 10. And our Gospel lesson says: "Zion, thy king cometh unto thee!" And we are of Zion; and

Zion's king is Christ Jesus the Lord, the same yesterday, to-day, and forever.

From these and from many other assurances of God's Word we have every reason to believe that, as was the past, the coming year will likewise be a year of grace.

THE NEW CHURCH-YEAR A YEAR OF GRACE.

- I. *Of grace to gladden our hearts—supplying the wants of the year.* V. 11–12a.
- II. *Of grace to strengthen our hands—doing the work of the year.* V. 12b–14. C. H. L. S.

B.

Int. “My soul waiteth for the Lord, more than they that watch for the morning: I say, more than they that watch for the morning.” Ps. 130, 6. The advent season, a time for watching and waiting. The (Jewish) morning-watch began two hours after midnight and included the following four hours. In like manner, four Advent Sundays precede the break of day which ushers in our holy and happy Christmas time.

You are watching and waiting for the Lord; but how? In the sleep of security? Think you, the appointed watchman will cry out and waken you betimes? Then this day hear his first call of the hour. The watchman calls out aloud to you:

THE HOUR IS AT HAND.

- I. *To awake out of sleep,*
- II. *To put on the armour of light,*
- III. *To walk honestly, as in the day.*

FROM THE GERMAN OF THELEMANN.

C.

It is said in the Church, at one time, “It is day;” at another, “It is evening.” How is it? Question:

IS IT MORNING OR EVENING IN THE KINGDOM OF GOD?

- I. *Answer, for those in whose heart it is still night:*
It is day, therefore arise, be made children of light.
- II. *Answer, for those who are become the children of light, but think that it is night again:*

Our salvation is nearer than we have believed. But have you come nearer this salvation, have you grown spiritually, since you have received it? The evidences are near at hand.

FROM PALMER'S HOMILETIC, p. 223.

SECOND SUNDAY IN ADVENT. Rom. 15, 4-13.

A.

Int. Thoughts. 1) Not the New Testament only, also the Old speaks of Christ. In the latter we have the prophecy of Him; in the former the history of its fulfillment.—Though prophecy, yet we find it marvelously clear and explicit in many of its utterances. We are there told who our Savior is to be; where He is to be born and when; what He is to do and to suffer to save us; etc.

2) Looking forward, as we now do, to the anniversary of Christ's nativity, and preparing for a proper observance of the day, what can be more appropriate than a review of the Old Testament promises concerning the coming of Christ.—To do this, our lesson affords the opportunity.

THE PROMISES GIVEN TO THE FATHERS CONCERNING CHRIST.

- I. *How do they read?* V. 9-12. and Gen. 22, 18; 12, 3. Accordingly, the Savior shall come
1. Of the seed of Abraham;
 2. Bringing the blessing of salvation
 3. To all people.
- II. *Do you find them to be true?* 4-8 and 13.
1. God's Word declares these promises fulfilled. 4 and 8.
 2. The hearts of all Christian people experience their truth. 5-7.
 3. Do you know that Christ is born and, is He born in you? 13.

C. H. L. S.

B.

THE THREEFOLD ADVENT OF CHRIST.

- I. *Christ has come*—Therefore glorify God. V. 6. 8-12.
- II. *Christ comes continually*—Therefore prepare the way for Him. V. 4, 5, 7.
- III. *Christ will come again*—Therefore let joy and peace fill your hearts. V. 13.

FROM THE GERMAN OF FUCHS.

THIRD SUNDAY IN ADVENT. 1 Cor. 4, 1-5.

A.

Int. Thoughts. 1) The lessons of the day both treat of the Gospel ministry. In the one the Lord Jesus speaks in defense and praise of John the Baptist, sent of God to make room for Christ in the hearts of men. In the other, St. Paul the Apostle vindicates himself over against injudicious critics; he tells his people how to look at the office in which he serves them, and what they have a right to expect of him.

2) Now it is true that every church-member, even the humblest among them, has the right and duty of judging his pastor as to his person and work. (Matt. 7, 15. 1 John 4, 1.) But there is a right and a wrong way of judging. People, for example, who search the Scriptures to see whether what is preached be true or not, are commended in the Word of God. An officious and fault-finding spirit is not in accord with those holy graces which the Bible would inculcate.

That we may the better understand our relation to the office, what we may expect of those having charge of it, and sin neither against the one nor the other, but the rather profit by them, let us examine the subject more closely.

THE GOSPEL MINISTRY.

I. *How God would have us account of it:* V. 1.

1. As an office, a service, of Christ.
 - a) By Him instituted;
 - b) By Him intrusted to the individual;
 - c) By Him directed and secured.
2. As an office of the Christian Church.
 - a) *Through* the Christian congregation God calls to this office;
 - b) *In* the Christian congregation so calling is the incumbent's field of labor;
 - c) *To* that Christian congregation the incumbent's time and the use of his gifts belong.
3. As a stewardship of the mysteries of God.
 - a) The things in charge are not the servant's own, but his Master's.
 - b) They are not of this earth, but of God and divine.
 - c) They are the Word and the sacraments—nothing more and nothing less.

II. *What is required of its incumbent?* V. 2-4.

1. In general, that he be found faithful;
2. More particularly—
 - a) That he thoroughly acquaint himself with the mysteries intrusted to him and with the work of his stewardship. (Study—an educated ministry.)
 - b) That he do all he can to instruct and edify his people, and to add to them others.
 - c) That he have a good report among men—be mindful of his accountableness to God.

Concl. V. 5.

C. H. L. S.

B.

The Christian answer to the question

“WHO ART THOU?”

I. *A servant of Christ and steward of the mysteries of God;* and

- II. *Accountable to the Lord in all things; and*
 III. *One who is very much in need of His grace.* 6-7.

FROM THE GERMAN OF GENZKEN.

FOURTH SUNDAY IN ADVENT. PHILIP. 4, 4-9.

A.

Int. Thoughts. In grateful joy over the birth of her Savior, the Church has appointed the holy festival of Christmas in commemoration of it.

In the same spirit Christians should keep the day. The danger of turning this holy day into a holiday is becoming greater year by year. That should not be. To secure ourselves against the evil, it may serve us to observe what is doing and what is to be done as the day draws near.

HOLY CHRISTMAS PREPARATIONS.

- I. *Of God the Father in heaven.*
 1. His gift is the Christ-child,
 2. With the gift of His Son, all things.
 II. *Of God's children on earth.*
 1. Expectant, prayerful and joyous hearts (for their Father to fill).
 2. Good will and good cheer extended to all about them.
 C. H. L. S.

B.

THE BELIEVER'S HAPPINESS IN CHRIST.

- In Him he possesses
 I. *A joy that passes not away.*
 II. *A love to all men.*
 III. *A confidence to God which banishes all care.*
 IV. *A peace of heart which keeps him in the most blissful fellowship.*
 ADAPTED FROM THE GERMAN.

CHRISTMAS. TITUS 2, 11-14.

A.

Int. 1) "Fear not: for behold, I bring you good tidings of great joy, which shall be to all people. For unto you is born this day, in the city of David, a Savior, which is Christ the Lord!" In these words the angel of God, and of God's promises of grace, announced the birth of the long-expected Messiah. O day of days, when the Word which was with God, and that was God, was made flesh, to dwell among men, that they might behold His glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth! On that day

the light of the world came into the world; and on that day rose the Sun of Righteousness to shine upon men, that men might come into the light and warmth of it, to be made righteous before God and be quickened unto life with God. In the thought of such a day, and in the memory of such an event, the joy of which is so great and which shall be to all people, who can be sad of heart? Oh, it is a faithful saying, and a saying worthy of all acceptation, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners, to save you, and me, and all people!

2) And yet there are people who are not glad to-day, who rejoice not at the great Gospel of Jesus' birth. Some have not heard this Gospel—others understand it not—many do not believe it—some reject and despise it. "And without controversy, great is the mystery of godliness: God was manifest in the flesh." But thanks be to God, who has revealed this mystery to us, that He has taught our minds to know of it and led our hearts to believe in it. Away, therefore, with every feeling of sorrow: we know that unto us this day in days gone by was born a Savior, Christ the Lord, and of that we are glad—of that will we say and sing to-day. But in what words can we declare so great a work of God, and give utterance to so great a joy of heart?—'Tis given us:

THE GRACE OF GOD THAT BRINGETH SALVATION HATH
APPEARED TO ALL MEN!

- I. *The Import*, and
II. *The Purpose of these words.* C. H. L. S.

B.

LET US OBSERVE THE DAY!

- I. *The day that is past*—when Christ was born. V. 11.
II. *The day that is now*—Christ's birth and life in us. V. 12 and 14.
III. *The day that will be*—when Christ shall appear in glory. V. 13.

ADAPTED BY C. H. L. S.

SUNDAY AFTER CHRISTMAS. GAL. 4, 1-7.

A.

THE REDEMPTION THAT IS IN CHRIST JESUS.

A redemption

- I. *From the bondage of sin*; v. 1-3.
II. *Unto the adoption of sons.* V. 4-7. C. H. L. S.

B.

THE CHILDREN OF GOD.

We will speak

- I. *Of their privilege;*
- II. *Of their disposition;*
- III. *Of their inheritance;*

FROM THE GERMAN OF MAU.

NEW YEAR'S DAY. GAL. 3, 23-29.

A.

Int. Thoughts. 1) On this morning of a new-born day and of a new-born year, what are your recollections of the past? what your expectations respecting the future?

2) As to the believer, all is well, and he has peace; for the sins of the past are forgiven him, and he has the sure promise of future grace. The child of God hath no care; God his Father careth for him. Christ is his, and he is Christ's; with Christ he has all things. Happy they, who with this confidence enter the New Year, and in the strength of it live out its day.

IF YE BE CHRIST'S, THEN ALL IS WELL.

- I. *Let us ascertain whether we are truly Christ's people.* 23-27.
- II. *Let us inquire into the certain happiness of Christ's people.* 28-29.

C. H. L. S.

B.

AND NOW FAITH HATH COME!

- I. *The divine discipline which leads to faith.* V. 23-24.
- II. *The divine blessings which accompany faith.* V. 25-29.
 1. Faith itself. Faith is salvation.
 2. Liberty. V. 25.
 3. Sonship. V. 26-27.
 4. Unity in the spirit. V. 28.
 5. Hope. V. 29.

FROM THE GERMAN OF BRUECKNER.

FIRST SUNDAY AFTER NEW YEAR. TITUS 3, 4-7.

A.

Int. Thoughts. 1) Uppermost in the minds and hearts of Christian people, at this time of the church-year, is the his-

tory of Jesus' birth; the great event, that the Son of God is become the Son of man.

2) Why this great work of God should so much engage our thoughts and move our hearts, is evident. The Son of God is become the Son of man, that in Him the sons of men might be made the sons of God.

3. To this, the object and aim of Jesus' incarnation, the words of our text would invite attention. It tells us of

THE BIRTH OF GOD'S CHILDREN

- I. *According to His mercy*—'Tis by grace alone,
- II. *Through Jesus Christ our Savior*—for Jesus' sake,
- III. *By the washing of regeneration*—by means of baptism and the Word,
- IV. *We are made children and heirs*—that we are begotten unto God—grow up unto Him and inherit eternal life.

C. H. L. S.

B.

WHAT HAVE WE IN OUR BAPTISM?

- I. *An evidence of God's saving grace which depends not on our works.*
- II. *A bestowal of all those treasures of salvation which Christ has acquired for us.*
- III. *An earnest for it, that, what as yet we are not, we shall be in God's own good time.*

FROM PALMER'S HOMILETIK p. 256.

EPIPHANY. Isa. 60, 1-6.

THE CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE MIDST OF A HEATHENISH WORLD.

- I. *Her preferment*—darkness covers the earth, gross darkness the people; but upon her the glory of the Lord is risen.
- II. *Her prospects*—that the Gentiles shall come to her light, and kings to the brightness of her rising.
- III. *Her mission*—arise, shine—be a light to all about her.

FROM THE SAME, p. 232.

THE COLUMBUS THEOLOGICAL MAGAZINE.

This Magazine is designed to supply the want, long since felt, of a Lutheran periodical devoted to theological discussion. Its aim will be the exposition and defence of the doctrines of the Church as confessed in the Book of Concord. Theology in all its departments is embraced within its scope, though for the present special attention will be given to the controverted subject of predestination.

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